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MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE
A Comparative Study of Political Change at the Communal,
Regional and Global Levels

BY

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ABSTRACT

Those who study world politics are divided between the traditional Realist paradigm, which depicts an international political system dominated by states involved in a 'power struggle' in pursuit of their 'national interest', and an emergent approach that includes in the analysis a wider range of political actors and defines the nature of politics very differently. The latter approach sees the central process of world politics as being the mobilisation of support in respect to the composition of the global political agenda and contest over the various issue positions. This thesis examines the Palestinian Question as a case study of a mobilisation process, that involved a non-state actor playing a crucial role in introducing to the global agenda an issue previously of low salience to other actors.

The Palestinian Question throughout the 1950s and 1960s was treated on the global political agenda as a by-product of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was perceived as a 'refugee problem', the solution of which was envisaged within an overall settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet, within less than a decade of the re-appearance of an indigenous Palestinian national movement a significant section of the international political system changed its attitude towards the Palestinian problem. It was not any more perceived simply as a 'refugee problem' but one of 'self-determination'.

In this thesis the analysis of the mobilisation process that brought the Palestinian issue to the forefront of the world political agenda is guided by a dynamic model applied to four different levels of analysis. The first level is constituted by the Palestinian community. Then there is the Arab governmental level. The third level is made up of various regional groupings, such as the Non-Aligned, the Latin Americans, the European Community and the East Europeans. The final level is the global one, represented by the United Nations political system. The analysis reveals the dynamic and interactive nature of the mobilisation process across different levels of analysis and the way in which the different positions held on the Palestinian issue have converged towards a relatively common stand.

CHAPTER 1

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE RESEARCH PROBLEM

1.1 The history of the origins of the Palestinian Question.

A lot has been written and said about the origins and the history of the Palestinian question. Kayyali **Palestine A Modern History**¹ and Sykes **Cross Roads to Israel**² are excellent books that give an account of historical developments from Arab and Jewish point of views, respectively. Ovendale **The Origins of the Arab Israeli Wars**³, on the other hand is a more balanced historical study of the emergence of the Palestinian Question. It is difficult to exhaust the literature on this topic but some other prominent works investigating the history as well as various narrower aspects of the problem are; Khalidi, **From Heaven to Conquest**⁴, Hurewitz, **The Struggle for Palestine**⁵, Davis, **The Evasive Peace**⁶ and Bethell, **The Palestinian Triangle**.⁷

In this chapter our purpose is twofold. Firstly, we shall give a brief account of some of the major historical developments that appear to constitute the origins and background of the Palestinian Question. Secondly, from this summary analysis we shall derive and introduce the research problem that this thesis intends to study.

The historical background of the Palestinian Question will be studied with particular attention to politics at the international level. The turn of this century seems to form a natural starting point. It was then that the world saw the birth of Zionism and Zionist efforts to rally world support for a 'Jewish homeland'. The chapter will stress particularly these energetic efforts to mobilise international support towards the establishment of a 'Jewish homeland' and contrast it with the unsuccessful Arab counter efforts. The chapter will also note how

Zionist goals were achieved within half a century while the Arabs and Palestinians found themselves in total disarray at the end of this period. It is in reference to this historical background that the gradual re-emergence of the Palestinian Question in late 1960s from relative obscurity to the forefront of world politics becomes puzzling. It is this puzzlement that will constitute the basis of our research problem and our efforts to explain it.⁸

1.1.1 The Origins of the Palestinian Question

The origins of the Palestinian problem lie in the persecution of Jewish populations in modern times and a growing realisation on the part of Jewish intellectuals, particularly from Eastern Europe, of the need to respond to this challenge. In the late 1880s, this response to what was referred to as the 'Jewish problem' started to transform itself into Jewish nationalism. Jewish nationalism, often referred to as Zionism, saw the solution of the 'Jewish problem' in settling the Jewish people on a piece of land to be governed by Jewish people. This idea appears first to have been articulated in a concrete manner by T. Herzl in 1896. In his famous pamphlet *Der Judenstaat*, Herzl saw the solution of the Jewish problem in the colonisation of a territory, that with the support of a European power would be converted into a Jewish state.⁹

Herzl's idea of a Jewish state together with the need to secure international support was taken up and endorsed by the First Zionist Congress in August 1897.¹⁰ Herzl, in an effort to bring about the creation of a Jewish state, set out to gain the support of leaders as diverse as Abdul Hamid, the then Ottoman Sultan, Kaiser Wilhelm and Czar Nicholas.¹¹ The reluctance of these leaders to lend their support in any concrete manner turned Herzl towards British help. However, to his dismay early British offers of territory in East Africa was not well received by

Zionist circles.¹² This opposition was reflected in a July 1905 decision of the Zionist movement to refuse offers outside Palestine.¹³ The need to accomodate to divisions¹⁴ within the various politically active Jewish communities, as well as to fears expressed about Arab rights in Palestine, led the Zionist Congress in 1911 to replace their earlier goal of a state by "a publicly recognised legally secured home in Palestine".¹⁵

This reconsidered Zionist position was taken up by Weizmann with the British. The British government's attitude, as a result of both external and internal considerations, became favourable to the idea of a Jewish homeland and culminated in the adoption of the Balfour Declaration.¹⁶ It was this Declaration issued on November 2, 1917 that became the first British public recognition and support for the Jewish claim for a homeland in Palestine. When the British took over responsibility for Palestine under a League of Nations Mandate, this recognition became an international commitment. The revised British draft Mandate approved by the Council of the League of Nations in July 1922 stated that "The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home..."¹⁷

The Zionists did not limit their efforts simply to receiving British support and ensuring the inclusion of the provisions for a 'Jewish homeland' in the draft Mandate. An international campaign directed towards the League of Nations was initiated during the period preceding the League Council's decision on the terms of the Mandate. The intensity of this campaign is evidenced in the roughly 350 telegrams sent by Jewish organisations from all around the world calling for the ratification of the Mandate with the Balfour Declaration.¹⁸ These efforts far outweighed the modest Arab and Palestinian efforts against the Mandate¹⁹ as well as the Vatican's objections to "the privileged and

preponderating position" given to the Jewish people in the Mandate.²⁰

In accordance with the term of the Mandate Britain facilitated Jewish immigration into Palestine and the development of a Jewish community. However, as a result of mounting discontent amongst the Palestinian Arabs and the changing international climate, Britain began to revise her position. This revision in policy became particularly evident between 1936 and 1939.²¹ The Royal Commission, which was set up in response to Palestinian Arab disturbances directed against British rule during the summer of 1936, recommended the abandonment of the Mandate and the division of Palestine into three parts, a Jewish state, an Arab state and a British mandatory zone including Jerusalem.²² The negative Palestinian Arab reaction led to increased violence in Palestine. Britain after having suppressed this violence was forced to abandon the Peel partition scheme and instead tried to reconcile all parties involved through two conferences in London.²³ The failure of these efforts coupled by the changing strategic-military and political considerations brought about by the approaching war²⁴ led the British government to declare that it had no intentions of making Palestine a Jewish state.²⁵

Britain's policy towards the Jewish homeland had never been one of great stability and continuity and did not always represent a unified stance. British commitments to Arab nationalism together with the continuous tension between the British executive in Palestine and the Foreign Office in London complicated this policy and at times made it incoherent, culminating in various conflicting declarations. Although Churchill's speech in June 1922 reiterated the government's commitment to the Mandate provisions and the 'Jewish homeland', by the late 1920s the Passfield White Paper, issued as a result of Arab disturbances urged restrictions on Jewish immigration and

land sales to Jews.²⁶ This new statement was bitterly denounced by the Zionists as a violation of the Mandate and in 1931 the government had to respond to these pressures in the form of the Macdonald letter assuring Britain's commitment to the terms of the Mandate.²⁷

However, the marked departure as stated in the 1939 White Paper from Britain's earlier commitments to a 'Jewish homeland' precipitated two major changes in Zionist politics. The first change came about in respect to politics within Palestine. The use of violence to achieve a Jewish state became increasingly central to the Zionist movement. Apart from a lull, brought about as a result of an Axis military threat to the Middle East, during the major part of the Second World War, this violence continued unabated until 1948. The second change was at the international level. The Zionists took this change in Britain's policy towards Palestine to the Permanent Mandate Commission and succeeded in getting a decision critical of the British government.²⁸ Equipped with the support of the Permanent Mandate Commission they sought to get the British government to reconsider the White Paper. Although Churchill sympathised with the Zionist demand²⁹ the government did not change its position and instead in 1940 announced that they remained committed to their policy laid down in May 1939.³⁰ These developments led the Zionist groups to conclude that they could no more depend on the British Government as a protector and sponsor. Hence, a second important period of mobilisation of support at the international level was initiated. These efforts were directed primarily towards the US government and the American Jewry.³¹

The US government had endorsed the British mandate in 1922 on the condition that Britain did nothing prejudicing the rights of non-Jewish communities in Palestine. As late as May 1943 President Roosevelt had assured Ibn-Saud that "no decisions altering the basic situation of Palestine should

be reached without full consultation with both Arabs and Jews".³² However, this situation changed very drastically during the period preceding the establishment of Israel. The World Zionist Organisation having succeeded in gaining the support of the American Jewry in May 1942, in the form of the Biltmore programme, embarked on an intense period of lobbying in the US domestic political scene.³³

These efforts in 1944 culminated in the tabling of draft resolutions in the Congress calling for unrestricted Jewish immigration and the establishment of a Jewish commonwealth.³⁴ Although these resolutions were never adopted because of intense War Department objections that such resolutions would incite violence in Palestine and undermine US war efforts, it did not prevent the question of a Jewish Palestine from becoming an important item on the agendas of the Presidential election campaigns of both Democrats and Republicans.³⁵ The election campaigns and the growing public awareness about the Holocaust was successfully used by the Jewish politicians to strengthen the linkage between the solution of the 'Jewish refugee problem' and the establishment of a Jewish Commonwealth in Palestine.³⁶ One concrete example of Zionist efforts to mobilise American support for their cause was reflected in a July 1945 petition widely supported by the Governors of the states and many members of the Congress calling on President Truman to lend formal governmental support for a Jewish Palestine.³⁷ However, President Truman in the face of strong State Department and British opposition reluctantly resisted ~~to acquiesce~~ ^{acquiescing} to domestic pressure until just prior to the UN vote on the Partition Plan "when he yielded to Jewish pressure and instructed the US delegation to assure the attainment of the two-thirds majority".³⁸

In contrast to Zionist political successes, particularly at the international level, the Palestinian Arabs were in disarray. Although, the Arab uprising in Palestine between 1936 and 1939 played an important role in getting the

British government to change its policy towards Palestine, it also precipitated such a fierce reaction that the backbone of the Palestinian Arab political structure was broken.³⁹ This situation left the Palestinian Arab community at a disadvantage at two levels. At the local level as a result of the suppression they experienced, they lacked the political and administrative institutions that the Jewish community possessed.⁴⁰ Similarly, at the international level they lacked a well organised movement with access to major governments. Hence they were unable to match the Zionist success in gaining the support of the US government.⁴¹ To make matters worse, while the Zionist managed to mobilise a government which was to play a very central and important role in the drawing up of the post-war order, some prominent local Arab political leaders associated themselves with the Nazis in Germany in the hope of receiving Axis support to achieve independence.⁴²

The only politically favourable development for the Palestinian Arabs came at the regional level. The Arab states with the support of the British government met in Alexandria in September 1944 and, amongst others, adopted a resolution in support of the independence of Palestinian Arabs. In March 1945 this was followed by the inclusion of a Palestinian annex to the Covenant of the newly founded Arab League. This provided for the possibility of seating a Palestinian representative at the Arab League Council meetings.⁴³ It is possible that it was as a result of Arab League lobbying that Zionist efforts to achieve representation at the San Fransisco conference were thwarted.⁴⁴ However, this almost simple procedural success achieved by the Palestinian Arabs did not change the course of events in the coming years in any significant way.

1.1.2. The problem reaches United Nations

In the aftermath of the Second World War the Zionists were in complete conflict with the British authorities in

Palestine. The Jewish population had increased from 83,790 in 1922 to 554,329 in 1945⁴⁵ to constitute an adequate demographic change in Palestine for the Zionists to make a formal bid for a Jewish state. In August 1946 in Paris the Jewish Agency proposed a plan demanding a Jewish state in an available area of Palestine.⁴⁶ These developments, together with domestic pressures and military exhaustion caused by the Second World War, led the British government in February 1947 to decide to place the Palestinian problem before the United Nations General Assembly.

Britain's decision to refer the Palestinian Question to the United Nations precipitated intense political activity in both the Arab and Zionist camps. The Arab League at the start of the Special Session of the General Assembly on Palestine, in April 1947, tried to place "The termination of the mandate over Palestine and the declaration of its independence" as an additional agenda item.⁴⁷ The Zionists, on their part requested the right to be heard by the Assembly and lobbied extensively in an attempt to link the problem of Jewish refugees in Europe to the Palestinian problem.⁴⁸

Despite forceful Arab arguments, the General Committee of the Assembly rejected the Arab proposal for the inclusion of an additional item on the agenda of the Special Session.⁴⁹ Symbolically, the Zionists request fared much better. The Jewish Agency was granted the right to address the Assembly, setting a precedent for non-governmental organisations to participate in the work of the Assembly.⁵⁰ Although this decision opened the possibility for the Palestinian Arabs to put their case to the Assembly too, this was achieved only after a dispute arising from an Arab procedural protest over the unequal treatment of the cases for representation was settled.⁵¹ Probably the greatest achievement for the Zionists was the adoption of an amended US draft resolution authorising the United Nations Special Commission on Palestine to conduct investigations anywhere

it considered necessary.⁵² The Special Session Resolution 106 (S-1), 15 May 1947 opened the possibility for United Nations Special Committee on Palestine visits to refugee camps in Europe and hence the potential of linking the Jewish refugee problem to the future of Palestine.

1.1.2.1. The Partition Plan

The UNSCOP, as a result of its investigations presented its report to the General Assembly at the end of August. Accordingly, the report declared the mandate unworkable and presented two competing plans for Palestine's independence.⁵³ These two plans precipitated intense Arab and Zionist efforts to gain support for their respective positions before the final Assembly decision. However, the General Assembly, as a result of effective Zionist lobbying,⁵⁴ mostly relying on an exploitation of the Holocaust and the Jewish refugee problem in Europe,⁵⁵ coupled with US pressure⁵⁶ on particularly small states and the Soviet decision to support the partition plan,⁵⁷ adopted Resolution 181 (II), on 29 November 1947, which recommended the establishment of a Jewish state and an Arab state with an economic union between them.

	YES	ABSTAIN	NO
W.European	12	1	2
E.European	5	1	-
L.American	14	6	1
Africa	1	1	-
Asia	1	1	4
Arabs	-	-	6
TOTAL	33	10	13 (10 Islamic)

TABLE 1.1: Distribution of votes on the Partition Plan by regional groupings

As Table 1.1 suggests the Partition Plan, favoured by the Zionists, received practically the full support of all delegations belonging to the Western Europe, Eastern

Europe and Latin American groups. One could argue that the 10 delegations that abstained lent implicit support to the resolution by allowing a bare two-thirds majority to hold. The Arabs, on the other hand, were joined by only six other countries four of them with significant Muslim populations.

1.1.2.2. The establishment of Israel

The UN decision to endorse the establishment of a Jewish state brought the Zionists one important step closer to the realisation of a half-century goal. However, for the Zionists there still remained two major obstacles - the withdrawal of Britain from Palestine and the opposition of the Arabs to the Partition Plan. The first obstacle after all did not constitute a serious problem. The British government had not given its full support for the Partition Plan. Yet, this did not prevent the government from announcing that it would terminate its responsibilities in Palestine on 14 May 1948. The second problem, on the other hand, proved to be more challenging. After decades of efforts to mobilise political support at the international level the Zionists this time responded to the challenge by channeling their military capabilities against the Arabs.

The Arabs throughout their efforts to prevent the adoption of the Partition Resolution had made it clear that they would regard such a decision as illegal and would resist it by all means.⁵⁸ Having lost the political battle at the international level the Arabs took the struggle to the military plain. First Arab irregulars came to the support of the Palestinian Arabs during late 1947, followed by the regular Arab armies after the departure of Britain from Palestine. However, this military struggle⁵⁹ by the Arabs did not prevent the proclamation and the early consolidation of Israel. When in early 1949 armistices between the belligerents were finally signed⁶⁰ the Arabs had not only failed to stop the partition of Palestine but

were now facing a Jewish state that was 21% larger than the UN Partition Plan had envisaged and more than half a million Palestinian Arabs had been displaced.⁶¹

1.2. The Research Problem

In just about 50 years the Zionist movement had succeeded to resolve Herzl's 'Jewish Question' by establishing Israel. The ability of the Zionist movement to mobilise not only the Jewish people but a variety of actors in the international political system played a central role in the establishment of Israel. This is well demonstrated in the various Zionist groups skill in lobbying and pressure-group politics transcending state boundaries. They worked closely with the British government and mobilised various groups to their cause during the 1920s and most of the 1930s. They continued their alliance with Britain as long as it served their interests. Once the protection and assistance of Britain for Jewish immigration and the Jewish community in Palestine started to diminish they replaced Britain with the US. To this skill one should add the accessibility by Zionist circles to the decision making processes of the politically important actors such as Britain and the USA. This naturally facilitated the task of Zionists in bringing the issue of a Jewish state to the attention of the governments of these countries. Furthermore, the successful linking of the solution of the 'Jewish refugee problem' in Europe to the future of Palestine appears to have favourably influenced the attitudes of various actors towards a Jewish state. Finally, to these factors one also needs to add the predisposition of the strategic interests of the two emerging 'superpowers'.

On the Palestinian Arab side the picture was very different. During the Mandate the Palestinian Arab community never had a political-administrative infrastructure as complex and elaborate as that of the

Jewish community. British attempts to establish an Arab Agency similar to the Jewish Agency had not been well received.⁶² This particular lack of an internal organisational structure may well have played an important role in the breakdown of the Palestinian Arab society in the aftermath of the 1948 war. Even though the Partition Plan had recognised the political rights of the Palestinians with provisions for an Arab state, with more than half of its population displaced the Palestinian Arabs were far from establishing a state. A tentative attempt to set up an "All Palestine Government" in September 1948 received recognition from Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon but never achieved the status of a politically independent unit.⁶³ Of the areas remaining outside Israel, the Gaza strip remained under Egyptian military rule while the West Bank was annexed by Jordan despite great Arab League opposition.

The situation for the Palestinian Arabs at the international level was not any better. The Palestinian Arabs as well as members of the Arab League lacked the degree of accessibility to the governments and domestic politics of important countries that the Zionist enjoyed. This lack of influence was particularly evident during the debates and decisions over Palestine. Most of the few countries that did support the Arab position had done so as a result of Islamic solidarity.

As Israel gained admission to the UN⁶⁴ in May 1949 the Palestinian Problem became set to be relegated to the status of a 'refugee problem'. Although the 'right of refugees to return to their homes' was supported by a series of resolutions including the resolution admitting Israel to the UN the issue began to lose its political nature. This was particularly evident in the growing number of resolutions of a 'technical and humanitarian' nature pointing to the plight of refugees and noting the need to offer them technical and financial assistance.⁶⁵

In this context, two developments at the UN appear to have played a central role in bringing about an eventual change in attitudes that redefined the nature of the Palestinian Question away from a problem of 'self-determination'. The first change came in the content of resolutions referring to the refugee problem. Until the fifth session of the Assembly resolutions concerning the refugees had stressed speedy 'repatriation'. However, starting with Resolution 394 (V) on 14 December 1950, Assembly resolutions began to add to their recommendations 'resettlement' and 'rehabilitation'. These recommendations were supported by Israel and certain Western governments. They maintained that the solution of the refugee problem would not be achieved by repatriation but instead through their resettlement in neighbouring Arab states. The Arab governments saw these developments as an attempt to erase the problem of Palestine by removing the refugees from the area. At the UN these developments had their impact by further pushing the political rights of the Palestinian Arabs into obscurity and in some ways prepared the groundwork for the second change.

The second change came in the form of the exclusion of the agenda item entitled 'Question of Palestine' from the Assembly's agenda. When the Secretary-General⁶⁶ chose in 1952 not to include the 'Question of Palestine' in the provisional agenda of the Assembly, the Arab delegations attempted to get the Assembly to discuss the political aspects of the Palestinian problem. However, in the ensuing procedural politics surrounding the additional Arab item⁶⁷ and the counter-item suggested by Israel⁶⁸ the changing attitude of the Assembly became even more conspicuous. A draft resolution by Western and Latin American countries argued that previous UN resolutions on Palestine constituted an obstacle to direct negotiations for achieving direct peace.⁶⁹ Although this resolution as recommended by the Ad Hoc Political Committee did not meet the Assembly President's two-third majority request for

the plenary the damaged was done, at least from the Arab delegations point of view.⁷⁰ The Palestinian problem lost its independent existence as an item on the agenda and instead it became an issue pushed into obscurity behind items concerning the refugees of the Near East.

In the mean time Israel appeared to be dominating the international scene outside the UN too. As Table 2 shows Israel, during the 1950s and 1960s substantially expanded her diplomatic relations with the outside world. Particularly significant were Israel's growing diplomatic and economic ties with the newly emerging Third World.⁷² Israel's preparedness to share her developmental and technical experience with the Third World made her particularly sought after. These bilateral relations were supplemented by a sympathetic attitude towards problems of great concern to the Third World such as decolonisation and apartheid. Israeli success in maintaining such a high status did play its role in perpetuating the status quo during the 1950s and early 1960s.

	1951		1967	
	Embassy	Diplomatic * Representation	Embassy	Diplomatic * Representation
W.European	1	16	15	7
E.European	1	4	2	5
L.American	-	6	16	5
Africa	-	-	25	4
Asia	-	1	6	4
TOTAL	2	27 (29)	64	15 (79)

TABLE 2.1: Expansion of Israeli Diplomatic Representation Abroad Between 1951-1966⁷¹

However, already from the early 1960s the beginnings of a change, particularly at the local level became evident. In the early 1960s there were the first signs of an awakening Palestinian national movement. Until then the Palestinian national movement, mostly as a result of the traumatic experience of the 1940s had remained disunited. Both Al-

* Covers other forms of diplomatic relations, such as Legations, Consulates and Non-Resident Ambassadors.

Fatah and the early PLO sponsored by the Arab League played an important role in providing the Palestinian national movement with an institutional-organisational background. During the late 1960s and 1970s the movement centred around the PLO gained increasing support and legitimacy amongst both the Palestinians and the Arabs.

This process of mobilisation of support for the PLO and the Palestinian cause did not remain limited to the local and regional levels. A similar process at the international level became also evident. The 'Palestine Question' that had for so long been treated as a 'refugee problem' started to change its content. At the United Nations General Assembly increasing number of delegations drew attention to the political nature of the Palestinian Question. As early as 1969 resolutions referring in one form or the other to the political rights of the Palestinians began to receive majorities. Third World governmental forums such as the Islamic Conference Organisation, the Non-Aligned Movement and the OAU began to recognise and lend their support for the Palestinian cause. This was followed by a recognition of the PLO's authority and legitimacy to represent the Palestinian cause. This growing base of support took a concrete form at the 29th General Assembly session which in 1974 re-introduced the 'Palestine Question' as a separate item on its agenda, adopted resolutions in support of the Palestinians' right to self determination and granted the PLO observer status.

Within less than a decade of the re-appearance of indigenous Palestinian national movement a significant section of the international political system had changed its attitude towards the Palestinian problem. This problem was not any more perceived simply as a 'refuge problem' but one of 'self-determination'. The Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict that had been ignored previously became restored.

The globalisation of the basis of support and recognition of the Palestinian cause enabled the possibility for the PLO to consolidate its role as the representative of the Palestinian people both locally and internationally. Hence, the image of the PLO held by a great majority of the governments and other actors as 'terrorists' changed. Furthermore, many governments did not simply recognise the PLO as the representative of the Palestinians but also granted this organisation varying degrees of diplomatic status. This newly acquired legitimacy and status as an actor in world politics gave the PLO the possibility to work directly with a large number of governments and international organisations, hence enabling the PLO to increase the salience of the Palestinian issue to a great variety of actors.

It is the desire to discover the probable causes behind this process of change and mobilisation of support, which brought an item of relative obscurity to the forefront of the world political agenda, that constitutes the research problem of this thesis. Given that the issue concerning the Palestinian problem remained outside the immediate concern of the global political agenda how can we explain the gradual recognition of the Palestinian problem as a political, rather than a 'refugee problem'. In other words, what kinds of factors and processes have led various actors in the international political system to change their perception of the nature and salience of the Palestinian problem?

1.3. Organisation of the thesis

1.3.1 Introduction

Throughout this introductory chapter the importance of the mobilisation of political support was noted. Both the Arabs and the Zionists right from the very early stages of the Palestinian problem were aware of the role of

aggregating support, both locally and internationally, in influencing the attitudes and policy formation processes of various actors. However, it was only the Zionists who successfully exploited the mobilisation of support during the mandate period and the 1950s.

In this respect The Arabs and more particularly the Palestinian Arabs remained unsuccessful until the early 1960s. It was with the gradual re-emergence of the Palestinian national movement in the 1960s that the attitudes of various international actors towards the Palestinian question began to change. The Palestinian question that had been perceived as a 'refugee problem' during the 1950s and 1960s was increasingly treated as a political question arising from the denial of the right of self-determination to the Palestinian Arabs. It is the purpose of the following two chapters to introduce an analytical framework, stressing the mobilisation of support to study how the Palestinian problem became an important item on the world political agenda after an absence of two decades.

The thesis is presented in two parts. The first part reviews the state of theory in international relations and constructs a model to study the research problem. The second part presents the results obtained from the application of the model offered in the first part to the regional and global levels of analysis.

1.3.2 PART I

1.3.2.1 Chapter 2; A review of theory in International Relations

The Kuhnian approach⁷³ to the accumulation of knowledge in science notes the role that paradigms play in selecting and researching a problem. The debate about the validity of this approach and its applicability to social sciences is

far from resolved. However, this approach to a certain degree has gained some acceptability in the study of international relations. The influence of this approach on the works of scholars such as Waltz,⁷⁴ Vasquez,⁷⁵ Mansbach and Vasquez⁷⁶ is quite evident. The purpose of this chapter is to identify a paradigm in the study of international relations that best accomodates our research problem.

The Realist paradigm appears to dominate international relations together with a number of contenders. Amongst these contenders the Global Politics Approach seems to offer the most serious and systematic challenge to the dominant paradigm.⁷⁷ It is these two paradigms that are closely examined and compared in respect to our research problem. The Global Politics Approach that appears to accomodate our research problem better than the Realist paradigm is selected. This selection is done in the belief that the accumulated theoretical and methodological knowledge in a paradigm provides the basis from which one can construct an analytical framework.

1.3.2.2. Chapter 3; The Analytical Framework

The concepts central to the analytical framework is derived mostly from the contributions of Mansbach and Vasquez⁷⁸ to the Global Politics paradigm. These concepts are supplemented by ones from the literature on mobilisation theory. On the other hand, the dynamic nature of the model capturing the mobilisation process relies on the concept of feedback and holism from systems thinking.

The change in governmental attitudes towards the Palestinian question is assumed to have occured as a result of the mobilisation of support. Therefore mobilisation of support is treated as the dependent variable. Three explanatory variables are suggested; accessibility to the decision making process of political actors, conduciveness

of the environment and cognitive linkage. The cumulative and interactive nature of the mobilisation process across levels of analysis and time is captured by allowing for a feedback mechanism. Methodological matters and problems associated with operationalisation and measurement of some concepts and the quantitative analysis employed in the research are discussed in appendix I and II.

1.3.3 PART II

1.3.3.1 Chapter 4; The local Palestinian level

This chapter applies the mobilisation process model to the Palestinian level and examines how the mobilisation process began and how it expanded to cover and gain the support of all sections of the Palestinian community. The role of the guerrilla groups and the PLO as the initiators and sustainers of the mobilisation process is particularly stressed.

1.3.3.2 Chapters 5,6 and 7; The Regional Levels

The results obtained from the analysis guided by our model are presented on a regional level basis. Chapter 5 will look at the changing Arab environment which encouraged the emergence of the contemporary Palestinian national movement. The access routes exploited by the Palestinians in bringing the Palestinian issue on the Arab governmental agenda will be stressed. Similarly, the various linkage processes associated with actors and issues in the area are presented. Chapters 6 and 7 follow the same structure as the previous one but instead of the Arab level they concentrate on two other broader regional levels. The first regional level is the Third World, while the second one is constituted of member countries of the Western and Eastern European Groups. The basis and composition of various sub-regional groupings are given in appendix III.

1.3.3.3 Chapter 8; The Palestinian Issue at the Global Level

This chapter looks at the Palestinian issue in respect to the United Nations agenda. The chapter assumes that the UN agenda can be treated as an indicator of world concern and opinion. The impact of the changing structure and composition of the UN on the Palestinian Question is examined in respect to the concept of a conducive environment. The role of accessibility by various political actors, including the PLO, to the decision making bodies of the UN to promote the Palestinian cause is examined. Furthermore, the major sources of cognitive linkages, such as anti-colonialism, that appear to have influenced the delegates' attitudes towards the Palestinian question are also analysed.

1.3.3.4 Chapter 9; Conclusion: The Model Revisited

This chapter re-examines the model in the light of empirical observations. The dynamic nature of the mobilisation process as well as the non-hierarchical nature of the growth of support for the Palestinian issue are noted. The way in which the Palestinian issue became redefined both in respect to the initiators as well as the supporters coupled with changes in the behaviour of the PLO are stressed.

1.3.4 Appendices

This section basically deals with the more technical aspects of the thesis. The construction of indices of support, identification of political groupings, description of data sets and computer packages employed in the quantitative parts of the thesis are presented.

ENDNOTES

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- 11 Vital, D. **Zionism, The Formative Years** (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1982).
- 12 For Herzl's acceptance of the first British offer see Vital, (1982: 129-162).
- 13 Ovendale, (1984: 7).
- 14 For divisions within the Zionist movement over the offer see Vital, (1982: 267-341).
- 15 For the debate whether to use the label 'state' or 'home' see Vital, (1975: 366-368).
- 16 For a treatment of British strategic considerations in the adoption of the Balfour Declaration see Ovendale, 1984: 29; Fraser, T.G. **The Middle East, 1914-1979** (Edward Arnold, London, 1980) pp. 14-18; Rowley, G. **Israel into Palestine** (Mansell, London, 1984) pp. 15-

16. For earlier British strategic interest in the area see Hardie, F. and Hermann, I., **Britain and Zion: The fateful entanglement** (Blackstaff, Belfast, 1980). For domestic reasons see Rowley, (1984: 18; Ovendale, 1984: 31); **Political and Strategic Interests of the United Kingdom: An Outline** (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1940). Both authors stress the British need to gain American support for the war together with a need to neutralise the perceived competition from Germany and France as prospective Zionist supporters. See Kayyali, W. (ed.) **Zionism, Imperialism and Racism** (Croom Helm, London, 1979) pp. 12-15, for the argument that British support for the Zionists was a design of imperialism. For a general analysis of British interest in the Balfour Declaration see Tibawi, A.L. **British Interest in Palestine** (Oxford University Press, London, 1961).
- 17 **League of Nations Official Journal** 3rd Year no.8 (August 1922) pp.823-25. Lord Balfour, the author of the Balfour Declaration, submitted the British draft Mandate in December 1920, (Doc. No. 21/4/33.VIA). Although various parts of the draft, in particular articles 8, 14 and 25 went through various stages of re-drafting, sections concerning the Jewish national home were adopted in their original form. For the Mandate text see Annex 391 pp.1007-1012 in **League of Nations Official Journal** August 1922. For the argument that "in effect the draft of the British mandate was prepared by the Zionists in Paris and accepted" with minor changes by the British officials see Ovendale, (1984: 47).
- 18 See **League of Nations Docs.** C.104.M.57.1921; C.226.M.165.1921.VI[A]; C.252(e.) 1922 VI[A].
- 19 See **League of Nations Documents**; C.21/4/44.VIA, C.67.M.32.1921.VIA; C.372 M.260 1921(VIA).
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 - 31 For a detailed study of these efforts see Lilienthal, A. M. **The Zionist Connection II** (North American, N.J., 1982) chp.II; Bain, K. R. **The March to Zion: United States's Policy and the Founding of Israel** (Texas University Press, College Station, 1969); Glick, E. **The Triangular Connection: America, Israel and American Jews** (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1982). For Zionist attempts to gain support from pro-Axis countries in Europe for increased Jewish emmigration from these countries to Palestine see Rowley, (1984: 43-44).
 - 32 Ovendale, (1984: 75).
 - 33 For detailed analysis of Zionist influences on US domestic politics during this period see Ovendale, (1984: 75-87); Lilienthal, 1982: Chps. 6 and 7; Glick, (1982); Snetsinger, J. **Truman the Jewish Vote and the Creation of Israel** (Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 1974); Schechtmann, J. B. **The United States and the Jewish State Movement** (Herzl Press, New York, 1966); Stevens, R. **American Zionism and U.S. Foreign Policy (1942-1947)** (Pageant, New York, 1962).
 - 34 Lilienthal, (1982: 37-39); Glick, (1982: 65).
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 - 36 Sachar, (1972: 452-457).
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 - 39 See Bethell, 1979; Kayyali, 1978; for a detailed study of the destruction of the Palestinian Arab political infra-structure by British authorities.
 - 40 For information on both communities political administrative institutions see **Great Britain and Palestine 1915-1945**, (Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1946); Quandt, W., Jabber, F. and Lesch, A. **The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism** (University of California Press, London, 1973) pp. 5-42. For a detailed and informative study of the political and administrative structure of the Jewish

community in Palestine see, Horowitz, D. and Lissak, M. **Origins of the Israeli Polity**, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1978).

- 41 For an analysis of the degree of meticulous organisation achieved by the Zionist Movement in mobilising grass-root support to bring pressure on the US legislature and government see Stevens, (1962).
- 42 Sachar, (1972: 159-172; 251-251).
- 43 Macdonald, R. **The League of Arab State: A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization** (Princeton University Press, N.J., 1965) p.87.
- 44 Overdale, (1984: 82).
- 45 Survey of Palestine, (Jerusalem, 1946: 142)
- 46 For various plans including the one approved by the WZO see Khalidi, 1971: LXVI and LXXX.
- 47 **General Assembly Official Records**, First Special Session, Docs. A/287 to A/291.
- 48 GAOR, First Committee, 54th, p.252.
- 49 GAOR, General Committee, Vol. II, 29th to 31st meetings.
- 50 GAOR, *ibid.*, 32nd meeting, pp.92-93.
- 51 GAOR, First Committee, Vol.III, 46th to 50th meetings.
- 52 GAOR, First Committee, Vol. III, 56th meeting.
- 53 The majority plan, 'Partition with Economic Union' and the minority plan, 'A Federal state of Palestine' (GAOR, Second Session, Document A/364).
- 54 Sachar, (1972: Chps.11-12).
- 55 *Ibid.*, p.487 and p.501.
- 56 There are conflicting accounts over whether the United State's government used any pressure on smaller delegations to cast their vote in favour of the Partition Resolution. Sachar claims that Latin Americans, for example, came neither under Zionist nor US pressure and concludes that wide Latin American support was a result of their compassion for refugees, (1972: 504) However, Khalidi, Davis, Fraser and Lilienthal argue the opposite. Davis, (1968: 37) and Khalidi, (1971: LXIX) talk about heavy US pressure on a number of delegations and Lilienthal, (1982: 62-63; 65-68) notes particularly Zionist and US pressure applied through business circles. Jansen too takes a very

similar position and refers to the US 'arms twisting' to get a favourable vote. Jansen, G. J. **Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism** (The Institute of Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1971) pp.200-1; Fraser, (1980: 411) on the other hand notes both the role of Soviet and US pressure.

When one compares the distribution of votes in the Ad Hoc Committee with the plenary, where a two-thirds majority was needed for the adoption of the Partition Plan, together with the speeches made during the debates it becomes evident that in the case of certain delegations the sudden change between the 27th and 29th of November could be attributed to what Cattán referred to as 'undue pressure' or as Gilmour suggested to "concentrated doses of political and economic pressure", (See Cattán, H. **Palestine and International Law** (Longman, London 1976) pp.82-89, for the concept of 'undue pressure' and a selection of quotations from delegations speeches following the Partition Plan vote, Gilmour, D. **Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians** (Sphere Books Ltd., London, 1982) p.59. The mood of some delegations was well summarised by the Colombian representative's thinly veiled criticism directed towards the US and the USSR, (GAOR, Second Session, Vol.II, Plenary meeting 127, p.1396). A particularly interesting case was that of the Philippines which casted an affirmative vote following a speech against partition, (GAOR, Second Session, Vol.II, Plenary meeting, 124th, pp 1313-1314). Also see Fraser, (1980: 61-62) State Department correspondence on Philippines and Haiti change of vote as a result of US pressures). More recently A Channel Four documentary too appears to point towards the role of US pressure, '**PALESTINE: END OF EMPIRE**', 20 May 1985.

- 57 Sachar, (1972: 495).
- 58 For the Palestinian Arab and Arab League arguments see the speech of the Arab Higher Committee delegate before the Ad Hoc Committee on the Palestinian Question Third Meeting, 23 September 1947. Also see the speech by the Egyptian delegate before the General Assembly session 124th plenary meeting, 26 November 1947.
- 59 For an account of the fighting between the Jewish and Arabs forces see Davis, 1970; Kayyali, 1979; Ben-Gurion, D. **Israel: A Personal History** (Funk and Wagnalls, N.Y., 1971); Kurzman, K. **Genesis 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War** (Vallentine Mitchell, London, 1972); Dupuy, T. N. **Elusive Victory: The Arab Israeli Wars** (Harper and Row, London, 1978).
- 60 The Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Agreement was signed on February 24 1949, the Lebanese one on March 22, 1949, the Jordanian one, which also covered Iraq, on April 3, 1949 and finally the Syrian one on July 20, 1949.

- 61 Israel at the end of armed hostilities covered an area of 20,724 km.sq. instead of 14,260 km.sq. as envisaged by the Partition Plan. There were 726,000 Palestinian refugees as a result of the war, (United Nations Conciliation Commission for Palestine, Document A/AC.25/6, p.19).
- 62 For an account of British attempts to set-up an Arab Agency and Arab refusal to cooperate see Kayyali, 1978: 130; Davis, (1970: 27-28); Abu-Lughod, **Transformation of Palestine** (North Western University Press, Evanston, 1971) p.223. The Jewish Agency was set up in accordance with article 4 of the Mandate. The Jewish Agency throughout the mandate worked closely with the Mandate authorities, played a very central role in the development of the Jewish homeland and maintained very close and subordinate ties with the World Zionist Organisation.
- 63 Sachar, (1972: 562); Quandt, (1973: 41-42).
- 64 GAOR, Third Session, Plenary Meeting 207, Doc. A/855.
- 65 Resolution 212 (III), 19 November 1948; Resolution 302 (IV), 8 December 1949; Resolution 393 (V), 2 December 1950.
- 66 Provisions of the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly give the Secretary General the discretion to include "All items which the Secretary General deems it necessary to put before the Assembly", (Rule 13 paragraph 'g'). This allows the Secretary General a certain degree of initiative in the formulation of and presentation of the agenda. Tomeh, G. J. "When the UN Dropped the Palestine Question" **Journal of Palestine Studies** Vol.IV (Autumn 1974), No. 1, p.19 suggests that the removal of the 'Palestine Question' from the agenda may well be a result of this discretion being employed by T.Lie, the Secretary General, an alleged supporter of the Zionist cause.
- 67 GAOR, Seventh Session, 14 September, Doc. A/2184.
- 68 *ibid.*, A/2185.
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- 70 See *Ibid.*, pp.249-54 for the text of the resolutions.
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- Studies, Beirut, 1971).
- 73 Kuhn, T. **The Struture of Scientific Revolutions** (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970).
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 - 75 Vasquez, J. **The Power of Power Politics: An Empirical Evaluation of the Scientific Study of International Relations** (Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1981).
 - 76 Mansbach, R. and Vasquez, J. **In Search of Thoery: A New Paradigm for Global Politics** (Colombia University Press, New York, 1981).
 - 77 For the origins of the term 'Global Politics approach' see Chapter II, endnote 16.
 - 78 Mansbach and Vasquez, 1981.

CHAPTER TWO

ESTABLISHING THE BASIS FOR A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK FOR STUDYING MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL

2.1 Paradigms as a source of guidance for selecting and tackling research problems.

Waltz warns us of the futility of starting research without "at least a sketchy theory"¹. Such a theory, however sketchy, has to rely on some existing body of knowledge. Then, the first task, in formulating this theoretical framework to understand and explain the problem presented in the earlier chapter, is to identify a suitable body of knowledge.

According to Kuhn's work, **The Structure of Scientific Revolutions**, it is paradigms that provide the ground knowledge needed to further our understanding of the world around us. Hence, scholars turn to a paradigm for guidance to select a research question and construct a suitable theoretical framework to study a problem.

In an effort to explain how scientific knowledge grows Kuhn uses the concept of a paradigm in a rather vague and loose manner. Masterman identified twenty-one different ways in which Kuhn appears to describe a paradigm.² Here, it would be appropriate to think of a paradigm as supplying a scientific community with a set of conceptual and instrumental tools³ which help the members of the community to identify and resolve certain puzzles. The particular paradigm that a scientific community employs will then be evident in the work they produce⁴.

2.2 Paradigms in the study of International Relations.

Since the appearance of Kuhn's work numerous scholars have

examined the applicability of his propositions about the advancement of knowledge to social sciences and International Relations in particular. Some rather conflicting conclusions appear to have been reached. Lijphart⁵ used Kuhn's approach to argue that the behavioural paradigm had challenged the traditional paradigm. However, Beal disagrees with Lijphart and claims that he

"has confused the magnitude of the methodological revolution accompanying the behavioural movement for a paradigm onslaught against the traditional perspective"⁶.

Defining a paradigm more narrowly as a theory⁷, Beal has serious doubts that a paradigm shift in International Relations could ever happen. Yet, more recently Vasquez⁸ has used the Kuhnian approach to show, empirically, the inadequacies of the dominant paradigm to generate any further knowledge about world politics. This has led Vasquez together with Mansbach⁹ to try to concretise an alternative emerging paradigm.

If one uses the earlier definition of a paradigm, literature in International Relations suggest that there are roughly four different ways of picturing world politics.

By far the dominant paradigm in international relations literature is the Realist or the power-politics paradigm.¹⁰ Most of the work produced in International Relations since World War II has been inspired by this paradigm. Morgenthau, a major and early contributor to this paradigm, typically sees the international political system as anarchic thus inducing states, which are assumed to be unified, to struggle for power in an attempt to satisfy their national interest.¹¹ Over the last three decades work on this paradigm has led it to become the most articulated and structured paradigm, capable of providing a general theory of international relations.¹² Yet, since the early 1970s it has come under continuous challenge, particularly

from scholars belonging to the Global Politics paradigm, for having encountered a number of anomalies and for not having produced any significant new knowledge, in the last decade or so.¹³ These challenges, so far, do not seem to have led to the collapse of this paradigm the way the idealist paradigm had found its unequivocal demise in the late 1930s. Instead scholars such as Waltz¹⁴ and more recently Little¹⁵ claim the Realist paradigm to be still the best equipped paradigm for understanding and explaining world politics.

The second most evident paradigm in International Relations literature has originated mostly from the US since the early 1970s.¹⁶ The Global Politics paradigm asserts that the assumptions central to the Realist paradigm are defective and hence Realist propositions about world politics are inaccurate. This paradigm has questioned and empirically demonstrated the weaknesses of focusing on states as the only important actors in world politics¹⁷, treating them as though they are completely monolithic and rational, separating domestic and international politics from each other and assuming that world politics is simply a struggle for power and peace. Instead, the paradigm claims that world politics is better depicted by a multitude of issues imperfectly linked receiving the attention of a variety of actors and parts of the state.

Although there is a realisation that an alternative paradigm must consist of something more than just the questioning of various aspects of the dominant Realist paradigm¹⁸, the Global Politics paradigm does not yet seem to have achieved the high level of structure and articulation of the paradigm it aspires to replace. This paradigm¹⁹ still appears to be at the level of trying to articulate and reach agreement over its central-organising concepts such as interdependence, issue cycles and linkages.²⁰

The remaining two paradigms in the study of world politics are less comprehensive in their scope compared to the preceding ones. Nevertheless, the World Society and Marxist paradigms do embody "distinct assumptions about who should be regarded as the significant participants in international relations and the nature of the transactions between them".²¹

For the World Society paradigm the unit of analysis is the 'system', rather than the state and they envisage a world that is depicted by a 'cob-web' model.²² This model pictures a world that is characterised by a great variety of exchanges ranging from economic to cultural ones. It is around these exchanges that the boundaries of the 'relevant' system are drawn and its structure investigated with a view to explaining the problem at hand. However, although the concepts central to this paradigm are attractive, they are plagued by lack of clarity which prevents the paradigm from being amenable to empirical research.²³ Furthermore, this paradigm's philosophical roots in functionalism and liberal international thought burdens it with normative and prescriptive assertions. This is reflected, against all empirical evidence, in its claim that the role of the state is diminishing and that the state is an impediment to the maximization of human welfare. This approach in complete contrast to the Realist paradigm limits its area of concern to the cooperative aspects of international relations and to the need to study structures that would increase cooperation in the international system.²⁴

The fourth and final paradigm is the Marxist one. Although classical Marxism dates back a century, its actual use in the study of international relations is more recent. For the Marxist paradigm the level of analysis is lowered from state-to-state interactions to the relations between socio economic classes. The state is given a secondary importance being a superstructure simply reflecting the prevailing

economic relationships in a society. Marxism's central concern with economic exchanges between classes has led the Marxist paradigm to be increasingly employed in the analysis of the international political economy. However, in spite of its conceptual and methodological richness, embedded in dialectics and historical materialism, the application of the Marxist paradigm to the study of international relations has been rather limited. This has led Thorndike to conclude that scholars in international relations should "stop and think, and invite the Marxist perspective to come out of the cold".²⁵

This conspicuous preponderance of paradigms in the study of world politics may not necessarily be the sign for a protracted and fractionalised revolution in the Kuhnian sense but rather that the discipline is a multi-paradigm one.²⁶ In such a discipline the decision for a scholar with which paradigm to work will be a political and cultural one, determined by the nature of the problem at hand and by whether the scholar feels intellectually closer to one or the other paradigm.

The following section will examine, closely, the first two dominant paradigms in relation to our research problem.

2.3 The Research Problem and the Global Politics Paradigm

If "Understanding ... means nothing more than having whatever ideas and concepts are needed to recognise that a great many different phenomena are part of a coherent whole"²⁷ then it seems that it is the ideas, concepts and theories associated with the Global Politics paradigm which provide the most fertile ground on which we can construct our theoretical framework to explain our research problem. This appears to be the case for the following theoretical and methodological reasons.

2.3.1 Theoretical Considerations

We have already mentioned that puzzlements, which form the basis of a research problem, are paradigm bound. An analysis of, particularly two of, the three central Realist assumptions should demonstrate that it would be difficult to place our research problem within the context of the Realist paradigm.²⁸ In other words, to the scholars working within the Realist paradigm these assumptions would prevent our research problem from coming across as worth studying.

2.3.1.1 The assumption that states are the actors

The first central assumption in Realist thinking is that the state is seen as the only important actor in world politics and furthermore rather like billiard-balls, these states are assumed to be hard-shelled and monolithic. In respect to our research problem this assumption faces a number of problems.

Firstly, the first part of the assumption manages to squeeze out the potential role of non-state actors, such as the PLO, so central to our research problem. It also ignores the independent impact that the United Nations, the Non-Aligned and other political groupings can have on world politics, particularly in attitude formation.²⁹ This particular aspect of Realist thinking also makes it difficult to account for the processes that lead to the creation of new actors as well as the impact such new actors may have on the structures and processes particular to a system.

Secondly, to treat the state as a monolithic unit makes the conceptualisation of various aspects of our research problem rather difficult if not impossible. It seems that the only way to alleviate this problem is to disaggregate the state into its constituent parts. It is by drawing a distinction between the state, the nation and the

government that we can begin to account for the characteristics of some of the more important actors and the nature of the interactions between them. Otherwise if one worked within the Realist paradigm it would not be possible to talk about the Palestinian nation scattered across a number of states. Equally, it would not be possible to account for the effects that certain political processes at the international level can have on different parts of a government or a country.³⁰

In terms of this research, within the realist framework, it would be very difficult to account for the emergence of an independent modern Palestinian identity as a transnational force which at the first instance manifested itself in terms of entry into the Middle Eastern political system of a new actor in the form of the PLO. Although the PLO was created by the decisions of the Arab governments it nevertheless was a response to growing signs of Palestinian nationalism and within a few years came under the influence of Palestinian guerrilla groups. This development played an important role in the mobilisation of the Palestinian community but also precipitated a process that changed the perceptions and attitudes of the outside world towards the definition and nature of the Middle Eastern Conflict.³¹ The definition of the problem became revised in such a way that the conflict was not any more perceived as a conflict between Arab states and Israel but instead one between the Palestinian people and Israel.

2.3.1.2 The assumption of a struggle for power

The second assumption central to the Realist paradigm is that world politics can be pictured as a struggle for power. This struggle constitutes a single issue in a single system and entails a ceaseless and repetitive competition for a single stake of power. In such a system the major source of power becomes military strength and the ultimate use of force remains as an omnipresent concern in the minds of

statesmen.

Naturally, with such a conflictful image of world politics where strategic-security considerations dominate the political agenda, it is not surprising that this assumption will fail "to accomodate the multiplicity of values and stakes for which actors both cooperate and compete".³² This makes it difficult to consider situations where new issues can make their way on to the global agenda. The Realist paradigm, by introducing a distinction between high and low politics, treats any issue that fall outside national security, power and strategic considerations as being of minor significance world politics.

There are two problems, one general and the other particular to our research, associated with this distinction between high and low politics. The first and general problem is a methodological one caused by the subjective nature of how to decide or define what constitutes 'high politics' at any one time or location. An issue that may be treated as low politics by one government may well be of crucial importance to other governments.

"For many governments of the Third World, such as Jamaica, Ghana or Sri Lanka, there may be no significant problems of 'national security' affecting their international relations.... For them the high politics of international relations lies in trade and aid issues".³³

Similarly, an issue that was not regarded as high politics may, at a later point in time, come to be redefined as of paramount significance. Wallace points out how the question of Britain's relations with the EEC was redefined from being a matter of foreign trade policy to a matter of high policy.³⁴

The second problem caused by this distinction is more central to the substance of our puzzlement that forms our research problem. The question of how the political and human rights of the Palestinian people became a major issue

on the agendas of numerous governments, international organisations and other actors could not be raised within the Realist paradigm, as self-determination and human rights would typically constitute issues of low policy.

In contrast, the Global Politics paradigm is not plagued with these problems associated with a unidimensional view of world politics. Instead the Global Politics paradigm with the help of a concept like 'issue-salience' resolves the methodological problems associated with the concept of high and low politics. Hence, this concept bypasses difficulties of having to define, for once and all, what constitutes high policy for a government by enabling the researcher to determine empirically how much salience a government or an actor attaches to an issue.³⁵ Furthermore, this paradigm allows scholars to view a world politics that is not simply dominated by one issue and accompanying conflict behaviour. Instead they have demonstrated that world politics is not unidimensional and that behaviour does vary according to issues.³⁶

These characteristics of the Global Politics paradigm make it possible to postulate that the Palestinian issue could have varying degrees of salience for a variety of actors in world politics and that these actors will interact with each other in ways that will produce different kinds of behaviour. While the Palestinian issue for leading Arab-African governments, Israel, the PLO, the Special Committee on Palestine will be of high salience this may not be the case for the Bahamas government, the Friends of the Earth or Commonwealth summits. During the decision making process for allocating the various values and stakes associated with the Palestinian issue, some of these actors may cooperate and form coalitions, other opposed actors may follow policies to undermine this cooperation. This process will be influenced by the changing salience of the Palestinian issue for various actors.

Hence, according to the Global Politics paradigm world politics is not seen as a unidimensional activity in which the players are states struggling for power in an anarchic international environment. Instead an alternative view of politics is argued which defines politics as contention over issues. The participants are actors ranging from governments to NGOs. Each actor may attach different degrees of salience to a wide range of issues that may be on the world political agenda. The process of interaction between these actors is not characterised by a competition to acquire as much power as possible. Instead actors are seen to interact with each other in order to influence the composition of the agenda as well as mobilise support for positions they hold on issues of salience to them.

2.3.1.3 The assumption of the separability of international politics

The third and final assumption in Realist thinking is centred around separating domestic politics from international politics. This assumption is based on the idea that states are simply responding to stimuli from the international environment and that a state's response will not be influenced by domestic factors, just as internal politics of a particular state will not be affected by events outside a country. Rosenau was one of the first scholars to question this assumption and point out the linkages existing among issues transcending the boundary between the two systems. Rosenau noted that

"Almost every day incidents are reported that defy the principles of sovereignty. Politics everywhere, it would seem, are related to politics everywhere else.... One can no more comprehend the internal political processes of a Latin American country without accounting for the United States presence (or, more accurately, the multiple United States presences) than one can explain the dynamics of political life in Pakistan or India without reference to the Kashmir issue".³⁷

Inherent in this assumption is also the Realist proposition

that while domestic politics is characterised by order and stability, international politics is dominated by anarchy and lack of order.³⁸ This, Realists, say is caused by the absence of a centralised authority in the international system capable of performing the role of governments in maintaining law and order. However, increasingly incidents around the world show that not all national political systems are stable and peaceful. The frequency of political unrest and civil wars in ever growing number of countries makes it rather difficult to separate the two political systems on the basis of order versus anarchy.³⁹ Furthermore, just as not all parts of the international system are unstable and violent, the international system does have a growing number of collaborative arrangements and legal regimes governing the allocation of values in an ordered and peaceful manner.

This final Realist assumption too affects our research problem in a number of ways, although not in as direct a manner as the other two. This is a result of the study's general focus actually being the international level. Without undermining the last assumption of the separability of international politics, it would be difficult to understand the dynamism behind some of the central processes characterising the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause. The interplay between international and national politics makes itself, to a certain degree, evident in understanding the attitude of certain governments towards the Palestinian cause. It would be difficult to understand US attitudes towards the Palestinian issue without considering how the Jewish lobby influences US foreign policy toward the Middle East.⁴⁰

Similarly, to understand the attitude of Non-Aligned governments particularly towards the Palestinian issue one would need to explore the cognitive linkages, that are formed in the minds of the policy makers, between the situation in Southern Africa and the Palestinian Question.

In the other direction, although, not of immediate interest to this study, the internal politics of the PLO as well as of the Palestinian community appear to have been influenced by political developments at the international level. This is particularly evident in the changing nature and intensity of violence employed by the PLO in response to growing international recognition for the organisation and for the cause it represents.

So far, we have tried to elaborate the theoretical reasons as to why the Global Politics paradigm appear to be the better equipped paradigm for tackling the puzzlement that forms the core of our research problem. Now, we shall examine certain methodological considerations that are better satisfied by the Global Politics paradigm.

2.3.2 Methodological Considerations

The Global Politics paradigm has, in a number of ways, better potential for guidance in methodological matters too. This is because the paradigm's behaviouralist origins encourage the researcher to use knowledge from other disciplines and its theoretical (substantive) composition encourages the use of data that otherwise would be considered unimportant.

Behaviouralism, from its very inception in the early 1950s, found fertile ground in the study of politics and at a later stage triggered a lively debate between the followers of the Historical approach (the Traditionalists) and the Scientific approach (the Behaviouralists) in international relations.⁴¹ For a long time, however, the academic community confused the attempts to employ scientific methods in theory building and testing in international relations with a substantive-theoretical breakthrough.⁴² Instead this led to a situation whereby there were Realist scholars such as Morgenthau, Bull, following a traditionalist methodology on the one hand and scholars

such as Singer, Kaplan employing a scientific methodology, on the other hand but they all worked from a similar theoretical basis about the nature of the international system.⁴³

However, it should be noted that behaviouralism "means more than scientific techniques, more than rigour".⁴⁴ It is not simply an attempt to employ sophisticated and rigorous techniques for accumulating, interpreting and analysing data. According to Easton one of the crucial tenets making up behaviouralism is;

"Integration: Because the social sciences deal with the whole human situation, political research can ignore the findings of other disciplines only at the peril of weakening the validity and undermining the generality of its own results".⁴⁵

It is particularly this aspect of behaviouralism that, at large, distinguishes the Global Politics paradigm. Scholars working within this paradigm have not only tried to employ scientific techniques and methods in their research but they have also made a conscious effort to use knowledge from different disciplines. The evidence for this is particularly strong in two areas, that are strongly related to our research problem. These two areas amongst others, from which the Global Politics paradigm has borrowed ideas and concepts are psychology (social-psychology) and comparative government.

Jonsson notes that in recent years there has been growing interest in using cognitive approaches in international relations in an attempt to develop theories that can account for the gap between the 'perceptual world' of actors and the actual world.⁴⁶ Willetts too has tried to think of interdependence in terms of psychological resources where the cognitive realm of actors become important.⁴⁷ He argues that Festinger's 'cognitive consistency theory'⁴⁸ is applicable to the study of global politics. This stems from the idea that not only

individuals but also collectivities can have a drive to make their perceptions of the world harmonious.

Comparative government is another area from which the Global Politics literature has drawn ideas. This has been facilitated by a preparedness not to treat domestic and international political systems as completely different. Breaking down the distinction between domestic and international politics has enabled the possibility of assuming that certain political processes within and between countries have similarities. When Mansbach and Vasquez⁴⁹ define politics as the raising and resolving of issues by actors they stress the central importance of understanding the agenda process. But they also note that this problem of "how issues are born, how and why they are placed on the agenda, how they are removed, and how and why the content of agendas change overtime" has not been investigated in the Global Politics literature.⁵⁰ This lack of a body of knowledge on this phenomenon has led them to borrow ideas particularly from the work of Cobb and Elder who have studied the dynamism of agenda building in US politics.⁵¹

The hard-core Realists have always been reluctant to make use of knowledge from other disciplines. This is a result of them defining international relations strictly as the study of state-to-state interactions, setting it apart from all other disciplines. Some Realists have openly questioned the usefulness of explaining international relations in terms of psychological or social-psychological factors. Their position is that such 'reductionist theories' cannot provide better explanation than theories of international politics.⁵²

Although this may be a broadly supported view it should, however, be noted that Realists are not that monolithic a group. Amongst Realists there have been, particularly in the area of decision making, scholars who have employed

ideas particularly from psychology and socio-psychology.⁵³ Their readiness to make use of knowledge from other disciplines may well have been a result of the influence of the then emerging behaviouralism. It seems that behaviouralism did not only lead this sub-set of Realist scholars to be more rigorous and precise in their work but also to try to integrate ideas from other disciplines. This appears to have brought these scholars to the fringes of the Realist paradigm by discovering the weaknesses of some of the Realist assumptions and concepts.⁵⁴ However, by and large the Realist paradigm has not encouraged its followers to employ concepts and ideas from other areas of study.

The final methodological issue we wish to consider concerns the kind of data we intend to use for operationalising the more central concepts in our theoretical framework. Vasquez shows how data-making in international relations has been wholly dominated by the Realist paradigm. However, he does note that some of this data has been used by people within the Marxist and, in a very limited way, the Global Politics paradigms.⁵⁵ The major sources of data we intend to use will come from voting at the United Nations and diplomatic exchanges. Both are highly government centred data. This is not surprising as most of data used in international relations are in one way or the other based on or derived from government collected data. This will probably remain so until the Global Politics paradigm develops and accumulates its own data. The data on UN voting has not been put into significant use by the Realist paradigm. This is because the theoretical considerations within the Realist paradigm does not attribute any significance to UN voting. However, as Alker⁵⁶ has shown and Vasquez⁵⁹ has also argued there does not appear to be any reason why this data-set could not be used for testing non-Realist hypothesis.

As the above theoretical and methodological considerations show our research problem falls firmly within the realm of

the Global Politics paradigm. In the following section we intend to develop an analytical framework which will draw not only from an already existing body of theory in the Global Politics paradigm but also from mobilisation theory.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Waltz, K. **Theory of International Politics** (Addison-Wesley, Reading:Mass., 1979) p.17.
- 2 Masterman, M., "The Nature of a Paradigm", in Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. (eds.), **Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge**, (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970) pp. 61-65.
- 3 Kuhn, T. **The Structure of Scientific Revolutions**, (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1970) p.37. For a discussion of paradigms as conceptual frameworks see Nicholson, M. **The Scientific Analysis of Social Behaviour**, (Frances Pinter, London, 1983) pp. 10-16.
- 4 Kuhn, (1970: 43).
- 5 Lijphart, A. "The Structure of the Theoretical Revolution in International Relations", **International Studies Quarterly** Vol.18 (1974), pp.41-76.
- 6 Beal, R. "A Contra-Kuhnian View of the Discipline's Growth", in Rosenau, J. (ed.) **In Search of Global Patterns** (The Free Press, New York, 1976) p.160.
- 7 Ibid., p.158.
- 8 Vasquez, J. **The Power of Power Politics; An Empirical Evaluation of the Scientific Study of International Relations**, (Rudgers University Press, New Brunswick, N.J., 1981).
- 9 Mansbach, R. and Vasquez, J. **In Search of Theory; A New Paradigm for Global Politics**, (Columbia University Press, New York, 1981).
- 10 For well known examples of literature relying on the Realist paradigm see Morgenthau, H. **Politics Amongst Nations** (5th ed., Alfred A.Knopf, New York, 1973), Carr, E.H. **The Twenty Year's Crisis, 1919-1939** (Macmillan, London, 1946), Thompson, K. **Political Realism and the Crises of World Politics** (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1960).
- 11 Morgenthau, (1973: 5).
- 12 Taylor, T. "Power Politics", in Taylor, T. (ed.), **Approaches and Theory in International Relations** (Longman, London, 1978) p.138.
- 13 Vasquez, (1981: 202).
- 14 Waltz (1979).
- 15 Little, R. "Power and Interdependence: A Realist Critique", in Jones, B. and Willetts, P.(eds.)

Interdependence on Trial (Frances Pinter, London, 1984).

- 16 Possibly as a reflection of the rather unsettled nature of this paradigm there is not yet one common agreed label for the paradigm. Keohane, R. and Nye, J. **Transnational Relations and World Politics** (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1971) in their book on Transnationalism call it the 'world politics paradigm', Banks, M. chooses to call it the 'international paradigm', "Ways of Analyzing the World Society", in Groom, J. and Mitchell, C. (eds.) **International Relations Theory: a bibliography** (Frances Pinter, London, 1978) p.201, Coplin, W. prefers 'world policy process paradigm' **Introduction to International Politics** (Rand McNally, Chicago, 1974) chp. 13, while Vasquez and Mansbach call it the 'issue paradigm' (1981). Here we shall employ Willetts label 'global politics paradigm' first used in "The United Nations and the Transformation of the Inter-State System" in Buzan, B. and Jones, B. (eds.) **Change and The Study of International Relations: The Evaded Dimension** (Frances Pinter, London, 1981) pp.104-108.
- 17 Vasquez, (1981) and Mansbach, R., Ferguson, I. and Lampert, D. **The Web of Politics: Non State Actors in the Global System**, (Prentice Hall International, London, 1976).
- 18 Mansbach and Vasquez, (1981: 27).
- 19 Perhaps with the exception of Mansbach and Vasquez theoretical work has not yet been, rigorously applied and tested by the academic community.
- 20 See Rosenau, J. **The Study of Global Interdependence** (Frances Pinter, London, 1980); Mansbach, R. and Vasquez, J. "The issue cycle: conceptualizing long-term global political change", **International Organisation** Vol.37 (Spring 1983), No.2, pp.257-259; and Willetts, P. "The Politics of Global Issues: Cognitive Actor Dependence and Issue Linkage", in Jones, B. and Willetts, P. **Interdependence on Trial** (Frances Pinter, London, 1984).
- 21 Willetts in Buzan and Jones (eds.), (1981: 100).
- 22 Burton, J. **International Relations: A General Theory** (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1965) and Burton, J. **World Society** (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1972).
- 23 Banks in Groom and Mitchell, (1978: 205-206).
- 24 The normative aspect of this paradigm is particularly evident in the work of the founding father of Functionalism, see Mitrany, D. **The Functional Theory of**

Politics (Martin Robertson and Company, London 1975).

- 25 Thorndike, T. "The Revolutionary Approach: The Marxist Perspective", in Taylor (ed.), (1976: 94).
- 26 See Masterman's argument on 'multiple-paradigm' sciences, particularly applicable to the social sciences, in Lakatos, I. and Musgrave, A. **Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge** (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970) p.74.
- 27 Quoted in Waltz, (1971: 9).
- 28 These three assumptions project a picture of high coherence amongst those scholars working within the Realist paradigm. However, to say that all Realist scholars strictly work within these assumptions may be rather too simplistic. The reality is more complex and diversified. There are a great number of scholars who have regarded themselves, or been regarded, as Realists. These have produced analysis that has gone beyond at least two of the above assumptions. It seems with the emergence of behaviouralism in the late 1950s there has been some work such as those offered by for example Snyder, G., Bruck, H. and Sapin, B. **Foreign Policy Decision Making** (Free Press, New York, 1962) and Allison, G. **Essence of Decision** (Little Brown, London, 1971) that has relaxed the assumptions that the state is monolithic and that there is no interaction between domestic and international politics. However, at large it appears that even the above scholars have remained confined to a state centric and unidimensional view of world politics. Furthermore, there also appears to be some degree of agreement in the international relations literature that these three assumptions are quite central to the realist paradigm. See for example Mansbach and Vasquez, (1981: 9).
- 29 For detailed discussions of the role of non-state actors in world politics see Mansbach, R. et.al. (1976), Willetts, P. **Pressure Groups in the Global System: The Transnational Relations of Issue-Orientated Non-Governmental Organizations** (Frances Pinter, London, 1982). For non-Realist studies of the role of the UN in world politics see Kaufmann, J. **United Nations Decision Making** (Sitjhoff and Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, 1980); Jacobsen, K. **The General Assembly of the United Nations** (Universitatforlaget, Oslo, 1978) and for an illuminating comparison of the Realist and Global politics views of the UN see Willetts in Buzan and Jones (eds.), (1981).
- 30 For example if one did not disaggregate the US government into its various bureaucratic constituent parts, including the separate analysis of the US delegation to the UN, it would not be possible to understand and explain the frequent disagreements and

conflicting behaviour between the State Department and the US delegation at the UN, each being exposed to and participating in rather different political processes. For a discussion of this particular phenomenon see Finger, M. **Your Man at the United Nations: People, Politics and Bureaucracy in the Making of Foreign Policy** (New York University Press, New York, 1980), particularly chp.2 and Beichman, A. **The 'Other' State Department, The United States Mission to the United Nations, Its Role in the Making of Foreign Policy** (Basic Books, New York, 1967). Also see the work of Allison (1971) which contrasts the Realist unitary perception of states with the disaggregation of governments into competing bureaucracies.

- 31 For analysis of systems change in the Middle East resulting from the activities of Palestinian guerrilla groups, see Mansbach et.al. (1976: 285-289).
- 32 Mansbach and Vasquez, (1981: 11).
- 33 Willetts, (ed.) (1982: 22).
- 34 Wallace, W. **The Foreign Policy Process in Britain** (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1977) p.13.
- 35 Willetts, P. (ed.) (1982: 22), see also Willetts's introduction to Chetley, A. **The Politics of Baby Foods** (Frances Pinter, London, 1986).
- 36 O'Leary, M. "The Role of Issue", in Rosenau (1980: 318-326)
- 37 Rosenau, J. "Introduction: Political Science in a Shrinking World", in Rosenau (ed.) **Linkage Politics**, (Free Press, New York, 1969) p.2.
- 38 Alger, C. "Comparision of Intranational and International Politics", **American Political Science Review**, Vol.57 (June 1963), No.2, pp.40-69.
- 39 Riggs, F. "International Relations as a Prismatic System", in Knorr and Verba (eds.) **The International Systems: Theoretical Essays** (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1961).
- 40 For literature looking at the influence of the Jewish lobby on US foreign policy see chp. 1 endnotes 31 and 33.
- 41 For a detailed study of this debate see Knorr, K. and Rosenau, J. (eds.) **Contending Approaches to International Politics**, (Princeton University Press, 1970).
- 42 For a telling account of how, after all, scientific work in international relations remained deeply embeded

in the Realist paradigm see Vasquez, J. "Colouring It Morgenthau: New Evidence for an Old Thesis", **British Journal of International Studies** Vol.5 (1979), pp.210-218.

- 43 For a collection of articles reflecting the traditionalist versus behaviouralist debate see, Knorr, K. and Rosenau, J. (eds.) **Contending Approaches to International Politics** (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1969) The traditionalist view is defended by Bull, H. "International Theory: The Case for a Classical Approach", while the behaviouralist position is argued by Singer, D. "The Incomplete Theorist: Insight Without Evidence" and Kaplan, M. "The New Great Debate: Traditionalism vs. Science in International Relations".
- 44 Easton, D. "The Current Meaning of 'Behavioralism'", in Charlesworth, **Contemporary Political Analysis** (The Free Press, New York, 1967) p.30.
- 45 Ibid., p.17.
- 46 Jonsson, C. (ed.) **Cognitive Dynamics and International Politics**, (Frances Pinter, London, 1982).
- 47 Willetts in Jones and Willetts (eds.) (1984).
- 48 Festinger, L. **A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance** (Row Peterson, Evanston, Ill., 1957).
- 49 Mansbach and Vasquez, (1981: 68).
- 50 Ibid., p.87.
- 51 Cobb and Elder, **Participation in American Politics: The Dynamics of Agenda Building** (Allyn and Bacon, Boston, 1971).
- 52 Waltz, (1979: 19).
- 53 Snyder, R., Bruck, H. and Sapin, B. (eds.) (1962); Boulding, K. **The Image** (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1956).
- 54 Snyder and et.al. (eds.) by introducing the 'internal' and 'external' settings undermined the Realist assumptions of the separation of domestic and international politics. Lindblom, C. "The Science of muddling through" **Public Administration Review** Vol.29 (1959), No.2; Lindblom, C. **The Policy Making Process** (Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1968); Simon, H. **Models of Man: Social and Rational** (Wiley, New York, 1957) demonstrate the questionable nature of the assumption of 'rationality', Allison (1971) not only demonstrated the weakness of the idea of assuming the state to be a rational actor but also the weakness of seeing the

government as unified and monolithic. For a discussion of Decision Making Theory and its relationship to Behaviouralism and Realist thinking see White, B. "Decision-making Analysis", in Taylor (ed.) (1976), particularly pp.142-155.

55 Vasquez (1981: 154).

56 Alker, H. and Russett, B. **World Politics in the General Assembly** (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967).

57 Vasquez, (1981: 189-199).

CHAPTER THREE

THE ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

3.1 Introduction

In the preceding section we tried to show how the Global Politics paradigm appears to be the most suitable one within which the research problem can be approached. The following section hopes to offer an analytical/conceptual framework that will guide the examination of how the Palestinian Question became an important item on the global agenda. Mansbach and Vasquez in their book **In Search of Theory** have made a conscious effort to take their work beyond a criticism of the Realist paradigm and introduce an integrated theory that they hope will "serve as a guide to research".¹ The parts that apply to our research problem will be critically examined. Suitable elements from this theoretical framework will then be supplemented with concepts derived from mobilisation theory to complete our analytical framework.

3.2 Agenda Politics

Inspired by Cobb and Elder,² Cobb et al.,³ and Easton,⁴ Mansbach and Vasquez define global politics as the raising of and the authoritative resolution of issues. They stress the importance of developing a theory of agenda politics taking into account the decentralised nature of world politics.⁵ This theory, they suggest, should aim to explain "how individual actors inject issues of concern to them into (an) agenda building process and what happens to issues once they have been added".⁶ They identify the factors that play an important role in the agenda setting process as (i) the nature and variety of access routes and (ii) the salience of an issue to key actors.⁷

The analytical framework to be developed for this study

relies heavily on Mansbach and Vasquez's theoretical work on agenda politics. However, this does not mean that the theory can be employed just as it stands. This is because there are certain general problems, as well as problems particular to our research. These problems appear to arise from their definition of 'global agenda', 'high status actor' and 'critical issues', and the relationship between the three.

3.2.1 Access to the global agenda

Mansbach and Vasquez offer a number of access routes that actors might follow in an effort to push an issue of concern to them on to the global agenda⁸ which is "defined as those issues and associated proposals that attract serious attention from either a large number of actors or from those capable of resolving the claims".⁹ Most important of those access routes are the ones that lead to the particular agendas of 'high status actors', which will be equipped with the resources to put the issue on the global agenda. This they believe, occurs because a high status actor on its own or together with other ones can resolve issues in an authoritative manner and confer legitimacy to dispositions in the system.¹⁰

Beside direct access to the agendas of 'high status actors' Mansbach and Vasquez discuss two other access routes that may play an important role. These routes can also be seen as 'transmission belts' carrying a new issue from a multiple of actors to the agendas of 'high status actors'. These routes can be grouped into two.

International organisations that allow less-powerful member states to

"raise issues of importance to them (economic development, racism and colonialism), but of lesser importance to the mighty, in the General Assembly and other UN organs. The effects of ensuing rhetoric and resolutions upon the agendas of high status actors is far slower than direct access but can be cumulative if

the existence of opportunities or the presence of threat to them is made clear".¹¹ Similarly, certain liberation movements and functional non-governmental organisations have also the opportunity to influence the agenda of 'high status actors' through informal access to various parts of the UN and its specialised agencies. IOs provide a forum within which new issues may be raised, but the process may not always be successful.

Familiarity and experience of participation in 'agenda politics', within a certain 'institutional framework' following the established rules and norms that govern it can help in mobilising the attention of a 'high status actor'. Mansbach and Vasquez note that, the skills and experience needed to participate effectively in agenda politics would not be unlike those that are associated with successful lobbyists in a domestic context.¹² The behaviour of the PLO since the mid-1970s at various General Assembly and Security Council sessions as well as in the diplomatic world is a typical example of an actor that has acquired the skill to promote its cause by working within the system.

A different access route is the use of violence and various forms of disruption. This strategy is employed by actors that have no direct or indirect access to 'high status actors'. The aim of such a strategy is to create publicity, as well as "convince elites that ignoring the dissatisfied will be more costly than dealing with the issue they raise"¹³ This is most dramatically depicted in the use of international terrorism by certain Palestinian groups to change the image held by the world of Palestinians as harmless refugees. The function of such a strategy was well summarised by G.Habbash, when he noted that

"when we hijack a plane it has more effect than if we killed a hundred Israelis in battle. For decades world public opinion has been neither for nor against the Palestinians. It simply ignored us. At least the world is talking about us now."¹⁴

3.2.2 Problems associated with the concept of a 'high status actor'

The first problem arises with the definition of high status actor. For Mansbach and Vasquez "status refers to the relative worth or respect one is accorded by others"¹⁵ yet their application of status to actors in global politics seems uncomfortably close to the Realist conception of major/powerful actors. This is evident when they note that the criteria for an actor's status to be

"related to overall political capability, which in turn seems to be based on such objective criteria as size (both demographic and territorial, including resource base), economic capability and military strength".¹⁶

Such a definition although difficult to reconcile with an attempt to develop a non-Realist paradigm, is not surprising considering that it heavily draws on the works of established Realist scholars.¹⁷

This definition depends on an established set of indicators that enables a researcher to calculate the score that a country receives on each attribute and hence its rank on the overall hierarchy(ies). However, the problem arises when these attributes have to be aggregated into one single indicator. Is each attribute, i.e military strength and size, to be given an equal weight? If not what standards or guidelines can be employed to determine which resource yields more power? Such methodological problems lead Taylor to go as far as to note that

"the power of a state is essentially an unquantifiable phenomenon and no amount of debate about definition and redefinition can change this. All that can be counted are those resources which, like men under arms, seem likely to prove useful in future specific situations. However, there is no guarantee that they will prove so and thus they remain at best indicators of power, guides as to where perhaps it will lie."¹⁸

This problem is further complicated if one wants to use a Realist inspired definition of 'high status actor' for

explaining world political behaviour that is not simply uni-dimensional but characterised by

"multiple issues that are not arranged in a clear or consistent hierarchy. This absence of hierarchy among issues means, among other things, that military security does not consistently dominate the agenda".¹⁹ Does one use the same index for military security issues as well as for non-strategic issues?

Moreover, it is also central to the Global Politics paradigm that states are not the only important actors in world politics.²⁰ According to Mansbach and Vasquez "Actors in global politics may consist of any individual or group that is able to contend for the disposition of a political stake".²¹ However, the above criteria that appears to equate 'high status actors' with 'major/powerful actors' would automatically preclude a large number of non-state actors who may command influence upon decisions on certain issues. As Willetts notes "IBFAN has had more impact than the US government upon the baby foods issue and the IPPF has had more impact upon the global politics of birth control than the Soviet government".²²

It seems, particularly for the purposes of this study, it might be useful to take the definition of a 'high status actor' beyond one relying predominantly on Realist elements. A definition of 'high status actor' ought to also take into account resources other than, economic and military ones. This would make it possible to consider actors that may have high levels of perceived legitimacy with low levels of "economic capability and military strength".²³

After all, even though the Vatican does not have any 'tank divisions', it does occasionally have an impact on world politics. The success that the Vatican had in bringing about a peaceful resolution to the Beagle conflict can only be seen in terms of the legitimacy conferred on the Pope. However, an attempt to operationalise 'high status actor'

relying on legitimacy would be fraught with methodological and theoretical difficulties too. It would be a rather difficult task to find reliable practical indicators of legitimacy.

The manner in which a 'high status actor' is operationalised becomes important because Mansbach and Vasquez postulate a strong relationship between the prevailing status hierarchy in the system and the ranking of issues on the global agenda.²⁴ However, if the definition of a 'high status actor' remains synonymous to 'powerful actors' it would become difficult to account for a host of issues that find their way on to the global agenda in spite of such actors' opposition.²⁵ Historically, the Palestinian question as defined by the Palestinians is one such issue that was pressed on to the global agenda without any high status actor taking the initiative and in spite of the opposition of at least one of the major 'high status actors'.

The US government for along time remained reluctant to consider the Palestinian problem as an independent issue concerning the political rights of the Palestinians. Instead they maintained that the Palestinian problem was a refugee/humanitarian stake within the Arab-Israeli conflict. But this, for any person familiar with world politics, has not kept the Palestinian Question from becoming an important item on the global agenda. Conversely, the US in spite of being a 'high status actor' was able neither to impose its version of the Central American issue on the global agenda nor to allocate the stakes attached to the issue in a conclusive manner. It has also found its actions towards the imposition of a particular outcome on the problem increasingly difficult to support legally let alone to legitimise.²⁶

Although Mansbach and Vasquez offer highly useful theoretical insights to understand agenda building, their

concept of a 'high status actor' faces some operational difficulties. We have also noted that the possibility of centering 'high status actor' around the concept of legitimacy has its own operational and practical difficulties. However, it would also be very unsatisfactory to drop completely the role that a 'high status actor' can play in helping issues to the global agenda. One practical way around this problem might be to relate the idea of 'high status actor' to highly active actors. There are three advantages of this formulation.

The first advantage comes from the fact that such an 'active actor' can be a government as well as a non-governmental actor or an international organisation. The second advantage is that it would be relatively easy to construct an index for ranking actors, based on the number of acts they initiate or number of interaction they become involved in on an issue or a selection of issues. In this way, the International Red Cross, for example, would in the area of humanitarian law and the rights of prisoners of war, appear high up on the 'activity scale'. The other advantage would come in the resolution of the problem of determining what is a 'critical issue'. To appreciate this we will first have to look at the relationship between issue salience and the global agenda.

3.2.3 Issue salience, critical issues and high status actor vs active actor

Mansbach and Vasquez cite issue salience to key actors as the most crucial factor in determining whether an issue reaches the global agenda.²⁷ Without going into the details of factors that make an issue salient to an actor we shall examine the difficulties inherent in some of the more central elements in the scheme depicting the relationship between an issue and the global political agenda.²⁸

The difficulty in the scheme arises in the way in which a

'high status actor', conceived as a 'powerful actor', plays an important role in determining whether the salience of an issue is high enough to warrant it to be on the global agenda.

"Issues that have the highest salience in the political system can be referred to as critical issues. These are issues that are initially at the apex of the individual agendas of all or most of the high-status actors and that, in time tend to draw in or redefine other issues. Such issues dominate and shape the agendas of lesser actors and consequently, the global agenda."²⁹

Such a formulation of a 'critical issue' has two limitations. Firstly, it would be difficult to explain how a powerful actor or a group of actors, following the OPEC oil price increases in 1973, could not get the issue of the control of oil price increases and the question of energy supplies on the global agenda. Instead these attempts were frustrated by the convening, with an overwhelming support, of the Sixth Special Session of the General Assembly dedicated to questions of development. 'Lesser actors', "had succeeded in carrying the discussions about the international economic system into to international arena" at the expense of economic issues of greater concern to 'major' actors.³⁰

The second limitation is a result of the idea that a 'critical issue' draws in and redefines other issues. In certain cases, this is also rather difficult to substantiate. The re-emergence of the Cold War, in recent years, has become a central concern to the US administration. This development has, surely enough, led the US government to redefine the predicaments of Central America away from being problems associated with development and human rights to the realm of 'communist subversion' and global strategic considerations. However, evidence so far does not suggest that many domestic and international actors have followed suit, in spite of considerable pressure to do so from the US administration.

The idea of using 'active actors' rather than 'powerful-important actors' to determine a 'critical issue' is also supported by other scholars. Willetts notes that "an issue can only be critical, with reference to salience, by dominating the attention of the actors which are most active on the issue".³¹ This should allow the global agenda to be made up of issues that would reflect the number of actors and the level of activity with each issue. In this way, there would not be a global agenda dominated by issues solely reflecting the concerns of only those actors occupying the higher echelons of a 'hierarchy' that heavily relies on indicators of economic and military strength.

The advantage of using levels of political activity and number of actors interacting on an issue is that they can be treated as rough measures of the degree of 'salience' being attached to an issue. It is those issues that generate high levels of activity and involve large numbers of actors which might best be seen as 'critical issues'. One such issue is the problem of apartheid in Southern Africa. It is an issue that has been on the global agenda since the early 1950s. It has involved political activity emanating from a great variety of actors such as the ANC, the South African government, the International Olympic Committee, MNCs, the UN to count but a few.

So far, we have tried to show how the idea of an 'active actor' facilitates the process of determining the access routes available for an issue, the salience of that issue to various actors and the relationship between that issue and the global agenda. However, before proceeding to introduce the analytical framework it should be pointed out that this formulation too suffers from two weaknesses for which we shall suggest local solutions.

The first weakness stems from the fact that 'active actor'

may not always be capable of allocating values authoritatively even though they may have an impact on the politics of raising an issue for the global agenda. It should become apparent in the following section that in respect to our analytical framework this does not constitute a major stumbling bloc. This is because we are only interested in examining how an issue became an important item on the global agenda. It could be said that the Palestinian question is still going through the decision making stage of the issue cycle.³² In other words the contention over the authoritative allocation of the values attached to the stakes that make up the issue, still continues.

The second problem applies to both formulations. Neither Mansbach and Vasquez's formulation nor the above one provides any concrete description of what the global agenda actually is. Mansbach and Vasquez are aware of this problem and they see it as a result of the absence of explicit and authoritative decision makers, who would have a 'formal agenda' the way Cobb and Elder visualise it.³³ The decentralised nature of world politics leads Mansbach and Vasquez to suggest that "a global agenda can be seen as consisting of those elements of individual actors' agenda that overlap"³⁴, a kind of juxtapositioning of numerous individual agendas as depicted by Figure 3.1.

If each actors' agenda could be pictured as a matrix the global agenda, at any one point in time would be the aggregation of the individual matrices. The aggregation, however, would not be a simple straight forward additive process. Instead, it would take into account the amount of activity surrounding each issue. Only issues characterised with high activity would make it to the global agenda. Such an approach would pave the way to determining the agenda empirically. However, the collection and processing of the relevant data would call for resources beyond the ones available for this research. As a result of the

determination to give the idea of a global agenda an empirical referent it was decided that the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council agendas would be used to represent the global agenda.




Figure 3.1 The composition of the Global Agenda

There are three advantages to using the UN agendas supplemented by the agendas of regional organisations. Firstly, these agendas in world politics are the nearest one can get to Cobb et al. 'formal agenda' used in studying agenda building in internal politics.³⁵ These agendas can be thought of as formal indicators of the kinds of issues that concern the majority of member states as well as various non-state actors. One word of caution is that, though with diminishing success some states do keep certain issues off these agendas. Also localised and short duration issues tend not to reach UN agendas. Thus, it would be futile to postulate one to one correspondence between UN agendas and the global agenda. However, such localised issues will appear on the agendas of regional organisations. The second advantage is that these agendas are easily obtainable and reliable. Moreover, the politics

that is associated with the drawing-up of these agendas is extremely well documented. This tends to provide interesting and often concrete insights into precisely the process that we are so interested to investigate. The third advantage is that from these records it is relatively straight forward to identify 'active actors' by examining participation in drafting resolution, tabling resolutions, speech making and voting. The only disadvantage being that one can not easily gain information on lobbying or activity that takes place without entering the official records.

3.3 The Model

3.3.1 Introduction

It is latent in our analysis that our research problem is to be examined within the context of agenda politics. In the preceding sections we tried to show and improve upon some of the weaknesses inherent in Mansbach and Vasquez original formulation. This led us to conceive an agenda politics that is closer to Cobb et al. idea of 'agenda building'. Agenda building is described as "the process by which demands of various groups in the population are translated into items vying for serious attention of public officials".³⁶ The stress in the study of this process is on the raising of an issue to public attention followed by entry to the formal agenda. Hence, the process to be explained is, "how individual actors inject issues of concern to them into this agenda-building process...".³⁷

Another way of stating this is to examine how actors appeal to other actors in the system in order to mobilise support to bring the issue on the agenda. Such efforts can take two forms; convincing other actors of the importance of one particular issue or getting them to change their perception of an issue in away that will allow the accomodation of the interests of the actor promoting the new issue. In other words the issue could also become redefined along lines

that would increase its potential of reaching the agenda. It should be noted that such a redefinition would be the product of an interactive process. The ultimate form that the issue takes may not always correspond to the original definition proposed by the initiators.³⁸

As mentioned earlier on, if one could assume that the global agenda is the aggregation of individual actor agendas, what we would like to examine is the process by which a global agenda which originally had the Palestinian Question as a stake subsumed within the Arab-Israeli conflict evolved into an agenda with the Palestinian Question as an issue in its own right. How did world political actors change their perception of the Palestinian Question from being a refugee problem to being one of 'self-determination'? Needless to say that this change did not occur overnight. Instead it was a result of mobilising support, over a certain period, in favour of redefining the Palestinian Question in such away that it could reach the global agenda as a separate item.

3.3.2 The Model and its components




Figure 3.2: Model for studying the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian Cause

As figure 3.2 shows the model is made up of four parts;

- i) The dependent variable, conceived as the mobilisation of support for putting an issue on the agenda.
- ii) Three sets of explanatory variables
 - a. Conducive Environment
 - b. Accessibility
 - c. Linkage
- iii) The relationship between the variables
- iv) A feedback mechanism to capture the dynamic nature of the process.

3.3.3 Defining the variables

3.3.3.1 Conducive environment

This variable is probably the most difficult one to operationalise in this model. It is a concept widely used in the literature on mobilisation theory. The nearest corresponding concept in international relations literature is the idea of a favourable 'international climate' or 'international environment'. Although widely used this concept in both literatures has not been defined in any clear and systematic way. Instead it often defines itself in the context of an analysis.

Obershall has this concept in mind when he points at "the impact of outside events and the outside support that played an important role in loosening social control and providing the resources for black mobilisation".³⁹ He specifically points at

"...increased federal executive and judiciary activity in the 1940s -(in the form of)-...the integration of the armed forces, the desegregation of Washington, D.C., fair employment in the federal government and, increasingly, in local and state governments outside the South, the requirement of nondiscriminatory employment and hiring in private industry holding government contracts"⁴⁰

creating a favourable environment for efforts to expand the enforcement of black civil rights in the Southern States.

Walsh, too, stresses the importance of the role of structural conduciveness in the mobilisation of farm workers in the United Farm Workers Union in the late 1960s in California. He notes that during the late 1960s,

"The environment could hardly have been more favorable for the launching of the new mobilization effort. The Berkley Free Speech Movement, the radicalization of the Black Civil Rights Movement, the first phase of the anti-Vietnam agitation, the post-Vatican II Catholic church era and signs of a revitalized labor movement in the search for new membership were all factors facilitating the growth of the UFW."⁴¹

Both examples demonstrate the role that a favourable environment plays in the mobilisation process. But this should not be taken to mean that it actually initiates a mobilisation process. Instead it simply facilitates it or provides a basis for it. It might be referred to as a structural variable. In agenda politics the importance of such a variable would stem from the fact that it can point at the availability and nature of access routes to an agenda.⁴² It would then depend on the actors who are trying to raise an issue to the agenda to decide what strategy to employ to convert a conducive environment into an active resource.

In the context of our research the conduciveness of the international environment can be determined by looking at the organisational set up prevailing in the system. The composition and behaviour of various international and regional organisations can indicate whether they form a favourable basis for accomodating and promoting various issues. A number of examples might help to clarify this point.

During the civil war in Nigeria the African political environment did not constitute a very conducive environment for the Biafrans to promote and gain support for their demands to set up a separate state of their own. This lack

of conduciveness for such an action was the outcome of an established African consensus, inscribed in the OAU Charter, to refrain from acts that may jeopardise the integrity of political boundaries as inherited from the colonial era. Similarly, the question of Algerian independence was prevented from reaching the UN agenda because the composition and concerns of the UN membership was still favourable for accepting the French argument that the issue was a matter of domestic jurisdiction, hence outside the UN's competence. On the other hand, the sudden influx of newly independent states to the UN enabled the General Assembly to take up the issue of Portuguese denial of the 'right to self-determination' of people in its African territories. Previously, Portugal used to block the raising of the issue by maintaining that these African territories were overseas provinces, which together with metropolitan Portugal constituted a single unitary state.

As mentioned earlier on, a favourable environment is not adequate on its own to raise an issue on to an agenda. A conducive environment, when conceptualised as organisational structures (in the form of formal international organisations such as the UN, the OAU) and informal political-diplomatic groupings, provides 'would be mobilisers' with existing political and communication channels. It is the accessibility of this organisational set up, to actors seeking support for their position, that constitutes the next variable.

3.3.3.2 Accessibility

Earlier in the chapter it was noted that the ability to exploit access routes to the global agenda is a crucial factor in raising an issue to the agenda. Three types of access routes were mentioned. (i) The first one was access to the agendas of 'active actors'. A distinction was drawn between Mansbach and Vasquez's definition of 'high status actor' and an 'active actor'. The determining factor

for an 'active actor' was the frequency of participation in interactions or acts concerning the issue. (ii) The second route was related to the ability to use an institutional framework effectively. Just as in the case of domestic political systems, the international system, in a more informal and decentralised manner, also has certain established rules, customs and patterns of behaviour governing various kinds of interactions including the raising of issues. Following the 'rules of the game' more effectively does tend to increase the chances of having an impact on a decision making process.⁴³ (iii) The last route mentioned was the use of violence to force an item on the agenda for consideration.

Accessibility, as a variable in this model will be defined, albeit not in a measurable form, in respect to the three types of access routes. The first two can be seen as complimentary routes. While the third access route, is mostly employed in situations where the initiators of an issue cannot have an impact on agenda politics in any other way. In that sense there is an inverse relationship between use of the first two and the last access route. Hence, it should be reasonable to assume that an actor will tend to resort less and less to violence as it perceives that it is gaining access to more established forms of participation in agenda politics.

The importance of having access to a network of existing channels of communication and political action within a favourable organisational fabric for mobilising support is also stressed by the Mobilisation literature. Oberschall notes that

"The presence of numerous organisations ensures a preestablished communications network, resources already partially mobilized, the presence of individuals with leadership skills, and a tradition of participation among members of the collectivity".⁴⁴

Similar arguments are also put forward by Wilson and Orum

and Cameron.⁴⁵ It should be noted that the 'existing organisational network of communication and influence' to which the mobilisation literature refers, encompasses only the negatively privileged groups, 'challengers' in Tilly's terminology,⁴⁶ and not the one dominated by the establishment. However, it relates to our model as far as it stresses the function of political networks and the accessibility of such networks. Naturally it is possible to think of groups the equivalent of 'challengers' in world politics. Some such groups are composed of governments or/and NGOs. Two such examples are the Casablanca Group in the early 1960s and the Arab Rejectionist Front after Camp David.

We have already noted that the United Nations General Assembly and Security Council agendas together with the agendas of regional organisations form our global agenda. We shall therefore place our agenda politics around a quasi-centralised, institutional structure, whose major participants will be international organisations, delegations from member states, NGOs. The basis of this decentralised international structure will be conceived of as the aggregation of the rules of procedures of various multi-lateral bodies, practices and decisions emerging from the interaction of the major participants and the body of law and customs as interpreted and implemented by these participants.

We shall conceive of two types of access to this institutional structure;

i) A direct, formal access by which we mean the capacity for the initiators, in this case the PLO or an indigenous Palestinian representative organisation, to raise the Palestinian issue with a government, a group of governments or an international organisation. The PLO will be considered to have direct access to actors which recognise the PLO as a public body and as the representatives of the Palestinian people. The important effect of this

recognition must be that the PLO acquires the right to raise the Palestinian cause through direct interaction with the actors involved. This in the case of an international organisation can take the form of granting observer status. On the other hand, with a state it can take the form of diplomatic recognition, that entitles the PLO to have access to the government.

ii) Indirect, access occurs when an attempt is made to raise an issue with the assistance of sponsors who have direct access to the process drawing up the global agenda.⁴⁷ These sponsors can be linked to Cobb et al.'s 'identification group'. They define such a group as

"those people who feel strong ties to the originators of an issue and who see their own interest as tied to that of those raising the issue. The members of the identification group are not only the first to be mobilized but are also most likely to support the position of the originators."⁴⁸

It is the role these identification groups play as an access route in raising the Palestinian issue on to the global agenda that will be examined.

Even though these access routes are postulated to play an important role in bringing the Palestinian issue to the attention of world political actors, there is one more explanatory factor that needs to be considered.

3.3.3.3 Linkage

The third and final explanatory factor is the role that establishing linkages between separate issues play in mobilising support for an issue. Cobb et al. suggest that linking an issue with already existing ones and with "emotionally laden symbols" is an important step towards "expanding an issue to new groups".⁴⁹ However, before introducing this variable it should be pointed out that the literature appears to use the linkage concept in, roughly, three contexts.

The linkage concept is most commonly used in the context of

bargaining and negotiations. Prutt notes that parties in a bargaining process may introduce a variety of linkages.⁵⁰ In this context the most familiar bargaining linkage in world politics is probably the one so often associated with H.Kissinger. This is reflected in Kissinger's belief that "every problem between the United States and the Soviet Union was linked with every other problem; and progress on one would effect progress on all".⁵¹ This kind of linkage is regularly demonstrated during the EEC meetings, for example at the summit in December 1984, when various members linked progress on certain issues, such as wine production, fisheries and financial assistance with progress on negotiations for the entry of Spain and Portugal to the EEC.

The concept of linkages is also encountered in efforts to break away from traditional Realist thinking in the study of world politics. According to Rosenau the need to develop the concept "arose of a conviction that students of comparative and international politics were needlessly and harmfully ignoring each other's work".⁵² This conviction culminated in the articulation of the concept of 'linkage politics' that was defined as "any recurrent sequence of behaviour that originates in one system and is reacted to in another".⁵³ The purpose of the concept was to capture the way in which behaviour originating in one political system could influence behaviour in another one. Previously, the assumption that domestic and international politics were distinct and separate would not have allowed the possibility of taking into account the role of the "Jewish lobby" or the "Polish lobby" on US foreign policy behaviour towards the Middle East and the Soviet Union.

It is also possible to talk about linkage or rather cognitive linkage in the context of the perceptual world of political actors. Cognitive linkages acquire particular relevance in the context of the drive individuals feel towards perceptual consistency that induces them to bring

harmony to the great diversity inherent to the empirical world surrounding them. These pressures to achieve cognitive consistency leads individuals to establish growing similarities between certain events or objects.⁵⁴ This enables an individual to force these set of events or objects into pre-existing 'pigeon-holes'. Willetts argues that homologous processes can be assumed to operate at the group level.

"For the group, there is the need to hold the allegiance of its constituent members, to establish a coherent identity and to project a credible view of the world as the basis for appealing for wider support to achieve the group's goal"⁵⁵

This opens the possibility to apply ideas from cognitive consistency theory to actors other than individuals.

Actors perceive the world around them on the basis of a belief/value system they have. It is with the help of this world image - Weltanschauung, ideology, meaning of values and expectations about the world and life in general⁵⁶ - that actors come to evaluate behaviour and interactions around them. Often central to this process are abstract values, that can be represented as political symbols. It is via such abstract values that cognitive linkages (between an issue and a symbol) are formed and more support for an issue is generated. Walsh notes the role that appeal to democratic egalitarianism played in enlisting urban support for the United Farm Workers.⁵⁷ Symbols of equality have also been equally stressed in the growth of support for civil rights and women's liberation movements.⁵⁸ Similar processes are applicable to world politics too,

"The Non-Aligned Movement has long been committed to the hyper-issue of non-use of force in international relations. This provided linkage between Yugoslav and Indian promotion of detente, African fears of South African military might and Arab hostility to Israeli expansionism".⁵⁹

Actors by appealing to such symbols or abstract values will try to recruit more support for their position and try to raise the salience of the issue to other actors.

There is one other kind of cognitive linkage that could occur along the above lines. It happens when actors come to evaluate a new issue by establishing similarities between this new issue and an already recognised-salient issue. A striking example of this process is, "when a 'Declaration on the Struggle for National Liberation' defined Palestine as a colonial question 'exactly the same as the situation in Southern Africa'".⁶⁰ The consequence of such a 'cognitive linkage' is that it will tend to increase the legitimacy of the new issue and link it with an existing pool of support. Simultaneously, being linked to what is regarded as a 'high salience' issue will increase the salience of the new issue to the related actors and hence its potential of being supported for inclusion on the global agenda.

3.3.3.4 The dependent variable, interactions and feedback;

It has already been stated that the raising of an issue to an agenda will be conceived as a result of mobilisation of support and constitutes our dependent variable. The initiators' efforts to raise the issue of concern can be seen in the light of the interaction between the above three factors and a feedback mechanism. The relationship between these factors are of a positive nature. That is an increase in the 'conduciveness of the environment' is expected to effect the level of mobilisation through the other two factors. As the model depicts a 'conductive environment' on its own will not generate support. Instead initiators have to bring up the issue via 'accessibility'. 'Conductive environment' as a variable also affects the 'linkage' variable by making the actors more amenable to perceiving parallels between issues. 'Accessibility', in turn, interacts with the level of mobilised support directly by the initiators or sponsors raising the issue to the attention of would be supporters or indirectly via the 'linkage' variable by arguing or promoting the similarity between their issue and already existing ones.

This interaction amongst the explanatory variables will lead to a level of mobilisation that will be fed into the next round through a feedback mechanism. This attribute of a mobilisation process appears to have first been suggested by Snyder and Kelly, in their 'fully interrelated Model' for the analysis of Mobilisation Processes.⁶¹ The rationale behind a dynamic process they suggest is because

"Social movements and their organizations do not necessarily, or even typically, move through a (nearly) linear sequence in which there is a single outcome (or at most a few). Instead, they are entities that persist through time, during which they continually mobilize resources, apply them in various forms of collective action or "tactics" and experience the consequences of those strategies in a fully interrelated process that also affects subsequent "rounds" of mobilization, action, and outcome."⁶²

In other words, the purpose of the feedback mechanism is to capture the dynamic nature of the process whereby an issue is raised to the agenda as a consequence of 'rounds' of mobilisation. Each 'positive' round leads (i) to the environment becoming more conducive (on top of what may be caused by exogenous factors); (ii) to an increase in accessibility (e.g. one quantum increase would be the result of a shift from an indirect to a direct formal access route); (iii) to linkages growing stronger and culminating in realignments.

The increase in the level of mobilisation at each round will be measured by a 'support' index constructed from data on UN General Assembly voting. Ideally, it would be preferable to think of rounds as a continuous process. However, the model and the accompanying analysis is based on discrete time frames, corresponding roughly to a UN General Assembly session. The construction of the index and the methodological and theoretical problems associated with this exercise are discussed in Appendix I. One major weakness of this index and hence the model is that the analysis is based on data about governmental behaviour. In

consequence it takes the governmental position as given and representing a state's attitude on the matter. Whereas, the state is not a monolithic unit and particularly in the West there will be intra-state actors with conflicting attitudes towards lending support for raising the issue to the agenda. Where possible such occurrences will be pointed out. Elsewhere for all its disadvantages, we shall assume that the position of the government corresponds, roughly, to the aggregation of positions held by all actors within the society together with the government.⁶³

3.3.4 Limitations of the Model

The limitation of such a model is that although the conceptualisation of it, in the sense of identifying the various variables and the relationships between these variables, is reasonably straight forward, to state and test the model in a formal way, in the 'hard science' sense of the word, was problematic. This was because the data concerning 'conducive environment' and 'accessibility'⁶⁴ is difficult to represent in a numeric form. This naturally excluded the possibility of using quantitative methods to examine the impact that these two variables have on the dependent variable, as well as their interaction with the feedback process. However, it was possible to operationalise and construct indices for the other two variables. This made it possible to test the relationship between the 'linkage' variable and the dependent variable, the level of mobilised support. This discrepancy between these two sets of variables prevented us from offering a fully integrated formal model expressed in mathematical terms. As a consequence it became impractical to account for the variance in the dependent variable that could be attributed to each independent variable and the feedback mechanism. It was equally not possible to account for the covariance resulting from the interaction between the independent variables that the model depicts.

These difficulties, in many ways are not much different from the ones inherent in the study of social behaviour. The complexity of social behaviour coupled with the frequent lack of appropriate, reliable data and formal theories from which testable propositions can be derived, continue to leave a lot to be desired. Within the context of these broader limitations the aim of the model was to represent an analytical framework whose theoretical background, central assumptions, concepts and relationships were stated as clearly and as conspicuously as possible. Where possible some of the propositions emerging from the model were statistically tested. The relationships between the parts of the model, that were not amenable to quantitative analysis, and the empirical world was established by, hopefully what still is a reproducible, qualitative analysis. The index associated with the dependent variable made it possible to observe the change in the level of support from one level to the other. Hence opening the possibility for the model to account, albeit not in a formal way, for the impact that one previous level of mobilisation had on the mobilisation process leading to the following level.

ENDNOTES

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- 8 pp.96-102.
- 9 p.94.
- 10 p.96.
- 11 p.99-100.
- 12 p.97.
- 13 p.101. The role of violence in raising the salience of the Palestinian problem is noted in Mansbach and Vasquez (1981) as well as in Mansbach, R., Ferguson, M. and Lampert, D. (eds.) *The Web of Politics* (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1976) pp.104-35. Cobb et al. on the other hand look at the role of violence as an access role at a more general and abstract level, (1976: 131-132).
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- 15 Mansbach and Vasquez, (1981: 58).
- 16 Ibid., p.152.
- 17 See note at the bottom of Ibid., p.152. Wilets, P. in Jones, B. and Wilets, P. *Interdependence on Trial* (Frances Pinter, London, 1984) p.97, too draws attention to Mansbach and Vasquez using 'important actors', 'high status actors' and 'powerful actors' as synonymous to 'major actors'.
- 18 Taylor, T. "Power Politics", in Taylor, T. (ed.) *Approaches and Theory in International Relations*

- (Longman, London, 1978) p.136.
- 19 Keohane, R. and Nye, J. **Power and Interdependence** (Little Brown and Company, Boston, 1977) p.25.
 - 20 For this line of argument see Keohane, R. and Nye, J. **Transnational Relations and World Politics** (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1976); Willetts, P. (ed.) **Pressure Groups in the Global System** (Frances Pinter, London, 1981); Young, O. "The actors in world politics", in Rosenau, J., Davis, V. and East, M. (eds.) **The Analysis of International Politics** (Free Press, New York, 1972).
 - 21 Mansbach and Vasquez, (1981: 68).
 - 22 Willetts, (1984: 97).
 - 23 The role of resources other than economic and military ones can be particularly important if world politics is not seen as dominated by solely one single issue, the struggle for power. In this way one can talk of actors that have issue specific resources. Amnesty International and the Anti-Apartheid Movement are two such actors. On the issue of human rights and apartheid these two actors can rely on resources such as accurate information, high prestige and legitimacy. These resources will play a central role in their efforts to mobilise support for their cause and influence the behaviour of actors including 'economically and militarily strong' ones. For an analysis of a range of resources that enable NGOs to influence world politics see Willetts, P. "The Impact of Promotional Groups on Global Politics", in Willetts (ed.) (1982).
 - 24 Mansbach and Vasquez (1981: 114, 116) and Vasquez, J. and Mansbach, R. "The issue cycle: conceptualizing long-term global political change", **International Organisations** Vol .37 (1983), No.2, p.264.
 - 25 Mansbach and Vasquez note the tendency of such 'high status actors' to be "prone to suppressing or ignoring issues that threaten to 'rock the boat'", (1981: 97).
 - 26 The US government has attached a high salience to the political problems of Central America and particularly those problems arising from a reluctance to accept the nature of the existing Nicaraguan regime. This has culminated in US efforts to gain the support of neighbouring countries to Nicaragua for her policies intended to pressurise the Nicaraguan government to adopt policies more acceptable to the US. One such country is Honduras, however, the Hondurans have openly expressed their discomfort in being associated with behaviour which they believe is branded as illegitimate in "certain international organisations". **The International Herald Tribune**, 12 October 1984.

- 27 Mansbach and Vasquez, (1981: 102).
- 28 See Ibid., pp.102-3 for a discussion of the determinants of issue salience.
- 29 p.110.
- 30 Sauviant, K. **Changing Priorities on the International Agenda**, (Pergamon Press, New York, 1981) p.68 and see also Willetts, P. **The Non-Aligned in Havana**, (Frances Pinter, London, 1981) pp.29-30.
- 31 Willetts, (1984: 97).
- 32 Mansbach and Vasquez suggest that issues go through a life cycle characterised by a number of stages of which one is the decision making stage preceding the authoritative allocation of values. For a discussion of the issue cycle see Mansbach and Vasquez, (1981: 113-124) and Vasquez and Mansbach, (1983: 113-124).
- 33 Vasquez and Mansbach, (1983: 260) and Cobb et al. (1976: 126-139).
- 34 Vasquez and Mansbach, (1983: 260).
- 35 Cobb et al. distinguish between two kinds of agendas. A "public agenda consists of issues which have achieved a high level of public interest and visibility; the formal agenda is the list of items which decision makers have formally accepted for serious consideration", (1976: 126). In their article they do not make the meaning of 'serious consideration' adequately clear. Mansbach and Vasquez seem to interpret it as authoritative allocation of stakes over an issue, (1981: 93). Naturally, if such an interpretation is adopted it becomes rather difficult to determine who the authoritative decision makers in world politics are and also to talk about a 'formal agenda'. The fact that the UN lacks the capability to allocate stakes authoritatively means Mansbach and Vasquez are reluctant to consider the United Nations agendas as formal. However, considering that it is the raising of an issue to an agenda which is of central interest to this research it might be possible to take a different approach. In chapter 2 we have shown that within the Global Politics paradigm there is a general agreement that the kind of issues that are raised, debated and contested at the General Assembly do reflect world opinion. This is also supplemented by the view that the decisions taken within the UN context in the long run do influence world political outcomes particularly when one takes into consideration the legitimising role that the UN plays for a wide variety of issues and issue positions. (This aspect of the UN was first brought up by I. Claude in Claude, I. "Collective Legitimization as a political function of the United Nations",

International Organisation, Vol.10, No.3, pp.367-79. This aspect of UN politics has been given further weight in the introduction of the report prepared by the US President's envoy to the UN, J.Kirkpatrick, **Report to Congress on Voting Practices in the United Nations**, United States Department of State, February 24, 1984). Hence, it seems reasonable to assume that UN agendas can be seen as resembling the 'formal agendas' of Cobb et al..

- 36 Cobb et al., (1976: 126).
- 37 Mansbach and Vasquez, (1981: 94).
- 38 Cobb et al., (1976: 127).
- 39 Oberschall, A. **Social Conflict and Social Movements**, (Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1973) p.125.
- 40 Ibid., p.215.
- 41 Walsh, E. "Mobilization Theory vis-a-vis a Mobilization process: The Case of The United Farmers Workers Movement", in Kriesberg (ed.) **Research in Social Movements, Conflicts and Change Vol.1** (JAI Press, Greenwich, Conn., 1978) p.165.
- 42 Mansbach and Vasquez, (1981: 97).
- 43 See for example Kaufmann's analysis of UN decision making and the kinds of rules that a delegation planning to table a resolution would need to follow for it to stand a chance of consideration let alone its adoption, Kaufmann, J. **United Nations Decision Making**, (Sijthoff and Noordhoff, Alphen and den Rijn, 1980) pp.119-124.
- 44 Oberschall, (1973: 125).
- 45 Wilson, K. and Orum, A. "Mobilizing People for Collective Action", **Journal of Politics and Military Sociology Vol.14** (1976), pp.187-202.
- 46 Tilly, C. "Revolutions and Collective Action", in Greenstein, F. and Polsby, N. (eds.) **Handbook of Political Science Vol.3**, (Reading Mass: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
- 47 Both Gamson, W. in **The Strategy of Social Protest**, (The Dorsey Press, 1975) chp.5-6 and Walsh (1978: 174) stress the role of sponsorship by other organisations in a mobilisation process.
- 48 Cobb et al., (1976: 128).

- 49 Ibid., p.128 and p.131.
- 50 For a detailed discussion of linkage in bargaining and negotiations see Pruitt, D. **Negotiation Behaviour** (Academic Press, New York, 1981) p.158 and Druckman, D. (ed.) **Negotiations: Social-Psychological Perspectives**, (Sage publications, Beverley Hills, California, 1977) and Raiffa, H. **The Art and Science of Negotiations** (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982).
- 51 Kalb, M. and Kalb, B. **Henry Kissinger** (Little Brown, Boston, 1974) p.102.
- 52 Rosenau, J. **The Study of Global Interdependence**, (Frances Pinter, London, 1980) p.180.
- 53 Rosenau, J. (ed.) **Linkage Politics**, (Free Press, New York, 1969) p.44.
- 54 Festinger, A **Theory of Cognitive Dissonance**, (Row Peterson, Evanston, Ill., 1957).
- 55 Willetts, (1984: 88).
- 56 Deutch, K. **Nationalism and Social Communication**, (The M.I.T. Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1966).
- 57 Walsh, (1978: 166).
- 58 For detailed studies of the role of symbols and abstract values in Politics see Elder, C. and Cobb, R. **The Political Use of Symbols**, (Longman, New York, 1983).
- 59 Willetts, (1984: 98).
- 60 Ibid., p.100.
- 61 Snyder, D. and Kelly, W. "Strategies for Investigating Violence and Social Change: Illustrations from Analyses of Racial Disorders and Implications for Mobilization Research" in Zald, M and McCharty, J. **The Dynamics of Social Movements** (Winthrop Publishers, Inc., Cambridge, Mass., 1979) p.220.
- 62 p.219.
- 63 For a discussion of the aggregation concept see Rosenau, (1980: 129-194).
- 64 During the writing of this thesis it has been pointed out that "when the model is applied to the UN as the level of analysis, accessibility can be measured by the number of members in whose capital the PLO has an office." Various problems were encountered in efforts to construct an index of accessibility. On numerous

occasions Palestinian and Arab circles were approached to obtain information on the PLO offices abroad. Similarly attempts were made to circulate a questionnaire to the PLO offices. This questionnaire was designed in such away that it was hoped it would have led to information on not only the location of the PLO offices but also on developments and changes in the diplomatic status of these offices. None of these repeated efforts bore any fruit in the face of an incomprehensible reluctance to help on the part of the above circles. The eventual list of the PLO offices that was compiled relied heavily on a list courteously provided by the research unit of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Although the list obtained from the FCO was expanded and where possible cross checked no adequately reliable and detailed information on the status of the PLO offices could be obtained. Hence, it became rather difficult to distinguish between different levels of PLO representation. Furthermore, where the PLO offices did have a diplomatic status the information remained terribly ambiguous and at times conflicting. For example while Y.Arafat claimed an embassy status for the PLO offices in Athens, the Greek authorities saw this office as having a status equal to Israel's representation which in effect is regarded to be below the rank of a charge d'affaires. In the face of the low level of accuracy and detail in the data it was concluded that no attempt would be made towards an operationalisation of the 'accessibility' variable.

CHAPTER FOUR

MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT AT THE PALESTINIAN LEVEL

4.1 Introduction

The major concern of this chapter is to examine the emergence and consolidation of modern Palestinian nationalism. This however should not be taken to mean that Arab inhabitants of Palestine had not in the past experienced some sense of a national identity. Ovendale notes that as early as 1890s Palestinian Arabs were aware of an Arab awakening against Ottoman rule to assert an independent identity as well as the particular threat caused by the "increasing flow of Jewish settlers" into Palestine.¹ During the period between the defeat of the Ottomans and the establishment of the new post First World War order in the Middle East the Arabs in Palestine had looked towards the short lived rule of Faysal in Syria for their political future.

"But Faysal's fall in July 1920 resulted in a swift reorientation of Palestinian political attention and aspirations. A Palestinian nationalism emerged which was concerned with problems caused by Zionist aspirations, problems that were not faced by the other Arab countries."²

The early Palestinian Arab calls for independence failed and Palestine became a British Mandate with provisions for the establishment of a Jewish homeland. The inability of the Arab and Muslim world to respond in an effective manner to Palestinian Arab calls for support culminated in an increase in resistance activities against the Mandate. This resistance became particularly fierce when Jewish immigration into Palestine grew after Hitler's accession to power.

The Palestinian national identity found expression in this resistance against Jewish immigration and against British rule that facilitated it while denying them independence.

This resistance attained the level of a rebellion in the mid-1930s. The rebellion was suppressed by Britain in a heavy handed manner destroying the local Palestinian political structure.³

In the aftermath of World War II, the Palestinian Arabs were unable to meet the Zionist challenge. As Israel emerged the Palestinian Arabs turned completely to the Arab world for help. However, the failure of Arab governments to prevent the establishment of Israel and the demographic as well as political dislocation caused by the 1948 war left the Palestinian Arabs in a situation even worse than the one after the collapse of their rebellion, just before the Second World War.

Nevertheless, from then on the Palestinian Arabs came to look to the independent Arab world as their means of achieving independence. The growth of the idea of 'Arab unity' and pan-Arabism in the 1950s strengthened the belief that "Palestine was not merely a Palestinian problem: since it was an integral part of the Arab nation, they expected Arabs everywhere to assist in its liberation."⁴

The purpose of this chapter is to examine how, against the above background, support for a separate Palestinian national identity was mobilised. We shall refer to the emergence of this new identity as modern Palestinian nationalism. The period of study will be limited to the 1960s and 1970s. The Palestinian Arab identity that developed during the Mandate period will be assumed to be one belonging to a different historical period and hence of no direct interest to the study of the growth of a separate modern Palestinian Arab consciousness.

In respect to studying how the Palestinians were mobilised to assert and struggle for their independent political identity, the Palestinian community constitutes a unique problem. As a result of the 1948 and 1967 Arab-Israeli wars

the Palestinian community became to a certain degree dispersed. This dispersion for 1977 can be seen in Table 4.1.

West Bank	750,000
Gaza Strip	410,000
Israel	380,000
Jordan	1,100,000
Lebanon	260,000
Syria	180,000
Kuwayt	170,000
Egypt	37,000
Iraq	16,000
Gulf States	18,000
Saudi Arabia	25,000
Libya	7,000
U.S.A	25,000
West Germany	17,000
Latin America	6,000
TOTAL	3,401,000

TABLE 4.1: Estimated Distribution of Palestinians for 1977⁵

Structurally it is possible to talk of a Palestinian community divided into four groups.

- i) Palestinians living within Israel and often referred to as Israeli Arabs,
- ii) Palestinians of the territories occupied since 1967
 - a. in the West Bank
 - b. in the Gaza Strip,
- iii) Palestinians in the numerous refugee camps in the countries neighbouring Palestine,
- iv) Palestinians of the diaspora;
 - a. those living in the Arab world
 - b. those living beyond the Arab world.

To make these distinctions is particularly significant in studying the mobilisation process amongst the Palestinians. The Palestinians in these four groups have been exposed to the mobilisation process in different ways and at different times. While the initiators, in the form of the elite as well as the rank and file of the resistance movement, tended to come mostly from Palestinians in the refugee

camps and those living in the Arab world, the Palestinians living within Israel and outside the Arab world had a more passive role. Similarly, Palestinians living in the refugee camps were more easily accessible to the Palestinian resistance movement, than the Palestinians living in Israel. Hence the Palestinians in the refugee camps were the first ones to lend their support to the resistance movement and later recognise and support the PLO as their representative.

4.2. The emergence of the Palestinian Resistance Movements; The initiators

In studying the emergence of the Palestinian national identity a distinction should be made between the initiators of the mobilisation process and the targets. The initiators constituted the sections of the society that were not content with the prevailing status-quo and were prepared to take measures to bring about change. In this case the initiators were the various groups that made up what is referred to as the Palestinian resistance movement and the early-PLO, as sponsored by the Arab League.

The target, at this level of analysis, is the Palestinian community. The Palestinian community after the traumatic experience of the 1948 war and the establishment of Israel had become dispersed. The indigenous political infrastructure of the Palestinians had been destroyed.⁶ The Palestinians found themselves either under the political rule of Israel or Arab states, or in refugee camps administered by the UNRWA.

Although a very small group of Palestinians remained committed to their national identity as Palestinian Arabs and to the liberation of Palestine, the large majority allowed their struggle and identity to be submerged within the broader concept of Arab unity. The immediate concern of particularly displaced persons became the struggle to

return to their homes.⁷ The larger problem of liberating Palestine from foreign occupation was left to the Arab states.⁸ In the aftermath of the 1967 war, the general feeling amongst many Palestinians was one of helplessness and despair.

4.2.1 The initiators: Al-Fatah

The situation amongst the initiators was different. The first and most important of the initiators was Al-Fatah. The origins of Al-Fatah can be traced back to the mid-1950s to a group of Palestinians that had never relinquished their national identity and their belief in the necessity of liberating Palestine via Palestinian means rather than relying on Arab states.⁹ Yet, throughout the 1950s the attitude of the Palestinians remained mostly sceptical, if not uncommitted to Al-Fatah's ideology.¹⁰ It was in the early 1960s that the situation began to change enabling Al-Fatah to expand its organisational structure and base. These developments reached a particularly critical point in December 1964 when Al-Fatah's military arm mounted its first operation against Israel.

Under the leadership of Arafat Al-Fatah pursued an ideology which simply stressed the nationalist struggle to liberate Palestine without dwelling too deeply on any theoretical speculations about the nature and form of the future Palestinian society.¹¹ The nationalist and uncontroversial nature of Al-Fatah's ideology enabled it to relate to various parts of the Palestinian community as well as some Arab governments. This manifested itself in the growing support that Al-Fatah mobilised both amongst the Palestinians and Arab governments, and culminated in its eventual domination of the PLO after 1969.

4.2.2: The Initiators; PFLP and PDFLP

The first of the two radical Palestinian resistance groups

emerged in late 1967 as a direct result of the June war. The founder of the Popular Front for the Liberation Palestine, G.Habbash, before the 1967 war had been the leader of the radical Arab Nationalist Movement. This organisation had existed for almost two decades within the framework of pan-Arabism and had conceived the liberation of Palestine within the context of an Arab struggle against Zionism and imperialism. However, it was the decisive failure of Arab armies against Israel that forced Habbash to reconsider his position. The ANM was then transformed into a "Palestinian organisation with its 'nationalist' goals recast in a Marxist-Leninist ideological framework".¹²

The PFLP, unlike Al-Fatah, became a group which articulated its ideology to its limits.¹³ The liberation of Palestine was envisaged as part and parcel of a larger revolutionary struggle to transform Arab society along Marxist-Leninist lines. The radical and narrow nature of its ideology limited its base of support mostly to students and intellectuals. However, its preparedness to embark on spectacular acts of international terrorism played a crucial role in bringing the Palestinian problem to the world public agenda. Similarly the impact of this type of violence is noted by Rodinson to have had its share in mobilising not only the Palestinians but also Arab masses.¹⁴

The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine is a smaller group that came to existence as a result of a split from the PFLP in February 1969.¹⁵ Just like Habbash, the background of Hawatmeh, the leader of this group, lies with the ANM. However, the more radical and pro-Soviet position of Hawatmeh culminated in an eventual ideological confrontation between the supporters of Hawatmeh and what they perceived to be the less-revolutionary and moderate section of the PFLP led by Habbash. It was as a result of this conflict that PDFLP

became separated from the PFLP.

Although its ideological arguments have mostly appealed to radical circles amongst Palestinian students abroad¹⁶ in practice it has followed policies more in line with Fatah and the PLO. After the mid-1970s this alliance collapsed when Arafat became increasingly willing to enter into a dialogue with Arab governments, in particular Jordan. The PFLP played a leading role in placing on the Palestinian political agenda the idea of a 'democratic Palestinian state' with Jews and Arabs living along side each other in the late 1960s¹⁷ and then the idea of a 'mini state' in the early 1970s.¹⁸

4.2.3 The Initiators; Arab government sponsored resistance groups

The above two group of initiators were purely Palestinian in the sense that they were established and run by Palestinians without any direct political dependence on any particular Arab government. After it became quite evident that Arab states were not going to get Palestine liberated and the Palestinian resistance movement began to emerge and consolidate itself, some Arab governments felt the need to continue to have some direct influence in Palestinian politics. Syrian and Iraq were two such governments.

Traditionally Syria always had an interest in the politics of Palestine and Lebanon which for Syrians forms an entity known as Greater Syria. Furthermore, the loss of actual Syrian territory during the 1967 war brought the problem of liberating Palestine closer to home. Hence the Baathist regime in 1968 established Al-Saiqa which became the second largest guerrilla organisation after Fatah. It follows a strict Syrian line and reflects the Baathist thinking that dominates the Syrian political scene. This has led Al-Saiqa to envisage a struggle for the liberation of Palestine fought within a pan-Arab movement led by Syria.¹⁹

The Iraqi equivalent of Al-Saiqa is the Arab Liberation Front. The growing rivalry between Iraq and Syria led the new Iraqi Baathist regime to establish ALF in April 1969 to have its own means of influence on the Palestinian resistance movement. Although the ideology of the ALF was very similar to Saiqa in stressing the primacy of Arab unity it never achieved the size of its Syrian rival. Its membership remained mostly Arab rather than Palestinian.²⁰

It is interesting to note that, as a result of Al-Saiqa's and ALF's Baathist backgrounds which uphold pan-Arabism, they remained reluctant to talk about an independent separate Palestinian entity. This is evident in the conspicuous absence of the word 'Palestine' in their names.²¹

4.2.4 The Initiators IV; The PLO

The PLO amongst all the initiators that have been mentioned so far is without any doubt the most important. However, it is important to make a distinction between the PLO from 1964 to 1969 and the PLO thereafter.

The PLO was set up in 1964 by an Arab League decision in response to growing signs of Palestinian unrest. The position of the Arab governments was that a PLO under Arab League supervision would be the best way of satisfying the demands made by an emerging Palestinian national consciousness. Also it was felt that through such an organisation Arab governments could be able to control Palestinian political activities. Hence, it is generally accepted that during Shuikary's leadership the PLO did not attain a great degree of independence in developing and pursuing policies towards the liberation of Palestine. However, in spite of this weakness the PLO between 1964 and 1969 did build the basis of what gradually became a complex political-economic-social organisational entity.

The situation in the aftermath of the 1967 war changed drastically. The resistance activities of various guerrilla organisations, in particular Al-Fatah and the PFLP, gained the increasing support of the Palestinians. The activities of the Palestinian resistance movement reached a turning point when Fatah and to a lesser extent PFLP emerged politically triumphant from a military engagement with Israeli forces near Karamah in March 1968.

This oft cited battle led to a significant increase in support and membership for guerrilla groups. It was in the immediate aftermath of this battle that the agreement to re-allocate the seats at the next Palestine National Council was reached at a meeting between the PLO, Fatah and the PFLP in Beirut. This decision was then formally endorsed by the PLO Executive Committee. This represented a rather formal recognition on the part of the PLO's traditional-moderate leadership of the prestige and support that guerrilla groups had come to enjoy amongst Palestinians.²² However, it was not until the fifth National Council in Cairo in February 1969 that the PLO came under the control of a resistance oriented new leadership, with Arafat as the Chairman.

This new political composition enabled the PLO to have a more effective and central role in mobilising the Palestinians and in expanding its basis of support both at the local and international levels. The PLO became an umbrella organisation for the various guerrilla groups. These groups had direct access to decision making as members of the Executive Committee. The legislative arm, the Palestine National Council, provided a wide range of Palestinian groups from various sections of the Palestinian community with the ability to participate in the decision making process. In turn these various local Palestinian groups represented at the Palestine National Council enabled the PLO to gain access to parts of the Palestinian

community otherwise not directly accessible to it.

In respect to mobilising the Palestinian community the role of the various economic and social-welfare institutions run by the PLO must also be noted. These institutions enabled the PLO to bring day to day services including education and health services to the Palestinian community, in particular to those living in refugee camps. Here it might be possible to draw an analogy to the way in which most modern governments retain their citizens loyalty by, inter alia, providing a variety of public services. However, this analogy has its limits as the PLO does not actually have full mandate over a definite piece of territory instead it has varying degrees of access to parts of the Palestinian community.²³

So far the main initiators were identified in the belief that an awareness of the more central actors will facilitate the application of the model to understand the mobilisation process. However, it should be noted that the initiators that make up the Palestinian resistance movement are not necessarily the actual agents of the overall mobilisation process itself. Instead it might be more appropriate to think of the resistance movement as performing the function of a catalyst in a chemical reaction.²⁴

The fluid, interactive and dynamic nature of the mobilisation process makes it rather difficult to pin with any exactitude a particular point where this stage actually begins. Yet, intuitively it can be said that once protest groups emerge as a response to demands for change, these groups will articulate their objectives and policies to bring about the desired change. It is in their attempt to achieve their objectives that the need to acquire the support of outside or identification groups will become important. In the case of this study the primary identification groups or targets for the Palestinian

resistance movement was the Palestinian community.

4.3 The mobilisation process

In the coming sections the model depicting the mobilisation process will be applied to the emergence of the Palestinian national identity. The first set of outcomes from the mobilisation process will be the formation of the various groups that make up the Palestinian resistance movement. The second set of outcomes of interest to this study will be the growing support for the Palestinian national identity received from various parts of the Palestinian community. This will be seen mostly as a result of the Palestinian resistance movement's efforts to aggregate support for the expression of the Palestinian national identity through the liberation of Palestine and the establishment of a Palestinian state.

However, although the emergence of initiators relatively easy to follow the something can not be said about the mobilisation of Palestinian support for the Palestinian resistance movement and the PLO. This is mainly the result of a measurement problem caused by the absence of publicly and practically available data to construct reliable and valid indices to measure growth in Palestinian support. The lack of data such as regular and systematically taken public opinion polls, election results, membership and financial contributions to guerrilla groups makes it difficult to develop measurable indicators of support.

Therefore the growth or change in the levels of support for the Palestinian cause, as represented by the Palestinian resistance movement and the PLO, will be established mostly by indirect indicators such as speeches made by public persons and written documentation. The drawback of this is that the analysis based on such indirect indicators can not achieve the thoroughness and reliability of an analysis based on reproducible indices constructed from

systematically and exhaustively collected hard data. Furthermore, such analysis will only point towards trends in change and will provide neither the rate nor the amount of change.

4.3.1 Conducive Environment

This part of the mobilisation process accounts for certain external and structural changes central to the emergence of the modern Palestinian identity. It has already been noted that throughout the 1950s the Palestinian community remained in a state of passiveness. The political structure of the community had collapsed and most Palestinians had come in one way or the other under the rule of other states. Furthermore, to this the disruption caused by the displacement of a large number of Palestinians must be added.

This state of affairs within the Palestinian community produced a situation receptive to Nasser's newly revitalised idea of Arab unity. Nasser had become successful in articulating the ideology of Arab nationalism that was to be expressed in Arab unity. Nasser's success in nationalising the Suez Canal followed by the declaration of Union in 1958 between Egypt and Syria were seen as the tangible fruits of his struggle for Arab unity. Naturally, in such an environment dominated by pan-Arabism and the charismatic leadership of Nasser, the Palestinians strongly identified themselves with the Arab world. "In the eyes of the Palestinian masses Nasser was the only horizon".²⁵ The Palestinians came to accept and even stress their Arab identity. It was through this identity that they saw the liberation of their land. This was, for example, symbolically demonstrated in the request of Haji Hussein, the head of the Arab Higher Committee, to join the United Arab Republic.

In the early 1960s a series of events appears to have

created a situation favourable for a sustained mobilisation process to begin within the Palestinian community. One of the first events to have significant consequences for the emergence of Palestinian nationalism was the break-up of the union between Egypt and Syria. Nasser had spent a good part of the 1950s promoting his revitalised ideology of pan-Arab nationalism. In the 1950s this ideology found a wide range of followers from all corners of the Arab world.

It played a central role in bringing about significant political changes in many Arab countries. However, it was not until 1958 that pan-Arabism as a transnational force achieved something tangible in the struggle towards Arab unity. Hence, when in February 1958 Egypt and Syria announced the establishment of the United Arab Republic this was hailed as a major step towards Arab unity. In Palestine it carried particular significance as the liberation of Palestine had always been envisaged within the context of the struggle for Arab unity. Yet as the union came to an end in September 1961, the particular symbolic importance that the Palestinians had given to the union led them to begin to question their belief in the liberation of Palestine through Arab unity.²⁶

The collapse of the union was soon followed by the independence of Algeria in July 1962. The significance of this event for the Palestinians stemmed from the fact that the liberation of Algeria was seen as the product of a revolutionary-nationalist armed struggle. The Algerians had achieved their independence as a result of purely nationalist struggle outside the context of pan-Arabism. The Algerian example, in some ways, gave the Palestinians the possibility of countering the disappointment caused by the break down of the only tangible evidence of the successful struggle for Arab unity. And in its place offered an example for an alternative but successful liberation ideology.

Historically a less spectacular but nevertheless significant event, from at least the Palestinian point of view, occurred in January 1964 at the very same Arab summit that led the way to the eventual establishment of the PLO. Arab states had been unable or unwilling to take any effective counter-measures against Israeli efforts to divert the Jordan river, in spite of their repeated promises and their announcement that "the battle of the Jordan river is a part of the Battle of Palestine".²⁷ Their hesitancy took a particularly conspicuous form when the first Arab summit voted not to engage in a war with Israel over the Jordan river diversion scheme.²⁸ The diversion programme itself was perceived by the Palestinians as an act of aggression committed against their homeland.²⁹ It is to some extent in defiance of the Arab leaders inability to respond to the diversion scheme that Al-Fatah mounted its first operation against an Israeli irrigation installation.³⁰

The last, but in its implications the most significant, event to contribute to an environment favourable to the mobilisation of the Palestinians was the defeat of the Arab armies in 1967 and the consequent acceptance by Egypt and Jordan of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 242, which referred to the Palestinians simply as refugees. During the period preceding the 1967 war Arab leaders, in particular Nasser, had repeatedly stressed the preparations being made to liberate Palestine. However, after the defeat of the Arab armies in June 1967 a growing number of Palestinians joined ranks with those who had already been, for some time, arguing the need for a national armed struggle to liberate Palestine. As a PLO official notes "By the defeat of 1967, the Arab governments had forfeited all claims to speak or negotiate on behalf of the Palestinian people".³¹

Egypt and Jordan's acceptance of Resolution 242 and later on their willingness to participate in negotiations around

the Roger's plan in July 1970 was more than enough to convince even the sceptics that there should be an alternative to relying on Arab governments for the liberation of Palestine. It had become quite evident that these governments were not going to put Palestine before national considerations. This belief was once more reinforced when Jordan mounted an operation to eradicate the Palestinian resistance movement from Jordan while Arab governments remained relatively passive.³²

In the literature concerning this subject these events are widely referred to as factors that appear to have brought about the emergence of the Palestinian national identity.³³ There seems to be one major problem inherent in such an analysis of the relationship between these events and the growth in Palestinian consciousness. Such an analysis tends to assume that these events had a direct and uniform impact in getting the Palestinian Arab community as a whole to raise its Palestinian consciousness. The relationship between the occurrence of these events and the emergence of a widely felt Palestinian national identity is not necessarily a direct and uniform one. Such an analysis remains rather static and unable to account for the fact that the interaction between these events and the growth of Palestinian consciousness was a dynamic and an indirect one.

The analytical model presented in chapter three opens the possibility of conceptualising the emergence of the Palestinian national identity as a result of a dynamic and complex mobilisation process. It is within the context of the first element of this model, the 'conducive environment', that the impact of these events on the mobilisation process should be seen. They were events that took place at different points in time and signalled a growing need amongst Palestinians to reconsider the prevailing attitudes towards the question of the liberation of Palestine.

4.3.1.1 Conducive environment and the emergence of the Palestinian resistance movement

One point to bear in mind is that as a result of the dynamic nature of the relationship between the two phenomena, the form of the response to these signals differed depending on when and where the response came from. At the very early stages of the mobilisation process the initial response was in the form of the emergence of indigenous Palestinian political organisations, that earlier on were introduced as initiators. However, these organisations did not emerge all at the same time and also they did not have the same kind of response to the mobilisation support for the liberation of Palestine.

Al-Fatah and the early-PLO entered the Palestinian scene in the early 1960s. It was the collapse of the union between Egypt and Syria, and the success of the Algerian revolution that began to lend credibility to Fatah's argument for the need to liberate Palestine through a Palestinian led armed struggle.³⁴ Until then these ideas professed by Fatah had been received only with suspicion.³⁵ On the other hand while Fatah was led by a radical-nationalist Palestinian leadership the early-PLO was founded and led by a conservative Palestinian elite, closely associated with the Arab governments. Hence as a result of this conservative leadership coupled with Arab governments control, the PLO at this time could not envisage the liberation of Palestine by means that would be unwelcome to the Arab governments.

The other major Palestinian political organisations emerged only later on, as a result of the final blow inflicted by the 1967 war on pan-Arab thinking in the liberation of Palestine. The guerrilla organisations that came to existence in the aftermath of the war developed a different approach to the problem of Palestine. PFLP, PDFLP and Al-Saiqa were such organisations. While the PFLP and later the

PDFLP professed strongly Marxist-revolutionary ideologies in respect to the liberation of Palestine, they were different from Al-Saiqa because of their independent Palestinian basis. Overall, these groups compared to the Fatah and the PLO had a relatively different response to the Palestinian problem.

The 1967 war had its own impact on the already existing Palestinian organisations too. Al-Fatah was able to expand its resistance operation as it gained access to growing volunteers from refugee camps freshly swollen with a new wave of refugees. On the other hand the inability of the PLO's conservative leadership to promote any effective resistance operations culminated in the eventual transfer of power to the armed-struggle oriented guerrilla organisations. The PLO under its new leadership was then able to develop and consolidate an organisational framework that in itself could be utilised to the mobilisation process.

As has been pointed out the above series of events had their impact in generating a response from within the Palestinian community that culminated in the emergence and growth of the Palestinian resistance movement loosely organised under the umbrella of the PLO. Another way of describing this interaction could be by seeing the above series of events as highly salient external inputs into the Palestinian system. These inputs then precipitated developments that brought about an organisational structure to the Palestinian community that came to play a central role in the mobilisation process. The picture, however, would not be complete without mentioning a number of other contributory factors that made possible the emergence of an environment successful for starting and perpetuating a mobilisation process.

The Palestinian community during the 1950s was characterised by socio-political attributes associated with

traditional societies. The leadership remained split usually along the lines of two prominent notable families. This made the development of a unified approach to the Palestinian problem difficult.³⁶ At least in practice this leadership remained status-quo oriented and was strongly aligned with the Egyptians in Gaza and with the Jordanians in the West Bank. However, a process of modernisation, to large extent attributable to UNRWA's educational programmes³⁷ and to Israel's direct influence,³⁸ precipitated changes in the social-political structure of the Palestinian community both inside and outside Israel.

Most influenced by this modernisation process was a new generation of young people in whose eyes the authority and legitimacy of the traditional leadership became gradually eroded. Hence the modernisation process not only planted the seeds of a new leadership independent of traditional social-political ties but it also caused at least a section of the Palestinian community to become more receptive to modern nationalist approaches.³⁹

Finally the 1967 war affected the Palestinian community in two more ways which did have some implications for the mobilisation process. The war created another wave of refugees most of them suffering the frustration of having been displaced twice in a life time. This did generate, especially amongst the young, a mood of defiance, ready to question the credibility of the idea of relying on Arab governments to liberate Palestine. Furthermore, as a consequence of the war a large proportion of the Palestinian community became territorially re-united.⁴⁰ This brought the possibility of direct interaction between the various sections of the Palestinian community that previously had remained isolated from each other.

These last set of factors must be seen in the context of the earlier series of events and the emergence of the Palestinian resistance movement. The 'conducive

environment' should then be seen as the end result of the dynamic interaction between these three sets of factors; the weakening of pan-Arabism as a means of liberating Palestine, the changes within the Palestinian community and the defeat of Arab armies in 1967. It is this interaction that constitutes the 'conductive environment'. The 'conductive environment' a part of the mobilisation process that on its own does mobilise a certain level of support, for the Palestinian cause. This level of support is represented by the emergence of various guerrilla groups and their supporters.

Although difficult to capture in any tangible form the role of the feed-back mechanism must also be kept in mind. Once the 'conductive environment' generates a certain level of support for the Palestinian cause, at this particular stage represented by the emergence of guerrilla groups, the feed-back mechanism performed a positive loop and made the 'conductive environment' even more favourable leading to the emergence of other participants. For the further expansion of this support to cover growing sections of the Palestinian community one must examine the role of the two other elements of the mobilisation process.

4.3.2 Cognitive linkages

In chapter three while introducing the mobilisation process model it was argued that initiators (protest groups) in an effort to mobilise support try to establish linkages or similarities between their movement and already existing prestigious movements and ideas. Such linkages or efforts appear to perform two functions.

Firstly, cognitive linkages are useful in assisting the development and articulation of a group ideology. The role of ideologies are central to any actor that has to mobilise support. It helps the actor to interpret one particular situation, determine its goals and develop policies in an

attempt to achieve these goals.⁴¹ The nature and level of articulation inherent in an ideology with which an actor works will to a certain degree influence the mobilisation of support within and outside the group.⁴²

Secondly cognitive linkages also provide an effective way of expanding a movement's basis of support. One of the primary ways of expanding one's basis of support is to persuade potential supporters of the just nature of one's cause. The likelihood of receiving such support is to some degree enhanced if the applicability of certain symbols (values) and existence of similarities between one's own cause and widely supported other causes can be demonstrated. Once a successful linkage has been established the initiator can benefit from an already existing pool of support mobilised by an established movement or accruing to a prestigious symbol.

Literature on cognitive dissonance points out the need that individuals feel to bring some form of structure and harmony to their perceived world. This structure and harmony is achieved by maintaining and working within the realm of cognitives structures or world views.⁴³ Hence, an individual confronted with a situation demanding a change in his attitude towards a certain issue is more likely to make this change if he can establish a degree of congruence between the cognitive structure that he works with and the new demand being made on his assessment of a situation. It is at this point that cognitive linkages can play an important role by enabling the individual to establish relationships between various concepts, which previously had been ignored or not seen as being related to more central concepts. Although this is a process that takes place at the individual level it has been argued that homologous processes at group level are also possible.⁴⁴ This opens up the possibility of suggesting a similar mechanism for the role of cognitive linkages affecting actors other than individuals.

In respect to the mobilisation process amongst the Palestinians one can observe the role of cognitive consistency in two closely related areas. The first and in some ways the most interesting one is the attempts to decouple the role of pan-Arabism from the liberation of Palestine. The second area in which cognitive linkages were used was in developing a new approach for the liberation of Palestine.

It was earlier on pointed out that the majority of the Palestinians during the 1950s looked to Arab capitals, in particular to Cairo, for their liberation. The liberation of Palestine was tightly bound with the struggle for Arab unity. With the exception of the early supporters of Al-Fatah, the attitude of the remaining Palestinians towards their homeland was determined by pan-Arabism. The Palestinians participated in the politics of Arab nationalism with enthusiasm.⁴⁵ The consequence of the strength of this pan-Arabist hold on Palestinians was that it created a situation whereby Palestinian efforts and energies were drawn away from their Palestinian identity towards the enhancement of Arab unity.⁴⁶

The first changes⁴⁷ in this state of affairs began to occur in the early 1960s and were reflected in an interesting way during the adoption of the PLO Covenant. The draft constitution of the PLO as prepared by Shukairy referred to the Palestinians throughout the text as 'Palestinians' or the 'Palestinian people'.⁴⁸ The use of the label 'Palestinian people' instead of 'Palestinian Arabs' or the more distant 'Arabs of Palestine' can be regarded as the expression of an independent Palestinian identity. This argument in some ways is clearly supported by the manner in which the final text differed from the first draft. The text, when it was finally adopted as the National Covenant of the PLO, had seen a number of changes that may well reflect the conflict between a Palestinian identity and pan-Arabism. The final text referred to the 'Palestinian

Arab people' instead of the 'Palestinian people'. Suggesting a possible compromise between the latter label and 'Arabs of Palestine' or 'Palestinian Arabs'. The final text also included clear references to Arab unity and the role of Arab unity in the liberation of Palestine.⁴⁹

Al-Fatah had always been stressing the primacy of Palestinian interests and the role of a national armed struggle. The influence of Al-Fatah's thinking together with the mood created after the 1967 defeat of Arab armies reflected itself in the adoption of the new Palestinian National Covenant at the 4th PNC in July 1968.⁵⁰ Although the new Covenant continued to refer to the 'Palestinian Arab people' it included a series of new articles that stressed the importance of the Palestinian 'national' liberation struggle.⁵¹ A much stronger Palestinian identity was expressed in Al-Fatah's seven point policy outline adopted by its Central Committee in January 1969.⁵² It referred to the 'Palestinian people' and its liberation struggle although some lip service was also paid to the distant objective of a 'progressive and united Arab society'.

However, the idea of Palestinian nationalism did not receive instant support amongst Palestinians. This is quite evident in West Bank demonstrations that continued to stress an Arab rather than a Palestinian identity by continuing to use slogans supportive of Nasser and Arab unity.⁵³ It is at this point that another set of cognitive linkages played an important role in mobilising support for an indigenous Palestinian identity and struggle. Al-Fatah as well as radical groups such as the PFLP and PDFLP used the Algerian and Vietnamese national liberation struggles as examples to improve their arguments. Parallels were drawn between the Palestinian situation and the situation in Algeria and Vietnam to gain support for a Palestinian national struggle. "An important factor in the Palestinian move for the 'repalestinization' of the conflict was the

influence of the Algerian War".⁵⁴

These Palestinian groups also came to stress the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist nature of the Palestinian struggle in an attempt to increase the prestige of an argument favouring a Palestinian national struggle. This is evident in the 1969 Fatah programme which stated that,

"The struggle of the Palestinian people, like that of the Vietnamese people and other peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America, is part of the historic process of the liberation of the oppressed peoples from colonialism and imperialism".⁵⁵

Fatah was not the only group to exploit the concept of anti-imperialism. The PFLP and PDFLP too employed this concept to articulate their ideology, which was heavily influenced by Marxist and Leninist thinking. In both cases the Algerian and Vietnamese struggles were portrayed as anti-imperialist struggles and similarities were drawn between these struggles and the need for a revolutionary struggle for the liberation of Palestine.

Prior to 1967 most Palestinians held images of themselves as Arabs. In the minds of these Palestinians the equating of a Palestinian identity to an Arab one and the stressing of Arab nationalism and unity as a source of strength for liberating Palestine formed a cognitively consistent whole. However, a series of events in particular the 1967 war steadily increased the stress on this cognitive structure and eroded its consistency to the point where the liberation of Palestine became only possible to visualise by stressing a separate Palestinian identity.

Hence, the de-linking of the Palestinian identity and the liberation of Palestine from Arab nationalism and the struggle for Arab unity was a crucial step in bringing about the necessary conceptual modifications in Palestinian cognitive structures. It was these conceptual modifications that helped to bring about the change in Palestinian attitudes towards their own identity and towards the way to

express this identity. The arguments that precipitated this process of cognitive change was aided by references to successful liberation struggles such as Algeria, Cuba etc... and to concepts such as anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism. The references to the Algerian struggle lend credibility to the idea of waging a successful armed struggle. The above two concepts helped Palestinians to place an indigenous struggle to liberate Palestine into a broader world view.

4.3.3 Accessibility

During the building of the mobilisation process model it was argued that access to the political decision making processes and agendas of actors play an important role in drawing attention to an issue and in aggregating support for it. It was argued that initiators in their efforts to raise an issue try to gain access to the public and/or formal agendas of political actors. Initiators achieve this by means of direct or indirect access to the actors and by employing methods ranging from lobbying to terrorism.

Earlier in this chapter the various members of the Palestinian resistance movement and the PLO were presented as the initiators. Their aim, inter alia, was to raise the national consciousness of the Palestinians and mobilise amongst the Palestinian community support for their struggle to liberate Palestine. The Palestinian community at large constituted the major target for the initiators.

4.3.3.1 Violence as an access route

Table 4.2 depicts the various access routes employed by the Palestinian resistance movement and the PLO in their efforts to reach and mobilise support from the Palestinian community. Although in the late 1970s Palestinian violence directed towards other Palestinian groups or individuals did occur, there were no such reported attempts in the

1970s to intimidate the Palestinian community to support the Palestinian cause. The role of violence in mobilising the Palestinian community was of an indirect nature. In the sense that once the Palestinian guerrilla groups emerged with the intention of liberating Palestine by fighting a popular war, the armed struggle directed towards Israel had a spill over effect in bringing about a change in Palestinian attitudes. This particular role of violence in the mobilisation of the Palestinians is noted by Frangi, a PLO official, in his description of the position of the leadership of Fatah on armed struggle.⁵⁶

	violent means	non-violent means
Direct access	local coercion	organisational access
Indirect access	attacks on Israel international terrorism	access via proxy organisations

TABLE 4.2 Matrix of access routes to the Palestinians

The literature looking at the growth of Palestinian consciousness too notes this particular role of the armed struggle against Israel.⁵⁷ However, the lack of publicly available systematically collected data on armed guerrilla operations and the growth of Palestinian national consciousness precludes the possibility of establishing a statistically supported relationship. Hence, most of the analysis on this relationship relies on partially available data and impressions derived from existing interviews and news reports.

Nevertheless, Hudson does demonstrate in a relatively tangible manner the impact of armed operations on the growth of guerrilla membership.

"Before the June war, according to a reliable Palestinian source, Fatah numbered no more than 200-300 men; by the time of the Karameh battle it had increased to around 2000; but in three months

following the Karamah battle it had burgeoned to 15000".⁵⁸

Other scholars too have noted the impact of armed struggle, particularly of the Karamah battle of March 1968, on enrolments of Palestinians to guerrilla organisations.⁵⁹ It should be relatively safe to say that this growth in membership to guerrilla groups does to a certain extent reflect the growing support enjoyed by the Palestinian resistance movement, at least amongst young Palestinians. Whether the Palestinian resistance movement's armed struggle against Israel did also bring the new line of thinking for the liberation of Palestine closer to the Palestinian community at large, is naturally more difficult to establish.

The same literature also notes the impact that international terrorism appears to have had on Palestinian attitudes towards their national identity. Although, Fatah limited its operations to Palestine, the PFLP, as a result of its more radical and revolutionary ideology took its armed violence to the international arena. The purpose was not simply to weaken Israel and attract world attention but also mobilise Arab support for the Palestinian cause.⁶⁰ The spectacular PFLP terrorist operations in the late 1960s and early 1970s did bring the Palestinian problem to the world public agenda even though at the cost of Western outrage but more importantly caught the imagination of Arab masses.⁶¹ The Palestinian cause as a result of these dramatic events reached practically every household exposed to the mass media.

4.3.3.2 Non-violent access routes

Violence was not the only way that the Palestinian resistance movement gained access to the Palestinian community and mobilised their support. Al-Fatah soon after the 1967 war began to develop an infra-structure to cater

for the health and welfare needs of the Palestinians particularly in refugee camps. Once the PLO came under the control of the Palestinian guerrilla groups, and despite the damage inflicted by the Jordanian civil war in 1970-71, the organisational structure providing these services continued to grow. The PLO through these facilities influenced the education programmes run by United Nations Relief and Work Agency, ensured the physical security of Palestinian refugee camps, ran commercial ventures providing jobs for Palestinians and provided funds for its welfare programmes. This complex organisational structure gave the PLO growing access to the Palestinian community in the refugee camps and other areas not under the control of Israel.⁶²

However, these activities did not remain restricted to the Palestinian community to which the PLO had direct access. The 10th PNC in April 1972 stressed the importance of organisational assistance to education, welfare and cultural institutions in the occupied territories in increasing the Palestinian awareness of their identity.⁶³ The PLO particularly after its 13th PNC in March 1977 has also channelled funds to various municipalities in an attempt to decrease their dependence on Israel. A variety of social bodies, such as women's associations and the Palestinian Red Crescent, have also received PLO funds. Their role is seen in the light of nation building

"strengthening, deepening, and solidifying the identification of the Palestinian people with the Palestinian nation as a whole and with the goals of the Palestinian nationalist movement".⁶⁴

Probably the most important institution within the PLO's that enables it to gain access to the Palestinian community at large is the PNC. Recognised as the supreme legislative body of the PLO, PNC meetings are held at approximately annual intervals.⁶⁵ It brings together usually more than 200 Palestinians in their capacity as representatives of various parts of the Palestinian

community as well as various organisations ranging from guerrilla groups to student associations. PNC meetings allow Palestinians representing all sections of the Palestinian community, including those from outside the Middle East, to deliberate over wide ranging issues and adopt binding decisions. It is through the members of the PNC that the PLO achieves political access to various parts of the Palestinian community and ensures the implementation of decisions adopted by the PNC.⁶⁶

The Palestinians in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Israel are not directly accessible to the PLO. Although groups from the Palestinian resistance movement have mounted armed operations, the PLO can not maintain direct organisational existence in these areas. Instead during the 1970s a variety of organisations have come to represent the views of the PLO, allowing the PLO to reach these communities indirectly.

Both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip throughout the 1950s and the 1960s had remained under the administrative control of a traditional leadership strongly attached to the Jordanian and Egyptian regimes.⁶⁷ It was not until early 1973 that the PLO made a formal attempt to build a political network to reach the Palestinian community in the occupied territories. In August 1973 the Palestine National Front was formed to act as an organisational framework to coordinate nationalist forces in the occupied territories with full allegiance to the PLO.⁶⁸ The unwillingness of Jordan to enter the 1973 war strengthened the hand of the PNF. The support that the PNF enjoyed was demonstrated by the readiness of Palestinians from the occupied territories to join strikes and demonstrations to disrupt Israel's war efforts.⁶⁹

The PNF activists who were expelled from the occupied territories after the war were incorporated into the PLO.⁷⁰ This enabled the maintenance of close ties between the PLO

and the PNF supporters in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The growth in the PLO's influence in the occupied territories was consolidated when candidates affiliated with the PNF won a substantial majority during the local elections in April 1976.⁷¹ These results in a conspicuous manner confirmed the end of the conservative and traditional rule practiced by the notable families.⁷² Although not in a direct manner both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip had become reasonably accessible to the PLO.

The Palestinians in Israel, on their part, had remained politically passive with strong pressures for assimilation. The limited political participation that did take place was in an environment that lacked institutions encouraging Israeli-Arabs to join in politics in any effective way.⁷³ The sole exception to this state of affairs was the Israeli Communist Party (Maqi), which was founded after the 1948 war by Palestinian Arabs and anti-Zionist Jews. It had recognised the Palestinians right to self-determination as early as October 1949 opening the possibility of some Arab participation.⁷⁴ In 1965 the New Communist List, Rakah, split from Maqi which became an all-Jewish Communist Party.⁷⁵ It was after this development that Israeli-Arabs began to participate in political party politics in a more active manner.⁷⁶

Rakah, notes Gilmour, "is the only political party which represents the Arabs in Israel at a national level and which is prepared to fight for their rights."⁷⁷ It has received increasing support from the Arabs at the cost of the Israeli Labour Party, which has usually been associated with local traditional leadership.⁷⁸ Rakah is also an active participant to the Democratic Front for Peace and Equality which recognises the Palestinian people's right to self-determination and the PLO as their representative.⁷⁹ The existence of relations between the PLO and Rakah, since 1977, has probably enabled the PLO to gain some degree of accessibility to the Palestinians in

As the above analysis points out during the early stages of the mobilisation period the use of violence appears to have played an indirect but important role in bringing the Palestinian cause to the attention of the Palestinian community. This period was one when actions spoke louder than words in raising the political consciousness of the Palestinian community. It was only in the aftermath of this period that non-violent politics began to play an increasing role in expanding and strengthening the Palestinian national identity. However, it would be wrong to think that these two stages were completely separate from each other. It is better to conceptualise two stages that significantly overlapped, with each stage being dominated by one or the other form of access routes.

4.3.4 The Output; Growth of support

Four points need to be stressed in respect to the growth of Palestinian support for the Palestinian cause. Firstly, the growth of support was not uniform throughout the Palestinian community. Secondly, the three set of factors that have just been studied influenced parts of the Palestinian community at different rates. Thirdly, the role of the feedback mechanism must be kept in mind. Finally, the mobilisation process within the Palestinian community is treated in isolation from similar process outside it. The role of the interactions between the mobilisation processes at different levels will be introduced at a later stage.

It was, earlier on pointed out that with the exception of the founders of Al-Fatah and a number of student groups in Egypt the rest of the Palestinian community did not stress their national identity. Hence, it is not surprising that as the Arab environment began to become favourable for the mobilisation process to start, it was Al-Fatah who first

responded to it. Although growing number of smaller guerrilla groups, mostly supported by Arab states, joined Al-Fatah and similarly Palestinian workers and students organisations, particularly in Europe, lent their support to Al-Fatah, its views continued to raise suspicion until after the June war.⁸¹ Al-Fatah's difficulty in making some headway can be attributed to the formation of the PLO in 1964 by the Arab League. By this move the Arab governments although recognising the Palestinian identity, were able to perpetuate the role of Arab unity in the struggle to liberate Palestine.

Just prior to the 1967 war it would be very difficult to talk about a broad basis of national awareness amongst Palestinians, let alone support for the Palestinian cause. However, in the immediate aftermath of the war the situation began to change significantly. The impact of the Arab armies defeat on pan-Arabism showed itself in the emergence of a new guerrilla leadership with radical ideologies. The growth in the number of refugees on the other hand provided a pool of recruits for these guerrilla groups. The battle of Karamah in March 1968 became a landmark as violence directed towards Israel increased the awareness of the Palestinian national identity.

However, in the late 1960s the emergence of a Palestinian identity remained rather limited to the formation and consolidation of the Palestinian resistance movement. Even though the size and activities of the Palestinian resistance movement grew, as the PLO came under the control of Palestinian guerrilla groups and began to consolidate itself in refugee camps in Jordan and Lebanon,⁸² the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause had not yet made any substantial progress in the occupied territories and amongst the Palestinians in Israel. The West Bank and the Gaza Strip appeared to be still under the influence of pan-Arabism as a number of pro-Nasser demonstrations in 1968 and 1969 seem to

indicate.⁸³ Furthermore, the traditional Palestinian leadership in the West Bank not only remained intact but also tended to take an apologetic stand on Palestinian resistance activities and favour deals with Israel.⁸⁴ As late as in 1972 the strength of the traditional leadership's grip on the West Bank is probably best captured by the very high turnout of the Palestinian electorate at the mayoral elections in March, despite the call for a boycott by the PLO.⁸⁵

Nevertheless it was in the early 1970s that the signs of support for the Palestinian cause in the occupied territories began to surface in a conspicuous manner. The early 1970s was a period marked by dramatic events such as the death of Nasser, the spectacular Palestinian violence at the international level, the Jordanian civil war, and the Israeli and Lebanese attacks on the Palestinian resistance movement in South Lebanon. In the aftermath of these events the mood of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip residents towards their Palestinian national identity is best demonstrated in the way they reacted to the assassination of three PLO leaders by Israel in April 1973.

"The reactions to the killings were ... significant because they were so general. There were manifestations of grief and condemnations in all towns and areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, while nearly a quarter of a million Palestinians and Arabs marched behind the coffins of the three leaders in Beirut. The Palestinian people, both inside and outside the occupied homeland, seemed moved by the same feelings of unity, suffering and aspirations to a common future."⁸⁶

This particular event was not the only one to point towards a strong Palestinian national identity in the occupied territories. The establishment of the pro-PLO PNF, its role in organising the Palestinians against Israel's efforts during the October war, and the pro-PLO demonstrations the day Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly in November 1974 are all indicative of the same phenomenon.⁸⁷ The Israeli media too recognised these

developments even before the October war. The Israeli daily Maariv after the October war noted and commented on the political developments in support of the PLO in the occupied territories.⁸⁸ This pro-PLO mood surfaced again when Sadat made his peace initiative with Israel. This move triggered student demonstrations in the West Bank against Sadat⁸⁹ and led the West Bank mayors to support the PLO's criticisms of Sadat.⁹⁰ Sadat attempts to lobby for support for his initiative in the occupied territories met little success. The only people to respond were some notables which the Israeli daily Haretz chose to refer to as "third rate personalities".⁹¹

However, the most decisive indicator of this strong Palestinian national consciousness and pro-PLO feelings in the occupied territories came in April 1976 at the local elections in the West Bank. The results of these elections were generally recognised as a referendum giving the PLO the mandate to represent the political aspirations of the Palestinians to express their national identity in a Palestinian state.⁹²

The Palestinians in Israel were probably the last to become mobilised. In this the traditional nature of the dominant leadership played an important role. It was a leadership that showed a readiness to work with Israeli political parties not necessarily receptive to the idea of a separate Palestinian identity. The lack of Arab political institutions until the late 1960s was another factor that contributed to their passive mood. However, this began to change by the late 1960s and Rakah appears to have played a significant role in this. It is generally assumed that the gradual shift in the Arab vote since the early 1970s in favour of a political party supportive of Palestinian political rights and the PLO is a reasonable indication of growing Palestinian consciousness and support for the PLO amongst Israeli Arabs.

The Palestinian national identity became completely consolidated by the mid-1970s. This was as a result of a decade long mobilisation process. It was the emergence of a Palestinian resistance movement that constituted the first signs of a Palestinian national consciousness that had remained dormant for more than a decade. The first groups to be mobilised were young recruits to the guerrilla groups from the many refugee camps. Soon the PLO began to consolidate its authority and legitimacy within refugee camps in the Lebanon and Jordan. From the early 1970s, the Palestinians of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip began to become aware of their Palestinian national identity and support the Palestinian cause in great numbers. By 1976 it had become generally accepted that the Palestinians at large regarded the PLO as their representative and supported PLO's efforts to express the Palestinian national identity in the establishment of a Palestinian state.

So far the mobilisation process amongst the Palestinians has been studied in isolation from its Arab and larger environment. The following section will examine the gradual recognition of a separate Palestinian national identity by Arab governments and the PLO's efforts to consolidate itself as 'the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.' The study of the mobilisation process at the Arab governmental level should also prepare the way for a concluding analysis looking at the interactive nature of the mobilisation process influencing the growth of support at different levels of analysis.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Ovendale, R. **The Origins of the Arab-Israeli Wars** (Longman, London, 1984) p.10.
- 2 Quandt, W., Jabber, F. and Lesch, A. **The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism** (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973) p.14. The Palestinian Arab efforts to achieve self-determination taking into view their desire to be separated from her Arab neighbouring states is forcefully argued in a Palestinian delegation's letter addressed to the League of Nations in September 1921. See **League of Nations document No. (1/15437/4213)**.
- 3 Quandt et al., (1973: 40). See also endnote 39 in Chapter 1 for literature examining the collapse of the Palestinian Arab political structure.
- 4 Gilmour, D. **Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians** (Sphere Books, London, 1982) p.143.
- 5 Amos, J. **Palestinian Resistance Organization of a Nationalist Movement** (Pergamon Press, New York, 1980) p.9.
- 6 For a discussion of the political structure of the Palestinian Arab community in Palestine before the Second World war see Khalidi, A.W. **Palestine: A Modern History** (Croom Helm, London, 1978) and Quandt et al. 1973.
- 7 Shuaibi, I. "The development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part I", **Journal of Palestine Studies** Vol.9 (Autumn 1979), No.1, p.79.
- 8 Ibid., p.78.
- 9 For an analysis of the origins of Al-Fatah see Frangi, A. **The PLO and Palestine** (Zed Books, London, 1983) pp.94-96, Shuaibi(1979-I: 79-82) and Cobban, H. **The Palestinian Liberation Organisation** (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984) pp.21-27.
- 10 Shuaibi, (1979-I: 84).
- 11 For a discussion of Al-Fatah's ideological background see Quandt et al. (1973: 55-56) and Amos (1980: 43-67).
- 12 Metz, R. "Why George Habash turned Marxist", **Mideast**, August 1970, p.31.
- 13 For a comparative analysis of Fatah's and PFLP's ideologies see Nakhleh, E. A. "The anatomy of violence: theoretical reflections on Palestinian resistance", **Middle East Journal**, Vol.25 (Spring 1971), pp.192-197.

- 14 Rodinson, M. **Israel and the Arabs** (Penguin Books, London, 1982) p.259.
- 15 A number of other splits occurred from the PFLP. PFLP-General Command split from the PFLP in 1968 to be led by a pro-Syrian leadership advocating the primacy of military struggle over ideological concerns. In April 1977 another group split away from the PFLP-GC known as the Palestine Liberation Front to follow a pro-Iraqi stance. Popular Revolutionary Front for the Liberation of Palestine on the other hand split from PFLP in 1972 when it decided that hijackings had become counterproductive.
The PFLP has had a record of conflict with Al-Fatah and later the PLO, too. The first major conflict with Fatah occurred in the wake of the Jordanian civil war. The PFLP advocated the revolutionary overthrow of the Jordanian regime while Fatah tried to follow a less confrontationist policy, (Gilmour, 1982: 170-172; Quandt et al., (1973: 125-126). The second major and more important conflict came in 1974 when the PFLP formed the Rejectionist Front. The Rejectionist Front first appeared in May 1974, as the PLO in a series of informal gatherings began to discuss the possibility of peace talks and a 'mini-state', (Arab Report and Record, 1974: 211) The Rejectionist Front then took a concrete form when PFLP withdrew from the PLO executive in September 1974 supported by the PFLP-GC, Arab Liberation Front and Iraq.
- 16 Metz, (1970: 36).
- 17 Quandt et al., (1973: 104) and Amos, (1980: 79, 84).
- 18 PFLP appears to have first accepted the idea of a 'mini-state' in December 1973 (ARR, 1973: 573) at a time when Arafat refused to support it and the PLO remained undecided about peace talks, (ARR, 1973: 594).
- 19 Yodfat, A. and Arnon-Ohanna, Y. **PLO Strategy and Tactics** (Croom Helm, London, 1981) p.27. For a more detailed study of the background of Al-Saiqa and its ideological basis see Amos, (1980: 99-107).
- 20 Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna, (1981: 28) and Amos, (1980: 107-110).
- 21 Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna, (1981: 27-28).
- 22 Quandt et al., (1973: 68-70) and Hamid, R. "What is the PLO?" **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.4 (Summer 1975), No.4, p.99.
- 23 For a description of the organisational structure of the PLO see Appendix V. For a study of the PLO's institutional structure including the function and role of various welfare societies see Rubenberg, C. **The**

Palestine Liberation Organization; Its Institutional Infrastructure (Institute of Arab Studies, Belmont, Mass., 1983).

- 24 For a similar point see Amos, (1980: 18).
- 25 Shuaibi, (1979-I: 78).
- 26 For this line of argument see Gilmour, (1982: 144).
- 27 Quoted in Kadi, L. **Arab Summit Conferences and The Palestine Problem** (Research Centre, PLO, Beirut, 1966) p.93.
- 28 Ibid., p.109.
- 29 Frangi, (1983: 98).
- 30 Schleifer, A. **Search for Peace in the Middle East** (Fawlett Publications, Greenwich, Conn., 1970) p.16.
- 31 Frangi, (1983: 107)
- 32 Gilmour, (1982: 173).
- 33 Gilmour, (1982: Chp.7), Hamid, (1975: 92-93) and Shuaibi, I. "The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part II" **Journal of Palestine Studies** Vol.IX (Winter 1980), No.2, pp.50-70, are three representative sources of the line of argument that explains the rise of Palestinian national consciousness by refering to the break-up of the Egyptian-Syrian Union, the successful Algerian national struggle for independence and the Arab defeat in the 1967 war.
- 34 Frangi, (1983: 97-98).
- 35 Nakhleh, (1971: 192).
- 36 Quandt et al., (1973: 75).
- 37 Hudson, M. "The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis", in Moore, J. (ed.) **The Arab-Israeli Conflict Volume II** (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1974) p.494.
- 38 See Peres, Y. "Modernization and Nationalism in the Identity of the Israeli Arabs", **Middle East Journal** Autumn 1970. The impact of urbanisation on the political views and voting behaviour of Palestinians in Israel is also noted by Zureik. Zureik, E. **The Palestinians in Israel: A Study in Internal Colonialism** (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1979) p.169.
- 39 Hudson notes the modern rather than traditional orientation of the resistance elite who were largely Western educated. Hudson, M. "Developments and setbacks

- in the Palestinian resistance movement", **Journal of Palestine Studies** Vol.I (Spring 1972), No.3, p.70.
- 40 Shuaibi, (1980-II: 55).
 - 41 See Hudson (1972: 77-80) on the role of ideology within the Palestinian movement.
 - 42 In the case of the Palestinian resistance movement Sharabi notes the strong relationship between the PFLP's success among the Arab masses and its well developed and articulated ideology, Sharabi, H. **Palestine guerrillas, their credibility and effectiveness** (Georgetown University, Washington D.C., 1970) p.28.
 - 43 For an anlysis of this subject see Boulding, K. **The Image** (University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Mich., 1956).
 - 44 Willetts, (1984: 21-22).
 - 45 Gilmour, (1982: 148) and Harkabi, Y. **Palestinians and Israel** (Wiley, New York, 1975) pp.67-76.
 - 46 Shuaibi, (1979-I: 78).
 - 47 See Harkabi (1975) for an analysis of changing Palestinian perceptions of their identity. Harkabi after having noted the methodological difficulties of establishing attitude changes restrospectively, examines the change in Palestinian attitudes towards the resolution of a number of problems central to the Palestinian community such as return to their homes, political organisation, the liberation of Palestine etc...
 - 48 For the text of the Draft Constitution see Laquer, W. **The Israeli-Arab Reader: A documentary history of the Middle East conflict** (Penguin Books, 1970: 165-169).
 - 49 Becker, J. **The PLO: The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1984) p.39, notes the influence of Nasser on the PNC and the Charter.
 - 50 See Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna, (1981: 147-153) for an article by article comparasion of the two Covenants.
 - 51 See Articles 21, 28, 29 in *ibid.*.
 - 52 Laquer, (1970: 444).
 - 53 Arab Report and Record, (1968: 338).
 - 54 Harkabi, Y. **Fedayeen Action and Arab Strategy** (Adelphi Papers No.53, Institute of Strategic Studies, 1968).

- 55 Laquer, (1970: 445).
- 56 Frangi, (1983: 97). For Fatah's arguments in 1968 on the role of armed struggle to awaken mass consciousness and for the redefinition of the Arab-Israeli conflict as one between the Palestinians and Zionism see Sharabi, H. **Palestine and Israel: The Lethal Dilemma** (Pergasus, New York, 1969) p.198-9.
- 57 Nakhleh (1971) and Harkabi (1968).
- 58 Moore in Hudson, (1974: 498).
- 59 Frangi, (1983: 111). Schiff, Z. and Rothstein, R. **Fedayeen, The Story of the Palestinian Guerrillas** (Vallentine Mitchell, London, 1972) pp.81-85.
- 60 Rodinson, (1982: 259).
- 61 Ibid. pp.236-237, Frangi, (1983: 119).
- 62 For a detailed analysis of the PLO's organisational structure and its role in providing public services to the Palestinians see Rubenberg (1983).
- 63 Sela, A. "The PLO, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip", **The Jerusalem Quarterly** No.7 (Spring 1978), p.72.
- 64 Rubenberg, (1983: 18).
- 65 See Appendix VI for a comprehensive list of PNC meetings.
- 66 For example through the General Union of Palestinian Workers the PLO has access to Palestinian workers not only in the surrounding Arab states but to workers in Europe too, Rubenberg (1983: 42-43).
- 67 Quandt et al., (1973: 88). A lack of strong Palestinian identity amongst this conservative leadership was evident in their opposition to the establishment of the PLO which they saw as a threat to their position, (Kadi, (1966: 105). This opposition in the late 1960s took the form of complaining about the growing strength of the PLO. They saw the extension of support to the PLO as tantamount to political surrender, Migdal, J. **Palestinian Society and Politics** (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1980) p.199.
- 68 It was at the 11th PNC that the PLO decided on the need to set up the PNF. The task of the PNF was to be the mobilisation of "Palestinians in the occupied territories", (ARR, 1973: 47).
- 69 Rodinson, (1982: 88).

- 70 ARR, (1974: 117).
- 71 ARR, (1976: 329). Amos notes that according to Arab observers 75 to 80 percent of all successful candidates were PNF members or supporters, (Amos, 1980: 125).
- 72 Gilmour, (1982: 123).
- 73 Landau, J. **The Arabs in Israel** (Oxford University Press, London, 1969) pp.71-72.
- 74 Ibid., p.84.
- 75 For a study of this split in the Israeli Communist Party, see Nahas, D. **The Israeli Communist Party** (Croom Helm, London, 1976).
- 76 Landau, (1969: 73).
- 77 Gilmour, (1982: 115).
- 78 For an analysis of Israeli Arab voting behaviour see Zureik, (1979: 167-172).
- 79 Frangi, (1983: 196).
- 80 For details of the first PLO-Rakah meeting in Prague see (ARR, 1977: 376).
- 81 Frangi, (1983: 97-103).
- 82 This consolidation had reached such a level that those areas came to be referred to as Fatahland (Frangi, 1983: 124) and the political situation was likened to one of a state within a state, (Rodinson, 1982: 228, 231).
- 83 **Keesing's Contemporary Archives** November 1968, pp.23029 and 23327 and ARR, (1968: 338).
- 84 Mansbach, R., Ferguson, Y. and Lampert, D. **The Web of World Politics** (Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1976) p.116 and p.118.
- 85 The high turn out of 84% in spite of the boycott calls led Dayan to claim that the residents had responded to 'the Israeli administration rather than to the Arab countries and terrorist organisation', (ARR, 1972: 157).
- 86 Shuaibi, I. "The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness, Part-III", **Journal of Palestine Studies** Vol.IX (Spring 1980), No.3, p.102.
- 87 Shuaibi, (1980-III: 121). See (ARR, 1974: 466, 502) for the reporting of pro-PLO demonstrations in the West Bank and the hoisting of Palestinian flags.

- 88 Shuaibi, (1980-III: 102, 116).
- 89 ARR, (1977: 960).
- 90 ARR, (1977: 1023).
- 91 Ibid.
- 92 Shuaibi, (1980-III: 123-124).

CHAPTER 5

THE ARAB GOVERNMENTAL LEVEL

5.1 Introduction

In this study the Arab governmental level is constituted by the membership of the Arab League. It is through this membership that a country asserts its Arab identity. At its inception the Arab League had six members and it has since expanded to its present size of twenty-two. The list of the members of the Arab League can be seen in Appendix III.

The study of the mobilisation process in support of the Palestinian cause at the Arab level concentrates mostly on Arab governments that have had a direct involvement with the question of Palestine. These are the countries neighbouring Palestine (Egypt, Jordan, Syria and the Lebanon) together with Iraq and Algeria. Most of the other Arab governments have tended to follow the lead of the above group of core countries.¹ This group has not been uniform and coherent. The idiosyncracies of each regime and its leadership, together with the primacy of each individual Arab government's immediate concerns and goals over the interests of Palestine has culminated often in individualistic and conflicting approaches to Palestine. The resulting rivalries that seem to characterise Arab politics in the region have, even at the height of pan-Arabism, prevented the development of a coordinated and unified approach towards Palestine. The only point over which they have all seemed to agree has been Israel's illegality.²

The purpose of this chapter is not to chart the development, changes and nature of each Arab government's policy toward Palestine. Instead the purpose is to study how Arab governments as a group interacted with the mobilisation process and came to revise their attitudes

towards Palestinian problem.

The established Arab governmental attitude of the 1950s was one which defined Palestine as an Arab problem. Both Nasser's Egypt and Baathist Syria and Iraq saw the liberation of Palestine within the context of Arab unity. On the other hand King Hussein, who represented part of the royalist and traditional trend in Arab politics remained concerned with the consolidation and recognition of Jordan's rule over the West Bank. This attitude began to change during the 1960s. The emergence of Palestinian groups stressing an independent and separate Palestinian national identity together with the inability of Arab governments to put pan-Arab rhetorics into effect and their defeat in the June 1967 war were developments that contributed towards these changes.

These changes were examined from a Palestinian perspective. That is these changes were seen as the product of a Palestinian initiated mobilisation process to bring the redefined Palestinian cause to the attention of Arab governments and to mobilise support for this cause. However, it should be noted that Palestinian efforts to gain the support of Arab governments was an interactive process. The net effect of this interaction was that Arab governments changed their attitudes towards Palestine and the Palestinian cause together with the Palestinian resistance movement finding it necessary to reconsider and revise its goals and policies.

5.2 The mobilisation process

The analysis focuses on Arab governmental responses to demands put forward by the Palestinian resistance movement and the PLO to gain Arab recognition and support for the Palestinian cause. The attitude of various non-governmental groups within Arab countries such as political parties, trade/student unions, religious and professional groups,

will not be examined in any particular detail. However, this should not be taken as an indication of an implicit acceptance of the assumptions either that states are monolithic and unified or that international relations and domestic politics do not interact. It is generally accepted that in most of these countries the public tends to have little influence on foreign policy making and that this domain remains the exclusivity of the immediate leadership. However, where the public opinion appears to have significantly differed or for that matter converged with the governmental position this will be noted.

5.2.1 Conducive Environment

The 1950s in the Arab world, just like in Palestine, was a period of optimism caused by a series of achievements attributed to the growing strength of Arab nationalism. The conservative regimes in Egypt and Iraq had been swept away by Arab nationalist forces. Nasser's challenge against colonial powers over Suez had culminated in a political victory. The independent Arab world was expanding as more and more areas under colonial rule achieved independence. Furthermore this period of struggle for Arab unity bore its first fruit with the establishment of the United Arab Republic.

All these events made the Arab world confident of the eventual liberation of Palestine. It was a matter of time before the Arab armies would move on to liberate Arab Palestine. According to Nasser this was predicted to happen

"once we are fully emancipated from the shackles of colonialism and intrigues of colonialist agents, we shall take a further step forward towards liberation of Palestine. When we have brought our armed forces to full strength and made our own armaments we will take another step forward towards the liberation of Palestine..., and when we have manufactured jet aircraft and tanks we will embark upon the final stage of this liberation".³

Such an environment was far from being receptive to a

mobilisation process in support of a Palestinian cause stressing the indigenous nature of the Palestinian national identity and the need to mount an independent armed struggle to achieve it. It is, as was pointed out earlier on, this lack of a conducive environment that kept Al-Fatah from surfacing until 1964. This however does not mean that the idea of an independent Palestinian struggle was not on the public agenda at all. Al-Fatah together with some smaller Palestinian groups⁴ had been talking about an independent Palestine throughout the 1950s.⁵ By the early 1960s the issue began to be taken up by Arab governments too. Iraq, for example, became the first country to commit itself to an independent Palestinian entity and expressed willingness to assist a Palestinian armed struggle as early as 1961.⁶ Algeria followed suit as it emerged independent from a long anti-colonial struggle which had been fought from a nationalistic rather than a pan-Arabic ideological basis.

The event that probably had the most significant impact, in changing the environment towards one more conducive for a Palestinian initiated mobilisation process, was precipitated by Israel. Israel had been working on a project to divert the waters of the Jordan river since 1953. This irrigation project was perceived by the Arab world as an aggression committed against Arab land precipitating promises of preventive Arab governmental action. However, as sections of this project reached its completion Arab governments began to criticise each other for not doing something concrete about it. In the face of growing criticism directed towards Egypt's reluctance to engage Israel and pressure from "revolutionary elements in the Arab World... accusing Nasser of having neglected the Palestine problem", Nasser called for a summit meeting of all Arab governments in January 1964 to discuss the situation.⁷ It was during the summit deliberations that

"Bourguiba and Ben Bella put forward a proposal to the Summit Conference for the formation of a <<FLN-style>> organisation (i.e National Liberation Front) to push

forward the campaign for the restoration of the rights of the Arabs of Palestine".⁸

This proposal was then endorsed by the summit and it was agreed that an organisation of the Palestinian people should be set up to enable them to liberate their homeland and determine their future. The summit authorised an ex-Saudi Arabian diplomat of Palestinian origin, Shukairy, to take necessary measures to establish a Palestinian organisation to represent Palestinian Arab aspirations.⁹ Even though the Arab governments decided not to go to war with Israel over the Jordan river,¹⁰ they set in motion the process that brought about the establishment of the PLO. As a result of Shukairy's consultations with Palestinians and Arab governments, the PLO was formed by the first Palestinian National Council in May 1964¹¹ and endorsed by the Alexandria summit conference of the Arab League in September 1964.¹²

Although in a letter to U'Thant, 25 May 1964, Shukairy claimed the right to be regarded as the "only legitimate spokesman for all matters concerning the Palestine people"¹³ this was a long way from reality. Instead, the PLO remained under the tutelage of Arab governments. This was particularly evident in military affairs. The Palestine Liberation Army which was set up as the PLO's military arm, in spite of Shukairy's urgings, was never allowed to mount any military action and his attempts to make the PLA an effective military unit remained frustrated.¹⁴ It was quite evident from the decisions of the Third Arab Summit in September 1965 that the liberation of Palestine was still envisaged through Arab unity and conventional military action. This was also reflected in the reluctance of the summit to endorse Boumedienne's suggestion that the PLA adopt a strategy of guerrilla warfare.¹⁵ Nevertheless, the establishment of the PLO to some extent was an acknowledgement by Arab states of a growing Palestinian political awareness.

The outcome of the 1967 war had an impact on the Arab governments in two ways. Firstly, Nasser's resignation after Egypt's defeat symbolically demonstrated the difficulty of Arab armies liberating Palestine.¹⁶ The growth of the Palestinian resistance movement in the aftermath, of the war and the Karameh battle in particular, increasingly convinced Nasser that a Palestinian armed struggle could have a role to play in the liberation of Palestine.¹⁷ Syria and Iraq too came to support the idea of guerrilla warfare and sponsored guerrilla groups. In addition Jordan in the face of growing support was induced to change its negative attitude towards the Palestinian resistance movement.¹⁸

Secondly, the war took Israel beyond Palestine dramatically increasing the salience of the conflict with Israel.

"Israel now occupied in addition to all of Palestine, significant portions of Syria, ... and Egypt. This condition made it impossible for Arab leaders to put the question of Israel 'on the back burner' as President Nasser did between the wars of 1956 and 1967".¹⁹

It brought Egypt and Jordan together in their concern to ensure the return of the occupied areas.²⁰

However, this development was rather like a double-edged sword. On the one hand the Israeli occupation was increasing the salience of the Palestinian issue to the Arab governments on the other hand the narrower territorial considerations were making a political settlement along the lines of Security Council Resolution 242 and the Rogers Plan more tempting. Hence, King Hussein and more importantly Nasser were drawn away from the position held by the Palestinian resistance movement which stressed the role of armed struggle in liberating Palestine.

The damage inflicted to the prospects of Arab unity with the collapse of the Egyptian-Syrian union, the establishment of the Arab League sponsored PLO, the defeat

in the 1967 war, the growth in size and effectiveness of the Palestinian resistance movement were major events that brought about an environment more receptive to the demands of the Palestinians. This occurred as a result of the impact that these events had both on the structure of the regional political system and on the dominant political processes.

The entry into the Middle Eastern political system of new elements in the form of the PLO and the Palestinian resistance movement brought about structural changes which enabled these elements to gain access to the Arab governments. The role of accessibility in mobilising Arab governmental support will be examined more closely when the 'accessibility' variable of the mobilisation model is introduced. Events such as the collapse of the union between Egypt and Syria, the 1967 defeat of the Arab armies weakened the dominance of pan-Arabism in the political system. This allowed the possibility of new political processes stressing a separate Palestinian national identity and recognising the role of an independent Palestinian struggle in liberating Palestine to emerge. It is the purpose of the following section to examine how these processes altered Arab governmental attitudes towards the Palestinian problem.

5.2.2 Cognitive Linkages

In the preceding chapter the inhibiting role of pan-Arab thinking on the mobilisation of support amongst Palestinians was pointed out. Arab nationalism and the struggle for Arab unity had a similar affect on the approach of the major Arab governments to the Palestinian problem.

As leadership motivated by Arab nationalism began to replace royalist and conservative ones they introduced changes to their foreign policies. The revolutionary nature

of Arab nationalism under the leadership of Nasser began to challenge the status-quo in the region. This challenge was aimed at the pro-Western and status-quo oriented approaches followed by the traditional royal regimes of Egypt before Nasser, Iraq and Jordan. After the signing of armistice agreements with Israel, these traditional regimes had come to accept to live with the existing situation. Their 'complacency' was evident in their reluctance to do anything more than giving some lip service to the problem of Palestine.

However, with Nasser the situation began to change drastically. One of the first manifestation of the revolutionary nature of the struggle for Arab unity on foreign policy was evidenced in Nasser determination to challenge Britain over the status of Suez. A similar challenge was also directed towards Israel. Soon after Nasser came to power he closed the straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, the first major belligerent move of any significance directed towards Israel since 1949. Suez and the problem of Palestine were perceived in the context of Arab nationalism and Arab unity. Arab nationalism constituted a major input into Egypt's foreign policy behaviour. Accordingly the liberation of Palestine was part and parcel of a struggle against colonialism and imperialism to bring about Arab unity. The ultimate goal was defined as Arab unity and the liberation of Palestine constituted a major task within it.

This central role of Arab unity in the liberation of Palestine is well noted in some of Nasser's speeches. His address to the public in Aleppo in February 1960 is a case in point.

"The rights of the people of Palestine are Arab rights above all. We feel it is our sacred duty to regain those rights for the people of Palestine. By this unity which is binding you and the power of Arab unity and Arab nationalism, we can march along the road of freedom and liberation in order to get back the usurped rights of the Palestine Arabs."²¹

Hence pan-Arabism and the struggle of Arab unity came to condition the thinking of those Arab governments and circles associated with this ideology.²² It is this cognitive linkage between Arab nationalism and the liberation of Palestine that denied any role to an indigenous Palestinian armed struggle, for so long. When the idea that Palestine was a problem for the Palestinians was first brought up by Syria and Iraq at the Arab League meeting in September 1963 it was more as a result of the rivalry between Egypt and Syria in alliance with Iraq, rather than a break away from a pan-Arab attitude towards Palestine.²³ Even then the role of the Palestinians in the liberation of Palestine was never envisaged as superceding Arab governmental efforts.

This stance is well demonstrated by the attitude that Syria and Egypt took towards Al-Fatah's public pronouncement on the question of Palestine. Both Syria²⁴ and Egypt regarded Al-Fatah's activities with suspicion and did not hesitate to arrest and imprison its members.²⁵ This attitude was also shared by the Arab media which in the aftermath of Al-Fatah's first military operation regarded the activities of Fatah as one that would undermine Arab unity.²⁶ The prevalence of such a frame of mind in early 1965 culminated in the adoption of a resolution by Arab League defence ministers which called on all Arab governments to suppress Fatah operations.²⁷

"As an Algerian observer noted most Arab states were suspicious of Fatah before 1967 because 'for the first time a Palestinian organisation presented itself as exclusively Palestinian, with exclusively Palestinian objectives. A revolutionary attitude because it was totally unorthodox'".²⁸

The situation with Algeria was very different. Algeria had just achieved its independence after a long national liberation war. A war that was after all fought by the Algerians alone. Even though Arab states did lend their political support at the international level and, after the establishment of its provisional government, gave Algeria

financial support,²⁹ at no point did the Arab governments contemplate liberating Algeria for the Algerians. The nearest the Arab governments came to committing themselves to military action was in an Arab League decision in March 1960 calling for volunteers to fight for Algeria.³⁰ The Algerian struggle for independence was a national one that did not rely on Arab unity or pan-Arabism. It was a purely national anti-colonial struggle. Hence it is not surprising that soon after its independence Ben Bella expressed support for Al-Fatah, allowed them to open an office in Algiers³¹ and argued amongst Arab governments the need for guerrilla warfare led by an FLN-style style Palestinian national organisation.³² Boumedienne on his part during the deliberations at the Third Arab summit in September 1965 urged for guerrilla warfare rather than conventional military action.³³

Pan-Arabism and the struggle for Arab unity influenced perceptions of who the Palestinians were and whether they could achieve a state of their own. From the early days of the Arab League the Palestinians were referred to as 'Arabs of Palestine'. This gained particular strength when revolutionary Arab regimes came to power in the 1950s. Arab League Council decisions during the 1950s appear to reflect this in their regular reference to the Palestinians and Palestinian refugees as 'Arabs of Palestine' and 'Arab refugees of Palestine'.³⁴ This is also evident in a speech made by Nasser in 1960 where the Palestinians were referred to as 'Arabs of Palestine' and Palestine was treated as an Arab land.³⁵

While the Arab nationalist regimes saw Palestine within the framework of a unified Arab world, King Hussein's monarchy had a different approach particularly to the West Bank. The residents of Palestine were seen as Jordanians and any debate over the liberation of Palestine including the West Bank was seen as undermining the sovereignty of Jordan. This remained a source of particular tension between the

Egypt and Jordan during the late 1950s and was only resolved in the early 1960s during the establishment of the PLO by a clear understanding of respect for Jordanian sovereignty.³⁶

The hold of Arab nationalism on most Arab governmental attitudes towards the Palestinians and their perception of the role of an indigenous Palestinian struggle continued until after the 1967 war. It was the changing environment particularly brought about by the defeat of Arab armies and the growing success and popularity of Palestinian resistance movement that began to weaken the influence of pan-Arabism. Both changes began to occur roughly at the same time.

The first signs of change began to take a concrete form in 1969. Nasser who had started to reconsider his attitude towards the Palestinian resistance movement after the 1967 war decided to attend the fifth Palestine National Council. The symbolic importance of Nasser's attendance stemmed from the fact that this PNC session elected Arafat as its chairman³⁷ Arafat, as the leader of Al-Fatah, had been urging Palestinian armed struggle to liberate Palestine since the early 1960s. He had also been challenging the Arab sponsored Palestinian leadership of the PLO to adopt this policy. It was at this PNC meeting that the transfer of the PLO leadership to the Palestinian resistance movement was completed, with the blessing of the most important Arab government and its leader. However, as will be pointed out later on, this attitude did not gain broad, instant and continuous support.

The Arab governmental perceptions of who exactly the Palestinians were and whether they were to be a part of a unified Arab nation had begun to change soon after the goal of Arab unity had experienced its first set back with the break up of the UAR. Arab governmental decisions and speeches that used to refer to the Palestinians as 'Arabs

of Palestine' introduced the term 'Palestine Arabs' suggesting a certain degree of change in their perception of the Palestinians.³⁸ This change occurred when Arab governments increasingly became aware of the difficulties of achieving 'Arab Unity'. Nasser's policies that stressed Arab unity were seen as interference in their domestic affairs particularly by the conservative regimes. It is as a direct result of these developments that the concept of 'Arab solidarity' developed to replace the idea of 'Arab unity'. 'Arab solidarity' stressed the "right of every Arab state to determine its own internal and external policies."³⁹

A second set of changes in Arab governmental perceptions occurred after the 1967 war and during a period when the Palestinian resistance movement began to have an impact on both Palestinians and Arab governments. The reference to 'Arabs of Palestine' disappeared in a conspicuous manner. Arab governments used the term 'Palestinian Arabs' together with 'Arab Palestinians'. However, it is difficult to substantiate a clear and unambiguous pattern until the Algiers summit in 1973. It was at this summit that reference to the 'national rights' of the Palestinian people was first used, suggesting the recognition of a separate Palestinian national identity. This took an even clearer form at the Rabat summit of October 1974 when Arab governments supported the right of the Palestinian people to establish an independent national authority. The Palestinians were now perceived as a distinct nation entitled to exercise their right to self-determination in the form of the establishment of a state of their own.⁴⁰

Accessibility by the Palestinian resistance movement and later the PLO to the Arab governments played an important role in influencing this conceptual/perceptual change in Arab thinking on the means of liberating Palestine and the future of Palestine. Access to Arab governments gave the Palestinian resistance movement the possibility to raising

or arguing their case and trying to change Arab perceptions of themselves and the Palestinian problem.

5.2.3 Accessibility

Access to the Arab governments was another factor that played an important role in mobilising support for the Palestinian cause. The PLO from its early days enjoyed direct access to the Arab governments through the Arab League and kept the Palestinian issue on the agenda. However, during Shukairy's leadership it did not mobilise support for armed struggle. In the case of the Palestinian resistance movement in the mid-1960s violence appeared to be the only means by which it could have its voice heard. It was only after Palestinian resistance movement received recognition for their role in the liberation of Palestine that they began to aquire the possibility of direct though informal access to the Arab governments. This accessibility increased when the Palestinian resistance movement in the late 1960s took over the leadership of the PLO. As the prestige and status of the PLO inside and outside the Palestinian community became evident and the PLO was recognised by the Arab governments as the representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO's direct access to these governments was formalised by the opening of PLO offices.

	violent means	non-violent means
Indirect access	against Israel	early-PLO Participation in the Arab League
Direct access	against Arab states	informal -1973 formal 1974-

TABLE 5.1 Access Routes to Arab governments

As Table 5.1 depicts there were a number of different ways of reaching the Arab governments. Al-Fatah from its early

days recognised the importance of having access to the Arab public and the Arab governments in launching an armed-struggle to liberate Palestine.⁴¹ Al-Fatah's first military operation, even though not well received by the Arab governments and the public, put the Palestinian armed struggle on Arab governments' agendas. In the light of Al-Fatah's unsuccessful early attempts to establish links with the Egyptian government and gain its cooperation,⁴² the only remaining option left for Al-Fatah was to continue to use violence against Israel to raise the tension between Israel and its Arab neighbours.⁴³ This was at least a successful way of drawing attention to what they had to say. Violence against Israel was a way of keeping the Palestinian cause on the agendas of Arab governments.⁴⁴

Simultaneously, the PLO led by Shukairy also constituted a channel through which the Palestinian cause was raised. Although there remained a gap between the PLO's and Al-Fatah's approach to the liberation of Palestine at least the PLO had some direct access to the Arab governments. It was able to participate at the Arab League deliberations on Palestine⁴⁵ and raise the need for support for the Palestinian cause including military action. However, the effectiveness of this access route is rather questionable, as Shukairy appears to have had little impact on Arab governments attitudes towards making the PLA, PLO's military arm, an effective fighting force.⁴⁶

Al-Fatah and the Palestinian resistance movement's access to Arab governments and the public improved significantly as the environment became conducive after the 1967 war and Arab nationalism began to loose its hold. Violence continued to play its role as an access route. The guerrilla fighter won the support of the Arab people as "an individual who has taken his future into his own hands, who sacrifices personal advantages, who works as part of a team for a noble purpose." ⁴⁷ It was in such an atmosphere that the Palestinian resistance movement's violence against

Israel began to make Arab governments reconsider their earlier position. The first evidence of a change in attitude came from Nasser as he developed direct relations with Al-Fatah. Throughout 1967 and 1968 Arafat on numerous occasions met with Nasser. As early as in 1968 Arafat was included in Nasser's delegation to Moscow giving Arafat ample opportunity to raise his case not only amongst Egyptians but with Soviets too.⁴⁸ Similarly, the take over of the PLO by the Palestinian resistance movement at the fifth PNC opened the possibility of participating in Arab League meetings. This naturally enabled the PLO to argue their case directly with the Arab delegations during such meetings.

The Palestinian resistance movement found itself in a situation where it resorted to violence against Arab states, too. The presence of the PLO in Jordan and the Lebanon became increasingly unacceptable to both countries governments. These governments saw the presence and activities of the PLO as undermining their sovereignty. The tension between the PLO and these two governments erupted into violence in 1969, 1970-71 and early 1973.⁴⁹ The armed confrontations had three results.

Firstly these confrontations attracted the attention of the public in Arab countries. During the civil war in Jordan the public appears to have expressed support for the Palestinians.⁵⁰ Secondly, it resulted in Arab governments intervention to try to bring the violence to an end in a manner favourable to the PLO. Thirdly, this violence forced the Arab governments to face up to the problems created by the Palestinian armed struggle against Israel. At the end of these events it was quite evident that the role of the Palestinian armed struggle had been accepted. But there were naturally deep disagreements over the distributions of the costs of the consequences of Israeli retaliation that this armed struggle attracted.

As pointed out until the early 1970s the PLO had maintained access to the Arab governments through a variety of means. Firstly, between 1964 and 1971 violence played a role in drawing attention to the Palestinian cause. After the June 1967 war Arafat first as head of Al-Fatah and then as the chairman of the PLO began to be received by Arab leaders particularly those in Egypt, Syria and North Africa. This situation came to a particularly crucial turning point in November 1973 at Algiers. As the possibility of an International Conference to resolve the Middle East conflict in accordance with Security Council Resolution 338 emerged, an Arab summit was called to discuss the matter.

The summit decided to support the idea of a Geneva Conference but simultaneously declared the PLO to be the sole representative of the Palestinian people with Jordan entering a reservation concerning the Palestinians living in the West Bank.⁵¹ Although Jordan's position was briefly supported by Sadat⁵² the problem, after extensive lobbying,⁵³ was resolved by the next Arab Summit meeting in October 1974 at Rabat. The summit recognised the PLO not only as the sole but also as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

The PLO's 'legitimacy' to represent all Palestinians was specially included to stress PLO's right to represent the Palestinians in the West Bank.⁵⁴ As Frangi notes "At last, the Palestinians were equal with other states and the Palestinian leadership had to be accepted as equal as others".⁵⁵ Subsequent to the Rabat decision the PLO acquired direct access to Arab governments and opened offices in all Arab League member countries except Oman. These offices, most of which had diplomatic status, gave the PLO the possibility of raising any matter with Arab governments. Furthermore, the Rabat decision on the PLO opened the way for the PLO to become a full-member of the Arab League. Egypt as a direct result of a series of talks between Arafat and the Egyptian premier, aimed at

redressing the rift caused by the Sinai disengagement agreements, called on the Arab League to grant the PLO full membership. This was then granted by a unanimous decision at the Council session in December 1976.⁵⁶

5.2.4 Output; Growth of Arab Governmental Support

The growth of Arab governmental support for the Palestinian cause as a result of the mobilisation process can best be summarised by breaking it down to three stages. The first stage covering the period prior to the 1967 war is characterised with little change in governmental perceptions of the Palestinian problem. The second one between 1967 and 1973 is a period of transition and of fluctuating attitudes. The last one covers the period from 1974 onwards when the Arab governments recognised the PLO and the Palestinian cause as defined by it.

5.2.4.1 Period I; Support prior to 1967

It was during the early 1960s that the Arab governments began to encounter the first open signs of a Palestinian awareness. The Arab governments sought to respond to this newly surfacing Palestinian consciousness within the context of the Arab League. It is within this context that the PLO was established. The PLO did represent and to some extent mobilised Palestinian aspirations. However, the fact that it had to operate within an Arab governmental framework limited its scope of action. This limitation was reflected in numerous complaints by Shukairy and in his willingness to support at least verbally the Palestinian resistance movement.⁵⁷

The establishment of the PLO itself was a recognition of the urgency of responding to the Palestinian problem and to a growing Palestinian national awareness. However, this development must be assessed with caution as it was also an attempt to control and channel emerging Palestinian

nationalism. This was amply demonstrated by the negative attitude most governments took towards the guerrilla groups that constituted the Palestinian resistance movement of the same period. These governments were reluctant to deal with the Palestinian resistance movement but also saw them as a threat to their security and to the eventual liberation of Palestine.

This rather unfavourable attitude to the Palestinian resistance movement and to Al-Fatah in particular was evident in Arab governmental response to Palestinian resistance movement position on the role of Palestinian armed struggle against Israel. The first Fatah operation triggered a very unfavourable response from the Arab governments. A string of Palestinians associated with Fatah were arrested across the Middle East.⁵⁸ This clampdown and the subsequent Arab League decision January 1965 calling for the suppression of military operations by Palestinian groups reflected the attitude that Arab governments held towards a Palestinian identity expressed outside the framework of the PLO. The only exception to this rather negative attitude towards the idea of an independent Palestinian resistance was Algeria. Algeria supported Al-Fatah's principle of 'guerrilla warfare' in the liberation of Palestine.

This overall negative stance towards indigenous Palestinian military capabilities was also evident in Arab governments reluctance to cooperate with Shukairy's attempts to build an effective military arm for the PLO. The PLO had been allowed to develop as a political/administrative organisation to preserve the Palestinian entity⁵⁹ with little muscle. Arab governments neighbouring Palestine were particularly reluctant to see a Palestinian organisation with military capabilities. Although, Egypt, Syria and Iraq eventually did allow the PLO to set up the PLA, the units from this conventional army was kept under the control of the respective host countries.⁶⁰ Jordan on the other hand

remained completely opposed to the idea.⁶¹

The period prior to the 1967 war was one when the Arab governments did recognise the need of a Palestinian organisation to preserve the Palestinian identity. The idea of a Palestinian entity acquired legitimacy amongst Arab governments including Jordan.⁶² However, their attitude towards an independent Palestinian struggle for the liberation of Palestine remained negative. This was reflected in their policy towards Al-Fatah and in their reluctance to allow the PLO leadership to follow policies not congruent with their interests. In other words, this was a period when the Palestinian problem came back on Arab governmental agendas and two approaches to this problem competed. The dominant approach recognised the need of Palestinian's to express their identity but continued to see the solution of the Palestinian problem within an Arab context. The competing approach called for the recognition of an independent national Palestinian armed struggle to liberate Palestine but was opposed by Arab governments in general.

5.2.4.2 Period II; Between the wars

The second period was one characterised by changing attitudes. This period of transformation however was not one where governmental attitudes changed uniformly and simultaneously. Nevertheless the changes that took place between the beginning and the end of this period were of great significance to the Palestinian cause. The defeat of Arab armies in the 1967 war led to the growth of the Palestinian resistance movement and support for it amongst Palestinians. Similarly, in the aftermath of this defeat coupled with growing support for the Palestinian resistance movement Arab governments began to reconsider their position particularly vis-a-vis the role of Palestinian national armed struggle. However, this did not happen at once and when it did, the change was rather erratic.

The decision adopted by the Arab summit held after the June 1967 war fell short of Shukairy's request to have no dealings even indirect with Israel that might affect the Palestinian cause.⁶³ The Arab governments did not just stop at refusing to take into consideration the wishes of the PLO's chairman, their own appointee. Instead most Arab governments including Egypt and Jordan found it expedient to accept Resolution 242, inspite of the Khartoum decision, 'no negotiations with Israel'.⁶⁴

Yet, it should be noted that in face of the Arab armies' defeat coupled with the Karamah action in March 1968, Nasser did begin to take a favourable position towards the arguments of the Palestinian resistance movement. He began to have direct contacts with Arafat. This was generally regarded as a symbolic acceptance of the centrality of Palestinian resistance movement's arguments for the liberation of Palestine. This acceptance of the guerrilla groups' role was also reflected in an Arab League council meeting in March 1969 that promised aid to the new PLO and confirmed "the right of the Palestinian people to liberate their fatherland and achieve their right to self-determination".⁶⁵ The ability of the PLO to gain the support of a high status actor in the Arab world improved their position both amongst the Palestinians and Arab governments.

However, these developments favourable to the Palestinian resistance movement did not continue unabated. As Quandt et al. note the honeymoon was a short lived one.⁶⁶ There were three setbacks. The rather unclear position of most governments towards the PLO became evident during 1969 and 1970. After the initial enthusiasm over the role of Palestinian armed struggle in liberating Palestine some Arab circles became sceptical of it. Gaddafi, at the cost of undermining his early role as the champion of the Palestinian cause "dismissed the idea of popular war against Israel as fanciful and told the fedayeen to join

with the Arab armies to fight Israel".⁶⁷ A similar position was taken by Nasser in the aftermath of his and Jordan's acceptance of the Rogers Plan in July 1970. Heikal, Al Ahram's editor often quoted as Nasser's spokesman, in an article underplayed the role of Palestinian armed struggle in the conflict with Israel.⁶⁸

The acceptance of the Rogers Plan too constituted a setback and reflected the inherent ambiguity in Arab governmental attitudes towards the problem of Palestine during this period. Even though Resolution 242 had initially been endorsed, it had fallen into some disrepute as a result of Israeli intransigence. Hence after a period of rapproachment between the Palestinian resistance movement and Nasser during 1968 and 1969 the acceptance of the Rogers Plan came as another source of ambiguity. The implied recognition of Israel through negotiations inherent in the peace-making process suggested by the Rogers Plan undermined the Palestinian resistance movement in two ways. Firstly, it went against the official position taken by the PLO and the individual member guerrilla groups, not to mention the Arab summit decision of August 1967. Secondly, the negotiations in the context of the Rogers Plan clearly were intended to exclude the Palestinians who were referred to as 'refugees'.

The above developments had been received with growing anxiety amongst Palestinians. The Palestinian resistance movement promoted protests against the Rogers Plan particularly in Jordan⁶⁹ and the PNC at its emergency session in August 1970 rejected the plan and proclaimed the independence of the Palestinian resistance movement and its armed struggle.⁷⁰ This situation exacerbated the already high tension between the Jordanian authorities and the Palestinian resistance movement. In September it finally erupted into violence when King Hussein felt the need to respond to what he perceived to be a challenge to his authority.⁷¹

The third setback in the growth of governmental support was embedded in the Arab governments response to the brutal manner in which Jordan was suppressing the PLO. Although Syria and Iraq showed early signs of military support⁷² and Nasser threatened to intervene militarily to stop the Jordanian suppression of the Palestinian resistance movement⁷³ no Arab government made a decisive move. Rodinson notes that

"The attitude taken up by Nasser and the Arab rulers throughout the crisis clearly revealed the ambiguity of their position. Most of them were disgusted by what Hussein had done, deplored the fate of the Palestinians and, on a more political plane, wished to conserve for the Palestinian Resistance a certain amount of strength.... The concern for the Palestinians felt by the Arab masses found expression at state level only in diplomatic pressure and verbal denunciation".⁷⁴

Nevertheless, to reflect the deep disapproval of Jordan's behaviour Arab governments did take certain relatively mild but concrete measures. Libya and Kuwait stopped their financial aid to Jordan. Iraq, Syria, Algeria and Libya broke or severed diplomatic relations and announced a series of boycotts. These measures according to Quandt "doubtless increased Hussein's receptiveness to the Egyptian Saudi mediation efforts".⁷⁵

However, by then most of the Palestinian resistance had been eradicated.⁷⁶ The feeling amongst Palestinians was one of having been let down. While Arafat talked about an Arab plot against the Palestinians, the PDFLP accused the Arab governments of colluding with Jordan.⁷⁷ At first it looked as though the damage inflicted on the Palestinian resistance movement was not going to stop at this point. King Hussein, in an attempt to reassert his challenged role as the representative of the Palestinians in the West Bank, got the Jordanian parliament in February 1971 to reject any idea of a Palestinian state and affirmed that Jordanians constituted a single integrated people.⁷⁸ This was happening at a time when the PLO was declaring its

intention to liberate all of their usurped homeland including the West Bank.⁷⁹

The following year King Hussein announced his plan for a United Arab Kingdom in March 1972.⁸⁰ However, this plan that envisaged a federal Kingdom to be set up through negotiations with Israel was not well received by Arab governments.⁸¹ The unequivocal rejection of this plan by Arab countries indicated the beginnings of a gradual process of convergence between Arab governments and the PLO, pointing the way towards the end of the setbacks in the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause.

After the death of Nasser it had become quite evident that Sadat did not intend to follow the radical policies of his predecessor. Sadat appeared to be primarily concerned with obtaining Israel's withdrawal from the occupied territories even if that meant guaranteeing the existence of Israel.⁸² Most Arab governments including Syria appeared to go along with this position. The Syrian government in March 1972 after a change in leadership became supportive of a negotiated solution along the lines of Resolution 242, as long as the rights of the Palestinians were recognized.⁸³ The Central Committee of the PLO dominated by Fatah too accepted Egypt's position. As early as January 1971 they were prepared to accept Arab efforts for a negotiated settlement with Israel provided Arab governments did not compromise the rights of the Palestinian people.⁸⁴

This convergence of positions between the PLO and Arab governments, although at first opposed by radical guerrilla movements, did consolidate itself. This was evident in the Arab governments rejection of King Hussein's plan for a United Arab Kingdom. To King Hussein's dismay the decisive turning point came roughly a year after the announcement of his plan. An Israeli raid into Beirut killed three leading PLO personalities and changed the atmosphere in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip significantly.⁸⁵ The funeral of

these three PLO personalities turned into an impressive show of support for the PLO. This was coupled by demonstrations during which the Palestinian flag was flown.

"The raising of the Palestinian flag on a nationalist occasion was certainly the expression of a consciousness that gathered momentum from then on; the flag has since been raised on many occasions, whereas throughout the period following the June War it was the Jordanian flag that headed demonstrations and flew over the graves of the soldiers and civilians who had fallen during the war."⁸⁶

This major breakthrough in Palestinian expression of support for their national identity and the PLO did not go unnoticed amongst Arab governments. After the October War Sadat spoke of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people together with the liberation of "our territories occupied by Israel" as his primary task.⁸⁷ However, the most decisive and complete affirmation of support at the Arab level for the Palestinian rights came at the Algiers Arab summit in November 1973. The decisions taken at Algiers stressed "the restoration to the Palestinian people of their established national rights".⁸⁸ The Algiers Arab summit decided also to confer upon the PLO the right to be sole representative of the Palestinian people with Jordan entering reservations.⁸⁹ The Algiers decision was the first of its kind at the Arab regional level to refer without any ambiguity to the 'national rights' of the Palestinians as a 'people'.⁹⁰

5.2.4.3 Period III: Post 1973

By 1974 the PLO had won the crucial part of the battle for recognition. Apart from Sadat's brief flirtation with Hussein, in respect to the PLO's representative status, other Arab governments held their position. At the Rabat summit Jordan too was convinced to join ranks with the other Arab governments. Hence, at Rabat the Arab governments were able to adopt unanimously a resolution that inter alia asserted the "Palestinian people's right to

return to their homeland and determine their own fate" it also stressed

"that any Palestinian territory liberated through struggle in any form shall revert to its legitimate Palestinian ownership under the leadership of the PLO; ... the Palestinian people's right to establish their own independent authority in all liberated territories."⁹¹

Since the Rabat summit Arab governmental support for the role of the PLO and the political rights of the Palestinians has been reaffirmed at the Tripoli, Algiers and Baghdad Arab League summit meetings. The Baghdad summit in March 1979 was also the occasion when Egypt became isolated and ejected from Arab ranks for having violated the letter and the spirit of the Rabat decision by implementing the Camp David peace process.⁹² This process which began informally with Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 culminated in the signing of a peace treaty in March 1979 between Egypt and Israel. The peace treaty⁹³ had no references to the Palestinian problem but an adjoining commitment to proceed with the implementation of the "Framework for Peace in the Middle East" agreed at Camp David in September 1978.

This framework stated that

"Egypt, Israel and Jordan will agree on the modalities for establishing the elected self-governing authority in the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed. The parties will negotiate an Agreement which will define the powers and responsibilities of the self-governing authority to be exercised in the West Bank and Gaza".⁹⁴

The provisions of this framework was far from meeting earlier Arab governmental decisions recognising the PLO as representing the Palestinians in their aspirations to achieve statehood.

The reactions in the Arab world to the announcement of the peace treaty between Egypt and Israel is indicative of the

extent to which the PLO had mobilised support for the Palestinian cause. The day after the treaty was formally signed an Arab summit was held in Baghdad that suspended Egypt's membership of the Arab League, decided to move the League's headquarters from Cairo to Tunis and announced economic boycotts. The PLO had already in September 1978 formed the Steadfastness Front with Algeria, Libya, Yemen, Syria. The Front had rejected the Camp David agreements because it renounced the principle of just peace in the Middle East; which they stressed could only be achieved by the recognition and realisation of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people.⁹⁵ The negative reactions were not limited to the PLO and Arab governments but to the Palestinians and Arabs at large, too. The visit of Sadat to Jerusalem had triggered protest demonstrations in the occupied territories.⁹⁶

An overwhelming majority of the Arab governments continued to support the official PLO position during the post-Rabat period. However, two points need to be made. Firstly, the official PLO line did not always reflect the position of the Palestinian resistance movement as a whole. Firstly, the PFLP, PFLP-GC and ALF, as a result of PLO's acceptance of the idea of a 'mini-state' and the possibility of comprehensive peace talks, formed the 'rejection front'. They asserted the continuation of the armed-struggle for the total liberation of Palestine. Particularly, the PFLP's involvement in hijackings during 1974 and 1975 brought this guerrilla group into direct conflict with the PLO leaders, which had by then banned hijackings. The consequence of this division was that Arab governments such as Libya and in particular Iraq supported positions 'plus royalist que le roi'.

Secondly, although the PLO at the 12th PNC in June 1974 opened the way to the possibility of negotiations its position on this matter was at times unclear. In the immediate aftermath of the Sinai disengagement agreements

and Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, it hardened its position and moved to a position closer to the one held by the rejection front. This became particularly evident in the Palestinian declaration of unity signed in Tripoli in 1977 by leaders of guerrilla groups, including those of the rejection front. The declaration reasserted the right of the Palestinian people "to self-determination within the framework of an independent state set up on any part of Palestinian soil that may be liberated."⁹⁷ The declaration appears to have left the issue of 'peace talks' unclear. However, the consequence of the PLO's change in its position vis-a-vis peace talks has been that it has strained and complicated its relationship with particularly conservative Arab governments that have favoured the resolution of the problem through negotiations. Nevertheless, the essential point to bear in mind is the fact that the PLO remained recognised as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.

As the analysis indicates it was only by the mid 1970s that Arab governments had lent their support for the Palestinian cause and the PLO. However, the mobilisation process that changed Arab governmental perception of the Palestinian cause was a long and complex one. Although as early as 1964 they came to recognise the resurgence of a Palestinian consciousness, they responded to it reluctantly and in a manner that did not conflict with their own goals. It was the inter-war period from 1967 to 1973 that was the most active one. It was characterised by an intense process of change in Arab governmental attitudes. The average governmental attitude fluctuated between a favourable disposition to the Palestinian resistance movement and the temptation to slip back to 'old thinking' particularly during the Jordanian war.

Two concluding points need to be made in respect to the mobilisation process at the Arab regional level. Firstly, the above analysis points out at how as a result of the

mobilisation process the PLO has found itself reconsidering the definition as well as the means of realising the Palestinian cause. The PLO during its efforts to gain support amongst Arab governments modified its goals as well as the means of achieving them.

The second point, which has not been introduced into the above analysis but does influence the mobilisation process, is the interaction between the mobilisation process at different levels. In Chapter 4 it was briefly noted that the PLO's improved status in the Arab governmental world and the international community did generate support for the PLO amongst Palestinians. This is quite evident from the strong pro-PLO demonstrations in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip both after of the Rabat summit and after Arafat's speech to the United Nations General Assembly. A similar process exists for the Arab level too. The growing support for the PLO amongst the Palestinians, as well as at the international level, did pressure the Arab governments to come out in support of the PLO. It is probably not a simple coincidence that the Algiers Arab summit decision in 1973 was closely preceded by the Non-Aligned recognition of the PLO the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in September and by the announcement of the establishment of the pro-PLO PNF in the West Bank.

It will be the task of the concluding chapter to take up these points in their aggregate form as they relate to the remaining levels of analysis. The nature and centrality of these two points will become clearer as the analysis expands to include the other regional levels as well as the global one.

ENDNOTES

- 1 With the exception of Morocco who suggested the recognition of Israel in April 1965, (Kadi, L. **Arab Summit Conferences and The Palestine Problem 1936-1950, 1964-1966** (PLO Research Centre, Beirut, 1966) pp.162-3); (Rodinson, M. **Israel and the Arabs** (Penguin Books, London, 1982) p.203). Saudi Arabia, although it is regarded as the largest creditor of Al-Fatah, has preferred not to get involved in a conspicuous and direct manner. Saudi Arabia in 1969 played a crucial role in convening the first Islamic Conference, where the Palestinian issue was brought up and the PLO granted observer status. Libya after Gadaffi's take over has usually followed idiosyncratic policies, sometimes overtly supportive of the Palestinian resistance movements and other times critical and even hostile.
- 2 Macdonald notes the integrative impact that relations with Israel has on Arab countries compared to the disintegrative impact of the Palestine problem. MacDonald, R. **The League of Arab States; A Study in the Dynamics of Regional Organization** (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1965) pp.85-94.
- 3 Laquer, W. **The Israeli-Arab Reader; A Documentary History of the Middle East Conflict** (Penguin Books, London, 1970) p.175.
- 4 Information on these smaller groups is scarce and ambiguous. Hamid refers to 40 such groups without mentioning names, (Hamid, R. "What is the PLO", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.IV (Summer 1975), No.4, p.93. Kadi, (1966: 105) on the other hand mentions and names six such groups.
- 5 Hamid, (1975: 92).
- 6 Ibid. p.92.
- 7 Kadi, (1966: 93-94).
- 8 Ibid. p.99.
- 9 See Kadi, (1966: 102) for the origins of the idea of a Palestinian entity in the form of an organisation raised by Syria and Iraq at the 40th session of the Arab League Council on 15 September 1963, also Rodinson (1982: 384); Macdonald (1965: 372).
- 10 Kadi, (1966: 109).
- 11 Ibid. 106.
- 12 p.139.

- 13 p.106.
- 14 For Shukairy complaints see Kadi,(1966: 176-7), see also Quandt et al. for Shukairy's problems with Jordan. (Quandt, W., Jabber, F. and Lesch, A. **The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism** (University of California, Berkeley, 1973) p.164.
- 15 Kadi, (1966: 179).
- 16 Frangi, A. **The PLO and Palestine** (Zed Books, London, 1983) p. 107.
- 17 Hudson, M. "The Palestinian Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis", in Moore, J. (ed.) **The Arab-Israeli Conflict, Volume II** (Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1974) p.499.
- 18 Quandt et al. (1973: 195). See Quandt et al., (1973: 163-165) for Jordan's hostility to Fatah and reserved attitude towards PLO.
- 19 Hudson, M. "Developments and Setbacks in the Palestinian Resistance Movement", **Journal of Palestine Studies** Vol.1 (Spring 1973), No.3, p.67. As Israel did not occupy any part of TranJordan, 'Jordan' was left out from the original text.
- 20 Quandt et al., (1973: 180-181).
- 21 Laquer, (1970: 174).
- 22 See Quandt et al., (1973: 161-2), for the influence of Arab nationalism on Syrian policies.
- 23 See MacDonald, (1965: 79), who notes this alliance against Egypt.
- 24 In the wake of the June war, as a result of a change in the leadership, the Syrian government reversed its policy and became supportive of the resistance. However, in 1968-69 Syria followed policies that hindered the movement of guerrillas, (Quandt et al., 1973: 166-7, 194).
- 25 Gilmour, D. **Dispossessed: The Ordeal of the Palestinians** (Sphere Books, London, 1982) p.144 and Frangi, (1983: 102-103).
- 26 Frangi, (1983:102).
- 27 Ibid. p.102.
- 28 Quoted in Quandt et al., (1973: 51 footnote 8). This sceptical attitude towards the role of resistance in liberating Palestine appears to have continued to exist after the 1967 war. This is quite evident in M.

Heikal's 19 January article in the semi-official Egyptian daily, Al-Ahram, (ARR, 1968: 43). This attitude seems to be corroborated by the news that as late as in January 1968 Egypt and Jordan with the cooperation of the PLO were still trying to curb the armed operations of Al-Fatah to help to achieve a political settlement. These news were however promptly denied by the PLO and the climate changed substantially after the Karameh battle, (ARR, 1968: 42).

- 29 MacDonald, (1965: 362).
- 30 Ibid. p.365.
- 31 Becker, J. **The PLO; The Rise and Fall of The Palestine Liberation Organization** (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1984) p.43.
- 32 Kadi, (1966: 99).
- 33 Ibid. p.176.
- 34 MacDonald, (1965: Appendix G).
- 35 Laquer, (1970: 174).
- 36 Kadi, (1966: 99-102, 139).
- 37 Becker, (1984: 68-69).
- 38 For parts of Nasser's speech in May 67, see Laquer, (1970: 228-9).
- 39 Kadi, (1966: 183).
- 40 It must be noted that Arab governments from the early days of the Arab League did refer to the right to self-determination of the people of Palestine. However, this was often made in an obscure and ambiguous manner. See for example, (Kadi, 1966: 122).
- 41 Laquer, (1970: 467).
- 42 Frangi, (1983: 103).
- 43 Mansbach, R., Ferguson, Y. and Lampert, D. **The Web of Politics** (Prentice-Hall Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1976) p.109.
- 44 The only exception to this was Algeria which had allowed Fatah to open an office in Algiers. It is possible that as a result of this direct Fatah access to the Algerian government that Algeria brought up the role of guerrilla warfare to liberate Palestine at the Third Arab summit.
- 45 See Macdonald, (1965: 372, 326), for Arab League

decisions to select a Palestinian representative to participate in debates.

- 46 Kadi, (1966: 109) notes that the PLA was only approved because Arab governments believed it would remain ineffective.
- 47 Hudson, (1973: 79).
- 48 Becker, (1984: 168).
- 49 For an analysis of the civil war in Jordan, including the response of various Arab governments see Quandt et al., (1973: 201); Frangi, (1983: 115-119).
- 50 Rodinson, (1982: 238).
- 51 Yodfat, A. and Arnon-Ohana, Y. **PLO Strategy and Tactics** (Croom Helm, London, 1981) p.166.
- 52 Ibid. pp.40-41, p.175.
- 53 Arab Report and Record, (1974: 363, 411, 412).
- 54 Yodfat et al., (1981: 179).
- 55 Frangi, (1983: 142).
- 56 ARR,(1976: 554). It is also interesting to note that efforts to get the PLO full membership began soon after the West Bank elections. Until the PLO became a full member of the Arab League, it was only an associate member with no voting rights, (ARR 1976: 333).
- 57 Quandt et al., (1973: 171).
- 58 Ibid. p.165 footnote 18.
- 59 p.158.
- 60 For a description of the PLA see, (ARR, 1970: 543; 1973: 426).
- 61 ARR, (1970: 301). In the first place Jordan had backed the idea of a PLO only after a clear understanding that the PLO accepted the West Bank as Jordan's responsibility (Kadi, 1966: 104). For Shukairy's attempts to extract concessions from Hussein being thwarted, see Quandt et al., (1973: 164).
- 62 Shuaibi, I. "The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness: Part I", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.9 (Autumn 1979) No.2, p.53.
- 63 Rodinson, (1982: 203) and Quandt et al., (1973: 185).
- 64 For the full text of the Khartoum resolution, see

- Fraser, T. **The Middle East 1914-1979** (Edward Arnold, London, 1980) p.115.
- 65 ARR, (1969: 111).
- 66 Quandt et al., (1973: 195-196).
- 67 Ibid. p.116.
- 68 Rodinson, (1982: 235).
- 69 Ibid. p.234.
- 70 ARR, (1970: 488).
- 71 Rodinson, (1982: 235). For other factors such as Palestinian resistance movement's claims to represent the Palestinians, see Quandt, (1973: 197); for growing radicalism, see Quandt, (1973: 182, 196), for the problem of creating a state within a state, see Rodinson, (1982: 231); for hijackings, see Rodinson (1982: 236). These factors too played their role in precipitating Jordanian action against the Palestinian resistance movement.
- 72 Quandt et al., (1973: 202, 204).
- 73 Ibid. p.203.
- 74 Rodinson, (1982: 238-9).
- 75 Quandt et al. (1973: 202, 210).
- 76 Ibid. p.205-210.
- 77 p.210.
- 78 ARR, (1971: 129).
- 79 ARR, (1971: 129-130).
- 80 For the details of the plan, see Yodfat et al., (1981: 159-163).
- 81 Gilmour, (1982: 173) and ARR, (1972: 157).
- 82 Quandt et al., (1973: 207 footnote 16).
- 83 ARR, (1972: 27).
- 84 Quandt et al., (1973: 207).
- 85 Shuaibi, I. "The Development of Palestinian Entity-Consciousness-Party II" **Journal of Palestine Studies** Vol.9 (Winter 1980), No.2, pp.101-102.
- 86 Shuaibi, (1980-I: 103).

- 87 Fraser, (1980: 130).
- 88 Ibid. p.134 and Yodfat et al., (1981: 166).
- 89 Yodfat et al., (1981: 180).
- 90 Yodfat et al. (1981: 40, 57). This was in marked departure from previous practice which tended to stress the Arab nature of the problem and referred to Arab Palestinians or Palestinian Arabs rather than the Palestinian people. The Khartoum decision might have been the first to refer to the 'Palestinian people' but the problem of liberating 'Arab lands' in Palestine had remained an Arab problem. Prior to the Arab summit, the fourth summit of Non-Aligned countries in Algiers in September 1973 had adopted similar decisions. On that occasion too Jordan entered reservations. Jankowitsch, O. and Sauvart, K. **The Third World Without Superpowers; The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries-Volume I** (Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1978) pp241-143, p.280.
- 91 Yodfat et al., (1981: 180).
- 92 Frangi, (1983: 167).
- 93 Fraser, (1980: 178-183).
- 94 Ibid. pp.173-174.
- 95 Frangi, (1983: 167).
- 96 Ibid.
- 97 ARR, (1977: 1013).

CHAPTER 6

MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT AMONGST THIRD WORLD REGIONAL AND POLITICAL GROUPINGS

6.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the mobilisation process amongst major Third World regional-political groupings. The analysis focuses on five such groupings, three regional and two political ones. The three regional groupings are the African, Latin American and Asian ones. The membership of these three groupings is similar to those of the United Nations regional groupings. The two politically based groupings are composed of Non-Aligned and Islamic countries respectively. Although the first three groups have mutually exclusive membership, the composition of the Non-Aligned and the Islamic group significantly overlap with each other and the three geographical groupings as well as the Arab group of the previous chapter.¹

The analysis in this chapter focuses on the responses to various demands put forward by Arab governments and the PLO in their efforts to mobilise support for the Palestinian cause in the Third World. The analysis concentrates on group behaviour as reflected in the decisions adopted by the political institutions of the above Third World groupings with the exception of the Asian group which unlike the others does not have an institutional structure of its own. Hence, the data on which the application of the mobilisation model rests, is based on the various speeches made during the debates and the decisions adopted at the formal gatherings of these Third World groups.

Two limitations in respect to these speeches and decisions must be noted. Firstly, the speeches on which the analysis relies are made by governmental delegations and reflect the position of the governments involved. Although more often

than not it can be assumed that the position of the current government does reflect the general attitude of the country this may not necessarily be valid in all cases. Secondly, the decisions adopted by the political institutions associated with the above regional groupings may not always reflect the position of all its members. The tendency of these groupings to reach their final decisions through consensus building rather than by taking votes makes it difficult to establish, with a high degree of certitude, the unity and support these decisions enjoy.

The actual change in attitudes and support for the Palestinian cause is established in two ways. Firstly, Third World decisions and statements on the Palestinian cause are examined for changes in their content and emphasis. Secondly, member states voting behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly on the Palestinian Question have been quantitatively studied. This has allowed the possibility of constructing an index of political support for the Palestinian cause derived from the agreement scores of each delegation with Israel on roll calls concerning the Palestinian issue.²

6.2 Conducive Environment

The first variable in the mobilisation process is the 'conducive environment'. This part of the mobilisation process consists of certain structural changes and events in the Third World that brought about an environment suitable for raising the Palestinian issue and aggregating support for it.

6.2.1 Structural changes

The very first structural changes began to take place as Third World forums and political institutions emerged. This enabled participants in such forums to raise and discuss problems of salience to their respective regions. These

multilateral interactions gave Third World statesmen the possibility of exchanging views, of discussions and of trying to formulate a unified approach to problems in an attempt to find solutions. Such interactions had the cumulative effect of paving the way toward the gradual articulation of a broadly supported world view that can be likened to an ideology. This ideology then came to perform the role of a yard-stick for determining whether issues raised by participants warranted their inclusion on the agenda for discussion and eventual support.

The first Third World political institutions to appear in world politics were the Arab League in 1945 and the Organisation of American States in 1948. The role of the former in respect to our model has already been considered in the previous chapter. The case of the OAS is rather different from the Arab League and the other Third World political institutions to be discussed below.

Throughout the 1950s and 1960s the Cold War was an issue of high salience to the OAS. Its members tended to follow policies closely associated with the US and in general the Latin Americans were seen as close allies of the Western Bloc. The influence of the US and Cold War politics for example was reflected in the way in which Cuba, after Castro's accession to power, was promptly excluded from the Organisation's activities. This US influence on Latin Americans did not remain restricted to East-West relations but also conditioned their attitude towards colonial issues. At the 16th session of the United Nations General Assembly the Latin Americans were closely aligned to the West in their voting behaviour. It was not until a decade later that the agreement between "the Western Bloc and the Latin Americans dropped to less than half of its original value" set during the 16th session.³ This rather strong pro-Western position of the Latin Americans throughout the 1950s and for the most part of the 1960s makes it rather difficult to consider the OAS as an institution to be

included amongst the structural changes that has contributed towards the emergence of a conducive environment.

The rest of the Third World as an independent force from the West first appeared in the world political scene in any significant way in the late 1950s. It was the entrance of an increasing number of newly independent states into the world political arena that generated the need for these countries to meet and discuss problems of interest to them. The agenda of world politics in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War had remained dominated by the Cold War. The issues and problems deemed significant by the participants in the Cold War did not necessarily include problems of greater salience to the newly emerging states. The decolonisation of peoples still under colonial rule, the racial policies of South Africa and economic development were such problems.

It was during the late 1950s and early 1960s that developments towards the emergence of a Third World approach to world problems began to occur. The Bandung Conference in 1955 was the first ever major gathering of Afro-Asian countries.⁴ In this conference, even though the influence of Cold War attitudes were reflected in the debates,⁵ racialism and decolonisation emerged as matters of salience to particular Afro-Arab participants.⁶ The Bandung Conference was then followed by a series of African meetings that paved the way to the establishment of the OAU in May 1963.⁷ The establishment of the OAU provided African states with a formal institutional structure and a common denominator.⁸ This denominator was reflected in the OAU's determination to eradicate both colonialism and racialism from Africa, supplemented by the realisation of the need to pool efforts in that direction.⁹

The Non-Aligned gatherings provided another possibility, this time for a wider geographical area, to discuss

problems and develop common approaches. As these meetings became institutionalised into the Non-Aligned Movement in the early 1970s, an ideology of particular importance to concerted action emerged. In the early 1960s, the Cold War, the achievement of a stable world peace together with anticolonialism were the major issues of concern to the Non-Aligned.¹⁰ In the following decade, as the Cold War lost its salience to the Non-Aligned anticolonialism continued to remain a very central element of the Non-Aligned ideology and gradually came to cover the Palestinian question too. At the same time the Non-Aligned began to direct greater attention towards the establishment of a New International Economic Order. The Non-Aligned ideology with its coverage of the above issues came to condition the foreign policies of an ever growing membership.

Finally, the Islamic Conference Organisation established in March 1971, is another forum that has contributed to the emergence of a conducive environment. Although the first Islamic Conference was called in response to a perceived threat to Islam caused by the fire at Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem, it quickly expanded to include the Palestinian problem in general. Hence the Islamic Conference Organisation became a forum for the promotion of Islamic solidarity on the Palestinian Question and the coordination of a common Islamic stand on the Palestinian Question in other Third World and international forums.

The conduciveness of this environment arises as a result of three factors. Firstly, these forums and gatherings constituted a place where problems of concern to the Third World could be raised and demands formulated. Secondly, these meetings enabled members to articulate an ideology that guides them in determining which issues and demands warrant their support. Thirdly, access to these forums, with the exception of the OAS, gave Arab governments the possibility of raising the Palestinian problem and more

importantly it gave them a chance to influence the development of this Third World ideology in a manner that eventually allowed its extension to cover the Palestinian problem, too.¹¹

6.2.2 Key Events

In Chapter 4 it was noted how a series of events, such as the Algerian liberation war, the break-up of the United Arab Republic and the 1967 war played an important role in generating a situation favorable for mobilisation, at the level of the Palestinian people, to start and to be consolidated. There are a number of events with similar consequences that have helped to bring about an environment more receptive to Arab initiatives on the Palestinian problem at the level of Third World groupings.

One such event was the role that Israel played in the 1956 Suez War. During the Bandung Conference Nasser had described Israel as a tool of Western imperialism. In the aftermath of this conference Israel's alliance with Britain and France during the Suez crisis played a central role in increasing the credibility of such Egyptian arguments hence undermining Israel's image in the Asian world. Decalo¹³ too notes the loss of considerable Asian goodwill toward Israel as a result of the latter's role in the Suez war.

A large part of Africa was not independent at the time to be influenced by this event. Instead another event within the African context did later have some adverse effect on African perceptions of Israel. Israel had not hesitated to lend her support for Biafra during the Nigerian Civil war. Israel's readiness to support a secessionist movement, particularly in a country with which it had good relations, alienated several African governments.¹⁴ For most Africans it was difficult to reconcile such behaviour with one of the major tenets of the OAU Charter which stresses the integrity of each African state.

The two Arab-Israeli wars of 1967 and 1973, in particular the latter one, did raise questions about the nature of Israel. The wars provided hard evidence for Arab arguments about the expansionist nature of Israel. Although the African response to the 1967 war was relatively muted and reflected a desire not to get embroiled in someone else's conflict, by early 1970s African attitudes had begun to change in a way that prepared the ground for a stronger reaction to the 1973 war. A number of factors played a role in this.

Firstly and probably most importantly in the 1973 war it was not just the territory of a OAU member that had been invaded. As a consequence of the Israeli thrust across the Suez Canal the African continent itself had become violated. The African governments felt they could not remain indifferent to this development. Secondly, the gravity of this development was particularly accentuated by the failure of their earlier mediation attempt in the Middle East. The OAU summit in 1971 had decided to send a mediation mission to the Middle East to try to seek the reactivation of the Jarring peace mission.¹⁵ The failure of the OAU mission was attributed to a perceived Israeli intransigence towards negotiating about withdrawal from captured Arab territories.¹⁶ Hence, Israel was seen to be undermining another central African principle: rejection of the acquisition of territory by the use force.

Just the failure of the OAU mission on its own had "brought Africa a few degrees closer to the Arab position".¹⁹ This generated a conducive environment for the Palestinian cause in two conspicuous ways. Firstly, the Africans became more receptive to Arab demands for the withdrawal of support from Israel by severing diplomatic relations. Secondly, the Africans began to respond to Arab arguments on the similarities between the Southern African problem and the Palestinian question. This is also pointed out by El-Ajouty "it could therefore be said that the OAU's failure in

its attempted mediation of the Egypt/Israeli sector of the Middle Eastern conflict precipitated a series of transformations in the international relationships between Africa and Israel. These transformations isolated Israel, brought the League of Arab states and the OAU together in the process of harmonization of policies regarding both the Middle East conflict and the Southern Africa conflict, and created more ideological interaction between the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the African liberation movements".¹⁸

The 'conducive environment' as constituted by the above structural changes and the key events is dynamic in nature and continuously interacts with the other parts of the mobilisation process model. The Bandung Conference gave the Arabs the possibility of gaining access to a large audience and raising the Palestine question. When the Bandung Conference was seen together with the Suez war which lent credence to Arab arguments about Israel it enabled an early consolidation of a reasonably broad base of Asian support and solidarity. The Non-Aligned, on the other hand, provided the Arabs with another forum with growing membership where problems of direct concern to the Third World were discussed. This together with the gradual development of an ideology reflecting Third World thinking and attitudes towards a wide range of issues provided the Arab governments the raw material with which to commence the mobilisation of support.

The initial accessibility and the possibility of linkages to existing legitimised concepts allowed by this conducive environment brought about a degree of support for the Palestinian question that gradually enabled the PLO itself to enter the process. This initial level of support made the existing conducive environment even more favourable by allowing the PLO to gain access to Third World forums and to put forward its own arguments. This enabled the PLO not only to benefit from but also contribute to an ideology providing legitimacy and support for the Palestinian cause. This dynamic nature of the conducive environment must be

kept in mind as the analysis moves to the next part of the model.

6.3 Cognitive and Bargain Linkages

In the introductory chapter it was pointed out that the Zionist success, in linking the solution of the problem of Jewish displaced persons to the establishment of Palestine, played an important role in mobilising support for the Zionist cause. Similarly, when Israel embarked on a policy to expand its basis of international support it did make use of various cognitive and bargain linkages.

Israel's brand of socialism and her access to the Socialist International played an important role in gaining legitimacy in the eyes of ruling political parties of countries such as Burma, Nepal, Ghana and Tanzania.¹⁹ During the 1960s Israeli government followed policies aiming to project the image of an anti-colonialist and anti-apartheid country alienating both the South African government, with whom it used to have good relations in the 1950s, and sections of the Jewish community there.²⁰ Israel's ability to draw similarities between historical Jewish persecution and the sufferings of black peoples too appears to have contributed to her strong image in Africa. This is reflected in the Congolese (Kinshasa) Premier Mulamba's June 1966 statement that "The African people like Israel because we are all victims of racial discrimination and we have had to fight for our liberty".²¹

To these cognitive linkages on which Israel relied to improve her standing in the Third World one can also include bargain linkages. In the late 1950s, as newly independent African and Asian countries began to discover the difficult problems of economic development, Israel became interested in lending her expertise to the Third World in terms of technical and development aid.²² One of the major considerations that encouraged Israel to adopt a

highly active aid programme directed towards the Third World was to cultivate the friendship of these countries. Her offers of aid were made conditional upon the recipient government extending diplomatic recognition to Israel.²³ This was done primarily in the belief that African support cultivated at the bilateral level would counter or neutralise Arab pressure on African countries to revise their attitude towards Israel.²⁴ This relationship which remained a major objective for Israel in Africa can be said to constitute a bargain linkage. It brought highly sought after Israeli developmental aid for Africa in return for African denial of support for the Palestinian cause. The Arab governments and the PLO too in their efforts to gain support for the Palestinian cause amongst Third World regional groupings made wide use of similar linkages.

The efforts to establish cognitive linkages were directed towards achieving two aims. One aim was to weaken the status and legitimacy of Israel in the eyes of the Third World. This was done in two ways: firstly, by stressing Israel's reluctance to respect a number of principles embodied in the OAU Charter , and secondly, by pointing out the growing relations between Israel and South Africa.²⁵ This was done to undermine Israel's legitimacy by associating her with South Africa, a state with low standing in the eyes of Africans and the Non-Aligned. The second aim was to get the Palestinian cause integrated into the anti-colonial thinking of the Non-Aligned Movement. In this way the Palestinian problem would be perceived and treated as an issue falling within the domain of the anti-colonial dimension of the Non-Aligned ideology, hence, benefitting from the same support accruing to other issues covered by anti-colonialism.

6.3.1 Territorial integrity and the inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by the use of force.

Above it was pointed out that overt Israeli support for one

secessionist movement together with the 1967 and 1973 wars created a conducive environment for the mobilisation process to begin. This was because these events by their nature undermined principles central to African thinking as reflected in the OAU Charter.²⁶ Arab governments, in particular Egypt, played an important role in exploiting these principles to weaken the position of Israel in Africa. At the OAU summit in September 1967 Arab members had argued²⁷ that Israel had violated the integrity of an African state and Israeli occupation of "their territory was an affront to the OAU".²⁸ For the African states "to fail to support Egypt was to question the letters on which the OAU Charter was written".²⁹

Although at the 1967 OAU meeting the Arabs had to restrain themselves, this was not the case at the UN. Particularly with the adoption of the Security Council resolution which declared the acquisition of territory by force as illegal, Arab arguments began to gain strength and influence African thinking. This is quite evident in the Tanzanian delegate's observation of the similarity between the situation in the Middle East and the vulnerability of African states to potential aggression from racist governments of Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia.³⁰

The gradual change of mood amongst African states was quickened by Israeli preparedness to support the Biafran secession. Many Africans perceived this as another action undermining the territorial integrity of an African country. The growing national liberation struggle particularly in Guinea-Bissau brought the problem of aggression home. The Portuguese regularly undermined the territorial integrity of neighbouring countries. This made African countries appreciate better the need to support the Arab cause to strengthen the principle of territorial integrity. Senegal was one such country whose territory was frequently subjected to Portuguese incursions. The Foreign Minister of Senegal reflected African thinking when he told

the United Nations General Assembly that "neither side can invoke security reasons to seize or annex territories of other states".³¹

The African recognition of Arab and particularly Egyptian arguments on the need for African support for the Arab cause was reflected in the growing strength of the decisions of the 1971 and 1972 OAU summits. These decisions supported the Egyptian position in the Middle East conflict and called for total Israeli withdrawal from 'all' Arab territories occupied since 5 June 1967. The June 1972 decision was particularly strong as it reaffirmed "in the name of African solidarity... its effective support for Egypt in its legitimate struggle to restore the integrity of its full territory by all means".³² Establishing the applicability of a highly regarded African principle to the Middle East undermined Israel's legitimacy and mobilised support for the Arab cause. Although this process did not contribute directly to the Palestinian cause it did bring the Africans nearer to lending their support for this cause. The legitimisation of Arab demands for the return of the occupied territories was crucial in mobilising support for the political rights of the Palestinians.

6.3.2 The Palestinian cause and anti-colonialism.

Anti-colonialism and the struggle against racism have been central to both the Non-Aligned and the OAU.³³ The anti-colonial dimension of the Non-Aligned ideology has played a leading role in determining the attitudes of the majority of Third World countries towards the colonial and racial problems of Africa. In Table 6.1 the average level of support for a standard anti-colonial position on all the relevant roll-calls is shown for various political groupings.³⁴ The results, which are for the years preceding and following the 1967 and 1973 wars, point towards the very high level of support that anti-colonialism enjoyed in the Third World, throughout the 1960s and 1970s. The Arab

governments since as early as the Bandung Conference³⁵ have tried to draw similarities between apartheid, imperialism and Israel in the hope of gaining support from the other Afro-Asians.³⁶ However, the linkage between the Palestinian cause and those causes covered by anti-colonialism was not immediately accepted.

TABLE 6.1: Level of average anti-colonial voting scores* for groups of countries

Assembly Sessions	Political and Regional Groupings				
	Latin America	Non-Aligned	Africans	Asians	Islamic
1966	72 %	89 %	84 %	82 %	88%
1969	90 %	99 %	96 %	98 %	96%
1974	94 %	99 %	98 %	98 %	100%

(* Percentages are based upon countries meeting the minimum attendance levels.)

The OAU and the Non-Aligned Movement did not share the Arab perception of a ideological linkage between the Palestinian issue and the colonial/racial problems of particularly Southern Africa until the late 1960s. In the late 1950s and early 1960s the only occasion when Arab efforts to establish a link took a concrete form was at the meeting of the Casablanca Group in 1961. This meeting "linking the problem of Palestine with the general theme of the defence of independence and security on the African continent"³⁷ denounced Israel as an instrument in the service of imperialism and neocolonialism.³⁸ The reluctance of Africans to discuss the question of Palestine, let alone its similarities with African colonial problems, forced Egypt to keep the Middle East away from the first and subsequent OAU summits during most of the 1960s.³⁹ However, during the 1964 summit this did not prevent the Algerian President Ben Bella from making a direct comparision of the apartheid policy of South Africa and the racial discrimination that the Arab minority in Israel faced.⁴⁰ Other Arab members drew similarities between the

roles of the newly formed PLA and that of African liberation movements.⁴¹

The debate on the similarities between the situation in South Africa and Palestine amongst the Africans did not receive a great degree of attention until the OAU summit in May 1973. During the summit Arab governments, in particular the Algerian President, strongly argued that the Palestinian problem was a part of the African struggle against colonialism, imperialism and Zionism. He criticised the discrepancy in African attitudes towards the problems of South Africa and Palestine when he declared that "Africa can not adopt one attitude toward colonialism in Southern Africa and a completely different one toward Zionist colonialism in Northern Africa".⁴²

One of the immediate consequences of the debate precipitated by the above argument was the adoption of a unanimously supported OAU resolution

"calling on African nations to consider taking collective and individual steps, both political and economic, against Israel should that country persist in its refusal to evacuate occupied Arab territories".⁴³

This led the OAU for the first time to express their support for Palestinian rights when they declared the need to respect the inalienable rights of the Palestinians in the solution of the Middle East conflict.⁴⁴ Although this OAU decision on the Middle East was not as far reaching as the Algerian call for the outright suspension of relations⁴⁵ with Israel it still signified a change in African perception's of the Palestinian problem.

In respect to the Non-Aligned Movement the developments on the question of cognitive similarities between the problem of South Africa and Palestine was quite different from the OAU. Primarily, as a result of a greater Arab presence and a more radical composition, the Palestinian issue had not only received early recognition but had also been defined

as a "struggle for liberation from colonialism and racism" since the 1964 summit.⁴⁶ This remained the position held by the Non-Aligned Movement without any significant change during the period between the Cairo and Algiers summits in spite of Arab efforts to convince the Non-Aligned of the strong similarity between the Palestinian problem and the Southern African problems. However, it was the adoption of the 'Declaration on the Struggle for National Liberation' at the Algiers summit in September 1973 that signified a major change in Non-Aligned thinking towards the Palestinian problem. In this Arab governments, in particular the Algerians, and the PLO played an important role, as throughout the Algiers summit they argued the similarities between colonialism, racialism and Zionism.⁴⁷

In this Declaration the Non-Aligned recognised that

"the case of Palestine is completely identical with the situation in South Africa, where racist and segregationist minorities have resorted to the same methods of colonial domination and exploitation..."⁴⁸

This unambiguous formulation of a cognitive linkage between the Palestinian and South African problems influenced Non-Aligned attitudes towards Israel and the Palestinian cause. Firstly, Israel lost considerable status and legitimacy when the Pretoria-Salisbury-Lisbon military/political alliance against national liberation was extended to include Tel-Aviv.⁴⁹ Secondly, the Non-Aligned reaffirmed "the legitimacy of the struggle of the Palestinian people against colonialism, Zionism and racism" and recognised the PLO as "the legitimate representative of the Palestine people and their legitimate struggle".⁵⁰

The change in Non-Aligned attitudes brought about by the linkage between the situation in Palestine and Southern Africa extended beyond the realm of verbal political support. The Non-Aligned Movement's decisions adopted at Algiers called on its members to extent a wide range of measures, including the severance of diplomatic relations initially introduced to isolate Portugal, Rhodesia and

South Africa, to cover Israel too. Furthermore, the summit called on member states who still maintained relations with Israel

"to work for a boycott of Israel in the diplomatic, economic, military and cultural fields and in the sphere of maritime and air traffic in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter".⁵¹

By adopting these measures and invoking the provisions of Chapter VII the Non-Aligned expressed the severity of its stand and its intention to harmonise its policies towards the Palestinian problem with the ones towards Southern Africa.

These developments within the Non-Aligned Movement, the October War and the alleged collaboration between South Africa and Israel during the war hardened the position of the OAU. At the emergency meeting of its Council of Ministers held in November 1973 in Addis Ababa, the OAU responded to the linkage between Southern Africa and the Palestinian problem in a much more strongly worded manner than at its summit in May of the same year. The meeting declared that the

"open military collusion between the United States, Portugal, South Africa, Rhodesia and Israel during the recent Middle East War further confirms the justification of the preoccupation of the African and Arab countries and has further strengthened their conviction in the need for a common struggle".⁵²

The OAU's new found belief in the perceived similarities between the imperialist and racist threats facing the Africans and the Arabs culminated in a call on all member states and friendly countries to impose a total economic embargo and in particular an oil embargo against Israel, Portugal, South Africa and Southern Rhodesia.⁵³ At the ideological level, on the otherhand, it led to the description of the Palestinian problem as a struggle for self-determination against colonial and racial discrimination.

This change in the ideological outlook of the Non-Aligned and the Africans as expressed in the formal decisions of their respective forums was also reflected in their voting behaviour. A comparative analysis of the Third World voting behaviour gives an indication of the way in which attitudes towards the two issues have converged.

The anti-colonial dimension of non-alignment had always upheld support for the struggles being waged against colonialism and racialism in Southern Africa. This continuous support for anti-colonialism as it relates to matters concerning Southern Africa was depicted in Table 6.1. A large proportion of the Third World political and regional groupings under study have on the whole supported anti-colonialism. Whereas this had not been the case in respect to the Palestinian problem especially prior to the 28th session of the General Assembly.

TABLE 6.2: Distribution of Highly Anti-Colonialist and Pro-Palestinian Votes* In Each Group Across Three Sessions

Assembly Sessions	Political and Regional Groupings				
	Latin Americans	Africans	Asians	Non-Aligned	Islamic group
1969	(2) 18%	(8) 35%	(9) 69%	(29) 69%	(24) 83%
1973	(6) 50%	(22) 100%	(12) 86%	(55) 98%	(32) 97%
1974	(20) 95%	(34) 97%	(21) 96%	(81) 99%	(31) 100%

(* Percentages and figures are based upon countries meeting the minimum attendance levels)

However, as the Palestinian problem became integrated into anti-colonial thinking the voting behaviour of the Afro-Asian countries began to change too. These countries started to extend their anti-colonial support for the Palestinian cause. Table 6.2 shows the number and percentage of countries which were adopting both a highly anti-colonial and a highly pro-Palestinian position. A growing proportion of Third World countries came to vote in

a manner suggesting an integration of the two dimensions at the United Nations General Assembly. (See Appendix II for a statistical analysis of the relationship between the two issues.)

If Arab arguments on a successful exploitation of the principle of territorial integrity played an important role in raising questions about Israel's behaviour, the ideological linking of the Palestinian problem to colonialism, imperialism and racism facilitated the extension of political support for the Palestinian cause. A number of other linkages which had played a role in changing Third World perceptions and attitudes towards the Palestinian problem can be added to the above major ones.

6.3.3 Bargain linkages

Earlier on it was noted that one of the factors that contributed to Israel's high status in the Third World was her ability to make developmental and technical skill available to Third World countries. It was argued that the trading of developmental assistance in return for support for Israel constituted a bargain linkage which played an important role in denying Arab governments any substantive progress in their efforts to weaken the image of Israel.

It is possible to identify a number of similar cases in respect to Arab efforts to mobilise support that could be likened to bargain linkages. However, it may be necessary to treat these bargain linkages with some caution. Although, these cases when studied individually may look like straight forward trade offs, they could also be seen as the natural manifestations of a political solidarity maintained by a common world outlook.

One such bargain linkage is the striking deal reached between the Arab and African governments at the extraordinary meeting of the OAU Council of Ministers in

November 1973. During this meeting the OAU called on its members to take "measures to put an end to Israel's defiance of the International Community"⁵⁴ and invited its members and Arab states to impose an oil boycott of Portugal, South Africa and Rhodesia as well as Israel. Within days, the Arab governments at their own summit in Algiers reciprocated by adopting the OAU recommendations and announcing a programme to increase Afro-Arab cooperation, to sever relations with South Africa, Portugal and Rhodesia, and impose a ban on oil supplies to these countries.⁵⁵

In isolation from its wider context this event may well appear to be the result of a conscious bargaining process whereby the Africans and Arabs have simply exchanged logistical support to weaken their respective enemies. Yet, such an approach would be too insufficient. In the immediate aftermath of the African severance of relations with Israel many have argued that this occurred as a result of Arab pressure resulting from their oil-based economic-financial power. Such arguments hold the view that Africans broke diplomatic relations and came to support the Arabs because of expected/promised Arab economic rewards and not as a result of a legitimisation process. However, as Legum argues

"It cannot be convincingly argued that the reason for this breach was ... fear of the Arabs' 'oil weapon' since the movement to break diplomatic relations first began to assume some significance in 1972, it escalated in September 1973, after the Summit of Non-Aligned Countries in Algiers and reached its high tide on 5 November when no fewer than 17 countries broke with Israel. Therefore the decision to break came before the punitive nature of oil sanctions had become manifest. There is no evidence to show that the Arabs had warned the African states of the economic consequences of any refusal to break with Israel as a direct pressure to compel them to yield. So the reasons must be sought in other explanations".⁵⁶

Without necessarily discounting the role of trade offs motivated by narrowly defined governmental considerations,

the picture would not be complete without taking into account the influence of broader ideology on the perceptions and behaviour of its adherents. It has already been argued that non-alignment as an ideology does play a crucial role on most Third World foreign policies. It has also been pointed out that anti-colonialism as a central tenet of non-alignment has been extended to embrace the Palestinian cause. Hence this bargain linkage, in respect to the Palestinian problem, that could otherwise be seen as the product of expedient bargaining need to be put into the larger ideological context too.

The third part of the mobilisation model examines the role of accessibility to the various Third World regional groupings in mobilising support for the Palestinian cause. It is this accessibility, conditional upon a conducive environment that has enabled first the Arab governments and then the PLO to argue their case and mobilise support for their cause. It is through a variety of access routes that the Arab governments and the PLO, the initiators, were able to bring the Palestinian problem to the attention of the Third World. Access to target actors gave them the opportunity to raise actor consciousness about the Palestinian problem and also establish linkages between the Palestinian cause and already legitimised and well supported principles and causes. It is the purpose of the following section to examine the role of accessibility in the mobilisation process.

6.4 Accessibility

In the introductory chapter it was noted that the ability of the Zionists to gain access to the domestic political systems of first Britain and then the US played an important role in mobilising support for the Zionist cause. Similarly, the conscious and rigorous efforts on the part of Israel to establish strong diplomatic and economic links enabled her to gain direct access to a great number of

governments in the Third World. In early 1970 Israel had cooperation treaties with 33 Third World countries⁵⁷ and had 70 diplomatic representatives including non-resident ones.⁵⁸ The Israeli presence in certain countries particularly in the early 1960s was of such quality that Israeli ambassadors were reputed to have enjoyed immediate access to some African heads of state which included the influential leader Nkrumah.⁵⁹

No doubt Israel's strong diplomatic presence in Africa played a major role in frustrating Egyptian efforts to mobilise African support. A vivid example of the consequences of Israeli advantages, arising from the access to African governments she enjoyed, was evident in African reluctance to discuss and adopt decisions on the Middle East favourable to the Arabs at the 1958 Accra Conference⁶⁰ and at the first OAU summit in 1963. According to Sawant⁶¹ the exclusion of the Palestine question from the debates and decisions of these two conferences can be linked to the Israeli Foreign Minister's visit to Ghana in early 1958 and "the great deal of (Israeli) diplomatic spade-work" prior to the OAU summit cautioning African leaders against possible Egyptian moves against Israel.

	Non-Violent means	Violent means
Indirect access	Arab Governments i.e Egypt, Algeria	M.E. wars, armed struggle
Direct access	PLO participation PLO offices	not used

TABLE 6.3 Access Routes to Third World Agendas

As the above matrix depicts, the Palestinians enjoyed a number of access routes through which they could reach the agendas of Third World governments and forums. Until the

early 1970s when the PLO began to be invited to the Islamic Conference Organisation, the Non-Aligned and the OAU meetings, and open offices in various Non-Aligned capitals, the Palestinian issue was brought up by Arab governments. In respect to violent access routes the Palestinians did not stage any violent acts that involved the Third World in any direct way. The two Palestinian hijackings that involved two African airports, Entebbe and Mogadishu, occurred well after African support for the Palestinian cause had been consolidated. However, the guerrilla warfare waged in Palestine did have an indirect impact as it helped the Non-Aligned countries to see similarities with national liberation struggles elsewhere.

6.4.1 Indirect Access through Arab Governments

From the very early days of the emergence of independent Afro-Asian countries Arab governments enjoyed certain advantages over Israel. Arab countries by their uncontroversial geographical and cultural location in Africa and Asia were readily accepted within the newly emerging Afro-Asian forums. The preparatory meeting for the Bandung Conference chose to invite Arab states rather than Israel at the end of a long debate over whether Israel could be regarded as an Asian country. The Bandung Conference set the trend for Arab participation in Afro-Asian forums at Israel's expense.

This gave the Arab governments the possibility of bringing the Palestinian question to the attention of an international forum outside the UN, where the item had been excluded from the Assembly's agenda since 1952. In respect to the significance of accessibility it is interesting to note that during the Bandung Conference a future leader of the PLO, Shukairy, too had the possibility of raising the Palestinian problem with the other delegates as a member of the Syrian delegation.⁶² Even though the final wording of the Bandung resolution on Palestine never satisfied the

Arab governments, at least the other Afro-Asian countries had been exposed to the Palestinian problem and the issue of the rights of the Palestinians. This early exposure to the Palestinian question and the impact of the Suez War doubtlessly played a role in Israel's failure to set up extensive diplomatic relations with Asian countries.

Israel's swift response to their exclusion from the Bandung Conference culminated in the establishment of an impressive Israeli diplomatic network, particularly in Africa. This diplomatic network, coupled with the striking of a successful linkage, where she offered wide developmental aid in return for African reluctance to support Egyptian arguments, undermined the Arab advantage based on access to Afro-Asian forums. Throughout most of the 1960s Egypt found its membership of the OAU of little use, as the OAU remained unwilling to discuss the Middle East in any way. Nevertheless, Egypt, later joined by Algeria, continued in raising the question of Palestine and describing Israel as a colonialist and racist state. This was done in Nasser's belief that Africa would eventually discover what he saw to be the truth.⁶³ However, for this Arabs had to wait until the failure of the OAU mediation mission to the Middle East. The failure of this mission created a favourable environment for the cumulative efforts of Arab governments during the 1960s to take effect.

6.4.2 Direct Access to Multilateral forums

The larger Arab membership and the more radical nature of the Non-Aligned Movement permitted the Arab governments to be more forceful. One of the consequences of this approach was that the PLO at an early stage gained access to the Non-Aligned meetings. The PLO was able to address the Non-Aligned for the first time during the Consultative Meeting of the Non-Aligned in Belgrade in July 1969.⁶⁴ This meeting set a precedent and the PLO, together with other liberation movements, was invited to the Lusaka summit in 1970 as a

quest.⁶⁵ From then on the status of the PLO gradually increased. As a result of a strong Algerian initiative the PLO was granted observer status at the Algiers summit in 1973 and full membership at the Lima Ministerial Meeting in 1975.⁶⁶

PLO's access to Non-Aligned delegates played an important role in mobilising full support for the Palestinian cause. It was at the Havana Coordinating Bureau meeting in 1974 that the Non-Aligned expressed their full and unambiguous support for the Palestinian cause. In this case the role of accessibility is vividly acknowledged by a PLO diplomatic representative.

"Palestinian representatives accompanied every delegation and were able to talk to them effortlessly in their mother tongues - one positive result of the world-wide Palestinian diaspora. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the delegations were thoroughly immersed in the Palestinian problem".⁶⁷

6.4.2.1 Bilateral relations

The establishment of the first bi-lateral relationship came in 1965 soon after the PLO was actually founded. That year the People's Republic of China granted the PLO the right to open an office with a quasi-diplomatic status.⁶⁸ The relative ease with which the PRC had made itself accessible was reflected in her position that saw the Palestinians "no longer as merely an international dispute over refugees, but as a manifestation of the national liberation struggle of a distinct Palestinian people".⁶⁹ This early achievement in Asia was followed by North Korea and North Vietnams' preparedness to have relations with the PLO. Various PLO representatives including Arafat made frequent visits to China and North Korea throughout the early 1970s. This played an important role in the PLO expanding its own basis of Asian support particularly amongst radical governments. However, it was only from the early 1970s that the PLO began to open offices abroad and gain access to host governments in any significant way.

The first two black African countries to allow the opening of PLO offices were Uganda and Chad. Uganda, soon after it severed its relations with Israel, invited the PLO to take over the premises of the Israeli embassy.⁷⁰ Similarly, Chad the third African country to break its diplomatic relations with Israel in December 1972 welcomed the PLO to open an office.⁷¹ These were followed by invitations to open offices from Senegal, Guinea and Congo during 1973. Doubtlessly, at a time when Israel's influence in Africa began to diminish, the ability of the PLO to gain access to some African governments contributed to PLO's efforts to mobilise support for the Palestinian cause. It gave the PLO the opportunity to discuss the Palestinian problem with these host governments and seek their support in lobbying others. Furthermore, the PLO's presence in these countries gave the PLO representatives the possibility to caucus amongst the diplomatic corps, particularly in those capitals where it was accorded full diplomatic status.

The number of PLO offices rapidly expanded following the Non-Aligned, OAU and ICO decisions calling for the severance of relations with Israel. This was also helped by the ICO decision in Lahore in February 1974⁷² calling on its members to allow the PLO to open offices in their countries. A similar decision was adopted at the Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau Ministerial Meeting at Havana in March 1975.⁷³ The combined effect of these decisions, coupled with the Non-Aligned (August 1975) and Arab League (December 1975) decisions to accord full membership to the PLO, contributed to the expansion of the PLO offices abroad. As Table 6.4 depicts by 1984 the PLO had 45 offices in the various Third World countries.

Although the opening of these offices was an indication of a certain level of support for the Palestinian cause it should not be treated simply as the end product of a mobilisation process. Instead, by allowing the PLO direct

access to these governments and regional forums, it gave the PLO a basis from which to continue and expand the mobilisation of support. The presence of PLO representatives in a country gave the PLO the possibility of both keeping the Palestinian problem on the public agendas of those countries and also continuing to strengthen the legitimacy of their cause. This was done in the belief that the opinion of the international community could help their struggle for self-determination morally as well as materially.

Africa	21	Non-Aligned	41	
Asia	16	Islamic Group	16	
Latin America	8	Arab League	20	
TOTAL	45			

TABLE 6.4 PLO offices by Third World Regional and Political groupings⁷⁴

However, there were limits on how far governments were prepared to go along with the demands of the PLO. At the July 1975 OAU summit in Kampala, the PLO together with Libya lobbied for a decision to work towards Israel's expulsion from the UN. However, the majority of members supported by Egypt refused to endorse it.⁷⁵ Instead the summit adopted a much milder decision that called on member states

"to take the most appropriate measures to intensify pressures exercised against Israel at the UN and other institutions including the possibility of eventually depriving it of its status as a member of these institutions."⁷⁶

Similarly the PLO initiative⁷⁷ to persuade the Non-Aligned Movement to call sanctions against Israel faced difficulties. The August 1976 Non-Aligned summit in Colombo, noting the obstacle caused by US vetoes in the Security Council declined to go any further than the

earlier position taken by the OAU summit.⁷⁸

These developments in many ways established the parameters within which the PLO could expect support. More interestingly the consequences of these developments for the PLO's behaviour reflect the dynamic and interactive nature of the mobilisation process. The accessibility enjoyed by the PLO contributed to the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause but this same accessibility put systemic pressure on the PLO to moderate its policies. As its international standing increased the PLO found itself revising some of its more radical attitudes and policies towards the solution of the Palestinian problem.

One last way in which the PLO gained access to the Third World countries was as a result of its armed struggle. The use of violence by the PLO had two consequences. The spectacular hijackings mounted by the Palestinians attracted attention to the Palestinian problem. It put the Palestinian problem on the public agenda. Secondly, and more importantly, violence against Israel had a different impact on particularly African countries and those countries that achieved independence through armed struggle. This violence in Palestine made them aware of 'another' armed struggle to which they could relate and with which they could sympathise. Establishment of the cognitive linkage between the problems of South Africa and Palestine aided this process. The Africans perceived growing similarities between the Israeli raids into refugee camps and on alleged guerrilla hide-outs and Portugese/South African raids into neighbouring African countries.

6.5 Growth of Support amongst Third World groupings

The final part of this chapter presents the growth of Third World support for the Palestinian cause as an outcome of a

mobilisation process, whose constituent parts have just been examined. Support for the Palestinian cause did not grow in a uniform manner across different Third World groupings. While the Non-Aligned and the ICO were more forthcoming, the OAU support came slowly and only in two stages. First with great reluctance the OAU changed its attitudes towards the Middle East conflict and the Arab cause. Only after it began to support the Arab cause in the Middle East conflict did the OAU begin to express separate support for the rights of the Palestinians. The least forthcoming Third World group was the Latin Americans. The regional forum for Latin America, the OAS, never adopted any decisions on the Palestinian problem. It was, only after 1973 that the Latin Americans too began to lend their support to the Palestinian cause.

The growth of support for the Palestinian cause has been established in two ways. Firstly, the formal decisions and, where possible, the debates of the regional forums were studied. This was done in the belief that the change in the content and the wording of the decisions would reflect the changing position of these forums in respect to the Palestinian problem. Secondly, given the practical difficulties of examining the attitude and position of every individual government towards the Palestinian cause, an index of political support was constructed.⁷⁹

This index was based on a modified Lijphart formula and gives agreement scores between Israel and every member of the Assembly on a set of selected roll-calls concerning the Palestinian problem. The scores range from 0.0 to 100.0 where 0.0 indicates complete disagreement with Israel while, at the other end of the scale, a score of 100.0 suggests full agreement with Israel. In view of the large number of scores generated for approximately 140 countries per session and the need to differentiate between one level of support and another, the results obtained from the index

were grouped into the below five different bands of support;

- ≥ 0.0 and < 20.0 = highly pro-Palestinian
- ≥ 20.0 and < 40.0 = medium pro-Palestinian
- ≥ 40.0 and ≤ 60.0 = intermediate
- > 60.0 and ≤ 80.0 = medium pro-Israel
- > 80.0 and ≤ 100.0 = pro-Israel.

The discussion concerning the index as well as the setting of the above cut-off points can be found in Appendix II.

6.5.1 Non-Aligned Movement

The first Non-Aligned summit in September 1961 in Belgrade did express some support for the "full restoration of all the rights of the Arab people of Palestine".⁸⁰ Yet, this brief reference to the relatively ambiguous term of 'all the rights' of the Palestinians fell short of what Nasser would have liked to see. In his address to the summit⁸¹ he strongly argued for the need to recognise the colonialist and imperialist nature of Israel. He had probably expected the adoption of a decision not very different from the relatively clearer and more elaborate Casablanca resolution. This resolution had condemned Israel's imperialism and had called for the restoration of "all the legitimate rights" of the Arabs of Palestine.

This lack of commitment to the Palestinian cause was also evident in the way in which out of sixteen non-Arab delegations only one, Guinea (a member of the Casablanca group), referred to the problem of Palestine in their speech.⁸² Nehru, one of the founding fathers of the Non-Aligned movement too confirmed this trend. In his speech he did not include Palestine amongst the list of urgent 'ills' awaiting immediate attention.⁸³ Under these circumstances it would be difficult to say that the Palestinian problem held much salience for a sizeable proportion of the participants. The second summit in Cairo in 1964 brought the Non-Aligned nearer to Nasser's position when in two

short paragraphs the summit expressed support for the inalienable right of the Palestinians to self-determination in their struggle against colonialism and racism.⁸⁴

When the Non-Aligned Movement was reactivated, after a lull of five years, a conspicuous increase in Non-Aligned support for the Palestinian cause began to occur. In the intervening years since the previous summit in 1964, the 1967 war created a cognitive environment favourable to Arab mobilisation efforts. The war raised questions about Israel in the minds of increasing number of Non-Aligned countries. It enabled the Arab delegations to gradually develop the argument for the need to respect and express support for the principle of 'territorial integrity' and the 'admissability of the acquisition of land by force'. The violation of these principles by Israel gave the Arab states the opportunity to substantiate their arguments about the imperialistic nature of Israel and lay the ground for the eventual establishment of the cognitive linkages between the Palestinian problem and the problems of Southern Africa. Furthermore, in this period the Non-Aligned began for the first time to hear about the Palestine problem directly from the Palestinian themselves as the Non-Aligned became more and more accessible to the PLO.

The beginnings of significant change in the attitude of the Non-Aligned towards the Middle East and the Palestinian problems were reflected in the decisions of the Lusaka summit in September 1970. In the first full resolution on the Middle East the Non-Aligned condemned Israel for its occupation of Arab territories and called on it to withdraw from these territories. Simultaneously they declared that "respect for the inalienable rights of the Arab people of Palestine is a prerequisite to peace in the Middle East".⁸⁵ These developments brought the Non-Aligned relatively nearer to the positions held by the Arabs and the PLO.

Throughout the early 1970s the position of the Non-Aligned continued to harden. The failure of the OAU mission played a crucial role in mobilising solid Non-Aligned support for the Arab cause. This became quite evident in the decisions of the Algiers summit in September 1973 which expressed unequivocal support for Egypt, Syria and Jordan's "lawful struggle to regain by all means their occupied territories" and recommended hardening measures against Israel, including the severance of diplomatic relations.⁸⁶

The decisive breakthrough in Non-Aligned support for the Palestinian cause came during the Algiers summit. A number of factors played a crucial role. Firstly, by then the prestige of Arab countries had increased at the expense of Israel, with whom increasing number of Non-Aligned countries were breaking relations. This development naturally began to lend increasing credibility to Arab arguments. This is well reflected in the preparedness of the Non-Aligned delegations to go along with the Algerian arguments on the similarities between the problems of Southern Africa and the Palestinian problem. The direct consequence of this was the inclusion of the Palestinian struggle amongst other national liberation struggles.⁸⁷ Hence the Palestinian cause acquired a status similar to other liberation struggles.

Secondly, the PLO as an observer was able to participate in the formal as well as informal deliberations of the summit and argue her own case. The impact of the PLO presence in the deliberations is reflected in the adoption of a reference of solidarity with the three PLO officials killed by the Israelis in Beirut, in the final declaration.⁸⁸ Thirdly, the growing support for the PLO particularly in the occupied territories increased the status of the PLO in the eyes of the Non-Aligned Movement. This was vividly reflected in the summit's recognition of the PLO as "the legitimate representative of the Palestine people and their legitimate struggle".⁸⁹

This breakthrough in Non-Aligned support for the Palestinian cause is also supported by their voting behaviour at the United Nations. As it can be seen from Table 6.5 the Non-Aligned attitude towards the Palestinian cause changed significantly. At the 24th session the Non-Aligned Movement had been divided, particularly as a result of some Afro-Asian members reluctance to support the Palestinian cause. There was a significant minority of almost 10% which was fully supportive of the Israeli position.⁹⁰ However, this situation changed during the early 1970s and by the General Assembly's 28th session, held just after the Non-Aligned Algiers summit, an overwhelming majority of the Non-Aligned were strongly supportive of the Palestinian cause. This support reached a saturation point at the following Assembly session with only Nepal expressing less than full support.

TABLE 6.5 Distribution of Non-Aligned Support

	General Assembly Sessions					
	24th 1969		28th 1973		29th 1974	
Highly pro-Pals.	(31)	67%	(57)	93%	(54)	98%
Medium pro-Pals.	(2)	4%	(4)	7%	(1)	2%
Intermediate	(6)	13%	-		-	
Medium pro-Isr.	(3)	7%	-		-	
Highly pro-Isr.	(4)	9%	-		-	
TOTAL*	46		61		55	

(* Percentages and figures are based upon those countries meeting the minimum attendance levels)

This strongly pro-Palestinian position at the UN found further expression at the Ministerial Meeting in March 1975 in Havana. Until then the Non-Aligned had expressed its support for the "restoration of the Palestinian people's national rights... and its right to self-determination."⁹¹ At Havana this support became quite elaborate and much clearer. In its first separate resolution on Palestine, the

Non-Aligned Movement having reiterated that the Palestinian struggle was an integral part of the world liberation movement, reaffirmed

"its full and active support for the PLO in its struggle to restore the national rights of the Palestinian people, particularly their right to return to their homeland, the right to self-determination, sovereignty, independence and the creation of a national authority, by all means".⁹²

The wording of this paragraph suggests two changes in emphasis from previous Non-Aligned decisions. Firstly, the meaning of the right to self-determination is clearly spelled out to mean "sovereignty, independence and the creation of a national authority". Secondly, throughout this resolution the Palestinians are referred to as 'the Palestinian people' rather than the 'Arabs of Palestine'. This doubtlessly signifies a complete change in Non-Aligned perception of Palestinians from displaced Arabs with ambiguous political rights to a distinct nation struggling for independence, a position argued and defended by the PLO since the late 1960s.

6.5.2 The OAU support

OAU support for the Palestinian cause did not come until as late as the Addis Ababa summit in May 1973. The OAU for a long time remained extremely reluctant to get involved in the Middle East conflict in any manner let alone the Palestinian problem. Although the Arab members tried to inject the Palestinian problem into the debates no formal decision was adopted until after the 1967 war. Even then the Africans faced the problem with some reluctance. This was quite evident in their refusal to take up a Somalia-Guinea proposal to call an emergency OAU meeting. This ambivalence was also reflected in some African countries readiness to support a Latin American draft resolution during the fifth emergency session of the General Assembly in 1967.⁹³ This draft resolution which had stressed negotiations without prior Israeli withdrawal was strongly

opposed by the Arabs. Nevertheless, the first signs of change did begin to surface at the fourth OAU summit in Kinshasa in 1967. The Africans without expressing any particular position decided to work together within the UN to assist Egypt to secure the withdrawal of the Israeli forces.

This development brought the Africans nearer to Egypt and culminated in their lending support for the Security Council Resolution 242. From then onwards Arab arguments based on the need to respect the basic OAU principles and the growing African recognition of the implications of the violation of these principles on African security began to gain ground over those who argued the need to keep the Middle East conflict outside African politics.⁹⁴ The breakthrough in the African stand towards the Middle East began to occur at the 8th summit in Addis Ababa in 1971. At this summit the OAU not only decided to intervene directly in the dispute but also, departing from previous practice, called on Israel to withdraw from all the three Arab states and not just Egypt.

The failure of the OAU mission created a situation where by Arab arguments began to undermine Israel's grip over Africa maintained through bi-lateral relations. Arab arguments that had previously gone unnoticed began to make an impact. During the 1973 summit the Algerian speech calling on Africa to establish some harmony in its attitudes towards the Middle East and Southern Africa was particularly influential in swaying African opinion. Africa was finally behind the Arabs in full force. It was only in such an atmosphere that the OAU expressed its support for the "inalienable rights of the Palestinian people".

This African slowness in expressing support for the Palestinian cause is also reflected in their voting behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly. As Table 6.6 suggests, until as late as the 27th session the

Africans had been divided over the Palestinian question. At the 24th session they appeared to be evenly split between those who were prepared to support the Palestinian cause and those aligning with Israel. During the 27th session although a large minority preferred to take an intermediate stand the rest of the Africans moved towards a distinctly pro-Palestinian position. This growth in support for the Palestinian cause quickly reached a saturation point when at the following session all Africans included in the statistical analysis (except Lesotho) became highly pro-Palestinian.⁹⁵

TABLE 6.6: Distribution of African Support for the Palestinian cause

	General Assembly Sessions			
	24th 1969	26th 1971	27th 1973	28th 1973
Highly pro-Pals.	(10) 34%	(6) 23%	(13) 52%	(24) 96%
Medium pro-Pals.	(2) 7%	(6) 23%	(2) 8%	(1) 4%
Intermediate	(5) 17%	(8) 31%	(10) 40%	-
Medium pro-Isr.	(4) 14%	(4) 15%	-	-
Highly pro-Isr.	(8) 28%	(2) 8%	-	-
TOTAL*	29	26	25	25

(* Percentages and figures are based upon those countries meeting the minimum attendance levels.)

These changes in African attitudes as reflected in their voting behaviour were also portrayed in the decisions of the OAU. During the emergency meeting in November 1973 African support, as expressed in OAU decisions grew stronger. This time the OAU expressed support for the Palestinian people's struggle for self-determination against colonialism and racial discrimination rather than the weaker reference to 'inalienable rights'. However, at large the decisions adopted by this meeting were dominated by expressions of African solidarity with the Arab states and their growing concern for Arab-African cooperation to meet the threats caused by Israel, South Africa, Rhodesia

and Portugal.

It was at the OAU meeting in July 1975 in Kampala that unequivocal support for the Palestinian cause was finally expressed. At this meeting the OAU for the first time adopted a separate resolution on the question of Palestine. The resolution, having reasserted its recognition of the PLO as the sole and legal representatives of the Palestinian people, declared its support for the Palestinian people's "right to sovereignty over their territory" and "their right to establish their independent authority".⁹⁶ These decisions were in many ways adjustments to the earlier developments at the 29th session of the General Assembly and the Non-Aligned decisions of March 1975. The OAU resolution on Palestine basically formalised the position taken by African countries in forums outside the OAU.

6.5.3 The Islamic Countries

Islamic countries had demonstrated strong solidarity with the Arab countries in opposing the adoption of the UN partition resolution in 1947. However, this solidarity became quickly eroded when, within a year of Israel's admission to the UN, three Islamic countries recognised Israel and two exchanged diplomatic representatives.⁹⁷ The early Islamic solidarity experienced further setbacks as all newly independent African Muslim countries, excluding the North African ones, established diplomatic relations with Israel.

This lack of unity amongst Islamic countries was well reflected in their voting behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly. As Table 6.7 depicts most African Islamic countries remained uncommitted to thorough support for the Palestinian cause. Four of the two African countries who were supportive of the Israeli position at the 24th Session also had their embassies situated in Jerusalem rather than

TABLE 6.7 Distribution of Islamic Support at the 24th session by ICO and sub-group membership

	ICO	Non-Arab Africans	Non-Arab Asians
Highly pro-Pals.	10	4	6
Medium pro-Pals.	-	-	-
Intermediate	3	3	-
Medium pro-Isr.	2	2	-
Highly pro-Isr.	2	2	-
TOTAL*	17	11	6

(* Results are for those countries meeting the minimum attendance levels)

As a result of the Al-Aqsa mosque fire in Jerusalem, 25 countries met in Rabat in September 1969. The conference adopted resolutions supportive of the international status of Jerusalem and the political rights of the Palestinians⁹⁸ and as a result of Algerian and Egyptian efforts admitted the PLO as an observer. However, a Libyan proposal calling on Islamic countries to break relations with Israel was not conclusive as Turkey, Iran and African participants objected to this initiative. Hence, Islamic support for the Palestinian cause stopped short of censuring Israel.

The situation began to change from the early 1970s. The first Islamic summit had led to the establishment of an Islamic Conference Organisation in March 1971. This organisation gave Arab governments and the PLO the possibility of mobilising support for the Palestinian cause by raising Islamic consciousness and solidarity. Even though, in December 1970 in Karachi the Foreign Ministers of Islamic countries had expressed support for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, it was not until after the October war that the majority of Islamic countries became prepared to radicalise their stand. By then the Islamic group had reached a very high degree of cohesion in their attitudes towards the Palestinian problem. Their voting behaviour at the 29th

session of the General Assembly suggest that all Islamic countries included in the statistical analysis fell in the highly pro-Palestinian band of support. This strong unified pro-Palestinian stand at the UN was also reflected in the decisions of the second Islamic summit in February 1974 in Lahore.

At this summit members supported the right to self-determination for the Palestinian people and called for the severance of diplomatic relations with Israel, the recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and the opening of PLO offices.⁹⁹ This summit, given that the PLO has participated in the following ICO meetings as a full member, also appears to have granted the PLO the status of full membership. At the following Ministerial Meeting in Jeddah in July 1975 the strength of ICO support for the Palestinian cause went as far as adopting a PLO-Syrian proposal calling members to work towards the expulsion of Israel from the UN. However, this decision appears not to have received the support of Turkey, Iran and some African countries.¹⁰⁰

6.5.4 Latin Americans

The least forthcoming Third World group in lending support to the Palestinian cause was the Latin Americans. In many ways this is not surprising. The Latin Americans had played a very crucial and decisive role in the adoption of the 'Partition Resolution' in 1947. They were also quick to follow the lead of the US in recognising Israel, without even waiting for her admission to the UN.¹⁰¹ By the late 1960s, with the exception of three Caribbean countries, all Latin American countries had exchanged diplomatic representatives with Israel.¹⁰² Eleven of them actually maintained embassies in Jerusalem, making the Latin Americans supportive of Israel's claim to Jerusalem as its capital.

This very strong pro-Israeli position can also be seen in their behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly. The Latin Americans played a leading role in the politics of the Emergency Special Session of the Assembly convened after the 1967 war. They tabled a draft resolution¹⁰³ which was perceived as strongly pro-Israeli, as it did not make negotiations conditional upon complete withdrawal. As Table 6.8 shows, at the 24th session of the Assembly they were still overwhelmingly pro-Israeli with only Cuba taking a pro-Palestinian position.

TABLE 6.8 Distribution of Latin American Support

	General Assembly Sessions		
	24th 1969	29th 1974	35th 1980
Highly pro-Pals.	(1) 5%	(7) 43%	(20) 87%
Medium pro-Pals.	-	(3) 19%	(1) 4%
Intermediate	(5) 26%	(3) 19%	(2) 9%
Medium pro-Isr.	(4) 22%	-	-
Highly pro-Isr.	(9) 47%	(3) 19%	-
TOTAL*	19	16	23

(* Percentages and figures are based upon countries meeting minimum attendance levels)

This situation continued until the 28th session when Latin American support began to increase in favour of the Palestinian cause. The overwhelming majority of Latin Americans that became supportive were also members of the Non-Aligned Movement reflecting the role played by the Non-Aligned in this development.¹⁰⁴ Through the Non-Aligned Movement Latin Americans became increasingly exposed to the Palestinian question. The Non-Aligned Movement constituted the only regional Third World political grouping active on the Palestinian question that allowed Arab governments and the PLO access to the Latin Americans. The Group of 77 and the OPEC are two other Third World political groupings that allow a similar access but these groups primarily operate on economic issues hence they have not been included in

this study.

Furthermore, the Latin Americans witnessed the process by which the Palestinian cause became absorbed by anti-colonial thinking. The cognitive linkage between the Palestinian struggle and other national liberation struggles against colonialism and racism played a crucial role in changing Latin American perceptions. The Latin Americans particularly those associated with the Non-Aligned, in their voting at the UN had developed an anti-colonial tradition. This pattern progressively expanded to include all other Latin Americans. The successful integration of the Palestinian cause into anti-colonialism doubtlessly helped the process by which particularly Non-Aligned Latin Americans came to support the Palestinian cause.

It was not until the 35th Assembly session in 1980 that a pro-Palestinian position amongst the Latin Americans emerged. It is interesting to note that some of these Latin American countries were regular participants at Non-Aligned summits as observers. The dramatic changes in the attitudes of Ecuador, Bolivia and Uruguay may well be attributed to their steady exposure to Non-Aligned arguments on the Palestinian question.¹⁰⁵ This Non-Aligned influence is to some extent also supported by the fact that the only two Latin American countries that did not support the Palestinian cause and instead held a 'balanced' stand were the Dominican Republic and Guatemala, both of which had no relations with the Non-Aligned and continued to maintain their traditionally close relations with the US.

However, it should be pointed out that in general this late Latin American support for the Palestinian cause has never reached the levels attained by other Third World groups. Latin American support on this issue has mostly remained declaratory. Only Cuba and Guyana have followed Non-Aligned recommendations and severed relations with Israel.

Similarly only eight out of thirty Latin American countries have allowed the PLO to open offices. Jamaica a Non-Aligned country even turned down an official request by the PLO in 1978 to open an office.¹⁰⁶ In general the Latin Americans have not seen their support for the Palestinian cause as incompatible with maintaining relations with Israel. But undoubtedly, the Latin Americans constitute the group that experienced the most dramatic change in their support for the Palestinian cause.

6.6 Conclusion

In general substantial Third World support for the Palestinian cause was not mobilised in any significant way until the early 1970s. Not surprisingly the Islamic countries were the first Third World political group to commit themselves to the Palestinian cause. They were promptly followed by the Non-Aligned. The relatively easier Arab and PLO accessibility to the respective forums of these two groups enabled Arab and Palestinian delegates to pursue their diplomatic efforts. These efforts benefited from developments in the Middle East that created a conducive environment such as the Middle East wars, the Al-Aqsa mosque fire, the failure of the OAU mission etc...

Particularly, in the case of the Non-Aligned the successful Arab/Palestinian campaign to integrate the Palestinian problem into the anti-colonial dimension of the Non-Aligned ideology benefited the Palestinian cause. These developments combined with inputs from the Palestinian level in the form of growing Palestinian consciousness and support for the PLO also played an important role in bringing about a significant change in Non-Aligned attitudes and support.

On the other hand, at the African level member Arab governments found a much less receptive audience as the OAU throughout the 1960s remained reluctant to get involved in

the Middle East conflict. It was only in the face of continuous Arab efforts that the Africans inched towards a more active role that culminated in the OAU mission. The failure of this mission eventually led the Africans to recognise Arab arguments. In the end for most of the African governments it was the October war itself that finally swung the Africans firmly into the Arab fold. Once the Africans had sided with the Arabs on the Middle East conflict they also became more receptive to Palestinian demands for support. In this case the conspicuous growth in Non-Aligned support for the Palestinian cause, coupled with the steady erosion of Israel's status in the eyes of the Africans eventually ensured near unanimous support for the Palestinian cause.

The Latin Americans were the very last Third World grouping to come out in support of the Palestinian cause. The Latin Americans in general had maintained strong ties with Israel especially at the bi-lateral level. The Non-Aligned Movement seems to have played a central role in eroding the influence of Israel on Latin American perceptions of the Palestinian problem. This was particularly evident amongst those Latin Americans associated with the Non-Aligned Movement. It appears that this occurred as a result of a socialisation process that precipitated the need to bring in line Latin American perceptions of the Palestinian issue with the rest of the Non-Aligned. This was reflected in the way in which Non-Aligned Latin Americans constituted the first group of Latin Americans to lend their support for the Palestinian cause at the UN. The remaining Latin Americans joined ranks with the rest gradually. Here the growth in support at the UN and the legitimisation of the PLO as the representatives of the Palestinians may have played a role too. This point, that is the influence of systemic support on regional support, will be taken up later on.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Appendix III provides a complete listing of members by each grouping.
- 2 The construction of the index including an analysis of the various techniques and methodological problems associated with the quantitative study of voting behaviour is provided in Appendix I.
- 3 Willetts, P. **The Non-Aligned Movement** (Frances Pinter, London, 1978), p.161.
- 4 For a detailed analysis of the Bandung Conference and its consequences on Third World politics see Tumukabin, G. **The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955** (Ithaca, New York, 1956), Triska, J. and Koch, H. "Asian-African Coalition and International Organization", **The Year Book of World Affairs 1956**, Jansen, G. **Afro-Asian and Non-Alignment** (Faber and Faber, London 1966), Sen, B. **Against the Cold War** (Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1962), Lyon, P. **Neutrality** (Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1963).
- 5 Willetts, (1978: 3).
- 6 Nweke, G. **Harmonization of African Foreign Policies 1955-1975: The Political Economy of African Diplomacy** (African Studies Center, Boston University, 1980), pp.29-30.
- 7 For an analysis of these meetings see, Legum, C. **Pan-Africanism** (Praeger, New York, 1965), chp.III.
- 8 For a study of the origins of the OAU, its charter and institutional structure see Wolfers, M. **Politics in the Organization of African Unity** (Methuen and Co Ltd, London, 1976).
- 9 For an analysis of the role of the OAU in decolonisation and efforts to harmonise policies see Nweke, 1980 Part III.
- 9 The public perception of non-alignment in its early days appear to have stressed the concern of the Non-Aligned with the Cold War. However, Willetts, (1978) challenges this view and empirically demonstrates that anticolonialism was a major dimension of non-alignment right from the early days.
- 11 According to Jansen, G. **Zionism, Israel and Asian Nationalism** (The Institute for Palestine Studies, Beirut, 1971) p.259 it was at Bandung that new countries first heard of the Palestinian problem. This advantage is also reflected in the way in which even during a pro-Israeli period at the bilateral level, some Africans were prepared to be less supportive of

- Israel at multilateral gatherings, Nweke (1980: 216). Nahumi, M. "The Years of Relations with Ghana", **New Outlook**, (Vol.9 (1966), No.2, p.22) too notes how Ghana in spite of its good relations with Israel tended to move closer to the Arabs on issues concerning anti-colonialism and Pan-Africanism.
- 12 El-Khawas, M. "African and The Middle Eastern Crisis", **Issue** 1975 (Spring), p.33 and Thiam, D. **The Foreign Policy of African States** (Phoenix House, London, 1965), pp.65-66.
 - 13 Decalo, S. "Israeli Foreign Policy and The Third World", **Orbis** Vol.II (1967), No.3, p.732.
 - 14 Decraence, P. "Is the Romance with Israel over?", **African Report** May-June 1973, p.24.
 - 15 For an analysis of the initiation and performance of the OAU mission to the Middle East see El-Ajouty, Y. (ed.) **The Organization of African Unity, After Ten Years** (Praeger Publications, New York, 1975) chp.10.
 - 16 El-Khawas, (1975: 38).
 - 17 Chibwe, E. **Arab Dollars for Africa** (Croom Helm, London, 1976), p.26.
 - 18 El-Ajouty, (1975: 207-8).
 - 19 Jansen, (1971: 252), Decalo, (1967: 730) and Thompson, W. **Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957-1966: Diplomacy, Ideology and the New State** (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1969), pp.46-47.
 - 20 Adams, J. **The Unnatural Alliance** (Quartet Books, London, 1984), pp.11-12. For example, in October 1961 Israel supported a motion preventing the South African Foreign Minister from addressing the General Assembly. In 1962 it voted together with the Africans for sanctions against South Africa in condemnation of the policy of apartheid. In 1966 Israel went as far as supporting the UN resolution revoking South Africa's mandate over South West Africa.
 - 21 Quoted in Sawant, A. "Rivalry between Egypt and Israel in Africa South of the Sahara, 1956-1970", **International Studies**, Vol.17 (1978), No. 2, p.312. Also see Thompson (1969: 47) for the sympathy expressed by Ghanaian governmental circles for the Jews.
 - 22 For a detailed account and analysis of Israel's developmental aid see Kreinin, M. **Israel and Africa: A Study in Technical Co-operation** (Praeger, New York, 1964); Laufer, L. **Israel and the Developing Countries; New Approaches to Cooperation** (The Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1967).

- 23 Sawant, (1978: 312).
- 24 Brecher, M. **The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process** (Oxford University Press, London, 1972), p.343.
- 25 For an analysis of relations between Israel and South Africa see Kayyali, A.W. **Zionism, Imperialism and Racism** (Croom Helm, London, 1979); Hellyer, P. "Israel and South Africa, Development of Relations 1967-1974" , (UN Document, A/AC.115/1.396); Ainslee, R. "Israel and South Africa; An unlikely Alliance?", (UN Document 20/81 - 18876 July 1981) and Adams (1984).
- 26 See OAU Charter Articles II (c) and (d) and III. Similarly the Bandung Conference and the First Non-Aligned summit too set these principles as central to the development of friendly relations between countries, (Jankowisch, O. and Sauvart, K. **The Third World Without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of the Non-Aligned Countries, Volumes I-IV** (Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, New York, 1978), p.lxv , p.lxvi and p.5.
- 27 However, these arguments had to be put forward in a restrained manner as in the immediate aftermath of the 1967 war the majority of Africans were reluctant to discuss the Middle East conflict at the regional level. A joint Guinean*/Somalian call for an emergency meeting of the OAU had been turned down as the Africans continued to believe that the Middle East problem belonged to the UN. When the OAU did meet for its 1967 summit session, the Middle East was not even on its agenda, hence the Arab arguments and efforts remained muted. (Sawant, 1978: 326) * Guinea was the only country to break diplomatic relations with Israel as a result of the war. She was also the only African country to take a very radical stance on the Middle East conflict during the General Assembly debates. (UN Document, A/PV 1546, 3 July 1967).
- 28 Nweke, (1980: 221).
- 29 Ibid.
- 30 See the Tanzanian delegates speech at the General Assembly, (UN Document, A/PV 1530, 21 June 1967).
- 31 **The Yearbook of the United Nations**, 1971, p.171.
- 32 Legum, C. (ed.) **Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1972-73** (Rex Collings, London, 1973), p.C23.
- 33 For an analysis of the place of anti-colonialism in non-alignment and the OAU see Willetts (1978) and Nweke (1980) respectively.

- 34 The statistical analysis of the relationship between UN voting behaviour on the Palestinian Question and matters concerning Southern Africa is examined in Appendix II.
- 35 Although the Declaration adopted at the Bandung Conference did briefly refer to 'the rights of the Arab people of Palestine' this was done under the 'Other Problems' of the Declaration rather than under the preceding section for 'Problems of Dependent Peoples' which dealt with problems of colonialism, (Jankowitsch and Sauvart, (1978, Vol.II: LXII, LXIII).
- 36 El-Khawas, (1975: 33).
- 37 Thiam, (1965: 65).
- 38 See Legum, (1965: 206) for the text of the resolution on Palestine. According to Legum the participants in the meeting were Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Egypt, Morocco, Libya, Ceylon and the Algerian Provisional Government.
- 39 El-Khawas, (1975: 35-6).
- 40 Ibid. p.36.
- 41 Akinsaya, A. "The Afro-Arab Alliance: Dream or Reality", *African Affairs*, Vol.75 (October 1976), No. 301, p.521.
- 42 Quoted in El-Khawas, (1975: 39).
- 43 Ibid.
- 44 Ibid.
- 45 Ibid.
- 46 Jankowisch and Sauvart, (1978, Vol.I: 100). At the first Non-Aligned summit in 1961 Nasser in his efforts to mobilise support for the Palestinian problem tried to draw similarities between the struggle against racism and imperialism, and the struggle in Palestine. (See Legum 1965: 51); for Nasser's speech see endnote 81 below.
- 47 Keesing's Contemporary Archives, October 1973: 26117.
- 48 Jankowisch and Sauvart, (1978, Vol.I: 109).
- 49 Previously, the idea of an alliance of Salisbury-Pretoria-Lisbon against the struggle for national liberation had not included Israel. (KCA, May 1973: 25955; Jankowisch and Sauvart, 1978, Vol.I: 211).
- 50 Ibid. p.241 and 242.

- 51 p.243.
- 52 **African Contemporary Record** 1973-74, p.A9.
- 53 Ibid. p.A11.
- 54 **ACR**, (1973-74: A9).
- 55 **ACR**, (1973-74: A12).
- 56 **ACR**, (1973-74: A4).
- 57 Decraene, (1973: 22).
- 58 **The Jewish Yearbook**, (1970: 161-174).
- 59 See Decalo, S. "Israeli Foreign Policy and the Third World", **Orbis**, Vol.II (1967), No, 3, p.734. For a closer study of Israeli-Ghanaian relations and the former's influence on Nkrumah see Nahumi, M. "Ten years of relations with Ghana", **New Outlook**, Vol.9 (1966), Part 2, pp.21-29.
- 60 This was despite the presence of an Arab majority in attendance. The attenders at the Accra conference were Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Ethiopia, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Sudan and Morocco, (Legum, 1965: 41).
- 61 Sawant, (1978: 319, 321).
- 62 Schichor, Y. **The Middle East in China's Foreign Policy 1949-1977** (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1979), p.52.
- 63 Sawant, (1978: 322).
- 64 However, this was achieved only after a controversial debate between Arab governments and some African countries was settled, with African liberation movements also being allowed to make speeches, (Willetts, 1978: 34).
- 65 Ibid., p.258.
- 66 Jankowisch and Sauvart, (1978, Vol.III:1221).
- 67 Frangi, A. **The PLO and Palestine** (Zed Books, London, 1983), p.139.
- 68 Schichor, (1979: 117).
- 69 Schichor, (1979: 115).
- 70 **Arab Record and Report**, (1972: 342).
- 71 **ARR**, (1972: 611).

- 72 ARR, (1974: 76).
- 73 Jankowisch and Sauviant, (1978, Vol.II: 437). In the following meetings the wording of recommendations for the opening of PLO offices became progressively stronger until at the Colombo summit in August 1976 members were called upon to develop bilateral relations with the PLO, (Ibid., p.863).
- 74 For a complete list of PLO offices see Appendix VII.
- 75 ACR, (1975-76: A87).
- 76 Ibid., p.C21. Even this milder version was not acceptable to some African countries. Zaire was against the resolution while Ghana, Sierra Leone and Liberia entered reservations.
- 77 ARR, (1976: 470).
- 78 Jankowisch and Sauviant, (1978, Vol.II: 863). During 1976 the Non-Aligned countries had tabled two resolutions at the Security Council concerning the political rights of the Palestinians. Both were vetoed by the US, see Chapter 8 endnote 91. A similar decision had already been accepted at the Lima Conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned countries in August 1975, (Jankowisch and Sauviant, 1978, Vol.III: 1259, 1261).
- 79 There are some who remain critical about the suitability of quantitative methods in the study of political behaviour. This position is based in the belief that such methods oversimplify complex phenomena in a rather crude manner. However, to be able to make general statements about what was by 1980 more than one hundred Third World countries, it is necessary to summarise the overwhelming wealth of information about the foreign policies of each state towards the Palestine problem. Quantitative methods, when employed with caution, provide the possibility of summarising this otherwise unmanageable wealth of information giving an analyst an opportunity to put forward general statements about the behaviour of each state or group of states. It is with this in mind that this index of political support for the Palestinian cause from 1969 to 1980 was developed.
- 80 Jankowisch and Sauviant, (1978, Vol.I: 5).
- 81 Conference of Heads of Government of Non-Aligned Countries, Belgrade, September 1-6, 1961 (The Publishing House, Jugoslaviya, Beograd, n.d.) pp.45-46.
- 82 Ibid. p.81.
- 83 p.124.

- 84 However, this resolution was not adopted without some opposition. A number of African countries expressed objections to this resolution at its draft stage, (Jansen, 1965: 262-63).
- 85 Jankowisch and Sauviant, (1978, Vol.I: 100).
- 86 Ibid., p.242 and 243.
- 87 p.209.
- 88 p.211.
- 89 p.242.
- 90 These countries were Nepal, Burma, Lesotho and Jamaica.
- 91 See for example the wording of the decision of the Algiers Non-Aligned Coordinating Bureau meeting in March 1974, (Jankowisch and Sauviant, 1978, Vol.III, 1387).
- 92 Ibid., p.1436-37.
- 93 Fifteen African countries supported the Latin American proposal (A/L.523 and Add.1 and 2) which did not make an immediate withdrawal a prerequisite to peace. The Non-Aligned proposal, on the other hand, (A/L.522 Rev.1 and Add.1) was supported by twelve African countries and called for immediate withdrawal behind armistice lines. The Arabs for themselves held the extreme position of no recognition of, and no negotiations with Israel (A/PV.1526, 1529 and 1530). For a detailed and thorough analysis of the 1967 negotiations during the 1967 General Assembly Emergency Session see Lall, A. **The United Nations and the Middle East Crisis**, (Colombia University Press, New York, 1968).
- 94 In 1969 Malawi and Gabon were still objecting to the Middle East being raised within the OAU, (ARR, 1969: 88).
- 95 Malawi and Swaziland were two other African countries that remained reluctant to support the Palestinian cause. However, they have not been included in the tables because of failing to meet the minimum attendance levels at roll calls to qualify for inclusion. Together with Lesotho these two countries still maintain diplomatic relations with Israel but are not highly regarded by the rest of Africa because of their political closeness to South Africa.
- 96 ACR, (1975-76: C20).
- 97 Turkey, Iran and Indonesia recognised Israel soon after its admission to the UN. The first two exchanged diplomatic representatives with Israel. Turkey lowered

its level of representation once after the Suez war and then again after Israel annexation of Jerusalem. Iran on the otherhand severed its relations after the overthrow of the Shah.

98 ARR, (1969: 398, 428).

99 ARR, (1974: 76).

100 For Turkish and Iranian objections, see "The Campaign leading to the UN Anti-Zionism Resolution", **IJA Research Report**, No.22 (November 1975), p.3.

101 With the exception of Mexico which recognised Israel on April 1949, Glick, E. **Latin America and the Palestine Problem** (Theodor Herzl Foundation, New York, 1958) p.171. For a thorough analysis of early Latin American support see Glick, (1958). Similarly, Kaufman, Shapira and Barromi provide an empirically based and systematic analysis of Latin American relations up to the early 1970s. Both publications note the very strong pro-Israeli stance amongst Latin Americans throughout the 1950s, 1960s and early 1970s, Kaufman, E., Shapira, Y. and Barromi, J. **Israel-Latin American Relations** (Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1979). For a more recent study covering the early 1980s see Klick, I. "Latin America and the Palestine Question" **IJA Research Report** No.2 and 3, (January 1986).

102 **The Europa Yearbook**, (1970: 699-700).

103 **A/L.523 and Add.1 and 2**. This resolution was rejected by the General Assembly on 4 July 1967 by a vote of 57 in favour to 43 against, with 20 abstentions failing to obtain the required two-thirds majority.

104 Kaufman, Shapira and Barromi too note the growing influence of the Non-Aligned on Latin American attitudes towards the Middle East conflict particularly from the early 1970s onwards, (1979: 4, 207).

105 Bolivia attended the 1979 summit as a full member.

106 ARR (1978: 619).

CHAPTER 7

MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE AMONGST THE NORTHERN TIER COUNTRIES

7.1 Introduction

This chapter looks at the mobilisation process amongst those groups of countries that do not belong to the Third World. In the context of economics these countries are often referred to as the 'developed world', the 'North' or the 'first and second worlds'. On the other hand, in the context of Cold War strategic and ideological issues these same countries together with a number of Third World countries are frequently referred to as belonging to the 'Eastern and Western blocs'. In the ensuing analysis the composition of the non-Third World or the North is assumed to be the same as the UN 'Eastern Europe' and 'Western Europe and Others' geographical groupings. The 'Western Europe and Others' Group which at the UN includes Canada, Australia and New Zealand is expanded, for the purposes of this study, to include the United States, too. This revised 'Western Europe and Others' Group will be referred to as the 'Western Group' for brevity.

As in the previous chapter here too the focus will be on the responses, coming from the governments belonging to the above two regional groupings, to the various demands put forward by Arab governments and the PLO in an attempt to mobilise support for the Palestinian cause. However, unlike in the previous chapter the analysis can not simply rely on group behaviour. This is because these two regional groupings do not have formal regional political institutions whose scope includes the Palestinian problem and whose decisions reflect the unanimous position and attitudes of its members. The nearest thing approaching an institution with a formalised regional decision-making mechanism, which covers the Middle East too, is the

European Community. Through 'European Political Cooperation' the EC tries to adopt and follow a common foreign policy. However, as the analysis will reveal, even then the decisions and declarations adopted as a result of this cooperation have not always reflected the stand of every individual participant but rather a minimum acceptable compromise.

The lack of institutionalised group decisions on which to focus the analysis has necessitated the study of political statements and declarations made individually by most of these governments. These statements and decisions, in particular the ones made during the United Nations General Assembly debates were studied for changes in content and emphasis. This analysis was then combined with a quantitative analysis of these countries voting behaviour in the UN General Assembly. The index of political support constructed from the voting analysis was found to be particularly useful in identifying sub-groupings. However, this index of political support needs a word of caution. As a result of the nature of the content of the General Assembly resolutions the index is not refined enough to capture on its own the changing attitudes, particularly of the EC countries, in relation to the rest of the Assembly. Hence, the results emerging from these countries voting behaviour at the UN need to be carefully related to the political statements and actions made within and outside the UN.

Before proceeding to the analysis of mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause amongst the East and Western European Groups it might be useful to bear in mind a number of differences that separate these two groups from the Third World regional and political groupings in respect to the Palestinian problem.

Firstly, some countries from both groups have had deeply entrenched historical interests in the politics and

economics of the Middle East in away no Third World country has had. This interest and involvement in the area has, in complex ways, influenced both the emergence of the Palestinian problem itself as well as attitudes held in these countries towards this problem. France and Britain as Mandate powers between the two World Wars and as countries with economic interests were closely involved in the politics of the region. After the Second World war these two countries were to some degree replaced by the US and the Soviet Union. Since the mid-1950s a multitude of factors ranging from domestic political to strategic considerations often involving matters of prestige and status have influenced the policies of these two countries towards the Palestinian problem as well as the actual problem itself.

Secondly, a great number of the countries belonging to these two groups, as a result of their membership of the United Nations have been exposed to the Palestinian problem from its early days. At a time when an overwhelming majority of Asian-African countries were still colonies, these countries were participants to the General Assembly debates and roll-calls concerning the Palestinian problem in the late 1940s and early 1950s. It was during this period that despite the Arab delegations protests these countries played a central role in the process that converted the Palestinian problem from a political one to a problem of resettling refugees. Hence countries from both groups carried on their perception of the Palestinian Question as a refugee problem and their image of Palestinians as refugees well into the late 1960s.

Thirdly, as a result of the Cold War the countries of the North have been split into two ideologically opposing groupings. This sustained ideological division, whose equivalent one can not find in the Third World, has limited the emergence of the kinds of interactions between the two groups that could have benefitted the Palestinian

cause. However, as the analysis below will suggest this has not necessarily led to the development of two completely separate approaches to the Palestinian problem. Instead the attitudes of some of the countries of the Western group have overlapped with those in Eastern Europe. This is partly a result of the lack of unity within the Western group.

In this context, the attitude of the Western group can be better characterised by a set of attitudes held by sub-groups such as the Southern European countries, the Nordic countries, the EC and another group including the US, Canada and Australia. The differences in attitudes between these Western sub-groups are reflected to some extent in their voting behaviour but more sharply in their political statements and their relations with the PLO. In contrast the East Europeans have manifested a much more unified behaviour, particularly in respect to their voting behaviour at the United Nations. However, it should be noted that this strong cohesive voting behaviour has not always reproduced itself in the political statements and declarations emanating from individual East European countries. This was particularly evident in the earlier stages of the mobilisation process.

7.2 Conducive Environment

This part of the mobilisation process model looks at a number of structural changes and key events that have brought about an environment receptive to the aggregation of support for the Palestinian cause amongst the East and Western European countries.

7.2.1 Structural Changes

At this level of analysis there has been few significant structural changes that have occurred with particular consequences to the mobilisation of support for the

Palestinian cause. Unlike most of the Third World, after the Second World War, countries from the East and Western blocs developed extensive structures of communications and cooperation at both bi-lateral and multi-lateral levels. However, the concern and domain of these structures of communications and decision making mechanisms, particularly in the form of regional organisations, have been mostly centred around two sets of issues.

The first set of issues have covered matters relating to the maintenance of the military-political status-quo between the East and Western European groups. These matters have been dealt at the multi-lateral level by the respective organisations of the two military alliances. The second set of issues have encompassed matters of economic growth and economic integration. The regional organisations dealing with these issues have mostly concerned themselves with policies directed towards the promotion of greater economic growth and trade between member countries.

Other than matters of developmental aid the agendas of these multi-lateral forums have not been receptive to items reflecting Third World demands for major changes in the international economic order nor to demands of political support for the resolution of a wide range of political and colonial problems of high salience to the Third World. It was only in the context of the United Nations General Assembly and then only since the early 1960s that both the East and Western Bloc countries became involved in these issues in any significant way. Until then the Western dominance of the General Assembly had prevented Third World attempts to introduce issues of concern to them to the agendas of the UN.

7.2.1.1 European Political Cooperation

It is against this background that the emergence of EPC and the Euro-Arab dialogue may be seen as important structural

developments that brought about a conducive environment in respect to the Palestinian problem. EPC emerged from the adoption of the 'Luxembourg Report' in October 1970, as an inter-governmental arrangement to consult and coordinate efforts on foreign policy matters.¹ Such matters had been deliberately left outside the scope of the Rome Treaty establishing the European Community. Hence, until EPC started Community countries were left to pursue their individual courses of action on foreign policy matters particularly in areas that fell outside the scope of the issues mentioned above.

However, with EPC a new dimension was introduced to foreign policy making amongst EC countries. These countries began to work towards developing common approaches to a wide range of extra-EC political problems confronting them. The consequence of this has been that members have acquired the possibility to influence each other's attitudes and the decision making process. Furthermore, smaller and less active countries have been absorbed into this attitude formation and decision-making process on issues that otherwise would have not been on their agendas. This has forced such countries to confront these issues and take position on them often highly influenced by the socialisation process inherent in such group decision making-processes.

The consequences of EPC have been particularly stark in respect of the Palestinian Question. Countries such as France, Britain and Italy with a relatively more pro-Arab inclination since the 1967 war have left their mark by leading the formulation of a common EC stand much more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. France has played a central role in trying to counter balance US pressure for an Atlanticist position much less favourable to the Palestinian cause. EPC has also led pro-Israeli countries such as Denmark and Holland to become exposed to the Palestinian problem during EPC deliberations and adjust

their attitudes to the prevailing EC position.²

Furthermore, the particular way in which the EPC works, with its rotating chairmanship, and its demands for active involvement have forced countries, such as Ireland, with little interest in the Middle East to become involved.³ The efficacy of this political socialisation process in bringing about attitudinal changes favourable to the Palestinian problem can probably be best substantiated by Israel's belligerence towards EPC.⁴ The entry of Greece to the Common Market has also had its own impact on EC attitudes towards the Palestinian problem. As an already committed ally of the Palestinian cause and with her close PLO ties, Greece injected greater urgency to the ongoing debate on the definition of the political rights of the Palestinians and the status of the PLO.

Overall the significance of EPC arises from the fact that it has become a forum whose agenda has included the Palestinian problem. Hence it has opened the possibility of debates and discussion on the Palestinian Question to take place, exposing participants to views which have come to condition their perceptions of the Palestinian problem and their attitudes towards the Palestinian cause. EPC has also become a tangible multilateral decision-making forum to which Palestinians and Arabs have tried to gain access directly or through the Euro-Arab dialogue.

7.2.1.2 The Euro-Arab dialogue

The initiation of the Euro-Arab dialogue can also be seen as a significant development that has contributed towards a conducive environment for the mobilisation of European support. This dialogue, which can be seen as "a manifestation of the EPC machinery at work", originated from the European Community Summit in Copenhagen in December 1973 attended by four Arab Foreign Ministers.⁵ However, as a result of various complications encountered during the

establishment of the institutions of the dialogue, it was not until June 1975 that the Euro-Arab dialogue finally got underway.

The Arabs, just as in the case of Africa, had been wanting to get Europe involved in the Middle East problem. Since the 1967 war, this view was held in the belief that once involved Europe would develop an approach independent from the pro-Israeli position of the US.⁶ It was the 1973 war that brought about certain changes that increased the salience of the Middle East to the Europeans. The Arab oil embargo and the ensuing oil price increase quickly precipitated changes in the structures of the pre-1973 political and economic relations between Europe and the Arab world. The demonstrative effect of the ability of Arab governments to control oil supplies and the significant increase in their purchasing power forced many European governments and the EC to change their position on the weight of the Middle East in their foreign policies.

It is in this climate that the Euro-Arab dialogue was launched. In spite of its vague terms of reference reflecting a compromise between a European desire to limit the dialogue to commercial matters and Arab governments insistence for a broader scope, the dialogue did provide a setting within which the Europeans came to face the Palestinian problem. This was, for example, well highlighted by the crisis that the composition of the Arab delegation precipitated. Arab governments insistence on including a separate PLO representation in the delegation created an embarrassing problem of diplomatic recognition for the EC. It was after lengthy consultations led by the Irish chairman that a solution acceptable to all was reached.⁷ Accordingly future meetings would be attended by a European and an Arab delegation rather than separate and individual country delegations.

This problem right from the onset forced the EC to confront

the Palestinian problem and form opinions in respect to the rights of the Palestinians and the status of the PLO, a matter until then largely ignored. This particular problem also shows the influence that the dialogue can have on the perceptions of smaller EC members. On the European side, the problem of Palestinian representation had been handled by the Irish premier Kennedy. Until then the Middle East had not been a primary concern for his country's foreign policy. Yet, the Irish Premier, in his capacity as the chairman of the EC members found himself exposed to the Palestinian problem as he struggled to find a solution to the representation problem. The experience undoubtedly influenced the Irish government's perception of the Palestinian problem.

Hence, the Euro-Arab dialogue and the far reaching structural changes in the nature of the relationships between Europe and the Arab world from which this dialogue emerged was another significant factor contributing towards a conducive environment for the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause.⁸

7.2.2 Key Events

In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, as the atrocities committed against the Jews in Axis-occupied Europe became fully known, feelings of shame and guilt amongst Europeans became particularly strong. As a result of these feelings combined with the misery suffered by Jewish displaced persons in European refugee camps, an environment germane to Zionist efforts to gain support for the establishment of a Jewish homeland emerged. The impact of the Holocaust and the sufferings of the Jewish displaced persons on the political process which culminated in the eventual establishment of Israel as a safe homeland for Jews have been studied and noted earlier on.⁹ It is possible to identify a series of key events that, in a similar way to the Holocaust, have contributed towards the

emergence of an environment receptive to Arab and Palestinian demands, even though clearly none of these events were comparable to the Holocaust.

7.2.2.1 Arab Israeli wars

The most dramatic of all the key events were the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. The 1967 war did not produce a direct response towards the Palestinian issue either in Eastern or Western Europe, but overall it did bring both sides much closer to the Arabs. As a result of the 1967 war the Soviet Union and the East Europeans broke relations with Israel and threw their diplomatic and political support behind the Arab side. Yet, this did not immediately culminate in a climate receptive to Palestinian demands. The first signs of a significant increase in East European receptiveness to such demands did not emerge until the period immediately preceding the 1973 war.

Firstly, the eviction of the Soviets from Egypt in July 1972 with the PLO's growing political ascendancy in the area increased the interest of the Soviet Union in the Palestinian problem.¹⁰ Secondly, a number of East European countries made themselves conspicuously more accessible to the visits of PLO delegations and became supportive of the Palestinian cause. Hence, the October war came as an event that accelerated and deepened East European move nearer to the Palestinian cause. One direct consequence of the 1973 war was to force the Soviets to take a lead in attempts to find a negotiated solution to the Palestinian problem by putting forward the idea of a 'mini-state' at the Geneva Conference in December 1973.¹¹

The 1967 war had less of a direct impact on Western European attitudes towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The only perceptible and significant change came from France. Previously a strong ally of Israel, France under De Gaulle's leadership moved much closer to the Arabs as the

French government began to withdraw its traditional military and political support for Israel.¹² The significance of this move becomes clearer as France became one of the first leading members of the EC to advocate an approach more sympathetic to Palestinian demands. However, indirectly the 1967 war did prepare the basis for important perceptual changes in for the rest of Western Europe.

Firstly, as a result of the decisive Israeli victory in the 1967 war Israel ceased to be the 'underdog' surrounded by belligerent and numerically superior Arab countries. Secondly, in the face of this victory, Israel's reluctance to show magnanimity and compromise for achieving a reasonable settlement undermined European perceptions of Israel as 'one of us' ready to share the spirit of compromise that had come to characterise European politics in the post Second World War era.

The impact of these two factors on West European thinking is quite evident from the importance they came to attach to Resolution 242 and the efforts of Jarring to mediate in the Arab-Israeli conflict. At the European Community level this was reflected in the adoption of the Schumann Report by the European Ministers on May 1971 which clearly stated the unacceptability of Israel's continued occupation of Arab territories and any changes to the status of these territories.¹³ Probably the significance of the change in the cognitive environment of European decision-makers brought about by the 1967 war and the failure of the post-war diplomacy is best demonstrated by the hostility the Schumann Report received in Israel. Nevertheless, it was not until after the 1973 war that an environment more conducive to the mobilisation of European support specifically for the Palestinian cause emerged.

Although France, later joined by Britain, had been arguing for the need to develop a common approach to the Middle East conflict it was the 1973 war that eventually jolted

the EC into action. The war together with Arab oil production cuts generated a degree of urgency which led to the adoption of a common approach to the Middle East whose content put the EC on a platform much more receptive to Arab and Palestinian demands than in previous times.

As it can be seen these two Arab-Israeli wars had a kind of cumulative impact on the emergence of a conducive environment. First, in Eastern Europe and to a much lesser extent in the West the 1967 war produced an atmosphere more receptive to Arab demands. And then the 1973 war built on this by duplicating the process this time in respect to the Palestinian problem. There were a number of other events, during the late 1970s and early 1980s in the Middle East that further improved the conduciveness of the environment within which Arab and Palestinian efforts towards the mobilisation of support had already made some progress.

7.2.2.2 Other key events

One such event was the formation of the Likud government in June 1977 under the leadership of Begin. Begin's personal past confrontations and conflict with various European governments and his expansionist approach towards the occupied territories contributed to an increase in Europe's receptiveness to Palestinian demands and arguments.¹⁴ This greater receptiveness is reflected in the EC's growing preparedness to respond to Palestinian efforts to mobilise support for a 'mini-state'. It was with the coming to power of Begin that the EC began to debate what form the expression of the political rights of the Palestinians should take. The re-election of Begin in June 1981 and his commitment to Eretz Israel¹⁵ made the EC even more sceptical about Israel's goodwill. This brought Europe closer to the Palestinians as evidenced in an increase of semi-official contacts between the PLO and the EC.

The signing of the Camp David agreements in March 1979 was

another event that brought the EC closer to the Palestinian cause. The consensus amongst the members of the EC was that these agreements were a positive development albeit a partial one.¹⁶ These agreements it was believed would not be complete until the views of the Palestinians were taken into consideration. The Autonomy plan was seen as inadequate and the extremely narrow Israeli interpretation of the meaning of autonomy was criticised. These points were reflected in the 26 March 1979 Paris Declaration which expressed the need to include Palestinian representatives in negotiations and the right of the Palestinians to a homeland.¹⁷

Furthermore, the aftermath of Israel's 1978 military operation in Southern Lebanon, with its damaging consequences for Palestinians, and the continued policy of expanding Jewish settlements, together with a conspicuous reluctance to maintain meaningful talks, created an environment within which the urgency and relevance of Palestinian arguments and demands became very strong. It is against this background that the mobilisation process that culminated in the launching of the 1980 Venice Declaration with its reference to "the right of Palestinian people to self-determination" and to "the need to associate the PLO with a comprehensive settlement" became possible.

The early events mentioned above led to the opening of a European debate on the Arab-Israel conflict followed by others that eventually paved the way for the recognition of the Palestinian dimension of this conflict. By the late 1970s these events had led the EC into an environment in which they had come to support the political rights of the Palestinians and the role of the PLO in a comprehensive settlement. However, the definition of the political rights of the Palestinians never went as far as a clear EC announcement in favour of the establishment of a 'state'. Similarly, the EC remained openly reluctant to recognise the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians. It

was a series of events in the 1980s which began to push a growing number of EC members towards a more radical stand.

The Israeli annexation of Jerusalem in June 1980 and the Golan Heights in December 1981 were two such events. These events threw serious doubts on the possibilities of achieving a comprehensive settlement based on Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories and the resolution of the Palestinian problem. Israel appeared extremely intransigent and the credibility of its willingness to achieve a negotiated peace suffered. But probably the event that shook European governments and public the most was the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

The invasion, the seige of Beirut and the Sabra Chatila massacres kept the Palestinian problem for many months on the formal and public agendas of European countries. The Palestinian problem regained particular urgency and salience for the EC. This urgency was reflected in the European support given to a French-Egyptian initiative at the Security Council in June 1982 and in the EC Foreign Ministers Declaration in September 1982.¹⁸ The public on the other hand was engulfed with outrage and felt that "more urgently then ever, a homeland in Palestine is what they (Palestinians) need."¹⁹

The 'conducive environment' as constituted by the above structural changes and events is dynamic as well as cumulative in nature and interacts with other parts of the mobilisation process. This can be observed quite clearly from the way the EC responded to each set of events. The 1973 war and the structural changes associated with it created an environment which gave the Arabs a greater say and led to the recognition of the 'legitimate rights' of the Palestinians. The following set of events each in turn put the EC and other Europeans into environments characterised by growing receptiveness to Arab and Palestinian efforts. The importance of these events arise

from the way they affected the general perceptions which became a part of the environmental structure within which foreign policy decision makers operate.

The Euro-Arab dialogue and particularly the events of the late 1970s and early 1980s enabled the PLO to gain direct access to a wide range of governments. Similarly these events also opened up the possibility of certain legitimising linkages to develop between certain set of values of high standing and the situation in the Middle East. Israeli policies and acts in the occupied territories in relation to international law became increasingly difficult to ignore. Also these events made it possible to evaluate the plight and suffering of the Palestinian people under Israeli occupation in relation to principles of justice and human rights. This enabled the Palestinians to argue the legitimacy of their case and gain support for their case. Undoubtedly the growth in support of the PLO and the Palestinian case in other different parts of the world did also contribute towards a greater conducive environment for change to occur amongst the Northern countries.

7.3 Cognitive and Other Linkages

In the introductory chapter it was pointed out that the cognitive linkage between the solution of the problem of Jewish displaced persons in Europe and the establishment of a Jewish state had played an important role in mobilising support for the Zionist cause. Similarly, in chapter five the role of widely legitimised principles central to the Third World thinking about state-to-state relations, (such as 'respect for territorial integrity' and the 'inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force'), together with the integration of the Palestinian cause into anti-colonialism, in mobilising support for the Palestinians was noted. It is difficult to find one or two common cognitive linkages that have influenced Northern

perceptions of the Palestinian issue. Instead there are a diverse set of linkages that appear to have influenced individual governments or small groups of governments in different ways.

7.3.1 Anti-colonialism and Anti-imperialism

These two concepts have played a crucial role in mobilising support amongst East European and, to a lesser extent, some Western countries. The East European countries have had a long record of involvement in the politics of decolonisation, particularly at the UN. The nature of Marxist ideology, which plays a certain role in East European foreign-policy-making, encourages support for anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles. Hence, those situations that became perceived as anti-colonial and anti-imperialist struggles have usually received the political support of East European governments. In East European governmental circles the territorial gains of Israel resulting from the Arab-Israeli conflict and the conspicuous US support for Israel generated sympathy for Arab allegations of the 'imperialistic and expansionist nature of Israel'.

The struggle waged by the Palestinians against Israel became to be seen as one against imperialism, a legitimate national liberation struggle worthy of political support. This was expressed quite clearly in a Warsaw Pact resolution of November 26, 1969 that spoke of the "anti-imperialist national liberation struggle of the Arab people of Palestine" and a similar position received Soviet support in December 1969.²⁰ This position of the East Europeans is amply supported by their strong anti-colonialist and pro-Palestinian voting.

For at least some East European countries it might also be possible to include the resurgence of anti-semitism as a factor in the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is evident in the

way in which the "Arab-Israeli wars of June 1967 pushed the Jewish problem into the forefront of Czechoslovak and Polish political life".²¹ The identification of Jewish communities with the Israeli victory put them into conflict with the governments of these two countries and their communist parties which had joined ranks with the Soviet Union in condemning Israel as the aggressor.

This conflict contributed to the view held by some governmental circles which attributed the political unrest of 1968 in both Poland and Czechoslovakia to an 'imperialist, revisionist and Zionist plot'.²² This frame of mind which attributed some of the domestic political problems to the 'disloyalty of Jewish communities and to Zionism' facilitated the assessment of the situation in the Middle East in a manner favourable to the Arabs. The Arabs became to be seen as the victims of 'Israeli imperialism and Zionism'.

There are a number of Western countries for whom anti-colonialism too played a certain role in moulding their attitude towards the Palestinian problem. These were some of the Scandinavian countries, Greece, Spain, Malta and Turkey. They tended to come from the fringes of European politics, in the sense they were not involved in the politics of the EC and lacked a political tradition as a colonial power. Since the early 1960s they have pursued foreign policies supportive of the rights to self-determination and of colonial peoples to struggle for independence. This is to a limited extent evident in their voting behaviour at the UN, which suggests a relatively anti-colonial position particularly in relation to the other countries in the Western European group.

Some of these countries have come to perceive similarities between the Palestinian situation and struggles for independence. A growing relationship between a strong anti-colonial voting and support for the Palestinian cause may

well be indicative of this cognitive linkage. However, the results of this statistical analysis must be handled with caution. Unlike in the case of the Third World there is a lack of systematic evidence in the form of common declarations that unequivocally supports such a cognitive linkage.

Spain, Malta, Greece and Turkey are one group of such countries. Turkey's perception of the Palestinian struggle and its similarities to other anti-colonial struggles may well have been influenced by the debates and the decisions of the Islamic group. In a similar way Malta is a member of the Non-Aligned movement which has endorsed and supported the Palestinian cause as an anti-colonial cause. Spain has traditionally held very close and friendly ties with the Arab world. It has had a long record of policies in support of Arab and African decolonisation. Hence, it has been more open to Arab and Palestinian arguments. Similarly Greece too has maintained strong ties with the Arab world. In strong expressions of solidarity with the Arabs, they voted against the Partition Plan in 1947 and were strongly critical of the Suez intervention. Greece's perception of the Palestinian problem is also influenced by the similarities it draws between the occupation of Palestine and Cyprus. This is further strengthened by strong feelings of anti-Americanism.²³

To the above countries one add Sweden, Finland and to a lesser extent Ireland. They have exhibited a voting behaviour which somewhat suggest similar levels of support for anti-colonialism and the Palestinian cause. Although all Scandinavian countries have been supportive of anti-colonialism in their voting behaviour it is only Sweden and Finland that have voted in a manner that suggests the possibility of a cognitive linkage between anti-colonialism and the legitimisation of the Palestinian cause. The different behaviour of the other Scandinavian countries on the Palestinian issue may well be induced by their

involvement in the politics of NATO and the EC. This may have restrained them from developing a cohesive Nordic approach towards the Palestinian issue complementing their approach to colonial matters.

Ireland's colonial background and its experience of partition has made it much more sensitive to Third World struggles for self-determination and the problems of dispossessed peoples.²⁴ Irish support for Egypt during the Suez crisis and for the Algerian liberation struggle²⁵ can be seen as early manifestations of this anti-colonial stand favouring the Arab world.²⁶ Undoubtedly the same feelings may have played a role in the conspicuous growth of Irish support for the Palestinian cause during the 1970s.

For the rest of the Western group the role of a cognitive linkage between anti-colonialism and the Palestinian cause in mobilising support for the political rights of the Palestinians appears to be weak. This is because countries falling into this group have voted in four separate ways on both issues. There are those countries such as Britain, France and Austria who have tended to be relatively more supportive of the Palestinian cause than of anti-colonialism. At the opposite end of the spectrum are those Scandinavian countries that are strongly supportive of anti-colonialism but not of the Palestinian cause. The US is the only country that has come to vote strongly, pro-Israeli and pro-colonial particularly since the 29th session of the General Assembly. Finally, there are those countries, mostly EC members, that have voted neither against nor in support of either issue.

7.3.2 Linkages derived from legal principles

Countries belonging to the Western group have a strong tradition in international law and in the promotion of it. A number of international legal principles such as the 'inadmisability of the acquisition of territory by force',

'respect for the territorial integrity of states' and particularly those principles that make up human rights law have come to influence European perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict and Israeli practices. Since the 1967 war Western attitudes influenced by these principles increasingly benefitted the Palestinian cause.

During the period prior to the 1967 war one of the major base of previous European support for Israel, such as during the Suez war and Nasser's blockade of the straits of Tiran, had been based on arguments derived from the need to respect the existing international order governing navigation through international waterways.²⁷ However, with the 1967 war the primacy of legal principles that favoured Israel became quickly eroded. Principles such as 'respect for the territorial integrity of states' had become generally accepted in the Third World and were expressed in the decisions of the Bandung Conference, the Non-Aligned meetings and the OAU Charter. Although these principles originated from the Third World, it was partly in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict that they became legal norms also recognised by the Europeans. In an increasingly anti-colonial world these principles came to undermine and replace the old 'right to sovereignty by conquest'.

It is in the light of these developments that the significance of the unanimous European support for Resolution 242 should be seen. Since the adoption of this resolution the West and particularly the EC has regularly reiterated the necessity for Israel to withdraw from the occupied territories and the need for all countries in the area to respect each others sovereignty. Many Arab governments readiness to accept Resolution 242 compared to Israel's reluctance to respect these principles by not showing any genuine interest to withdraw from the occupied territories weakened the earlier support that Israel had enjoyed. More importantly these measures created doubts in

the minds of Europeans as to whether Israel genuinely meant to achieve lasting peace through negotiations. Hence, the continued violation of the above principles led Europe to question its support for Israel and become more open to Arab arguments.

The increasingly substantiated Israeli violation of human rights in the occupied territories too appears to have played a role in changing European attitudes towards the Palestinian problem. Israel in the 1950s and 1960s had gained the admiration of large sections of the European public as well as governments. This admiration in general was based on the image that Israel projected of an egalitarian and socialist society. Israel was perceived as a bastion of democracy in the midst of a repressive Middle East, dominated by Nasserism and feudal monarchies. However, Israeli governmental and military policies in the occupied territories gradually eroded this image. The arbitrary nature of the behaviour of Israeli authorities became increasingly difficult to accept. Groups inside Israel and in Western Europe began to express growing concern about the violation of various aspects of the Geneva Conventions and the systematic undermining of the principle of 'rule of law' so central to Western political-legal thinking.²⁸ This gradually eroded Israel's legitimacy in the occupied territories and enabled the West to sympathise with the plight of the Palestinians, their frustration and at times their use of violence towards the authorities.

Furthermore, similarities, however superficial, have been drawn between Palestinian resistance to Israeli occupation and resistance to the German occupation during the Second World War. Particularly, in the eyes of East Europeans, the French, the Spanish and the Greeks the violence perpetrated by the Palestinians in the occupied territories ^{was seen as} the natural outcome of foreign occupation. The people involved in this violence were referred to as 'resistance fighters'

or 'partisans' rather than terrorists.²⁹ This at least in the eyes of these governments signified an increase in the perceived status of Palestinian guerrilla fighters. The overall affect of this process, more importantly, was its contribution to a change in the perception of the Palestinian problem from being merely a refugee problem to a problem of a people resisting occupation in a struggle to achieve self-determination.

7.3.3 Bargain Linkages

The conspicuous change in the European approach towards the Arab-Israeli conflict has often been attributed to Arab oil power and to the dictations of European economic interests in the area.³⁰ On its face value, the announcement of the first joint EC Declaration of November 6 1973, in the immediate aftermath of Arab oil production cuts and embargos, may appear to lend some credit to such an argument. This declaration reflected a number of significant changes in the EC approach to the Arab-Israeli problem. Firstly, it was the first time that the EC was taking a common approach towards the Middle East and expressing the need to take an active role in search of a comprehensive settlement. Secondly and most importantly for the first time the EC referred to the 'legitimate rights of the Palestinians'. Thirdly, it suggested the need of Israeli-Arab negotiations to take place within a UN framework, a position strongly opposed by Israel. Fourthly, this declaration stressed the ties between Western Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean, and expressed interest in developing these ties, paving the way to the Euro-Arab dialogue.

To attribute this declaration, which received the welcome of the November 1973 Arab summit in Algiers and the very strong disapproval of Israel³¹, to a straight forward bargain linkage between Arab governments and the EC whereby Europe was guaranteed oil and access to Arab markets in

return for EC support for the Palestinian cause would be an oversimplification of a complex relationship between the EC and the Arab world. The oil crisis demonstrated

"in a dramatic way the connection between economic and politics questions in international relations. For Western Europe, the energy problem is economic in one sense, but it is also political in that the needed petroleum resources are largely under Arab sovereignty".³²

It would be difficult for the EC to maintain stable and healthy commercial relations with the Middle East without taking account of the political concerns of the actors in the area.

The EC, with the adoption of the Schumann Report on May 1971, had already recognised some of the concerns of the Arab countries by calling for the withdrawal of Israel from the occupied territories. Furthermore, most EC countries including traditionally pro-Israeli ones were moving towards recognising the political rights of the Palestinian people before the adoption of the November 1973 Brussels Declaration. The Netherlands, ironically the primary target of the oil embargo in Europe, had acknowledged the political dimension of the Palestinian problem as early as November 1970.³³ Belgium too had followed a similar pattern of behaviour and by October 1972 it was expressing its concern for the future of the Palestinian people.³⁴ Both France and Britain, principal architects of the Brussels Declaration, had supported the 'rights and legitimate aspirations' of the Palestinians in a draft Security Council resolution in the summer of 1973.³⁵ French Minister of State, J.Lipkowski in Kuwait in April 1972 noted that

"France would not recognise any solution that does not recognise the human and political rights which will establish the existence of the rights of the Palestinians people."³⁶

Furthermore, in this declaration the EC stopped well short of Arab and Palestinian demands. The recognition of the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the

legitimate rights of the Palestinians did not meet Palestinian demands for a Palestinian state. It took almost a decade for most European countries to begin to support unambiguously the right of Palestinian people to self determination. And this was only as a result of a dynamic process, rather than solely a bargain linkage. A process which took Europeans through various stages of the definition of the 'legitimate rights of the Palestinians'.

In the matter of the diplomatic recognition of the PLO too, the EC remained reluctant to meet Arab demands and at no point has the EC waived from its position of support for the Israeli state. All support that the EC has given to Palestinian political rights have always been conditional on the recognition of Israel's existence. In many ways the Europeans have skillfully exploited the significance that Arab governments and Palestinians have attached to European support in trying to moderate the PLO and some Arab governments. The moderating influence that the mobilisation process has had on the PLO will be taken up in the concluding chapter.

However, probably the most authoritative statement undermining the credibility of an argument attributing European support for the Palestinian cause purely to economic considerations came from an old ally of Israel. Germany's Foreign Minister Genscher, in an explanation of his government's support for the principle of Palestinian self-determination, noted that a settlement of the problem was of vital concern to Europe "even if the Arab states exported nothing but water".³⁷ Hence the role of economic considerations leading to bargain linkages should be seen in conjunction to the other cognitive factors that have influenced European perceptions of the Palestinian problem and their attitudes towards its resolution. All in all, this bargain linkage precipitated a process of closer dialogue between the Arabs and Europe which, despite early reluctance, put the Palestinian problem firmly on the

7.3.4 Linkages to domestic politics

Western states are not monolithic actors in world politics. Many groups contribute towards the foreign policy making process in these countries. In the case of foreign policy making on the Middle East, some of them such as those representing the interest of oil companies and certain sections of the industry may be keen to promote bargain linkages in an effort to secure good relations with Arab governments. On the other hand other pressure groups such as human rights groups, or trade unions will rely on cognitive linkages. In their attempt to persuade a government they will use arguments legitimising the Palestinian cause by establishing linkages between the Palestinian problem and various highly prestigious principles central to political thinking in the West.

Similarly, there will be a variety of groups arguing the case of Israel, such as Jewish groups or socialist groups that identify with the dominant ideology in the Israeli political system. The aggregate impact of these pressure groups, together with governmental factors, such as organisational and bureaucratic politics, and environmental factors, such as regional and international commitments and demands, will determine a governments foreign policy on the issue. However, there are situations when domestic politics surrounding pressure group feature so heavily in a governments foreign policy behaviour that it becomes possible to talk about clear linkages between domestic and foreign policies of a country on the issue.

Linkage politics, as noted in chapter three, was a term introduced to conceptualise the relationship between the domestic political environment of a state and its international environment. Literature that was precipitated by Rosenau's work has mostly concentrated on linkages

emanating from the international environment to the domestic environment or on linkages between domestic political systems.³⁹

"The idea of linkages as a way of organising data may be extended to include links in the opposite direction, from within state systems to their environment. Much less attention has been paid to this aspect of the concept. If the international arena is conceived of in systemic terms... then sub-systemic outputs could be seen in terms of their impact either on state systems or on a variety of behavioural systems."⁴⁰

The impact that the Jewish community in the US has on US foreign policy making and the international system can be seen as one such linkage. Since the early 1940s the Jewish community and the Zionist lobby in Congress has had a significant say in US policy making towards the Middle East. The existence of the Jewish lobby has become a structural feature of the US domestic political system. It operates through a process of domestic bargain linkages which often generate inputs for the international political system. Although this linkage was to some extent weakened during and in the aftermath of the Suez war it has gained increasing strength since the 1967 war. It has featured prominently in presidential election campaigns, in Congressional politics over various aspects of the Middle East issue and in the government's foreign policy decision making on the Palestinian problem.

However, this linkage especially since 1967 can also be likened to Roseanu's 'penetrative linkages'. Such linkages, according to Roseanu, consist in processes whereby actors from outside one state participates directly in the politics of that country.⁴¹ Israel, it can be said, through the intermediaries of an active Jewish community and a Zionist lobby in Congress is able to bring about such linkages and influence US governmental policy. This is well demonstrated, for example, by the way in which Carter's peace plan, announced in March 1977, evoking the idea of a 'homeland' for the Palestinians had to go through a number

of revisions as a result of Jewish-Israeli intervention.

Similarly, the US delegation at the UN too faced the consequences of such linkages. A. Young after an unauthorised meeting in July 1979 with the PLO representative at the UN was forced to resign as a result of mounting Jewish pressure. In a later incident after the US delegation cast an affirmative vote in favour of a Security Council draft resolution strongly critical of Israel settlement policies, President Carter "as a result of protest from Israel and her supporters announced that the vote had been a mistake".⁴² Nevertheless, in spite of Israel's direct and indirect influence on the formation of US perception and attitudes towards the Palestinian problem it would be erroneous to attribute US foreign policy in the Middle East solely to this factor.

Before examining the role of strategic linkages in attitude formation toward the Middle East, the role of European socialist and labour parties in providing greater accessibility for Israeli views and a basis for favourable cognitive linkages with these views needs to be mentioned. In the 1950s and 1960s Israel in the eyes of the Socialist International, an international non-governmental organisation composed of the many socialist and labour parties of Europe, held a special status. The moral impact of the Nazi atrocities on the European socialist movement together with the fact that

"Young Israel was seen by European socialists as a realization of the socialist dream: a state based on social democratic principles and led by a social democratic movement, fullfilling the principles of freedom, justice and equality" ensured this status."⁴³

This status enabled the often Labour led Israeli government to enjoy the support and solidarity of the Socialist International on the Arab-Israeli conflict throughout this period. However, this favourable image became gradually

eroded as the membership of the Socialist International began to include groups from the Third World and anti-colonialism became absorbed in its ideology.⁴⁴ This culminated in the Socialist International revising its perception of the nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

7.3.5 Strategic linkages

Traditional theory in international relations makes power and power maximisation central determinants of state behaviour. Accordingly US and Soviet foreign policy behaviour in the Middle East would be explained in terms of this region's place in the overall global security considerations of both countries. The US would be expected to follow a foreign policy towards the Middle East whose primary concern would be to check Soviet expansionism, to protect vital oil fields and to maintain the strategic global status-quo. Such a foreign policy would take the form of strengthening local allies of the US and improving US capabilities to project military power to the area to meet any direct or indirect Soviet threat. The Soviet Union too would be expected to behave no differently. Its primary concern would be to try to expand its base of influence in an attempt to undermine the US position in the area. All this would be done in the name of maximising a super power's national interest, defined in terms of power.

Undoubtedly such global strategic/security considerations do enter the minds of foreign policy makers on the Middle East particularly those from the US and the Soviet Union. Both the Global Politics approach and the Realists would breakdown such strategic consideration into three possible constituent parts

- i) prestige/status,
- ii) economic,
- iii) military/security considerations.

For the Realists prestige will be seen as a reflection of a countries 'power' usually associated with its military

capabilities. On the other hand, for the Global Politics approach an actor's prestige can also be derived from sources other than military capabilities, as in the status given to the Pope. In this light the first consideration can be seen as an attempt on the part of the foreign policy makers to maintain a high status and prestige in the eyes of their allies in the area. This is often done by aiming to generate some degree of cognitive congruence over priority problems of the area and the means to resolve them. The US promotes the threat of Soviet expansionism and communism as the major problem of high salience. This determines her foreign policy options. It helps the US to justify its strong support for Israel, to mobilise support from moderate governments in the area and to promote a piecemeal approach to the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, although this is a position advocated by Israel it is not one that is shared by Arab governments. The lack of congruence over the Soviet threat to the Middle East was illustrated by Qatar's Information Minister when he accused the US of "trying to sell us the idea of danger in Afghanistan but I think Jerusalem is nearer than Kabul."⁴⁵

In a similar way the Soviet Union too aims at achieving firm relations with allies, through the instrument of a policy having cognitive congruence with those in the region by depicting Israel and the US as major threats to the area.⁴⁶ It has projected the struggle against the US and Israel as an anti-imperialist and anti-Western one and has sought to gain the allegiance of what it perceives to be progressive forces, which since the early 1970s have come to include the PLO.⁴⁷ The Palestinian issue has steadily gained greater centrality and has become the major problem with high salience for whose solution the Soviets have supported a comprehensive settlement. The high level of activity that has surrounded the Soviet government's desire to be involved in such a settlement can be attributed to prestige considerations. As Golan notes,

"...the Soviets have used their stances on the Palestinian issue to enhance Moscow's position in the Arab world and increasingly to counter U.S. inroads, successes, or potential successes in the Middle East".⁴⁸

The role of economic considerations in the Middle East is probably more central to US foreign policy making than the Soviet Union's. It is a consideration that needs to be seen in relation to the earlier one. As important as the prestige element of checking a Soviet threat is the need to protect the economic resources of the area and ensure the accessibility of the local market to US goods and capital. At the strategic level this is felt in the belief that the loss of the area to the Soviets would endanger the continuity of the Western way of life. However, the foreign policy options emerging as a result of economic considerations conflict with the ones from the earlier considerations. These options dictate the need to give greater importance to the concerns of those governments with economic leverage resulting from their control over oil supplies. The slow and painful way in which the Palestinian dimension of the Middle East problem has acquired greater attention in US foreign policy could be attributed to this conflict.

US military strategic considerations in the area are complex and at times conflicting. The credibility of the US argument of impending Soviet threat is attempted to be maintained by an active US involvement in the defence of the area. This is done in two ways: firstly by maintaining a US military presence, particularly a naval one in the area and secondly by equipping the national defence forces of moderate friendly regimes. However, the latter one is seriously undermined by the politics surrounding US commitments to Israel. This in turn weakens US credibility and goodwill in the eyes of moderate Arab governments. Furthermore, these military considerations condition U.S.

attitudes towards the PLO. The PLO's strong ties with the Soviet Union and Syria coupled with the real and proclaimed threat the PLO constitutes towards Israel, culminates in US reluctance to recognise and maintain relations with the PLO. This close Soviet connection too conditions the US stance against the idea of a Palestinian state as it "fears that such a Palestine state would become the Cuba of the Middle East".⁴⁹

The Middle East historically for reasons of geographic proximity and military exposure has featured heavily in Soviet security considerations too.⁵⁰ The Soviet Union has perceived Western and US presence in the area a threat to her security. In the late 1950s and through the 1960s ideological linkages had ensured the Soviets a string of allies in the Middle East. These ideological affinities and anti-Westernism had played an important role in the Soviet stance on the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, it was the loss of Egypt in 1972 in this context that to some degree increased the salience of the Palestinian problem and the PLO. The PLO became an important means of maintaining some influence in Arab politics.

Yet, inspite of the advantages of having the PLO as an ally the Soviet Union has been surprisingly cautious in its military and political support. It was only in the 1980s that the Soviets began to talk about a Palestinian state and granted the PLO full diplomatic status. In a sense the PLO and the Palestinian issue was seen more from a political point of view rather than a military one. It is doubtful whether the Soviet government considered the PLO as a serious military ally. This is well reflected in their reluctance to give military assistance to the PLO in an overt and consistent manner.⁵¹

A set of different linkages played a certain role in the way Northern countries approached the Palestinian problem. The cognitive linkages contributed towards the

legitimisation of the Palestinian cause and provided the justification for lending support for the rights of the Palestinians. For the Europeans bargain linkages increased the salience of the area and its problems that make the area unstable. In the case of the US domestic linkage politics and strategic considerations have conditioned its perception of the Palestinian problem. It has made the US less accessible and less responsive to the efforts of the Arabs and Palestinians to mobilise support.

7.4 Accessibility

This section looks at the role of accessibility to the agendas and decision makers in East and Western Europe in the mobilisation process. In 1947 the ability of Zionists to reach and address themselves to Western governments in a very effective way played a crucial role in mobilising support for the establishment of a Jewish state. In contrast this ability was conspicuously absent in Arab counter efforts. This lack of Arab accessibility compared to the Zionist one in Britain is aptly recalled by Lord Mayhem,

"Compared with the Zionists, they (the Arabs) were separated by the totally different culture, and procedure and politics of their countries and ours. If they did make somekind of a submission in writing, it would be wrongly worded the arguments would be wrong, it would be sent to the wrong person. Whereas, of course the Zionist lobby was right in among British politics and there were Zionists so close to the cabinet that there had been instances where cabinet ministers actually telephoned the results of a cabinet meeting straight to the Zionists concerned".⁵²

As the below matrix depicts, the Palestinian issue reached the European agendas in a number of ways. In the period between the 1967 and 1973 wars some Arab governments tried to push the Palestinian issue on the European agendas. Neither the East nor the West responded to it in any particularly favourable way. It was only in the aftermath of the 1973 war that the PLO began to gain access to

Eastern followed by Western governments. Violence both at the local and international levels played a certain role too in raising the Palestinian issue on public as well as formal agendas. Violence at the local level amongst East European and some Western countries came to be seen as a legitimate struggle against occupation and the reprisals

	Non-violent	Violent
Indirect	Arab governments Euro-Arab dialogue	Resistance in the occupied territories
Direct	Formal PLO offices visits	Informal Contacts Hijackings

Table 7.1: Access Routes to European Agendas

precipitated by it led to condemnations. But it was the hijackings of aircraft belonging to Western airlines that brought the Palestinian issue on Western public and formal agendas in a spectacular way.

7.4.1 Nonviolent access routes

7.4.1.1 The European Community

After the 1967 war Europeans remained outside the politics of the Middle East. Mostly they confined themselves to supporting US and Security Council efforts to find a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It was only with the gradual development of EPC that the EC countries began to show some interest in developing a common approach towards the Middle East. The development of the first signs of a common approach was influenced by the pro-Arab disposition of France and the growing contacts with the Arab world, particularly since the change in Egypt's traditional anti-Western stance. One tangible result of these developments was a European Ministerial agreement achieved over the

Schumann report. Although the report did take up the Arab cause the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict remained unrecognised.

It was only after the October war that the Arabs gained significant access to the European political system. The Brussels Declaration of November 1973 brought the EC significantly closer to the Arab world and precipitated the setting up of the Euro-Arab dialogue. This dialogue significantly increased Arab accessibility to the European scene. Once an Arab demand to include the PLO in the dialogue as a separate independent participant was resolved, the PLO was able to participate as a member of a unified Arab delegation allowing the Palestinians to have contacts with high ranking officials and politicians in Rome, Brussels, Bonn, Paris and other European capitals.⁵³ This opened the possibility for the Palestinians to take up their problems directly with their European counterparts.

Following the substantial increase in the PLO status in world politics in 1973 and 1974 more direct contacts between the West and the PLO gradually developed. Most of the early contacts were of an informal kind. In late 1974 in an atmosphere generated by Arafat's appearance at the UN General Assembly and the adoption of resolutions supportive of the Palestinian cause numerous Western politicians, in particular from Britain and West Germany, met with Arafat.⁵⁴ During the same period France went further and was the first EC country to have direct official contacts with the PLO. In October 1974 the French Foreign Minister met Arafat in Beirut and promised support for the PLO in return for moderation in the PLO's policies.⁵⁵ This encounter undoubtedly influenced France's voting behaviour at the UN and led Giscard D'Estaing to note that

"The key to the problem is the understanding that there can be no durable peace in the Middle East if there is no just settlement of the Palestine question. Once the international community has recognised the existence of a Palestinian people, what is the natural aspiration of this people? It is to have a

Unlike her French partner Britain throughout the 1970s maintained the position of not having contacts at or above the ministerial level. Its contacts were limited to the ones taking place between the PLO and the British embassy in Beirut.⁵⁷ A slight change occurred in this policy as an EC consensus supportive of an eventual inclusion of the PLO in a negotiation process emerged. As a consequence of the Venice Declaration the EC in an attempt to moderate the PLO and prepare the way towards a comprehensive settlement, dispatched Gaston Thorn in August 1980 and then Van der Klaauw in April 1981 to the Middle East. Both EC leaders met and had discussions with Y.Arafat.

The minor change in Britain's policy towards contacts with the PLO came between these two visits. In early 1981 Sir J.Graham, Deputy Permanent Under Secretary, went to Beirut to meet Arafat. The purpose of the meeting was to maintain the momentum in EC efforts and also pave the way to Lord Carrington's expected meeting with Arafat during his presidency of the EC in the second half of the year. However, as a result of Lord Carrington's resignation over the Falkland's crisis this encounter never materialised.

His successor F.Pym, although he expressed support for a Palestinian state as one possible way of fulfilling the Palestinian right to self-determination,⁵⁸ never showed Lord Carrington's disposition to meet Arafat or other PLO officials.⁵⁹ In a reversal of policy in late 1982 the British government made itself even less accessible to the PLO when it refused to meet Arab League delegation led by the PLO during their tour of permanent members of the Security Council.⁶⁰ Since then Britain has maintained its policy from the 1970s and has kept its contacts with the PLO at a low level with only one meeting at a ministerial level that took place in April 1983 in Tunis between Mr.Hurd, Minister of State and F.Kaddoumi.⁶¹

7.4.1.2 Other Europeans

The PLO gained access to Europe outside the EC more readily. Particularly, through F.Kaddoumi, Head of the Political Department of the PLO, regular contacts were developed with Finland, Sweden, Austria, Portugal, Spain, Malta, Greece and Turkey. As a result of these contacts the PLO opened offices in all of these countries. With the exception of the Scandinavian countries and Portugal, the PLO was recognised as the sole representative of the Palestinians and its representatives were granted diplomatic status. This gave the PLO a significant political advantage considering that some of these countries maintained no or low key relations with Israel. Furthermore, Kaddoumi's good relations with Kreisky, the Austrian Chancellor, was of particular significance in gaining the support of the Socialist International.⁶² Similarly, Kreisky appears to have helped to maintain an 'indirect dialogue' between the PLO and the US in the late 1970s.⁶³

7.4.1.3 The United States

The most inaccessible government for the PLO has been the US. This government has consistently maintained the position of not having any relations with the PLO as long as the latter does not recognise Israel. This has been formally expressed in a gentleman's agreement reached between Kissinger and the Israeli government at the time of the signing of the Sinai disengagement agreement on 1 September 1975. Nevertheless, in spite of this uncompromising public position the US has had some unofficial contacts with the PLO.

The first contacts between the US and the PLO were developed by Senators. Senator McGovern, Chairman of the Middle East Subcommittee of the US Senate Committee on

Foreign Affairs met Arafat in April 1975 and envisaged the possibility of an eventual independent Palestinian state. The following year Senator Stevenson held talks with Arafat in February 1976. He came back with observations of alleged moderation in Arafat's position towards the solution of the problem.⁶⁴ These visits may well have contributed to certain perceptual changes that partially precipitated a sudden upsurge of unofficial contacts between US officials and the PLO.

As early as June 1976, prior to a Security Council vote on a resolution calling for a Palestinian entity, US officials held talks with F.Kaddoumi.⁶⁵ Although at first denied by Kissinger, these contacts should be seen in the light of Saunders, (the Assistant Secretary of State for the Near East and South Asian affairs) recognition of the centrality of the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict, as well as the publication of a report prepared by the Brookings Institution which noted the need to recognise the Palestinian right to self-determination and the need for credible Palestinian representatives.⁶⁶ This report influenced the Carter administration's policy towards the Palestinian problem too. Hence a further series of unofficial contacts took place including a meeting between Carter and a PLO representative during a UN reception in March 1977.⁶⁷ To these contacts one can also add the visits of various US senators and congressmen to Beirut.⁶⁸

These contacts may well have been caused by the disagreement between the US and Israel when the US expressed preparedness to accept the PLO as the representative of at least a substantial proportion but not the exclusive representative of the Palestinians.⁶⁹ Another source of disagreement was the administration's assessment that "without the PLO cooperation, it would be difficult perhaps impossible to solve the problems of the region".⁷⁰ In 1978 these contacts included meetings between Arafat and various Congressmen as well as Saunders' visit to the

Middle East.⁷¹ Congressman P. Findley, on his return from direct talks with Arafat in November 25, 1978 claimed that Arafat was prepared to recognise Israel in return for a Palestinian state and called the September 28 Saunders' statement that the US could establish direct contacts with the PLO if it recognised and accepted both Resolution 242 and Israel existence to be put into effect.⁷²

The following year these semi-official contacts received particular publicity when in August it was revealed that A. Young, the head of the US delegation to the UN, had held a private meeting with the PLO representative. The incident eventually led to A. Young's resignation to demonstrate US commitment to the promise made to Israel in September 1975.⁷³ Although the public position of A. Young and the US administration was that the discussions were confined to procedural matters concerning a Security Council meeting, Young's efforts were directed more towards finding "a common ground for an Arab-American resolution supporting both Israeli security and Palestinian rights".⁷⁴

In spite of this public rebuke given to the idea of having contacts with the PLO, the Young affair was seen as being beneficial by Arafat. He alleged that the incident made the American community, particularly the blacks more aware of the Palestinian problem.⁷⁵ Hence even though the PLO lacked direct and formal access to the US government the Palestinian problem found its way to the formal and particularly public agendas of the US. And as Campell has noted it was "at or near the top of the Carter administration's foreign policy agenda".⁷⁶

7.4.1.4 The Soviet Union

The PLO gained direct access to the Soviet government at a surprisingly slow rate. The Soviets throughout the 1960s had treated the Palestinians as refugees⁷⁷ and had favoured a negotiated political solution to the Arab-Israeli

conflict. This position had even led the Soviet Union to be critical of early military activities of Palestinian groups.⁷⁸ Arafat's first contact with the Soviets came in July 1968 when he accompanied Nasser to Moscow. This first contact does not appear to have inspired any particular Soviet support or change of policy in favour of Arafat and the Palestinian resistance movement. This Soviet attitude was strongly reflected in their refusal to support Palestinian guerrilla groups' demands for international legal status at the International Red Cross in Istanbul in September 1969.⁷⁹

The second Arafat visit occurred at a period when Soviet attitudes towards the Palestinian problem were going through a gradual change as reflected in Kosygin's reference in December 1969 to the struggle of the Palestinians as a just national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle worthy of support.⁸⁰ As the new head of the PLO Arafat and his delegation visited Moscow at the 'unofficial' invitation of the Soviet Committee of Solidarity with Asian and African countries.⁸¹ A similar PLO delegation visited Moscow again in October 1971. Although both visits received wide coverage in the Arab world and were seen as a sign of growing international recognition they did not bring about any particular change in Soviet behaviour towards the Middle East other than the change reflected in Kosygin's remark and permission for 'unofficial' contacts.

A fourth visit occurred in July 1972 soon after Nasser's death at a time when Egypt had started to weaken its ties with the Soviet Union. A change in Soviet attitude was reflected in her readiness to express support for 'the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine' and promised military aid to the PLO.⁸² Even though the PLO admitted to having differences on various issues with the USSR⁸³ it was after this particular visit that the Palestinian issue began to take a concrete form on Soviet

public and formal agendas. Arafat went to the Soviet Union in late November 1973 where he was for the last time received on an 'unofficial' basis. During this meeting the Soviets appear to have tried to put pressure on Arafat to participate in the Geneva Conference and accept the idea of 'mini state' and at the same time promised its support for the Palestinians and described the PLO as "the only legitimate representative of the Palestinian people".⁸⁴ However, this position did not culminate in a Soviet official recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. A status conferred on the PLO by the Non-Aligned and the Arab League earlier in the year.

The move towards the establishment of official ties came in March 1974 when Gromyko "extended to Arafat the latter's first official invitation to the Soviet Union from the Soviet government."⁸⁵ Arafat's visit was preceded by wide media coverage of the international recognition received by the PLO. Arafat and his delegation arrived in Moscow in August 1974 and were met by Boris Ponomarev, a politburo member and Head of the CPSU International Department. At the end of the visit the Soviet's recognised that the PLO had been widely recognised as 'the sole legitimate representative of the Arab people of Palestine' and agreed to allow the PLO to open an office in Moscow.⁸⁶

Although Arafat, on his way back from attending the General Assembly in 1974, met with Gromyko and the Soviet premier Kosygin, implying a further increase in the status of the contacts, a formal Soviet recognition of the PLO as the 'sole representative of the Palestinian people' however, did not come until November 1978.⁸⁷ Until then the Soviet Union behaviour and policy suggested a 'de facto' recognition of the PLO⁸⁸ particularly strengthened by Brezhnev's reference to the PLO as the 'head' of the Palestinian people's struggle during his meeting with Arafat in March 1978.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, even this degree of accessibility to the Soviet Union carried importance for

the PLO particularly in relation to the US.

The American awareness that this PLO accessibility to the Soviets worked in both ways and that it could enable the Soviets to exert influence in favour of a political settlement appears to have made the US more flexible. This is reflected in the US-USSR statement of 1 October 1977. The statement called for a comprehensive settlement "incorporating all parties concerned and all questions" such as "the resolution of the Palestinian Question including the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people" and "for ensuring the participation in its (Geneva Conference) work of the representatives of all parties involved in the conflict including those of the Palestinian people."⁹⁰

It was in October 1981 that from the PLO's point of view the major breakthrough came about when the PLO was granted full diplomatic status at the end of Arafat's state visit to the Soviet Union. Arafat recognised this when he said,

"I consider this visit the most important visit I have ever made to the Soviet Union. What happened in Moscow is the main event of the year for the Palestinian people... The recognition of our office in Moscow as a fully fledged diplomatic mission is a message addressed to the whole world by the other superpower - I am not saying the first or second. This means that the Palestinian people have fully asserted their existence and cause on the political and international map."⁹¹

The Soviet Union may have had its own considerations for this particular move⁹² but the significance of this outcome lies in the fact that the PLO had gained formal and direct access to an influential actor in the politics of the area.

7.4.1.4 Eastern Europe

The East Europeans, with the exception of Romania, broke diplomatic relations with Israel after the June war of 1967. This was done as an expression of solidarity with the

Arab countries. This, however, did not immediately change the East European treatment of the Palestinian Question as a refugee problem. In an attempt to change this, the PLO from the early 1970s tried to gain access to East Europe. The responses of the East Europeans were varied.

The first contacts were of an 'unofficial' nature mostly between East European trade unions and various groups from the Palestine resistance movement. Bulgarians and especially East Germans appear to have played a leading role in expanding these contacts with Palestinian representatives during 1972.⁹³ By early 1973 these 'unofficial contacts' began to turn into visits that included Arafat too. One such visit occurred in February 1973 when a PLO delegation visited both Bulgaria and East Germany.⁹⁴ In Bulgaria the visit received some official character when Arafat was met by the Secretary General of the Bulgarian Communist Party.⁹⁵

The first official Arafat visit to East Germany, on the other hand, came in July 1973.⁹⁶ The way for this visit was prepared by an East German delegation that came to have talks with Arafat.⁹⁷ The consequence of this first visit to East Germany is significant in a number of ways. The visit and the Palestinian problem received wide media coverage putting the Palestinian cause on the public agenda. Secondly, Arafat was received by Honecker with whom he signed an agreement which allowed the PLO to open its first office in East Europe.⁹⁸ This recognition granted to the PLO is particularly significant considering that the PLO had not yet been recognised by the Arab League as the 'sole representative of the Palestinian people'.

In marked contrast to its accessibility to Bulgaria and East Germany the PLO could not develop any meaningful contacts with the other East Europeans until after the 1973 war. The first breakthrough for the PLO came with Romania, when Romania agreed to allow the opening of an PLO

office.⁹⁹ This development had particular significance as Rumania less than two years before had received Golda Meir of Israel and during the visit there had been no reference to the rights of the Palestinians.¹⁰⁰ The significance of this development was further highlighted when before Arafat's visit to the UN, the Romanian Foreign Minister's visit to Israel was concluded without the announcement of a joint communique as a result of deep differences between the two countries over the Palestinian problem.¹⁰¹

In the case of other East Europeans the first official contacts occurred in June 1974 when all East European ambassadors in Damascus had talks with Arafat.¹⁰² These talks may have provided the basis for the preliminary arrangements that culminated in a major PLO tour of Eastern Europe in August-September 1974, as a part of a major PLO world wide campaign to mobilise support for the Palestinian position at the coming 29th General Assembly session.¹⁰³ The East Europeans did lend their full support for all the resolutions supporting the Palestinian cause including their right to national independence and sovereignty. However, how far one can attribute this to the PLO's campaign is much more difficult to establish. Nevertheless, these developments did pave the way to the eventual establishment of official relations with the PLO. The PLO was allowed to open an office in Hungary in September 1974 followed by the ones in Czechoslovakia and Poland in May 1975 and March 1976, respectively.

The increase in status and frequency of PLO contacts with Eastern Europe strongly coincides with a growth in East European support for the Palestinian cause. However, how much of this can be directly attributed to the PLO's accessibility to the East Europeans governments is very difficult to say. The early unofficial contacts between Palestinian representatives and Bulgarian/East German trade unions must have played a certain role in the formation of a public opinion about the Palestinian problem followed by

the eventual introduction of the problem to the attention of the government. However, to these informal Palestinian contacts one must also add the role of Arab governments with strong ties, such as Syria and Iraq in raising the problem with East European countries. It may not be a coincidence that early breakthrough's in East European governmental support for the Palestinian cause have tended to be announced during official talks between these countries.¹⁰⁴

Yet, probably the most difficult factor to assess is the role of the Soviet Union in this process. The peculiar relationship between the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, that is widely claimed to allow the Soviets a great say in these countries foreign policies, has led to assertions that East European attitudes towards the Palestinian Question are more or less a direct result of Soviet directives.¹⁰⁵ Such assertions are the product of implicit ideological and/or theoretical dispositions which are methodologically difficult to establish or for that matter refute.

It is not within the scope of this thesis to test the validity of such assertions. Suffice it to say no doubt the Soviet Union, just as the United States, has a capability to mobilise greater resources in aggregating support for its positions. This may have played a certain role in determining East European attitudes and decisions on these issues. However, it would be wrong to assume that this flow of influence is one way at all times and that the Soviet decision making process is a closed system completely insensitive to inputs from its environment. It becomes rather difficult to substantiate such an assumption considering that, as it emerges from the discussions above, most East European governments have been systematically a head of the Soviet Union, particularly in their recognising the PLO as 'the sole representative of the Palestinian people'. The world of politics is much more complex and

warrants a model less simplistic than one that is based on conception of hard shelled monolithic states deriving their influence solely relying on 'power'.

7.4.2 Violence as an access route

Both local and international violence played a role in bringing the Palestinian problem to the attention of Europeans. Early Palestinian resistance acts had received criticism from the Soviet Union. However, from the late 1960s onwards the Soviet Union joined ranks with some East Europeans in lending public support for the resistance activities of Palestinian guerrillas. As Golan notes,

"A decided stamp of approval was given when the Soviets began to use the word 'partisans' in connection with these operations, explaining that the Palestinian actions were legitimate acts of self-defence similar to the resistance movements in Nazi-occupied territories during World War Two."¹⁰⁶

The East Germans and Bulgarians too referred to Palestinian guerrilla operations as 'partisan acts'¹⁰⁷ and the East German Foreign Minister in November 1972 affirmed "the legality of the struggle of the Palestinian resistance movement, which is aimed at the reestablishment of the rights of which the Arab people of Palestine have been deprived".¹⁰⁸ The Hungarians appear to have been less keen to share the views of their neighbours. At least on one occasion strong criticism was expressed.¹⁰⁹ The Czechs on the other hand seem to have steered a middle course as reflected in a Czech daily,

"Although it is sometimes impossible to agree with all methods used by some parts of the Palestinian resistance movement, nobody can deny the Palestinians the right to struggle for their really vital demands."¹¹⁰

Overall, local violence in the form of Palestinian guerrilla operations and Israeli reprisals appears to have brought the Palestinian issue to the public agenda and in the case of most East European countries, through the cognitive linkages based on the legitimacy to resist

against occupation the Palestinian struggle, gained political support.

In the case of Western Europeans, in particular the EC countries and the US, it was the hijacking of international airliners in the late 1960s and early 1970s that brought the Palestinian problem to the attention of the public and governments. The nature of the events that involved Western airliners ensured wide media coverage. Although these acts were met in general with public condemnation it did also bring the motives behind these actions to the public. The fact that these hijacking involved air-planes and passengers from the West created an atmosphere of crisis for the involved governments. The grievances expressed by the hijackers became items on the very top of the formal agendas, at least for the duration of the crisis. The problem of hijackings actually precipitated a Security Council meeting in September 1970 called by the US and Britain.¹¹¹

The problem of hijackings had already been taken up by the General Assembly in 1969 at the urging of the IFALPA.¹¹² Consequently, in the early 1970s a series of meetings occurred in attempts to control and prevent such occurrences.¹¹³ As Mortimer notes,

"Just as de Gaulle with his infuriating and absurd obstinacy managed to keep France on the political map of the world during the Nazi occupation, so the PLO resistance groups with all their terrorism and posturing have kept Palestine on the map - indeed have put it back there after a period when its existence even as a geographical expression had virtually lapsed outside the Arab world."¹¹⁴

Local violence did not effect Western Europe in a major way until the 1978 and 1982 Israeli invasions of Lebanon. Both invasions were seen as unjustifiable and disproportionate retaliations to isolated acts of terrorism leading to unnecessary and unacceptable levels of human sufferings. The 1982 invasion of Lebanon brought the Palestinian

problem, particularly during the seige of Beirut and the massacres in refugee camps, to the attention of the public in a very effective way to the extent of even awakening the unquestioning Jewish US public.¹¹⁵ In Western Europe the invasion was taken up formally by governments as well as the EC and the European Parliament. The European Council in June 1982 adopted a lengthy declaration that condemned the Israeli invasion and stressed the linkage between 'Israel's long term security' and the need to satisfy 'the legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people', which must be able 'to exercise its right to self-determination'.¹¹⁶ Although the statement wording was milder than the Venice Declaration a number of countries such as France, Greece and Ireland had wanted to see a stronger statement with reference to a "state formula of their choice".¹¹⁷

France in an attempt to break the deadlock and the lack of meaningful European initiative went even further and presented a Franco-Egyptian draft resolution in the Security Council on 28 July 1982.¹¹⁸ The draft expanded on Resolution 242 and called for "mutual and simultaneous recognition of the parties concerned" and accepted the existence of the PLO without granting it official status. This draft resolution although it was not adopted did receive the support of the Ten¹¹⁹ and reflects the role of local violence in bringing the Palestinian question to the agenda of the Security Council in a way which was very different from previous occasions.

The invasion also precipitated a major reaction from the US government in the form of an acknowledgment of the centrality of the Palestinians problem and its linkage to a secure Israel. Reagan noted this when he accepted that

"The war in Lebanon has demonstrated another reality in this region. The departure of the Palestinians from Beirut makes even more dramatic than ever the lack of a homeland for the Palestinian people. The Palestinians are convinced that their problem is more than a refugee problem".¹²⁰

7.5 Growth of Support

In this concluding part of this chapter the change in attitudes towards the Palestinian problem and the growth in support amongst East and Western European countries will be examined. This change should be seen as the outcome of a dynamic mobilisation process whose constituent parts have been introduced in the preceding sections. A similar method to the chapter looking at the mobilisation process amongst Third World groupings has been employed to substantiate the change in European perceptions of the Palestinian problem. Firstly, the content of political statements made by major governments and the EC have been examined to establish whether a change in attitudes and declared support has occurred. Secondly, an index of political support constructed from these countries voting behaviour at the UN has been used to supplement the above analysis. However, in this chapter the index of support for the Palestinian cause will not be used in an extensive way. Its use will be limited to a few countries mostly outside the EC. This is because this index eventhough is very informative and useful in summarising the behaviour of the relatively larger Western Group it nevertheless needs to be taken with some caution, particularly in the case of Eastern Europe.

The index suggests very strong and cohesive East European support for the Palestinian cause throughout the period under study. This lack of change in East European voting behaviour as reported by the index is misleading in two ways. Firstly, during the first half of the mobilisation process East European attitudes developed differently whereby one group of East European countries reached peak support well before others. Secondly, East European support did not reach the levels suggested by the index until well into the 1970s. On the other hand, in the case of the Western Group, although the index captures the disunity as well as the sub-groups in a reasonably accurate way but in certain cases it underrepresents the actual level of

political support for the Palestinian cause. This is because in the case of some European countries their progressively increasing support for the Palestinian cause has not been reflected in their voting and hence in the index.

7.5.1 Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union

In the immediate aftermath of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war the East Europeans, except Romania, broke their diplomatic relations with Israel in an expression of political solidarity with the Arab world. However, a survey of East European and Soviet commentaries on the war indicate no reference to the rights of the Palestinians.¹²¹

"For almost twenty-five years, East European countries made no use of the terms "Palestine" or "Palestinian. Whenever the subject of the Middle East conflict was treated, it was invariably "refugees" and not "Palestinians" for whom concern or pity were expressed".¹²²

The Soviets too did not refer to the rights of the Palestinians other than their rights as refugees. This was quite evident in a Soviet sponsored peace proposal in early 1969 which referred to the right of the Arab refugees to return to their homes.¹²³ However, towards the end of the same year the situation began to change. In November 1969 in a Warsaw Pact Declaration the East Europeans recognised the political nature of the Palestinian problem and declared it as a national liberation struggle.¹²⁴

This breakthrough in East European perceptions of the Palestinian Question should be seen in the light of two developments. Firstly, at the local level Palestinian guerrilla groups had intensified their use of violence and become more assertive. Secondly, the Palestinian resistance movement appeared to be gaining support amongst the Palestinians particularly after the Karamah battle in March 1968. The linkage between this violence and the change in Soviet perception was noted by Kosygin in December 1969,

"The Soviet people consider the struggle of the Palestinian organizations for the liquidation of the consequences of aggression, in the situation where the Israeli aggression continues, as a just national liberation and anti-imperialist struggle and supports it".¹²⁵

Furthermore, at the international level the political rights of the Palestinians were making their first appearances in the debates and decisions of the UN General Assembly. East European delegations participated in the relevant debates and lent their full support to the resolutions ensuring their adoptions with narrow margins. From 1969 onwards, although East European voting behaviour was highly cohesive and they remained the only group in full agreement with the Arabs, their behaviour outside the UN suggested a different picture.

An analysis of East European statements made in relation to the political rights of the Palestinians, particularly their right to establish a state and their behaviour towards the PLO suggest that East European attitudes developed along more or less two separate lines until they converged towards a unified position by the mid-to the late 1970s. The first approach emerged amongst East Germans and Bulgarians, subsequently to be joined by Romania and Czechoslovakia. Bulgaria and East Germany became the first countries to refer to the Palestinians as a 'people' and develop contacts with the Palestinians and the PLO.¹²⁶ This occurred from early 1972 when other East European countries such as Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland continued to ignore the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict¹²⁷, and the Soviet Union limited itself to expressing support for the restoration of the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.¹²⁸ Bulgarian and East German contacts with the Palestinians quickly intensified. According to one commentary in the Middle East in early 1973 the East Germans went as far as expressing support for the establishment of a democratic 'Palestinian state' during Arafat's second visit to Berlin.¹²⁹

As promised during Arafat's visit to lobby the East Europeans, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria in their speeches at the 29th session of the General Assembly unambiguously referred to the Palestinians right to an independent state.¹³⁰ The position of East Germany was rather confusing. In spite of the alleged support expressed for a Palestinian state the East Germans were more restrained at the UN. There they referred to "the lawful right of the Palestinian Arabs to their own statehood".¹³¹ This wording was rather similar to the Soviet one¹³² which fell short of an unambiguous support for a state. However, this situation changed when two days after the adoption of Resolution 3236 (XIX) the East German leader Honecker spoke of "the right of the Arab people of Palestine to found an independent state".¹³³

The situation with the remaining East European countries Poland and Hungary was somewhat different. Even though these countries had voted in favour of Resolution 3236 (XIX) they remained reluctant to express public support for a 'Palestinian state' and recognised the PLO as 'the sole representative of the Palestinians'. Poland during the debates only referred to "the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine to self-determination and existence as a nation".¹³⁴ Hungary expressed support for the "creation of an independent Palestinian national power".¹³⁵ During the visit of Arafat to Hungary in October 1974 the Hungarians were reluctant to go any further than speak of "the creation of an independent Palestinian national rule",¹³⁶ and not surprisingly did not put into effect their alleged promise to allow the PLO to establish a mission in Budapest.¹³⁷

Developments at the UN, in other East European countries and frequent PLO visits appear not to have impressed the Hungarians as during Arafat's visit in late November 1975 they did not go any further than support "the restoration of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian

people".¹³⁸ If it was not for the eventual opening of the PLO office in October 1975 it would even have been possible to suggest, from the wording of the November statement that the Hungarians had to some degree retracted from their earlier position. Poland too followed a similar pattern, allowing the PLO to open an office only as late as March 1976 hence becoming the last East European country to do so.¹³⁹

The Soviet Union in spite of its strong support for the Palestinian cause at the UN has rather hesistantly¹⁴⁰ come to recognise the right of the Palestinians to establish a state and also recognise the PLO as their sole representative. The Soviets in 1971 have been noted to have responded sceptically to the idea of a separate Palestinian state, particularly if it is to be created at the expense of Israel.¹⁴¹ The Soviet Union's position towards Israel's right to exist has been probably one of the most consistent features of its policies towards the Palestinian problem and has conditioned its attitudes towards the Palestinians' right to self-determination. This is evident from the way in which Soviet support for Palestinian self-determination began to emerge along with Soviet efforts to influence the PLO to accept the idea of a mini-state,¹⁴² in the immediate aftermath of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Hence, it is not surprising that the first public references to a Palestinian state by high Soviet officials began to occur after the 12th PNC's decision to endorse the idea of a mini-state.¹⁴³

However, to the PNC decision one must also add the role of Arafat's visit to Moscow in July-August 1974 and his discussions with Ponomarev in mobilising Soviet support.¹⁴⁴ It was in this climate that in 8 September 1974 that the Soviet president Podgorny referred to the need to take into account the right of the Palestinians "to establish their own statehood in one form or another" in the context of finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.¹⁴⁵

However, it was only after the Arab League decisions at Rabat and the adoption of Resolution 3236 (XIX) that the ambiguity in Podgorny's reference to "a statehood in one form or another" was removed by Brezhnev, who on 26 November unambiguously referred to the rights of the Palestinians to a state.¹⁴⁶

As Golan notes,

"...from the close of 1974 onward the official Soviet position consistently called not only for ensurance of the Palestinians' legitimate -sometimes inalienable - national rights, but specified these as the right to self-determination and the establishment of their own state."¹⁴⁷

However, even though the Soviets did refer to the right of the Palestinians to their own state, as Yodfat points out (in reference to the wording of Brezhnev speech to the 25th CPSU Congress in February dealing with the Palestinian problem) the Soviets consciously appear to have refrained from actually calling for the establishment of such a state.¹⁴⁸ Eventual Soviet support for a Palestinian state came only at the end of a series of Arafat's visits to Moscow between April 1977 and November 1979 and in a conducive environment brought about by the announcement of the Camp David agreements in March 1979.¹⁴⁹ The communique concluding Arafat's visit on November 1979 resolved both the issue of support for a Palestinian state and the related matter of the recognition of the PLO as the 'sole representative of the Palestinians'.¹⁵⁰ The Soviet support became even clearer when Gromyko at the end of the US-Soviet summit in Vienna in June 15-18 1979 called for a Palestinian state.¹⁵¹

7.5.2 Western Europe

7.5.2.1 The European Community

During the period under study the size of the EC increased from six to nine then to ten. It would be difficult to take the evolution of each country's attitude towards the

question of Palestine separately. Instead the EC countries will be examined as a group and their declarations will be used as a basis for determining their position on the issue. However, where there have been major departures from the common EC position this will be mentioned. The index of political support, although it has to be taken with some caution when used for measuring EC support for the Palestinian cause, has been particularly useful in determining those countries undermining EC cohesion.

In the aftermath of the 1967 war the EC like other West and East European countries saw the Palestinian problem exclusively as a humanitarian problem concerning 'Arab refugees'. This was strongly reflected in the Schumann report of 13 May 1971. This report defined EC policy towards the Middle East conflict referring to the 'Arab refugees' and their right either to return to their home or to be indemnified.¹⁵² The report did not suggest a perceptible change in the common position of the EC. However, the situation by the time of the next EC declaration changed substantively. This change was precipitated by developments in the Middle East, such as the October 1973 war, the growth of Palestinian nationalism, the oil embargo as well as greater Arab accessibility and the enlargement of EC which brought in two relatively pro-Arab countries Britain and Ireland.¹⁵³ The EC in November 1973 adopted a French-British sponsored text¹⁵⁴ that recognised 'the legitimate rights of the Palestinians' by expressing the need to take these rights into consideration in a global settlement. This change is also reflected in the voting behaviour of the EC members. They moved from a position of support for Israel at the 24th General Assembly session to a balanced position at the 28th session.¹⁵⁵

The period between November 1973 and the next EC Declaration in December 1977 was one of substantive change, particularly in respect to what form the 'legitimate rights of the Palestinians' was to take. The French, who in their

voting during the 29th session had taken a relatively pro-Palestinian position, defined these rights in a way that led it to note the need to take into account 'the legitimacy of a Palestinian homeland',¹⁵⁶ while Britain limited itself to stressing the need "for any settlement to provide for a personality for the Palestinian people".¹⁵⁷ Italy and Netherlands for their part noted the need for the Palestinian people to express their 'national identity',¹⁵⁸ and Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister spoke of allowing "for the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people including the right to establish a State authority..."¹⁵⁹

The vagueness inherent in these references to a 'homeland', 'national identity' and 'a state authority' was to a certain degree resolved when the London Declaration of the EC in December 1977 stated that the realisation of "legitimate rights of the Palestinians should take the form of a homeland for the Palestinian people". The reference to a homeland at least for some Jewish circles was synonymous to a 'state'. This is not surprising considering that the history of the establishment of Israel was marked by the Zionist movement's struggle to mobilise support for a 'Jewish homeland' that eventually came to mean a state. However, at the time of the London declaration for the EC members the linkage did not necessarily exist. This is reflected in the observation of Dr. Owen, the British Foreign Secretary, that "The statement was not referring to a Palestinian state. It was referring to the need for a Palestinian homeland."¹⁶⁰ This is further strengthened when Crossland spoke of "a land for the Palestinians, not necessarily a sovereign state but a place where they will be free to look after their own affairs".¹⁶¹

The period after the London Declaration became one during which EC countries edged their way closer to the Palestinian cause and the PLO. The PLO gained increasing access through the Euro-Arab dialogue as well as directly

to European countries. Although no EC country went as far as recognising the PLO, there was a growing realisation of the need to include the PLO in efforts to find a comprehensive settlement for the Middle East conflict. This became particularly conspicuous in the immediate aftermath of the announcement of Camp David agreements. The Europeans found these agreements as a positive, but inadequate, development particularly in respect to the conspicuous exclusion of the Palestinians.

The speech of O'Kennedy, the Irish Foreign Minister and spokesman for the EC, at the 34th session of the UN General Assembly came as a turning point.¹⁶² In this speech the EC for the first time officially brought up the role that the PLO could play in attempts to achieve peace in the Middle East.¹⁶³ The need to include representatives of the Palestinian people in negotiations had been mentioned before in the London Declaration as well as in the Declaration put out by the EC on 26 March 1979 right after the Camp David agreements. However, the speech was the first time that the name of the PLO had been raised. At the same time the EC had also been facing increasing pressure from the Arabs to get involved in efforts to achieve a comprehensive peace.

Simultaneously, for their part the EC was interested in a move that would encourage more moderate Arab governments to join in.¹⁶⁴ This pressure towards a more active role, the weaknesses of the Camp David agreements and the growing realisation of the need to involve the PLO in future negotiations culminated in the Venice Declaration of 13 June 1980. The declaration noted a readiness to work in a more concrete way toward peace and the need to associate the PLO with negotiations. Furthermore it stressed that

"A just solution must finally be found to the Palestinian problem, which is not simply one of refugees. The Palestinian people, which is conscious of existing as such, must be placed in a position, by an appropriate process defined within the framework of the comprehensive peace settlement, to exercise fully

its right to self-determination."¹⁶⁵

In less than a decade the EC changed its group perception of the Palestinians from 'Arab refugees' to that of the Palestinian people entitled to self-determination. However, the Venice Declaration remained ambiguous on whether self-determination meant the establishment of a state, although Greece, France and Ireland had wanted to see a clear reference to 'a state formula of their own choice'.¹⁶⁶ Cheysson in the aftermath of his meeting with Arafat reiterated France's support for Palestinian self-determination and made remarks alluding to the establishment of an eventual Palestinian state.¹⁶⁷ On 14 December 1981 Cheysson's position became clearer when he declared that one of the main principle of his government's approach to the Middle East was based on the Palestinian right to a state.¹⁶⁸

Since 1980¹⁶⁹ the EC has not made a declaration in support of a state. However, the European Parliament in the aftermath of Israel's invasion of Lebanon and the seige of Beirut went beyond the position of the EC Council of Ministers and expressed support for the eventual creation of a Palestinian state.¹⁷⁰

Even though the EC has not come in support of a Palestinian state in an unambiguous manner, the extent of the change in the EC's perception of the Palestinian problem and its support for the political rights of the Palestinian people is often underestimated. These two significant changes have been blurred by two European demands. Firstly, the EC has supported the political rights of the Palestinians without prejudice to Israel's existence in its pre-1967 borders, a position not very unlike the East Europeans. It is in this respect that the index of support for the Palestinian cause does not do justice to the EC support. The relatively low reading for the EC on the index is because the wording of the resolutions on which the roll-calls are based have

often not included an adequately clear and explicit reference to Israel's right to existence. Secondly, the EC countries have consistently demanded from the PLO that it should recognise Israel, express support for a political solution and denounce violence. It has tried to use the issue of recognition as a separate leverage on the PLO again giving to the unexperienced eye the impression that the EC is far from supporting the rights of the Palestinian people.

7.5.2.2 Other Europeans

In respect to this research West European countries outside the EC can be grouped into two. The Mediterranean countries together with Austria form a reasonably cohesive group characterised by conspicuous support for the Palestinian cause and the PLO. On the other hand the Scandinavian countries can be sub-divided into two. The first sub-group has Sweden and Finland that follow a policy closer to the Southern European countries particularly at the UN. The second sub-group with Norway and Iceland are somewhere between the EC stance and the US position.

Table 7.2 depicts the way in which the Mediterranean countries have gradually coalesced around a position highly supportive of the Palestinian cause which after the 29th session of the General Assembly included the right of the Palestinians to self-determination. Spain, Greece and Turkey have followed the development of the Palestinian issue at the UN from a highly supportive stance.¹⁷¹ Portugal after the 1974 change in regime joined ranks at the 29th session.

The matter of the recognition of the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people is another common denominator for the South European countries. These countries together with Finland voted in favour of resolutions inviting Arafat to the UN and granting the PLO

observer status. However, these countries did not develop official relations with the PLO until the late 1970s. It was the Spanish government that became the first European country to receive Arafat officially shortly followed by Turkey.¹⁷² In Greece Papandreu in his first day in office invited Arafat on an official visit in October 1981. The PLO maintains diplomatic missions, of varying and at times unclear status, in all these countries except Portugal.¹⁷³

	24th Session 1969	29th Session 1974	35th Session 1980
Highly pro- Pals.	Spain, Greece, Turkey	Spain, Portugal, Finland, Turkey	Spain, Malta, Portugal, Greece, Turkey
Medium pro- Pals.		Austria, Sweden, New Zealand <i>Greece</i>	Austria, Sweden, Finland
Inter mediate		Australia	Canada New Zealand <i>Iceland, Norway</i>
Medium pro- Israel	Austria, Norway Finland, Sweden Iceland, Portugal, Austria <i>New Zealand</i>	Norway, Iceland, Canada	Australia
Highly pro- Israel	US, Canada	US	US
Low attenders	Malta	Malta	

**Table 7.2: Distribution of support across sessions
for countries outside the EC**

The Scandinavian countries in their voting behaviour on the Palestinian question at the 24th session of the General Assembly were generally supportive of the Israeli position. It was during the period preceding the 29th session that Scandinavian attitudes began to change. As Table 7.2 suggests Finland and Sweden at the 29th session became

supportive of the Palestinian cause while Norway and Iceland continued to maintain their earlier positions. Sweden's behaviour at the UN Security Council is particularly remarkable too. In December 1975, during the vote on whether to allow the PLO to participate in the work of the Security Council Sweden cast the only Western vote that settled the matter in favour of the PLO.¹⁷⁴ Sweden and Finland unlike the other Scandinavians have not hesitated to project their anti-colonial values to the Palestinian problem. However, in the case of Norway and Iceland military alliance commitments may well have restricted their foreign policy options on the Middle East.¹⁷⁵

The Nordic Council statement of 27-28 March 1980 on the Middle East has a strong resemblance to the Venice Declaration. The content of this statement suggests the possibility of a compromise brokered by Denmark to bridge the gap between Sweden and Finland on the one hand and Norway and Iceland on the other.¹⁷⁶ This possibility is strengthened because Denmark appears to be holding the middle ground between the two groups, particularly since it declared that the Venice Declaration did not imply a recognition of a Palestinian state.¹⁷⁷ Such a position is roughly mid-way between Norway's US-like position expressing support for the "legitimate interests and rights of the Palestinians"¹⁷⁸ and Sweden and Finland who in their 1980 voting have demonstrated a position more supportive of the Palestinian cause, not unlike France's position.

7.5.2.3 Others

The remaining countries within the Western group are Australia, New Zealand, Canada and most importantly the US. Unlike the other three the US has been involved in the Palestinian problem from its early days. During the Second World War the US became a committed supporter of the Zionist cause. Once established the US developed close ties with

Israel. Although, the US had strongly lobbied in favour of the partition of Palestine into two separate states, in the aftermath of the establishment of Israel the Arabs of Palestine became perceived as refugees. The US maintained this image of the Palestinians as refugees well into the 1970s becoming the last and most reluctant Western country to recognise the minimum of the political rights of the Palestinians.

The first suggestion that the Palestinian problem for the US may be something more than one of refugees came in 24 June 1973. The communique issued at the end of Brezhnev's visit to the US noted that a Middle East settlement "should take into due account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people".¹⁷⁹ Eventhough the reference was to the milder 'interests' rather than 'rights', the problem had nevertheless been put on the agenda and the Palestinian Arabs had been referred to as 'the Palestinian people' rather than 'Arab refugees'. However, the US did not hesitate to veto a Security Council draft resolution noting the need to take the legitimate aspirations/rights of the Palestinians into account in the resolution of the Middle East conflict. The US, after the 1973 war continued to remain unimpressed by the growing recognition of the political rights of the Palestinian people and the PLO. The position of the US as elaborated by Kissinger was that the problem was one to be settled between Israel and Jordan, and that recent developments favouring the Palestinians were impediments to the achievement of peace between Arab states and Israel.

A major breakthrough in US perceptions came on 12 November 1975 when Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East and South Asian Affairs, noted

"the legitimate interest of the Palestinian Arabs must be taken into account in the negotiations of an Arab-Israeli peace. In many ways, the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict is the heart of that conflict".¹⁸⁰

The Carter administration began office at a time when the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict had also been recognised by a report prepared by the Brookings Institute in December 1975.¹⁸¹ The report was prepared by a panel which included persons that later became members of the Carter administration. The report stressed the importance of taking into account the Palestinian right to self-determination in a viable peace settlement in the Middle East. The report had two possible scenarios. The first one suggested a Palestinian state and the second a Palestinian entity associated with Jordan. It was the second one that appear to have won the interest of the Carter administration.

This was reflected in the emergence of what has become known as the Carter plan.¹⁸² The plan was summarised by Rouleau as,

"A homeland would have to be set apart for the Palestinian people. It would be either on an independent entity (a solution Carter is said to have misgivings about, because of the opening it would provide for Soviet infiltration) or an integral part of Jordan, or again a component state of a federation along with Jordan and Syria".¹⁸³

However, in the face of mounting Jewish pressure¹⁸⁴ Carter had to make it quite clear that his reference to a Palestinian entity or homeland did not add up to an acceptance of the Palestinian right to self-determination. In an interview given on the eve of Israel's 30th anniversary he plainly said "my belief is that a permanent settlement will not include an independent nation on the West Bank" and declared "I have never favoured an independent Palestinian state".¹⁸⁵

This retraction on the part of the Carter administration did not come as a surprise at least to F.Kaddoumi, Head of the Political Department of the PLO. In an interview Kaddoumi maintained that the 'Carter Plan' in his view had already reflected a certain degree of retraction from the Saunders statement. This statement's reference to the

legitimate aspirations of the Palestinian people was found by Kaddoumi to be much stronger than the Carter reference to 'a homeland for the Palestinians'. Kaddoumi noted he would have liked to see Carter refer to the "national homeland for the Palestinian people".¹⁸⁶

During the Camp David peace process repeated references to the 'concerns of the Palestinians' did not go as far as recognising the political rights of the Palestinians in an unambiguous manner. In September 1978 there was a framework agreement arrived at between President Carter, President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to recognise the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and their just requirements and the determination to achieve full autonomy for the inhabitants. The negotiations as prescribed by the framework did not get anywhere as the parties remained deeply divided on what 'full autonomy' entailed and on who was to represent the Palestinians.¹⁸⁷

In spite of a growing realisation, particularly amongst State Department officials and some politicians, of the need to include the PLO in efforts to achieve a settlement in the Middle East,¹⁸⁸ domestic political considerations have prevented the US administration from introducing major changes to its foreign policy on the Palestinian problem. The constraining role of this domestic linkage on the US administration's options is well demonstrated by Carter's unrestrained reference on his return from Sadat's funeral to the need to include the PLO in efforts to resolve the Palestinian problem.¹⁸⁹ This was in marked contrast to the requirements of an election campaign that had led President Carter, only a few months earlier on 25 February 1980, to stress his opposition against an independent Palestinian state and the recognition of the PLO.¹⁹⁰

The late 1970s, nevertheless was a period when the Palestinian problem was high on the US administration's foreign policy agenda. This was a period which saw a marked

increase in 'unofficial' contacts with the PLO in an attempt to persuade the PLO to accept Resolution 242 to enable it to play its role to settle the Palestinian problem. Furthermore this was also a period when

Disagreements between the US and Israel now appeared on a wide range of issues. The US, criticising Israeli raids on Palestinian bases in Southern Lebanon, said that Israel 'may have' broken the US law by using American supplied weapons for other than defensive purposes. Dissatisfaction was expressed about Israeli settlements in the West Bank and the slow progress of autonomy talks. President Carter compared Palestinian organizations with the US civil rights movement."¹⁹¹

This probably was the period when the PLO achieved its highest standing in the US. This was evident in the US administration desire to see the PLO involved in a negotiation process and in the implementation of the 'autonomy plan' that would emerge from it. However, in the end as Yodfat notes as a result of a combination of factors ranging from PLO's inflexibility to Israel's threat to withdraw from the autonomy negotiations the US administration fell back to its traditionally pro-Israeli stand.¹⁹²

It is interesting to note that it was another dramatic event of the scale of the Israeli besiege of Beirut and the Sabra-Chatila massacres coupled with the new Reagan administration's commitment to anti-communism, which accentuated the need to improve relations with the Arab world, that produced the most far reaching US peace plan so far. The Reagan plan, as it was called, recognised the lack of a homeland for the Palestinian people hence the need to attain autonomy for the Palestinians in association with Jordan. He made it quite clear that this did not entail a state but simultaneously he announced the categorical rejection of annexation. "In comparison with the traditional position of the US, Reagan's speech constituted a turning point in the American Palestinian problem".¹⁹³ In spite of this development the US, during the period under study, has remained strongly pro-Israeli and has

consistently stopped short of recognising 'the Palestinian people's right to self-determination'.

Of the remaining three countries, in this group, Australia and Canada have held attitudes towards the Palestinian problem not unlike the US, while New Zealand has gone in a very different direction. Although, Canada, in its voting behaviour between 1969 and 1980 moved from a strongly pro-Israeli position to an intermediate one, this transformation did not reach a point of a clear and an unambiguous recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination. Instead the Canadian delegation's speech at the Seventh Emergency Special Session of the Assembly did not go any further than expressing the view that any settlement of the Palestinian problem would have to take "into account the existence of a Palestinian national consciousness, and unless there is a recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, peace will not prevail".¹⁹⁴ Furthermore, this speech did not seem to envisage any role for the Palestinians in a negotiation process to reach such a settlement.

The Australians too appear to have taken a similar position. Except during the 29th session of the Assembly when the Australian delegation referred to his governments support for the applicability of "the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination and independence" to the Palestinian Arab people they have in their voting behaviour maintained a pro-Israeli position.¹⁹⁵ This is particularly evident in the way in which the Australian delegation to the 30th session of the General Assembly retracted from its position in 1974 and was not prepared to endorse anything stronger than "the need to recognise and respect the legitimate rights of the Palestinians" in achieving an eventual settlement.

It is New Zealand that experienced a significant change in its attitude towards the Palestinian problem. While New

Zealand, together with the US, Canada and Australia, had voted strongly pro-Israeli at the 24th session of the General Assembly in 1969 by the 29th session this stance had changed quite dramatically. This was reflected in their preparedness to support the resolutions inviting Arafat to address the Assembly and granting the PLO permanent observership. This change in attitude had consolidated itself to such an extent that by 1980 the New Zealand delegation was prepared to argue that

"Palestine is not simply a refugee problem. It is also a political problem for which a political problem must be found. The search for a solution must involve the participation of the Palestinian people, including the PLO, along with the other parties directly concerned. The rights of the Palestinian people include the right of self-determination. That is not something as limited as local autonomy. It means that the Palestinians must have the right to set up an independent Arab State of Palestine, as was envisaged in the 1947 partition resolution, if that is their wish".¹⁹⁶

7.6 Conclusion

As it has been suggested in the preceding sections both the Western and East Europeans governments continued, to perceive the Palestinian problem as a refugee problem subsumed within the Arab-Israeli conflict well into the late 1960s. Furthermore, the perceptual changes towards the Palestinian problem that then followed did not develop in an uniform manner in both regions.

In Eastern Europe Bulgarians and East Germans were the first that began to respond to Arab and Palestinian efforts to mobilise support. In spite of their very cohesive and pro-Palestinian voting at the UN, it was not until mid-1970s that a general East European consensus supportive of a 'Palestinian state' and of the PLO as the 'sole representative of the Palestinian people' emerged. For the East Europeans cognitive linkages based on particularly anti-colonial and anti-imperialist thinking played an important role in the process that altered their

perceptions of the Palestinians from being refugees to being a people fighting a national liberation struggle. Palestinian violence at the local level played a certain role in bringing about this breakthrough.

The countries within the Western group too saw the Palestinians as refugees in the aftermath of the 1967 and the changes in attitudes within the group was even more diverse and also in some cases slower and more limited than the East Europeans. Firstly, within this group there were Southern European countries, to some extent joined by countries such as Finland, Sweden and Austria, that lent full support to the Palestinian cause on the one hand, and countries such as the US, Canada and Australia which remained very reluctant to recognise anything stronger than 'the legitimate rights and interest of the Palestinians' on the other. In the case of the first group cognitive linkages based on anti-colonialism and geographical proximity contributed to their preparedness to go as far as supporting a 'Palestinian state' and recognising the PLO. While in the case of the US domestic political considerations coupled with strategic ones made the change in governmental attitudes much more limited.

Secondly, the position of the EC which included some traditionally pro-Israeli countries experienced a very slow change in opinion. This change is reflected in the difference between the contents of the Schumann Report of May 1971 which did not recognise the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the June 1980 Venice Declaration recognising the Palestinian right to self-determination and the need to include the PLO in any settlement effort. This change was also marked by a relative increase in the cohesion of the group. The group which once included pro-Israeli and relatively pro-Arab countries together with uncommitted members, as a result of EPC and the Euro-Arab dialogue developed a more unified position increasingly favourable to the Palestinian cause.

However, this relatively more cohesive and pro-Palestinian position did not reflect itself in the EC countries voting behaviour at the UN. This is because some members would not support resolutions recognising the political rights of the Palestinians without a clear reference to Israel's right to existence within recognised borders, while others were content just like the East Europeans, with an implicit recognition of Israel's rights.

ENDNOTES

- 1 For a study of the origins and development of the EPC see Wallace, W. and Allen, D. "Political Cooperation: procedure as a substitute for policy", in Wallace, H. and Webbs, C. (eds.), **Policy Making in the European Communities** (Wiley, London, 1977) and Allen, D. Rummel, R. and Wessels, W. (eds.), **European Political Cooperation** (Butterworth, London, 1982).
- 2 Haagerup, N. and Thune, C. "Denmark: the European pragmatist", in Hill, C. (ed.) **National Foreign Policies and European Political Cooperation**, (George Allen and Unwin, London, 1983) p.110 and Edwards, G. "Britain" in Allen, D. and Pijpers, A. **European Foreign Policy-Making and The Arab-Israeli Conflict** (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague, 1984) p.40.
- 3 For the case of EPC influence on Ireland see Keatinge, P. "Ireland", in Allen and Pijpers (eds.), (1984: 19).
- 4 Ibid. p.165.
- 5 Allen, D. "The Euro-Arab Dialogue", **Journal of Common Market Studies**, Vol.XVI (1978), No.4, p.323 and 325. For a discussion of the institutions and meetings of the Euro-Arab dialogue see Taylor, A. "The Euro-Arab Dialogue: Quest for Interregional Partnership", **The Middle Eastern Journal** Autumn 1978, pp.429-43.
- 6 Frangi, A. **The PLO and Palestine** (Zed Books, London, 1983), p.159.
- 7 Allen, (1978: 333).
- 8 At least in the eyes of one PLO official the Euro-Arab dialogue played an important role in EC recognition of the Palestinian problem and had a significant impact on the 1977 London Declaration which recognised the right of the Palestinians to a homeland, (Frangi, 1983: 160). This is also supported by the fact that the first EC position emerging from the March 1976 General Commission meeting of the Euro-Arab dialogue "emphasised the necessity of a solution to the Palestinian question recognising the legitimate right of the Palestinian people as a prerequisite for a just and lasting peace". Artner, S. "The Middle East: A Chance for Europe?" **International Affairs**, Summer 1980, p.431.
- 9 See Chapter 1 pp. 8-10.
- 10 Golan, G. **The Soviet Union and The Palestine Liberation Organization: An Uneasy Alliance** (Praeger, New York, 1980) pp.46-47.
- 11 Ibid. p.87. At another level the Soviet Union had already brought up the idea with the Palestinians and

- had urged the PLO to adopt a constructive position. See also **Le Monde** 31 October 1973.
- 12 For the sudden switch in French policy towards the Middle East see Feuer, G. "La politique de la France", **Revue Francaise de Sciences Politique**, Vol.19 (1969), No.2, and Auri, N. and Hevener, N. "France and the Middle East 1967-1968", **The Middle East Journal**, Vol.23 (Autumn 1969), No.4.
 - 13 For a text of the Schumann Report see **Le Monde**, 15 May 1971.
 - 14 Greilsammer, I. and Weiler, J. "European Political Cooperation and the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: an Israeli perspective", in Allen and Pjipers (eds.) (1984: 184).
 - 15 **Keesings Comtemporary Archives**, p.31119, October 1981 and **The Times**, 2 July 1981.
 - 16 Artner, (1980: 435). This position is clearly reflected by D.Hurd, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "I do not think that anyone believes that bilateral peace between Egypt and Israel can last in isolation. Progress towards a wider peace is vital. That is one reason why we find the presnt situation so depressing and dangerous. The Camp David settlement was vehemently rejected by almost the whole of the Arab world out side Egypt. It is therefore difficult to see how by itself it can provide the means by which a wider peace can be achieved". Corney, H. "Britain and the Carrington Era and After" **IJA Research Report**, No.9 (September 1982), p.5
 - 17 **Le Monde**, 28 March 1979.
 - 18 **United Nations Security Council Official Records**, 37th year, S/15317. For the EC Foreign Ministers Declaration see **The Times**, 22 September 1982.
 - 19 **The Times**, 20 September 1982.
 - 20 Golan(1980: 10-11) and for a study of change in Soviet perceptions of Palestinian guerilla warfare see Freedman, R. "Soviet policy towards International Terrorism", in Alexander, Y. (ed.) **International Terrorism**, (Praeger, New York, 1976).
 - 21 Fejto, F. **A History of the People's Democracies**, (Pelican Books, Harmondsworth, 1974), p.297.
 - 22 *Ibid.*, p.298-99.
 - 23 "Enlargement of the EEC", **IJA Research Report No.1** (January 1978), p.3 and Paper, S. "The International status of the PLO", **IJA Research Report No.16** (December

1981), p.4.

- 24 Keatinge, P. "Ireland: neutrality inside EPC", in Hill (ed.), (1983: 143-4) and Keatinge in Allen and Pijpers (eds.), (1984: 19).
- 25 Keatinge in Allen and Pijpers (eds.), (1984: 19).
- 26 A relatively anti-colonial Irish behaviour amongst the West European Group at the UN in the mid 1950s is also supported by Reiselbach, R. "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behaviour in the UN General Assembly", *International Organisation* Vol.14 (1960), p.300-1.
- 27 Soetendrop, B. "The Netherlands", and Raeymaeker, O. "Denmark", in Allen and Pijpers, (eds.) (1984: 39, 64).
- 28 There is a wide body of literature looking at human rights violations in the occupied territories. These range from reports prepared by the UN to private observations. However, the three sources below are particularly interesting because the first one reflects the view of an eminent Israeli scholar, the second one is a very rigorous study prepared by the Sunday Times which includes an Israeli reply and the last one is a report prepared by a professional NGO. Shahak, I. (Chairman of the Israeli League for Human and Civil Rights), "Human Rights in Israel", *Middle East International* January 1975; The Insight Report, *The Sunday Times*, June 19, 1977; The Israeli Reply, *ibid.* July 3; The Sunday Times Reply, July 10, 1977; Special Document: "International Association of Democratic Lawyers; Mission to the Occupied Territories" *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.X (Summer 1981), No.4.
- 29 For details of speeches at the Security Council by these countries see chapter 8 endnote 82 also see O'Neill, B. *Armed Struggle in Palestine: A Political-Military Analysis* (Westview, Boulder, Colorado, 1978) p.195 for a similar observation.
- 30 In her visit to European leaders in the aftermath of the 1973 war Golda Meir accused them of deserting Israel and claimed that no one had responded to her because "Their throats are choked with oil", Meir, G. *My Life* (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London 1975) p.376. Similarly, "Israel's UN representative Blum, Y. complained about the growing number of 'sorry parade of nations supplicating the Arab oil gods'. In some cases that may be true. Yet Blum's comment reflects a dangerous misapprehension on the part of the Begin government- namely, that support for Palestinian rights is based solely on a fearful lust of Middle East oil supplies", (*Economist*, 14 April 1980, p.10).
- 31 Geilsammer and Weiter in Allen and Pijpers (eds.),

- (1984: 135).
- 32 Taylor, (1978: 430).
 - 33 Soetendrop, in Allen and Pijpers (eds.), (1984: 40).
 - 34 Raeymaeker in Ibid., p.66.
 - 35 See below endnote 153. **The Yearbook of the United Nations** 1973 p.188 and 190.
 - 36 Al-Siyasa 6 April 1972 cited in **Journal for Palestine Studies**, Vol.I (1972), No.4, p.156.
 - 37 Quoted in Artner, (1980: 439).
 - 38 For a similar view see Artner (1980: 431).
 - 39 Rosenau, J. (ed.) **Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems**, (Free Press, New York, 1969) and **The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy** (Frances Pinter, London, 1980) chapter 15.
 - 40 Reynolds, P. **An Introduction to International Politics**, (Longman, London, 1980) p.290.
 - 41 For Rosenau's definition of penetrative linkages see Rosenau, J. "Toward the Study of National-International Linkages" in Rosenau (ed.), (1969: 46).
 - 42 Yodfat, A. and Arnon-Ohanna, Y. **PLO Strategy and Tactics** (Croom Helm, London, 1981) p.129. Also see Nicol, D. "Andrew Young at the United Nations: A Major Role for the UN in US Foreign Policy" in Nicol, D. (ed.) **Paths to Peace: The UN Security Council and Its Presidency** (Pergamon Press, New York, 1981) p.324.
 - 43 Peri, Y. "The Fall From Favour: Israel and the Socialist International" **IJA Research Report**, Nos.21 and 22 (December 1980), p.2.
 - 44 For an analysis of this change and the impact it had on attitudes held by the Socialist International towards the Palestinian problem see Ibid.
 - 45 **Middle East Magazine**, October 1982.
 - 46 Golan, (1980: 52).
 - 47 Ibid. p.45.
 - 48 Golan, G. "The Soviet Union and the Palestine Liberation Organization", in Kauppi, M. and Nation, C. (eds.) **The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980s** (Lexington Books, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1983) p.191.

- 49 **The Guardian**, 14 October 1982.
- 50 Nation, C. "The Sources of Soviet Involvement in the Middle East: Threat or Opportunity?", in Kauppi, M. and Nation, C. (eds.), (1983: 42-43).
- 51 For Soviet attitudes on military aid to the Palestinians see Golan, (1980: 214-227). The Soviet Union remained wary of PLO commitment to armed struggle and destruction of Israel and encouraged the idea of a 'mini-state' to gain ground amongst Palestinians, (Ibid. pp.25-26).
- 52 Channel 4, **Palestine: End of Empire**, 20 May 1985.
- 53 Frangi, (1980: 163).
- 54 Arab Report and Record, (1974: 597).
- 55 ARR, (1974: 468).
- 56 The French delegation not only supported the invitation to the PLO but in their speech directly referred to G.D'Estaing's speech, (UN Document (Provisional) A/PV 2292, p.46, 20 November 1974).
- 57 Blumenkrantz, A. "Britain and Israel: the Carrington era and after", IJA Research Report (September 1982), No.9.
- 58 **The Guardian**, 12 October 1982.
- 59 L.Carrington had expressed interest in meeting Arafat in the belief that it would serve the cause of peace, Allen, D. and Smith, M. "Europe, the United States and the Arab-Israeli conflict", in Allen and Pijpers (eds.), (1984: 217).
- 60 In July 1982, when such a visit was first brought up, London had expressed no objections, (**The Guardian**, 24 November 1982) and PLO representatives within the Arab League delegation had met Mr.Hurd, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in the summer of 1982, (Edwards in Allen and Pijpers (eds.), 1984: 54).
- 61 Edwards, in Allen and Pijpers (eds.), (1984: 54).
- 62 It should be noted that in spite of these developments which has allowed the PLO greater access to European governments it is difficult to say that this accessibility has ever reached the quality that Israel enjoyed as a result of its contacts through the Socialist International. Blumenkrantz (1982: 2) notes that one of the reasons why Israel had good relations with British Labour governments is that "Israeli Socialist government leaders were on first name terms with many of their counterparts through the medium of

the Socialist International".

- 63 Yodfat and Arnon-Ohanna (1981:115). The Palestinians also developed close contacts through various non-governmental organisation in Europe. For some of these contacts see Cobban, H. **The Palestinian Liberation Organisation: People, Power and Politics** (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984) pp.232-234.
- 64 **Facts on File**, 28 February 1976, p.161. See Also 'Arab Reports and Analysis: "Changing American Attitudes to the Palestinians", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.IV (Summer 1975), pp.155-56.
- 65 ARR, (1976: 400, 470). The Security Council was convened to consider the report of the Committee on the exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian people. At the initiative of Non-Aligned members of the Security Council the PLO was invited to attend the proceedings. The US objected to the basis on which the PLO was being invited and went to unusual pains, compared to previous occasions (see D.Moynihan, the US representative speech during the Security Council meetings in December 1975), to point out they did not have anything against listening to the PLO, (**The Yearbook of the United Nations** 1976, pp.236-7 and **Security Council Official Records**, Thirty First year, meetings 1924, 1928). The timing of this position concided with violence in Beirut and the evacuation of US citizens from Beirut. Extensive unofficial contacts between US officials and the PLO were reported. After the evacuation was completed the US thanked the PLO for its positive role in the evacuation with a letter signed by Kissinger. The letter was forwarded by the Egyptians to F.Kaddoumi, (**Facts on File**, 21 June 1976, p.448).
- 66 Yodfat et al., (1981: 109).
- 67 ARR, (1977: 184).
- 68 ARR, (1977: 620).
- 69 ARR, (1977: 809, 757). Although in the context of bringing about such a solution the need to have Palestinian representations in negotiations towards the solution of the problem became increasingly acknowledged (see US-USSR statement October 1977) it never led to a recognition of the PLO. The boldest ever US approach was reflected in Carter's observation that the PLO "do not represent a nation. It is a group that represents a substantial part of Palestinians. I certainly do not think that they are the exclusive representattives of the Palestinians...we will begin to meet them and to search for some accomodation and some reasonable approach to the Palestinian question if they adopt 242 and recognize publicly the right of Israel to

- exist", (Yodfat et al., 1981: 110-111).
- 70 Yodfat et al., (1981: 111).
 - 71 ARR, (1978: 31, 794). For a list of meetings between US politicians and PLO officials se Yodfat et al., (1981: 118, endnote 24).
 - 72 Views from Abroad: "An opening of US-PLO talks", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.VIII (Winter 1979), No.2, pp.173-5.
 - 73 Finger, M. **Your Man at the United Nations: People, Politics and Bureaucracy in the Making of Foreign Policy**, (New York University Press, New York, 1980) p.284-5.
 - 74 Artner, (1980: 429).
 - 75 'Interview with Arafat' in **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.IX (Winter 1980), No.2. The growth in black awareness of the Palestinian problem is also supported by the remark of the Mayor of Washington D.C. Marion Barry that "the PLO was not even known in the poorest sectors of the black community and now it is an object of interest and concern in these quarters". 'Arab Reports and Analysis': Andrew Young; The Two edged Sword in ibid p.143. For studies of attitudes of blacks in the US towards the Palestinian problem see Newby, R. "Afro-Americans and Arabs: An Alliance in the Making", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.X (Winter 1981), No.1, pp.50-58 and Miller, J. "Black view points on the Mid-East Conflict", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.X (Winter 1981), No.2, pp.37-49.
 - 76 Campell, J. "The Middle East: A House of Containment Built On Shifting Sands", **Foreign Affairs**, 1981, p.612.
 - 77 Golan in Kaupi and Nation (eds.), (1983: 189).
 - 78 Golan, (1980: 7-8).
 - 79 Schiff, Z. and Rothstein, R. **Fedayeen; The Story of the Palestinian Guerrilla** (Valentine-Mitchell, London, 1972) p.215.
 - 80 Golan, (1980: 11).
 - 81 Yodfat et al., (1981: 87).
 - 82 ARR, (1972: 365).
 - 83 ARR, (1972: 443).
 - 84 Yodfat et al., (1981: 90).
 - 85 Golan, (1980: 231).

- 86 ARR, (1974: 311, 337) However, the office was not opened until June 1976, (ARR, 1976: 400).
- 87 Golan in Kaupi and Nation (eds.), (1983: 190).
- 88 Golan, (1980:234-243).
- 89 Ibid. p.243.
- 90 Adam, E. (ed.), **American Foreign Relations 1977, A Documentary Record** (New York University Press, New York, 1979) p.277.
- 91 Paper, (1981: 2).
- 92 Golan claims that this Soviet decision was meant to strengthen PLO position vis-a-vis US attempts to promote non-PLO groups in the West Bank, (1980: 244). In Kaupi Golan says this was more a game of one upmanship after the signing of the Camp David agreements, (Kaupi and Nation (eds.), 1983: 191).
- 93 Hazan, B. "Involvement by Proxy-Eastern Europe and the PLO '1971-1975'" in Ben-Gor, G. (ed.) **The Palestinians and the Conflict** (Turtle Dove Press, Ramat Gan, 1979) p.324.
- 94 ARR, (1973: 71).
- 95 Hazan in Ben-Gor (ed.) (1979: 326).
- 96 ARR, (1973: 310).
- 97 ARR, (1973: 287).
- 98 Hazan in Ben-Gor (ed.), (1979: 327).
- 99 ARR, (1974: 161).
- 100 ARR, (1972: 243).
- 101 ARR, (1974: 388).
- 102 ARR, (1974: 266).
- 103 ARR, (1974: 363).
- 104 Hazan in Ben-Gor (ed.), (1979: 333).
- 105 Golan, (1980: 59) talks about East German openings to the PLO as a Soviet decision to use East Germany as a sounding board for new policy initiatives, (see also, 1980: 235-6). Similarly Hazan, having accepted Soviet dominance of East European foreign policy making as an axiom in his analysis, (1980: 322), tries to explain the apparent duality in East European behaviour

between East Germany and Bulgaria on the one hand and other East Europeans on the other as a simple consequence of Soviet decision to use East Europeans to keep Soviet options vis-a-vis the Palestinian issue open, (p.328).

106 Golan, (1980: 8).

107 Hazan in Ben-Gor (ed.), (1979: 332).

108 Quoted in Ibid. p.325.

109 p.325.

110 Quoted in Ibid. p.332.

111 UN Docement No. S/9933 and S/9932. It is interesting to note that the first public British statement in favour of Palestinian rights occurred in the immediate aftermath of the incidents that precipitated the Security Council meetings. Sir Alec Douglas-Hume referred to the 'legitimate aspirations' of the Palestinians as early as November 1970, (**The Observer**, 1 November 1970).

112 **The Yearbook of the United Nations**, (1969: 792).

113 See Finger, S. "International Terrorism and the United Nations" in Alexander, Y (ed.) **International Terrorism; National, Regional and Global Perspectives** (Praeger: New York, 1976) for an analysis of International meetings precipitated by Palestinians terrorism.

114 **The Times**, 29 January 1974.

115 Some Jewish communities felt the need publicly to disassociate themselves from Begin after Israel's invasion of Lebanon. "Menahem Begin does not speak for us" statement by American Jews, July 6, 1982 which appeared in San Fransisco Chronicle as reported in **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vols. XI-XII (Summer/Fall 1982) p.332. For an analysis of the impact of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon on European and North American attitudes towards the Palestinian problem see Suleiman, M. "Development of Public Opinion on the Palestinian Question", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.XIII (Spring 1984), No.3, pp.87-116.

116 Documents and Source Material: "Statement on the Mideast issued by leaders of the Common Market, 29 June 1982", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vols.XI-XII (Summer/Fall 1982), p.343.

117 Franck, C. "Belgium: committed multilateralism", in Hill (ed.), (1983: 99).

118 UN Doc., S/15317.

- 119 Keatinge, in Allen and Pijpers (eds.), (1984: 30, note 24).
- 120 Documents and Source Material: "Middle East Peace Proposal of President Reagan, September 1, 1982", **Journal for Palestine Studies**, Vols.XI-XII (Summer/Fall 1982), pp.340-343.
- 121 "Eastern Europe and the Middle East Crisis-II" **IJA Background Papers**, No.6 (August 1967).
- 122 Hazan in Ben-Dor (ed.), (1979: 320).
- 123 ARR, (1969: 23).
- 124 Golan, (1980: 11).
- 125 Quoted in Golan, (1980: 11).
- 126 Hazan in Ben-Gor (ed.), (1979: 323-5).
- 127 Ibid. p.323.
- 128 ARR, (1972: 292).
- 129 Arab Reports and Analysis, "Yasser Arafat in Berlin", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.III (Autumn 1973), No.1, p.117. However, such a reference was missing in the statement concluding Arafat's first visit in August 1973, (ibid. pp.166-8).
- 130 For Romania see (Provisional) A/PV 2289 November 1974, p.7, 18; For Czechoslovakia see (Provisional) A/PV 2292 November 1974, p.27, 20; and for Bulgaria see (Provisional) A/PV 2295, 21 November, p.36 and p.45
- 131 (Provisional) A/PV 2286, 15 November 1974, p.80.
- 132 (Provisional) A/PV 2287, 15 November 1974, p.102.
- 133 Sighted in Hazan in Ben-Gor (ed.), (1979: 333).
- 134 (Provisional) A/PV 2291, 19 November 1974, p.12.
- 135 (Provisional) A/PV 2287, 15 November 1974, p.61.
- 136 Hazan in Ben-Gor (ed.), (1979: 334).
- 137 Ibid. p.335.
- 138 Ibid.
- 139 ARR, (1976: 169).
- 140 See Golan, (1980: 56-57; and chp.2) for an analysis of Soviet attitudes towards Palestinian statehood.

- 141 'Special Document': "The Soviet Attitude to the Palestinian problem; From the records of the Syrian Communist Party, 1971-1972", **Journal of Palestine Studies** Vol.II (Autumn 1972), pp.187-212. See also Golan (1980: 12, 67).
- 142 Soviet attempts to influence the PLO on this matter were particularly evident during the PLO visit in October 1973. See **The Guardian** 6 November 1973, **Le Monde** 31 October 1973.
- 143 Soviets openly praised those involved in the decision Golan, (1980: 87-88).
- 144 Arafat was allegedly promised support for an independent state, (Golan, 1980: 55, footnote 15). However, the communique released after the Arafat-Ponomarev meeting referred only to "the attainment of the legal national rights of the Palestinian Arab people". 'Documents and Source Material'; "Joint Palestinian-Soviet Communique August 4, 1974", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.IV (Autumn 1974), No.1, pp.202-3. Previously, the Soviets used to refer to "the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people". 'Documents and Source Material'; "Text of the Joint Soviet-Palestinian Communique, Moscow, July 28, 1972", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.II (Autumn 1972), No.1, pp.183-4.
- 145 Yodfat et al., (1981: 91).
- 146 'Documents and Source Material': "Joint Palestinian-Soviet Statement", **Journal of Palestine Studies** Vol.V (Spring/Summer 1976), No.3-4, pp.255-6. According to Filastin al-Thawra Brezhnev lend full support for PLO's struggle to achieve the right of the self-determination in an independent Palestinian state when Arafat met him in May 1975. Sighted in Arab Reports and Analysis: "Arafat goes to Moscow", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.IV (Summer 1975), No.4, pp.145-47.
- 147 Golan, (1980: 58).
- 148 Yodfat et al., (1981: 94).
- 149 The first of these meetings resolved the issue of a Palestinian state in an unambiguous manner though there was no mention of the PLO being 'the sole representative of the Palestinians'. The communique noted that the Soviet Union aimed at a comprehensive settlement which had to include "the guaranteeing of the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian Arab people, their right to self-determination, and their right to establish an independent Palestinian state." 'Documents and Source Material': "Joint Soviet-Palestinian Communique, April 8, 1977" **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.VI (Summer 1977), No.4, pp.178-9.

- 150 Yodfat, et al.,(1980: 101). The first acknowledgement of the 'sole representative' status of the PLO came during the visit of the Syrian President Assad to Moscow in February 1978. 'Documents and Source Material': "Joint Soviet-Syrian Communique, February 23, 1978" **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.VII (Summer 1978), No.4, pp.181-83. For a very thorough and illuminating analysis of the gradual and at times inconsistent development of the Soviet position on the recognition of the PLO see Golan, (1980) chapter 7, in particular pp.236-245.
- 151 Yodfat et al., (1981: 102).
- 152 **Le Monde**, 15 May 1971. Although the report was far from recognising the political rights of the Palestinians, Israel nevertheless lobbied very hard against the adoption of this report in the belief that the gradual reconciliation of the divergent views of the EC countries would culminate in a position closer to France's, **Le Monde**, 14 May 1971.
- 153 Although for Ireland the Middle East had been of little salience in its foreign policy, cognitive linkages based on anti-colonialism and historical experiences of partition made it more sensitive to Palestinian mobilisation. Britain, on the other hand, had been showing increasing concern for the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was reflected in Britain's support for a Security Council resolution tabled in July 1973, demonstrating an attitude going beyond the provisions of the Schumann Report. The resolution was sponsored by Non-Aligned countries and referred to the "rights and aspirations of the Palestinians", (S/10974, 24 July 1973, p.2). However, even though the British delegate noted that "In our view this phrase (the rights of the Palestinians) as used in the draft resolution refers essentially to the refugees and their rights under General Assembly resolution 194 (III)", (**Security Council Official Records**, Twentyeight year, meeting 1735, p.15.) for the sponsors it carried a political meaning and furthermore the British Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Hume had, as early as November 1970, acknowledged the 'legitimate aspirations' of the Palestinians and their desire for 'a means of self-expression'. **The Observer**, 1 November 1970.
- 154 **Le Monde**, 7 November 1973.
- 155 See Appendix IV for the scores of EC countries, together with other countries in this study, on the index of political support.
- 156 (Provisional) A/PV 2292, 20 November 1974, p.47.
- 157 *Ibid.*, p.28.

- 158 UN Document (Provisional) A/PV 2423, 2 December 1975, p.42 and A/31/PV.7, 28 September 1976, p.77.
- 159 Ibid., p.81. In 1974 West Germany was the first EC country to refer to the right of self-determination of the Palestinian people and "recognise the right of the Palestinian people to decide itself whether to establish an independent authority", ((Provisional) A/PV 2291, 19 November 1974, p.6.
- 160 Quoted in "European Stance on the Palestinian Issue: EEC Statement Analysed", IJA Research Report, No.3 (August 1977), p.4.
- 161 Ibid. p.3. Crossland's reference to 'a land for the Palestinians' were seen as considerably weaker than prior to a 'Palestinian entity' by other European Foreign Ministers at the United Nations General Assembly, (ARR, 1976: 586).
- 162 A/34/PV.8, 25 September 1979.
- 163 Ibid., p.12.
- 164 Khader, B. "Europe and the Arab-Israeli conflict: an Arab perspective", in Allen and Pijpers (eds.), (1984: 141).
- 165 The Times, 14 June 1980.
- 166 Franck, in Hill (ed.), (1983: 99).
- 167 Le Monde, 1 September 1981.
- 168 Moisi, D. "La France de Mitterand et le conflit du Proche-Orient comment concilier emotion et politique", Politique Etrangere, Vol.47 (1982), No.2, p.396. Moisi on this development notes that "En reconnaissant le droit des Palestiniens a un Etat, et plus seulement a une patrie, la France de Mitterand va plus loin que ne le faisait celle de Giscard d'Estaing". Mitterand's early ideas towards a Palestinian state can be seen in Mitterand, F, Ici et Maintenant (Artheme Fayard, Paris, 1981) pp.273-278.
- 169 The EC Foreign Affairs Ministers statement, 20 September 1982, announced after the Beirut massacres, did not add anything new to the EC's earlier position. For the declaration see, The Times, 22 September 1982.
- 170 Le Monde, 13 January 1983 and The Guardian, 12 January 1983.
- 171 Malta which has been excluded from the statistical analysis because of low attendance can also be included in this group.

- 172 Greilsammer, in Allen and Pijpers (eds.), (1984: 228). Kreisky was, together with Brandt the ex-chancellor of West Germany, the first European head of government to meet Arafat in Vienna on 7 July 1979. Although not an official state visit "he was in fact received at the airport with the ceremonial usually reserved for heads of state" and consequently the Austrian government officially recognised the PLO in March 1980.
- 173 Greilsammer, I. "The impact of Enlargement: Spain, Portugal and the Arab-Israeli Conflict", in Allen and Pijpers (eds.) (1984: 234). In the case of Portugal it is interesting to note that the sudden increase in support for the Palestinian cause was accompanied with improved relations with Israel, which culminated in the opening of diplomatic relations in May 1977. The basis for this development appears to have been prepared during contacts between the new Socialist leaders of Portugal and the Israeli Labour government through the Socialist International, (ibid.:235-6).
- 174 Furthermore at the General Assembly Sweden spoke of the PLO as "the most authoritative spokesman for the Palestinian Arabs", ((Provisional) A/PV 2295, 21 November 1974, p.88).
- 175 The influence of such consideration on Norwegian and Icelandic policies towards political problems in the Third World is also noted by Rudebeck "Norway is a member of the Atlantic pact (NATO), whereas Sweden is neutral. This made it possible for Sweden, for instance, to come out earlier and more strongly than Norway in support of national liberation movements in Indochina and in Portugal's former African colonies... Iceland is also a strategic link in the NATO system which puts some implicit restrictions on its freedom of action in international politics", (Rudebeck, L. "Nordic Policies Towards the Third World", in Sundelius, B. (ed.) **Foreign Policies of Northern Europe** (Westview, Boulder, Colorado 1982), p.167 and p.171.)
- 176 Haagerup and Thune in Hill too note Denmark's influence in getting the Nordic Council to a position closer to the one held by the EC, (Hill (ed), 1983: 112).
- 177 Thune, C. "Denmark", in Allen and Pijpers (eds.), (1984: 84).
- 178 (Provisional) A/PV 2296, 22 November 1974, pp.18-20.
- 179 Stebbins, R. and Adam, E. (eds.) **American Foreign Relations 1973: A Documentary Record** (New York University Press, New York, 1976), p.279.
- 180 For a thorough analysis of the origins and the making of the Saunders Statement see Buheiry, M. "The Saunders

Document", *Journal of Palestine Studies* Vol.VIII (Autumn 1978), No.1, pp.28-40.

- 181 A copy of the report can be found in Special Document: "The Brookings Report on the Middle East", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.VI (Winter 1977), No.2, pp.195-205.
- 182 Carter's first major statement came in March 16, 1977. In his speech at the Clinton Town meeting he said "There has to be a homeland provided for the Palestinian refugees (sic.) who have suffered for many, many years". Adam, E. *American Foreign Relations, 1977; A Documentary Record*, Document 20b, pp.256-8. (New York University Press, New York, 1979) It was two months later that Secretary of State Vance referred to "a homeland for the Palestinian people" rather than 'Palestinian refugees' (ibid., Document 21 p.259) However, Vance's version became increasingly attributed to Carter.
- 183 E.Rouleau in a series of articles in the July editions of the *Guardian Weekly* as reported in 'Views From Abroad': "US-Israel relations", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.VI (Summer 1977), No.4, pp.170-171.
- 184 Ibid., p.174.
- 185 The interview was conducted by T.Feldman in *New York Post*, 1 May 1978. The article is sighted in *Views From Abroad; Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.VII (Summer 1978), No.4, p.168. A similar but more authoritative statement can be found in Yodfat p.117 who refers to a statement by Carter on 16 September 1977, "I've never called for an independent Palestinian country. We have used the word 'entity'... we think that if there is a Palestinian entity established on the West Bank, that it ought to be associated with Jordan..."
- 186 "Interview with Farouq Al-Qaddumi" in "Shu'un Filastiniya" Beirut June 1977 reproduced in *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.VI (Summer 1977), No.4, pp.181-190.
- 187 According to Hurewitz, "Egyptians expected the autonomy to unfold by stages into full self-government for the Palestinians. For the Israel's the evolution into a state of the projected Palestinian "self-governing authority (administrative council) was wholly excluded" Furthermore Begin advocated autonomy for the population but not the territories a thinly disguised intent of maintaining sovereignty over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Hurewitz, J. "The Middle East: A Year of Turmoil", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol.59 (1980), No.3.
- 188 For a discussion of this view that gained strength in the late 1970s, see Yodfat et al. (1981: 11-116).

- 189 Campbell, (1978: 616).
- 190 Yodfat et al., (1980: 129).
- 191 Ibid. p.116.
- 192 p.116-7.
- 193 Documents and Source Material: "Middle East Peace Proposal of President Reagan, September 1, 1982", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vols.XI-XII (Summer/Fall 1982), No.4, pp.340-343.
- 194 UN Doc., A/ES-7/PV.11, 30 July 1980.
- 195 (Provisional) A/PV/2294, 21 November 1974.
- 196 A/ES-7/PV.4, 24 July 1980.

CHAPTER 8

MOBILISATION OF SUPPORT AT THE UN LEVEL

8.1 Introduction

So far we have examined the mobilisation process across local and regional levels of analysis. It is the purpose of this chapter to extend the analysis of the growth of support for the Palestinian cause to our final level of analysis, the global level. In the case of previous levels of analysis, where possible, attention was focused on the agendas of the regional organisations and their decisions relating to the Palestinian problem. At the global level the United Nations with its near universal membership and its agenda, which covers a wide range of issues, appears to best represent this level of analysis. It is, in particular, to the General Assembly and the Security Council that attention will be directed. It is the politics that surround the changes in the content of the agendas of these main organs and the outputs that emerge from these organs that will constitute the basis for the analysis.

The introductory chapter briefly looked at the Palestinian question in its early days at the UN. An attempt was made to point to some of the processes that gradually led the UN of the time to define the Palestinian problem as a problem of refugees. The occasional challenges made by Arab countries, attempting to undermine this definition went unheeded. All in all, this refugee image remained firm in the minds of many until the late 1960s. The first challenges from non-Arab delegations began to surface during the debates on the June 1967 war in the Middle East. Hence, the analysis of the mobilisation process that eventually changed the definition of the Palestinian problem from one of refugees to one of self-determination will begin from 1967 and cover the period up to 1980.

The year 1980 was chosen for substantive as well as practical reasons. By 1980 an overwhelming majority of the UN had come to favour the Palestinian right to self-determination and a general consensus had developed on the inadequacy of the provisions of the Camp David agreements relating to the rights of the Palestinians. This was also the year when the last major regional grouping, the European Community, formally joined ranks in recognising the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. Similarly it was in 1980 that the Latin Americans reached a high degree of cohesion in their support for the Palestinian cause. The practical reasons, on the other hand, emanate from the unavailability of post-1980 voting data in a machine readable form, when this research project was started.

8.2 Conducive Environment

The first task of this chapter will be to identify a series of developments during the 1960s at the United Nations that has brought about changes in the structure of the UN political system making it more conducive to the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause than the one which existed in the 1950s. There were four such developments. These were firstly, the growth of Third World membership at the UN; secondly the formal and structural changes within the UN affecting decision making; thirdly the emergence of various political groups to coordinate Third World efforts to influence this decision-making process and finally the recognition of national liberation movements as legitimate participants in the work of the UN.

8.2.1 Growth in Third World membership

When the UN came into being it was an organisation dominated by what was known as the Western Bloc. The Western Bloc, which included the Latin Americans too commanded a majority of the membership well into the late

1950s. This influenced both the nature of issues that were taken up by the UN as well as the resulting decisions. During the first decade the UN agendas remained dominated by items that reflected the high salience of the Cold War to the majority of the membership. In a similar way decisions on this issue tended to be determined by the almost automatic majority that the Western bloc could master.¹

Years	Latin America		Western Europe		Eastern Europe		Asia (Arabs)		Africa (Arabs)		Total
1945	20	39%	14	27%	6	11%	8(4)	16%	3(1)	6%	51
1950	20	33%	17	28%	6	10%	14(5)	23%	3(1)	5%	60
1955	20	26%	23	30%	10	13%	19(6)	25%	4(2)	5%	76
1960	20	20%	23	23%	10	10%	21(5)	21%	25(5)	25%	99
1965	22	19%	24	20%	10	9%	25(7)	21%	36(6)	31%	117
1970	24	19%	24	19%	10	8%	28(8)	22%	41(6)	32%	127
1975	27	19%	25	17%	11	7%	35(12)	24%	46(8)	32%	144
1980	29	19%	25	16%	11	7%	38(12)	25%	50(9)	33%	153

TABLE 8.1: Change in Distribution of United Nations' Membership by Region between 1945-1980²

As Table 8.1 depicts the composition of the UN began to change from 1955 onwards as Afro-Asian countries joined the UN in increasing numbers. A particularly dramatic increase occurred in 1960 when 17 newly independent countries became members. It is not surprising that this was also the year that saw the adoption of the "Declaration On The Granting Of Independence To Colonial Countries And Peoples". This was in many ways an indication that decolonisation was becoming an issue of high salience to a growing number of members and hence a dominant item on the agenda of the UN.³

One of the consequences of the growing salience of decolonisation was that issues that could be treated as problems of decolonisation stood a better chance of receiving attention and benefiting from the prestige that anti-colonialism offered. It is mostly in this context that the growth of Third World membership provided a more favourable basis for the mobilisation of support for the

Palestinian cause. The high salience of decolonisation to the Assembly meant that issues perceived to be of a colonial nature stood a better chance of being put on the agenda.

The Arabs had always seen the problem of the Palestinians as a product of the denial of the Palestinian Arabs of their right to self-determination. However, during the 1950s when the UN remained dominated by the West, they could not get the Assembly to consider the problem within that context. It was after the fifteenth session as the UN began to pay growing attention to decolonisation that the Arabs and later the Palestinians had a potentially more favourable environment to work in. The problem then remained a matter of convincing the Assembly of the appropriateness of treating the Palestinian problem as one covered by decolonisation.

Another consequence of the growth of the Third World membership was that it precipitated certain structural changes within the UN that contributed favourably to putting issues of interest to the Third World on the formal agenda. This occurred as a result of the reallocation of the distribution of seats in various organs of the UN.

8.2.2 Changes in the distribution of elected posts

The Assembly elects the countries to fill the seats of the elected-bodies of the UN as well as the President and Vice-Presidents of the Assembly and the Chairmen of the Main Committees. One major consequence of the growth of Third World membership has been an increase in demands for better Third World representation on these elected posts. Previously, the distribution of the elected posts of the General Assembly and non-permanent seats on the Security Council tended to favour Western and Latin American countries.⁴ These increased demands culminated in the adoption of a series of resolutions that changed this

situation. Resolution 1990 (XVIII) in December 1963 increased the number of Vice-Presidents and reorganised their distribution across geographical regions in a way that allowed greater Third World representation. The same resolution also rearranged the distribution of main committee officers. These changes are depicted in Table 8.2 and 8.3.

Table 8.2: Geographical distribution of Vice-Presidents before and after Resolution 1990 (XVIII)

	Before	After
Africa and Asia	4	7
Latin America	2	3
East Europe	1	1
Western and others	2	2
Permanent members	5	5
TOTAL	13	17

Table 8.3: Distribution of Main committee Chairmanships before and after Resolution 1990(XVIII)

	Before	After
Africa and Asia	2	3
Latin America	2	1
East Europe	1	1
Western and others	2	1
TOTAL	7	6*

* (The seventh chairmanship rotates every alternate year between representatives of states belonging to second and third groups).

These changes appear to have had two consequences for the politics of the General Assembly. Firstly, it changed the composition of the General Committee from a rather Western dominated body to one with enlarged representation for the Third World. The General Committee, composed of the President of the Assembly, the Vice-Presidents and the Chairmen of the Main Committees, is important because it makes recommendations to the Assembly regarding the adoption of the agenda, the allocation of items and the organisation of work in the Assembly and its Main Committees.

It is particularly in respect to the politics of the

inclusion or exclusion of certain items and the allocation of the agenda items to various parts of the Assembly that the composition of the General Committee can play a significant role. A General Committee with a larger Third World representation will naturally act more favourably towards matters of greater concern to the Third World. The General Committee's decisions on the agenda, conditional upon Assembly approval, will determine "whether a particular item will go through the remaining ... phases of "parliamentary diplomacy" and be considered by the Assembly".⁵

Secondly, although the influence that presiding officers have on the course of debates and decision making is difficult to ascertain, these officers particularly the chairmen of the Main Committees can exercise a certain degree of influence in steering a debate particularly through in the handling of important procedural matters.⁶ Similarly, the President of the Assembly can at times take certain initiatives with significant political consequences. One example of this was the ruling by the Algerian President of the 29th Assembly that amounted to the suspension of South Africa from the work of the General Assembly.⁷ During the same session the President did not hesitate to ensure that the Chairman of the PLO, Y.Arafat, be escorted from the rostrum by the UN Chief of Protocol, an honour usually reserved only for heads of states.⁸

Another structural change was precipitated by Resolution 1991 (XIII) which endorsed Third World demands for more equitable representation on the Security Council. The resolution not only increased the number of non-permanent seats from six to ten but also introduced for the first time a formalised geographical distribution of elected seats. Previously the seats were distributed according to a 'gentleman's agreement' reached during the first session of the Assembly.⁹ From its early days this formula became a source of problems as the West in the context of the Cold

War employed the agreement,

"to have the Security Council so constituted that there are always seven members which can be relied upon to stand together in the case of threats to the peace and which, should the Security Council be unable to act because of the veto, would vote in favour of an emergency special session of the Assembly under the "Uniting for Peace" resolution".¹⁰

However, it was not the Soviet bloc challenges to the way the 'gentleman's agreement' was being interpreted that undermined this arrangement. Instead it was the inability of the original pattern of geographical distribution of seats to accomodate a growing number of Third World countries that led to the adoption of Resolution 1991 (XIII).¹¹ This resolution rearranged and formalised the geographical regions into Western Europe and others, Eastern Europe, Latin America and Africa-Asia, allotting five seats to the last group. This change in the arithmetic of seat distributions appears to have influenced Security Council decision making in a number of ways.

Firstly, seven seats gives the Third World the possibility of commanding adequate votes to block majority decisions. Conversely and more importantly, the Third World with the support of only two other members can achieve a majority.¹² This has made Third World views highly influential in relation to procedural decisions which require only simple majorities without the veto being usable. This advantage, in the context of the Palestinian problem, was well demonstrated when the Security Council in December 1975 invited the PLO to participate in the work of the Security Council. In this case the significance of Third World membership of the Security Council is made even more striking, as it was at the request of the representatives of Guyana, Iraq, Mauritania, Cameroon and Tanzania that the PLO was invited "with the same rights conferred upon a Member State invited to participate under rule 37".¹³

8.2.3 Emergence of Political Groupings

Another important aspect of the growth of Third World membership at the UN was the strengthening of existing political groupings and the emergence of new groupings with Third World membership. A number of scholars have studied and identified various types of groupings operating within the United Nations General Assembly.¹⁴ It is not the purpose of this study to list and examine the operation of these political groupings. Instead it is the manner in which the emergence of Third World political groupings has contributed towards a more conducive environment for mobilising support for the Palestinian cause that is of interest.

According to Kaufmann groups at the UN perform a wide range of functions that include;

- a) "To exchange information on all or part of the agenda"
- b) "To develop common general-positions on important agenda items".
- c) "To undertake joint action for or against a proposal."¹⁵

These functions enable group members to pool resources for an effective voice in General Assembly decision making. The existence of political groupings provide for members the possibility to raise issues of high salience to them and seek the cooperation of the group. The group hence plays an important role as an access route to the larger assembly. Furthermore, once the position professed by a member (or a sub-group) has been adopted, the particular member (or sub group) can benefit from the capacity of the whole political group to lobby other political groups and members of the Assembly.

The possibility of lobbying other groups becomes particularly facilitated when there are political groupings with overlapping membership. For example, the Latin American group is not directly accessible to the Arab

countries. However, growing Latin American membership in the Non-Aligned group has opened the possibility for the Arabs to gain access to the larger Latin American audience. Similarly, the Afro-Asian and Islamic Groups constitute a channel through which Arab representatives can influence the position of the Turkish delegation who in turn may have an impact on the West European group in which it also participates. The same things can be said for the overlapping memberships of the Afro-Asian/Non-Aligned Groups with the Commonwealth Group.

Another important aspect of overlapping membership is that it can facilitate the development and recognition of common political values. These values then play a crucial role in guiding group perceptions and attitudes toward issues of concern to various groups. This process as it unfolds culminate in the emergence of cross-cutting loyalties and hence form a crucial basis for the mobilisation of support. The ability to have access to these groups then will give countries seeking support the possibility of arguing the applicability of shared political values to particular cases.

It is these aspects of political groupings with Third World membership that contribute towards a conducive environment at the United Nations. Firstly, it provides a net-work of contacts and channels of influence. Secondly, it offers the possibility of pooling resources for a more effective say. Thirdly, it provides commonly shared political values that can help to legitimise certain positions in relations to others or earlier ones.

8.2.4 National Liberation Movements and the UN

A final factor that contributed towards a conducive environment for the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause was a growing acceptance that non-governmental actors, in particular national liberation

movements had a legitimate and desired role to play in UN politics. The background or basis for direct national liberation movements participation can be traced to the adoption of Resolution 1514 and the reluctance of Portugal and South African governments to accept eventual independence for African territories under their control. This situation in South Africa was further aggravated by their discriminatory racial policies against African people.

The Fourth Committee of the General Assembly in the wider context of decolonisation had already developed a practice of granting hearings to petitioners.¹⁶ However, it was not until the late 1960s that direct contacts between the UN and the national liberation movements began to develop. The basis of these developments lay in the contacts between the Special Committee on Decolonisation and national liberation movements during its visits to Africa and particularly in a Bulgarian initiative¹⁷ calling for a more active UN involvement in the process of decolonisation. The Bulgarian initiative culminated in the adoption of Resolution 2311 (XXII) which opened the way to contacts between the UN specialised agencies and the national liberation movements. The Special Committee for its part adopted, after contacts with African liberation movement leaders in September 1970 a programme for the 10th anniversary of the adoption of Resolution 1514 in 1960.¹⁸

This programme, inter alia, called for the participation of liberation movements in UN proceedings related to their countries. The endorsement of these points by the General Assembly laid the ground for further developments in the following two sessions.¹⁹ Firstly, UN agencies were called on to examine procedures for national liberation movements participation and secondly Resolution 2874 (XXVI) prepared the way for these movements to obtain observer status at the General Assembly.²⁰ It was the Special Committee that first invited the liberation movements to participate in

its deliberations²¹ and then its chairman suggested²² that the movements be allowed to participate in the work of the Fourth Committee as observers. These developments were subsequently endorsed by the Assembly in 1974 when an invitation to all liberation movements recognised by the OAU to participate in the work of its Main Committees and subsidiary bodies was adopted.²³

The strength of the consensus amongst a large majority of the UN membership favouring the participation of the national liberation movements centred around the problem of whether the governments of Portugal and South Africa did represent the African people under their control. An overwhelming majority of the Assembly held the view that these governments lacked the legitimacy to represent the African people and that as reflected in Resolutions 2878 (XXVI) and 2795 (XXVI) liberation movements were increasingly seen as the representatives of these people. This position also found vivid expression in the Assembly's rejection of South Africa's credentials between 1970-74 and the eventual denial of this delegation's right to participate in the work of the Assembly.²⁴ Similarly during the 28th session of the Assembly Portugal's credentials were accepted on the understanding that it only represented continental Portugal.²⁵ It was against such a background that the national liberation movements' role as representatives of the Southern African people gained acceptance and culminated in the granting of observer status. This enabled representatives of the national liberation movements to gain direct access to the decision-making process of the General Assembly as well as contribute towards the efforts of various parts of the UN to ensure the implementation of Resolution 1514.

8.2.5 The Impact of the Structural Changes

These four major developments that have been examined in respect to a conducive environment are important for the

mobilisation process in a number of ways. Firstly, the growth in Third World membership and the changes in certain aspects of the structure of the General Assembly and the Security Council were significant because they broadened the basis of potential allies for Arabs and also enabled both Arabs and Third World delegations to have a greater say in the politics of the UN. Secondly, the emergence of political groupings opened the possibility for the Arabs and later on the Palestinians to gain access to growing number of delegations. It enabled them to caucus the non-Arab membership of these groupings. It also opened, for the Arabs and Palestinians, the possibility of contributing towards the development of ideological guidelines for the inclusion and processing of various issues on the agendas of the UN. Thirdly, the gradual incorporation of national liberation movements in the work of the UN set a precedent for the PLO's eventual participation, allowing it to gain access to various parts of the UN and hence have a direct impact on the politics of the Palestinian problem.

Before ending this first part of the mobilisation process model as it applies to the UN it must be noted that the above developments brought about a conducive environment and did not necessarily generate instant support. Take for example the sudden increase in Third World membership in 1960 and the adoption of Resolution 1514. This did not translate itself into immediate support for demands made by the Arabs. At the sixteenth session of the Assembly, this was reflected quite starkly in the reluctance of some African and most Latin American countries to support the Arab position in relation to the situation in Algeria. These countries preferred to abstain on a First Committee resolution calling for resumed negotiations for an independent, territorially unified Algeria.²⁶ Similarly at the eighteenth session the Arabs failed in mobilising adequate African and Latin American support to have Oman labeled as a colonial territory under resolution 1514 (XV).

Hence the conducive environment as described should not be equated to support itself. Instead it should be seen as a series of structural changes that has increased the chances to generate support for the Palestinian cause by allowing Arab/Palestinian access to a potentially favourable audience and argue in favour of cognitive linkages between the Palestinian issue and other issues already enjoying the UN's support. It is the purpose of the following two sections to examine those aspects of the mobilisation process at the UN.

8.3. Accessibility

8.3.1 Indirect Access

When the Palestinian problem first came to the UN the Palestinian Arabs had enjoyed indirect access to the UN through Arab countries that tended to support their cause.²⁷ However, once the Palestinian Question at the United Nations lost, in the early 1950s, its political dimension it became very difficult for the Arab delegations to maintain debates on the political rights of the Palestinian Arabs let alone ensure recognition for their rights. There were not many non-Arab countries that would raise the political aspects of the Palestinian problem.

This situation remained unchanged until the late 1960s when some African and other non-Arab Islamic countries began in their speeches to make references to the rights of the Palestinian Arabs.²⁸ One such country was Mali, whose delegation during the Security Council debates on the Middle East war of 1967 was the only member of the Council to refer to the Palestinian dimension of the Arab-Israeli conflict.²⁹ Yet, it was not until the 24th session of the Assembly that this growing recognition of the political dimension of the Palestinian problem gathered adequate strength to translate itself to the adoption of a Resolution recognising 'the inalienable rights of the

Palestinians'.

To these delegations' role one must also add members of the Secretariat that during this initial period enabled the Palestinian Arabs to gain indirect access to the Assembly. A remarkable development in respect to bringing the political aspects of the Palestinian problem to the attention of the Assembly came in 1968 when the Secretary General in his address to the Special Political Committee deplored the inability of the General Assembly to take any significant steps towards a solution of the problem of Palestine refugees who still, he noted, "had no homeland, no future and no hope".³⁰ The Commissioner General of UNRWA in his report in 1969, using cautious language, noted the political aspect of the unrest and frustration observed in UNRWA's camps³¹ and added that there seemed to be a need to consult the representatives of the refugees.³²

The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories set up in December 1969 was another body that allowed the Palestinians to have indirect access to the UN.³³ This Committee during its visits to the Middle East interviewed and consulted many Palestinian Arabs. Their first report reflected the frustration felt by the Palestinian Arabs of living under occupation without enjoying the right to self-determination.³⁴

The impact of the reports prepared by UNRWA and the Special Committee should not be underestimated. These reports, during their discussion by the Assembly, injected new and particularly detailed information on aspects of Palestinian life in the refugee camps and the occupied territories into the general debate on the Palestinian problem. By exposing delegations to new aspects of the Palestinian problem and forcing them to develop and express opinions, the information presented took the content of the Assembly debates on the Palestinian problem well beyond the

usual deliberations on the narrow humanitarian and technical aspects of the refugee problem that had characterised most of the earlier debates.

8.3.2 Direct Access

The Palestinian Arabs beside this indirect access had also experienced direct access to the UN soon after the Palestinian Question was brought to the attention of the UN. The Arab Higher Committee together with the Jewish Agency had been invited to participate in the work of the Assembly concerning the Question of Palestine.³⁵ However, this situation did not last very long. Once Resolution 181 (II) was adopted, Palestinian Arabs speaking on behalf of their own political organisations did not reappear until 1965. The Special Political Committee of the Assembly, which traditionally has debated issues pertaining to the refugees in the Near East, began, after a long procedural debate, to invite the PLO and another group of Palestinians calling themselves the Palestine Arab Delegation to address the Committee. The PAD had already been receiving such invitations since November 1960. The delegation was composed of individuals who claimed to represent Palestinian Arab refugees. One such person was I. Tannous who since the 7th session of the Assembly had been appearing before the Special Political Committee.³⁶

The invitations to the PLO and the Palestine Arab Delegation were extended on the clear understanding that it did not imply recognition of the organisations and they were limited simply to addressing the Special Political Committee of the Assembly.³⁷ It nevertheless did give representatives of these organisations the possibility of expressing the views of the Palestinian Arabs and participate in the more informal aspects of the politics surrounding the debate.

The direct participation of the representatives from these

two organisations affected politics at the General Assembly in the two ways. Firstly, both delegations injected the political dimension of the problem into the debates and contributed towards the radicalisation of opinions and views on the Palestinian question. This to a certain extent was reflected in the increasing number of Arab, followed by Islamic and African, countries systematic references to the colonial nature of the problem and the Palestinian Arabs rights to self-determination. Secondly, as Table 8.4 depicts the number of delegations sponsoring the renewed requests each session to invite the PLO steadily increased. This growing support for the PLO to address the SPC prepared the way for the eventual granting of observer status to the PLO.

TABLE 8.4: Number of Countries Sponsoring PLO's Participation in the Work of the SPC

	1965	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
Arabs	13	14	17	18	18	19
Asians	-	3	8	10	9	9
Africans	-	6	5	7	27	29
L.Americans	-	1	1	2	6	4
East Europe	-	2	10	10	11	10
West Europe	-	-	-	-	-	1
TOTAL	13	26	41	47	71	72

It has already been noted that the General Assembly had began to look favourably to the participation of African national liberation movement in the work of the UN. The adoption of Resolution 3118 (XVIII), 12 December 1973, had led various specialised agencies to introduce measures to allow for the participation of African liberation movements in their work.³⁸ These measures had enabled the PLO to be invited as an observer to several UN specialised agencies.³⁹ However, the major breakthrough, which naturally was influenced by the above developments as well as the growing status of the PLO in other regional organisations, came about as a result of the adoption of Resolutions 3210 (XIX) of 14 October 1974 and 3237 (XIX) of 22 November 1974. These two resolutions amounted to the

granting of a status of observership that went beyond the privileges enjoyed by other national liberation movements.⁴⁰

Unlike the other national liberation movements, this status gave the PLO the possibility of participating in all sessions and debates of the Assembly. In practice, this came to include the right to make speeches, to circulate and receive documents, and to table draft resolutions with the cooperation of 'friendly' delegations. Although this status did not include the right to vote, it nevertheless opened the way to participation in and to influencing all stages of decision making at the Assembly. Furthermore, this status also allowed the PLO to bring up the issue of Palestinian rights in relation to other items on the agenda, such as matters concerning Southern Africa, and in the context of forums of specialised agencies.

Beside the General Assembly, the Security Council is the other major main organ to which the PLO gained access. The PLO's participation in the work of the Security Council was first endorsed in the November 1975 majority statement delivered by the President of the Council which noted that the PLO would be invited to the next meeting of the Council.⁴¹ The nature of the PLO's participation, which was not clarified, became a highly contested issue when the Council next met in December 1975.⁴² After a long procedural debate and by a vote of 9 in favour to 3 against, with 3 abstentions, it was agreed that the PLO would be invited to the debates with "the same rights of participation as are conferred when a Member State is invited to participate under rule 37".⁴³ This practice which was then repeated on numerous occasions enabled the PLO to participate in the Security Council debates concerning the Middle East and the rights of the Palestinians.⁴⁴ Although none of these meeting adopted resolutions recognising the political rights of the Palestinians, it nevertheless gave the PLO the possibility

of interacting directly with other representatives present at the Security Council debates.

There are a number of advantages attached to having access to the Security Council. Firstly, unlike the General Assembly, the Security Council is organised in such a way that makes it possible to function continuously. This enables members of the UN to call for the convening of the Council practically at any time. Secondly, the role and the status of the Security Council within the UN and world politics gives issues brought to its attention an enhanced urgency and publicity. Thirdly, direct access to the Security Council gives the African liberation movements, and the PLO in particular, practical advantages, such as informal consultations, that are so crucial to the decision-making process at the Security Council. Especially given that,

"Western Ambassadors regularly consult the representatives of the liberation movements at the United Nations, although some cautious ones, to avoid semblance of official recognition, send their deputies instead".⁴⁵

A dramatic consequence of the PLO's participation in these consultations occurred when Andy Young the US representative and the impending President of the Council for August 1979, held a private meeting with the PLO representative in July that, in face of Israeli protests culminated in his resignation.⁴⁶ Finally, the participation of an increasing number of Third World countries not members of the Council opens the possibility for national liberation movements and the PLO to benefit from the publicity and pressure emanating from political solidarity often expressed by these countries.

8.3.3 Local and International violence

Violence was another access route to the United Nations agenda for the Palestinian problem. From 1965 local

violence by the Palestinian resistance movement directed towards Israel from neighbouring countries and international violence in the late 1960s and early 1970s led to the frequent calling of Security Council meetings. During these meetings the Arab delegates were able to bring up and argue the point that the political dimension of the Palestinian problem was the cause of this violence. The membership of the Council became particularly receptive to these arguments after the 1967 Middle East War. Until then most of the members of the Council had gone along with the Israeli position that armed operations into Israel were breaches of armistice agreements between her and neighbouring Arab countries. However, in the aftermath of the 1967 war a different climate emerged which made Arab arguments, that portrayed these operations as reactions to alien domination, more acceptable.

Armed Palestinian operations at the local and international levels was also brought up during the discussions of the agenda item on the 'Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples'. One tangible consequence of these discussions was reflected in the adoption by the Assembly Resolution 2649 (XXV) which recognised the legitimacy of the struggles of peoples under colonial and alien domination and condemned "those Governments that denied the right to self determination of peoples recognized as being entitled to it, especially the peoples of South Africa and Palestine".⁴⁷ The phrase 'alien domination' which had not been included in the previous session's resolution on the same issue is generally agreed to have been especially introduced to cover the Palestinian case.⁴⁸

Furthermore, the use of international violence by the Palestinian resistance movement was a major factor that gained the Palestinian problem access to the Assembly's Legal Committee and Plenary debates on terrorism in 1972.⁴⁹ Some delegations referred to aspects of the Palestinian

problem that related it to recognised national liberation struggles elsewhere. One such country was Algeria which played a major role in the eventual adoption of the Resolution stressing the legitimacy of national liberation struggles.⁵⁰

These three different sets of access routes enabled the Palestinian problem to appear on the agendas of the UN. This played an important role in increasing the awareness of delegations of the issue and also brought about the possibility of working towards cognitive linkages with other legitimised issues. This in itself contributed to influencing the perceptions of growing numbers of delegations in such away that it led them to apply their criteria of legitimacy during the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause.

8.4 Cognitive Linkages

In the previous chapters the role of various cognitive linkages in the development of Third World, Eastern and Western European attitudes favourable to the Palestinian cause was closely examined. Particular importance was given to the growing assertion of similarities between the situation in Southern Africa and the Palestinian problem. This it was argued played a significant role in extending anti-colonial support for the Palestinian cause. In an effort to substantiate this observation an analysis of the decisions of various regional organisations on this matter was supplemented by a quantitative analysis of voting at the United Nations General Assembly concerning the relationship between the two issues.

This section, to avoid any duplication, will primarily examine the decision-making process that extended the coverage of the decolonisation struggle to include the Palestinian cause. Therefore, the emphasis will be on the inputs, in the form of significant speeches and draft

resolutions, into the decision-making process and emerging outputs in the form of adopted resolutions, rather than an analysis of each delegation's voting behaviour. This has already been done in Appendix II and the results have been used in the previous chapters.

The fifteenth session of the General Assembly was a crucial year in the struggle against decolonisation and in the development of anti-colonial thinking because it saw seventeen newly independent countries join the UN as well as the adoption of Resolution 1514 (XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries. This resolution, which was also known as the Declaration on Decolonisation, noted that "All peoples have the right to self-determination" and proclaimed "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end to colonialism in all its forms and manifestations".⁵¹ The adoption of this resolution without any opposition is generally regarded as an indication of the change in attitudes towards the right to self-determination in the UN and also a landmark in the recognition of the growing legitimacy of the struggle for decolonisation.⁵²

This Declaration precipitated a series of decisions and measures which granted particular support and legitimacy to the struggles of the peoples and national liberation movements against the situation arising from the policies of the Portuguese, South African and Rhodesian governments. The Palestinian struggle remained excluded from this until 1970.⁵³ This is no surprise considering that as late as in 1967 the Assembly still considered the Palestinians as refugees and victims of the conflict between Israel and the Arab states. This attitude is quite conspicuous in an Indian diplomats criticisms, during the Emergency Special Session, of Arab intransigence and his treatment of the refugee problem as a natural outcome of war.⁵⁴ He argued for the need "to offer realistic assistance to resettle the Arab refugees" and claimed that

"in human terms this is no means an insoluble problem. As we observed the number of refugees is nowhere nearly as large as those in other parts of the world. Moreover, there are underpopulated areas in the Middle East."⁵⁵

Hence, the Palestinian problem in the eyes of many delegations remained a by-product of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This refugee status for the Palestinians was reinforced by the adoption of Security Council Resolution 242.

Those Palestinian representatives allowed to address the Special Political Committee had since 1963 been arguing the need for the Assembly to recognise their political rights as a people. The consequences of the 1967 war added a greater urgency and precipitated two developments. Firstly, during the 22nd session of the Assembly the Palestinians argued that their problem was not one of refugees but one resulting from the denial of their right to self-determination guaranteed by the Charter as well as the Declaration on Decolonisation.⁵⁶ The second development occurred during the following session when they, with the added confidence of increased resistance activities in Palestine,⁵⁷ took their arguments one step further by drawing similarities between their struggle and the struggle of the various Afro-Asian peoples against colonial and foreign occupation.⁵⁸ A number of Arab delegations particularly from radical Arab countries argued along similar lines both at the Security Council and the General Assembly.⁵⁹

Although the 24th session saw an intensification of the arguments stressing the anti-colonial nature of the Palestinians struggle for self-determination, it was not until the 25th session that this became recognised by the Assembly. During the deliberation on the agenda item entitled "Implementation of Recommendations of the International Conference on Human Rights" the Third Committee recommended to the Assembly an Afro-Asian

resolution which, inter alia, condemned governments which deny the right to self-determination to peoples "recognized as being entitled to it, especially the peoples of Southern Africa and Palestine."⁶⁰ The inclusion of the word "Palestine" had been challenged by Israel but at a subsequent vote requested by Costa Rica on the whole phrase "especially by the peoples of South Africa and Palestine" was then retained by a vote of 49 in favour to 22 against, with 35 abstentions.⁶¹ According to Mallisons, the

"legal effect of this significant resolution is that the prior resolutions setting forth the basic right of self-determination, resolutions 1514 and 2625 ..., are now specially applicable to the Palestinian people"⁶²

Some further weight to the linkage between colonial struggles and the Palestinian one was added when the Assembly at the recommendation of the Fourth Committee adopted Resolution 2708 (XX), on 14 December 1970, which reaffirmed the Assembly's "recognition of the legitimacy of the struggle of the colonial peoples and peoples under alien domination to exercise their right to self-determination". The phrase "alien domination" was inserted at the request of the Afghan delegation and was generally meant to cover the Palestinian people.⁶³ It was during the following session that the Assembly endorsed "the legality and the legitimacy of the struggle of the Palestinian people for self-determination" in an explicit manner when it adopted Resolution 2787 (XXVI), on 6 December 1971.⁶⁴

Beside the incorporation of the Palestinian people's struggle into decisions supportive of national liberation struggles in Southern Africa by the 26th session, non-Arab delegations, too, began in their speeches to note similarities between the regimes of South Africa and Israel. The Byelorussian representative drew parallels between what they described as 'the policies of racial and national superiority' pursued by South Africa and by Israel. He noted that Israel was pursuing a policy similar to the policy of Bantustans in South Africa.⁶⁵ However, the

most dramatic development in respect to the assertion of similarities between South Africa and Israel came in 1973.

Firstly, Resolution 3175 (XXVIII), of 17 December 1973 that had been sponsored by Non-Aligned countries, became very critical of Israel's policies in the occupied territories and in its last paragraph declared that the principles mentioned in the resolution were applicable to 'all states, territories and peoples under foreign occupation, colonial rule and apartheid'. Secondly, the political implications of the last paragraph suggesting similarities between the situation in Israeli occupied territories and that in South Africa was further strengthened when the representatives of Upper Volta asked for a separate vote and declared the purpose of the vote to be a means for identifying the unshakable supporters of Portugal and South Africa.⁶⁶ Ninety four countries supported the motion while Israel, Nicaragua, Portugal and the US opposed it. In the light of this it is not surprising that a large number of African and Asian countries supported the inclusion in Resolution 3151 G (XXVIII) of an amendment condemning the "unholy alliance between Portugese colonialism, South African racism, zionism and Israeli imperialism".⁶⁷

The establishment of cognitive linkages between the problems of South Africa and Palestine was a major factor that contributed to the growth of support for the Palestinians. For the Third World, East Europeans and some West Europeans anti-colonialism as a belief system had become a primary source of reference in defining their attitudes towards a variety of problems. Once similarities between the situation in the occupied territories and particularly South Africa were accepted a growing number of delegations began to apply their anti-colonial criteria to their perceptions and decisions concerning the nature of the Palestinian problem. In that context the Palestinian problem ceased to be a refugee problem. Instead it became a

problem of a people struggling to achieve self-determination not unlike the national liberation struggles of various peoples in Southern Africa.

Furthermore, the policies of Israel particularly in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip became increasingly seen as policies designed to deny the Palestinians their right to self-determination. This contributed towards a change in Third World perceptions of Israel. Furthermore, links between Israel and South Africa became increasingly singled out for criticism as signs of an alliance to perpetuate repression in these two parts of the world. These points were expressed in a stark manner in Resolution 3324 E (XXIX) which condemned relations between the two countries and received the overwhelming support of the Third World with the exception of a few Latin Americans.⁶⁸ As Israel became more and more likened to South Africa, its favourable image became eroded at the cost of increased support for the Palestinian cause. The process gained so much strength that to continue to support Israel while condemning South Africa became a source of anomaly in itself, a position incompatible with anti-colonial thinking and behaviour.⁶⁹

8.5 Growth of Support

8.5.1 The Period from 1947 to 1967

The political rights of the Palestinian Arabs on a part of Palestine had been recognised by Resolution 181 (II), however, very quickly these rights drifted into obscurity. By the third session of the Assembly, the Palestinian Question was being transformed from one that sought a 'future government of Palestine' to one that sought a solution to the refugee problem as defined in Resolution 194 (III). However, the Assembly did not stop there, during the fifth session it adopted Resolution 394 (V) that recommended a solution to the 'refugee problem' not through

repatriation but by resettling substantial numbers of Palestinian Arab refugees. This new position was much closer to the Israeli one that claimed the Palestinians had the whole Arab World to settle in. By the seventh session the process of redefining the issue reached a climax when 'the Question of Palestine', an agenda item that had originally symbolised the search to satisfy the political aspirations of both the Palestinian Arabs and Jewish people, was dropped.⁷⁰ The Western European and Latin American members even attempted to invalidate the applicability of previous UN resolutions particularly Resolutions 181 (II) and 194 (III).⁷¹ Although this attempt failed in practical terms the Western countries had set the parameters defining the problem.

In the mid-1960s there had been some signs of the beginnings of a change in attitudes towards the acceptance of the definition of the Palestinian problem in its prevailing form. The Palestinian Arabs had begun to appear before the Special Political Committee and argue strongly in favour of the political nature of the refugee problem. Their arguments by the 20th session had gained some ground as Afghanistan and Malaysia sponsored a draft resolution favourable to the Palestinian Arabs.⁷² However, in general the Assembly, including many Africans, remained reluctant to recognise the Palestinian problem as anything other than an off-shoot of the Arab-Israeli conflict. This is strongly reflected in the way in which some Africans did not hesitate to join West European countries in supporting the idea of direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, during the eighteenth session.⁷³

Furthermore, the 1967 war in some ways reinforced in the eyes of the majority of the Assembly the centrality of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Lall in his study of the speeches of the delegates during the Fifth Emergency Special Session in 1967 identified seven different approaches towards the possible solution of the crisis.⁷⁴ Mostly, these approaches

related to positions taken on matters concerning the withdrawal of Israel from occupied territories, the means of achieving a just and durable peace, and the issue of freedom of navigation through the straits of Aqaba. None of these approaches tackled the Palestinian question in a form other than the expression, particularly on the part of West European and Latin American delegations, of humanitarian concern for the refugees.⁷⁵

The Arabs, on the other hand, during the deliberations of the Emergency Special Session, did not separately articulate the political rights of the Palestinian Arabs.⁷⁶ Although in the past there had been some references on the part of Arab representatives to the right of self-determination of the Palestinian Arabs it seemed these rights were not taken up separately.⁷⁷ Instead they were subsumed within the uncompromising challenge offered to the very existence of Israel whose presence in their midst was described as an aggression.⁷⁸ However, during the Security Council deliberations in November 1967 this situation began to change as the political rights of the Palestinians received greater attention from Arab delegations.

In this, the role of the Arab Summit at Khartoum in August 1967 needs to be noted. The Arab Summit, after an eventful debate centred around the Palestinian problem, had adopted a resolution that determined the guidelines for future policies towards Israel, which amongst other points included "an insistence on the rights of the Palestinian people in their own country".⁷⁹ It was against this background that Egypt forcefully argued that the central issue in the Middle Eastern Conflict was the expulsion of the people of Palestine and the need to ensure 'the Palestinian Arabs' right to self-determination'.⁸⁰ This line of argument received only some support from the Mali representative which called for the need to restore the inalienable rights of the people of Palestine. Hence there was inadequate support to influence the content and

eventual adoption of Resolution 242, which continued to treat the Palestinian problem as a by product of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

8.5.2 The period between the wars of 1967 and 1973

8.5.2.1 The Security Council

The period between the two Middle Eastern wars was marked by a rapid change in attitudes towards the nature of the Palestinian problem. The Palestinian problem from as early as 1968 began to occupy the attention of various parts of the UN. The increased resistance operations of the Palestinian guerrilla groups and Israeli reprisals led to numerous Security Council meetings precipitating debates on the causes of violence in the area.⁸¹ Growing number of non-Arab delegations participating in the debates argued that the acts of violence were a natural reaction to occupation.⁸² Some African delegations joined the Arabs in arguing that resistance operations represented the Palestinians' struggle to achieve their right to self-determination while Israeli reprisals reflected the colonial nature of its regime.⁸³ By 1973 there was general agreement amongst even some permanent members of the Security Council that the Palestinian problem was political in its essence and hence Resolution 242 needed to be modified to accomodate this.⁸⁴

These developments took a concrete form during a Security Council debate in June 1973. At this meeting, which was attended by a large number of African countries, in itself a sign of the increasing salience of the Palestinian problem to the Third World, a Non-Aligned sponsored draft resolution, was tabled.⁸⁵ The resolution, inter alia, expressed its conviction that a just and peaceful solution to the problem of the Middle East could be achieved only on the basis of "respect for national sovereignty,

territorial integrity, the rights of all states in the area and for the rights and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians".⁸⁶ The draft resolution which reflected a compromise between the position of radical Arab countries, such as Algeria and Syria, and the content of Resolution 242 failed when the US cast the only opposing vote.⁸⁷

8.5.2.2 The General Assembly

The General Assembly became the forum within which various aspects of the Palestinian problem was debated, views expressed and opinions formulated, culminating in the growth of support for the Palestinian cause. The deliberations surrounding, particularly the agenda item entitled "Assistance to refugees in the Near East" transformed the Special Political Committee into a major forum for the discussion of the political aspects of the Palestinian problem. This became quite evident during the 24th session of the Assembly. Until then the resolutions recommended by the Special Political Committee had not gone beyond the expression of support for the refugees' right to return to their homes.

It was at this session that the arguments put forward by the Palestinian Arabs and Arab delegations stressing the political nature of the Palestinian problem began to bear fruit. Firstly, a number of non-Arab delegations made speeches indicating the change occurring in attitudes held towards the Palestinian problem. This is probably best reflected in the position taken by France and the Soviet Union. Both delegations, while continuing to express support for Resolution 242, also acknowledged the essentially political nature of the Palestinian problem.⁸⁸ The Soviet Union went even further and, for the first time, noted that the Palestinian Arabs had the right to exercise self-determination as much as Israel had the right to exist.⁸⁹ Secondly, the Assembly saw the adoption of Resolution 2535 B (XXIV), on 10 December 1969. Even though

this resolution was adopted with a very small majority, it nevertheless was the first resolution to explicitly refer to 'the inalienable rights of the Palestinians'.

At the 25th session the Assembly in Resolution 2672 C (XXV) of 8 December 1970 expanded the 'inalienable rights' of the Palestinian people to include the right to self-determination and in Resolution 2628 (XXV) of 4 November 1970 declared the need to respect the rights of the Palestinian people in establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. This session also saw the Palestinian problem taken up by the Third Committee during its deliberation of the agenda item concerning the implementation of the recommendations of the International Conference on Human Rights. On the recommendation of the Third Committee the Assembly adopted Resolution 2649 (XXV) of 30 November 1970 which extended the application of the Declaration on Decolonisation to the Palestinian problem by recognising the Palestinians as a people entitled to self-determination.

Between the 24th and 28th sessions of the Assembly the content of resolutions supportive of the political rights of the Palestinians became more and more comprehensive as well as receiving growing support. The growing support of the Assembly is depicted in Tables 8.5 to 8.7. Both the Africans and Asians increasingly lent their support to the Palestinian cause. Amongst the Third World countries it was the Latin Americans that remained reluctant to extend full support for the Palestinians as a group. They were generally divided with substantial sections of the Latin Americans either supporting or maintaining an intermediate position. This in many ways is not surprising considering that the Latin Americans as late as the 26th session were prepared to table a resolution supported by Israel. This draft resolution if adopted would have called for direct negotiations between the Arab governments and Israel.⁹⁰

**TABLE 8.5: Distribution of Support by Regional Groupings
at the 24th Session***

	West European %	Latin American %	Africa %	Asia %	East Europe %
Highly Pro-Pals.	14	5	35	71	100
Medium Pro-Pals.	-	-	7	-	-
Intermediate	10	26	17	21	-
Medium Pro-Isr.	67	21	14	7	-
Highly Pro-Isr.	10	47	28	-	-
No. of Countries	21	19	29	14	10

**TABLE 8.6: Distribution of Support by Regional Groupings
at the 26th Session***

	West European %	Latin American %	Africa %	Asia %	East Europe %
Highly Pro-Pals.	14	10	23	58	100
Medium Pro-Pals.	33	5	23	24	-
Intermediate	14	35	31	18	-
Medium Pro-Isr.	29	15	15	-	-
Highly Pro-Isr.	10	35	8	-	-
No. of Countries	21	20	26	17	9

**TABLE 8.7: Distribution of Support by Regional Groupings
at the 28th Session***

	West European %	Latin American %	Africa %	Asia %	East Europe %
Highly Pro-Pals.	14	39	96	81	100
Medium Pro-Pals.	14	11	4	19	-
Intermediate	68	22	-	-	-
Medium Pro-Pals.	-	11	-	-	-
Highly Pro-Pals.	5	17	-	-	-
No. of Countries	21	18	25	16	10

* Percentages are based upon countries meeting the minimum attendance levels.

The Western Europeans, on the other hand, moved away from a position whereby a substantial proportion remained supportive of the Israelis to one that was slightly favourable to the Palestinians. The East Europeans constituted the only non-Arab group that throughout the

period maintained a pro-Palestinian position.

8.5.3 Post 1973

If the previous period was characterised by a rapid change in attitudes towards the nature of the Palestinian problem and growth of support for the Palestinian right to self-determination, the post 1973 period was one during which the recognition of the political rights of the Palestinians not only became consolidated but also was clearly elaborated to include the right to establish a state. The 'Palestinian Question', as an independent item was reintroduced to the plenary level of the Assembly and the problem was also taken up the Security Council, ECOSOC and the Specialised Agencies. Furthermore, this was the period when the PLO became recognised as "the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people" and was granted the right to participate in the work of practically all the bodies making up the UN system.

8.5.3.1 The Security Council

The Security Council deliberations following the October War had attracted some speeches supporting the need to take into consideration the rights of the Palestinians. However, the eventual Security Council decision that emerged did not mention the political rights of the Palestinians in any way. Instead Resolution 338 (1973), 22 October 1973, called for a cease fire and the implementation of Resolution 242. This in many ways set the limits for future Security Council decisions. Although numerous broadly supported attempts to expand Resolution 242 to include the political rights of the Palestinians were made between 1973 and 1980 US vetoes ensured that such proposals did not get adopted.⁹¹

Yet, it would be misleading to suggest that the Palestinian problem did not receive any recognition at all just because

the US prevented the adoption of formal decisions recognising the political rights of the Palestinians. Although, the political and legal weight of a Council resolution can not be denied, the position of the remaining members of the Council did play a certain role in relation to attitude formation and the mobilisation process.

The post 1973 period became the one during which the Palestinian question entered the agenda of the Security Council and most members acknowledged the right of the Palestinians to self-determination in one form or the other. The Security Council debate in January 1976 is a good case in point. On this occasion a variety of formulations on the question of self-determination emerged. France held the view that the Palestinian people's right to 'an independent homeland' had to be recognised. The Soviet Union took a stronger view and noted that it was "a legitimate national right of the Palestinians to create their own state", while the UK limited itself to the necessity of recognising "the right of the Palestinian people to express their national identity" without indicating what form this expression was to take. The East Europeans and Non-Aligned countries who participated in the debate mostly supported the idea of an independent Palestinian State. This became particularly conspicuous when Romania and Non-Aligned countries tabled a draft resolution which called for, among other things, respect for the Palestinian people's 'right to establish a State in Palestine'. Nine countries supported the draft resolution including France while the US voted against with the other West Europeans abstaining. ⁹²

The obstacle caused by the US vetoes throughout the second half of the 1970s finally precipitated the calling of an Emergency Special Session of the General Assembly in July 1980. The Security Council had met in March and April during which a large number of delegations had made repeated calls for a resolution going beyond the provisions

of Resolution 242.⁹³ However, a Tunisian draft resolution reflecting these positions was vetoed by the US.⁹⁴ Subsequently, Senegal called for the convening of an Emergency Special Session invoking the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution. The session met in July and adopted Resolution ES 7/2 by a vote of 112 in favour to 7 against with 24 abstentions which recognised the right of the Palestinian people "to exercise their right to self-determination including the right to an independent state."⁹⁵

Beside the fact that the Security Council did become a forum where the Palestinian problem was discussed one other development occurred with important implications to the mobilisation process. The procedural decisions on the participation in the Council of states, bodies and persons from outside the Council call only for nine votes and are not subject to a veto. This enabled the Council to allow the PLO to participate in its deliberations. This in itself can be regarded as a significant development in respect to the Palestinian problem. Firstly, the invitation accorded to the PLO can be seen as a recognition of the PLO's centrality to the question. Secondly, it gave the PLO the possibility of raising the rights of the Palestinians directly in the most prestigious main organ of the UN. Hence, it gained effective status for lobbying and mobilising support for the cause it represents. Thirdly, to invite a non-state entity to participate in the work of the Council as if it was a state can be regarded as according a significant degree of prestige to the PLO.

8.5.3.2 The General Assembly

It was the General Assembly within the UN family that became the major focus of attention. The 29th session of the Assembly began with two significant developments that set a pattern for the post 1973 period. Firstly, the Assembly at the request of 56 countries asked the Secretary General to include an item entitled "Question of Palestine"

on the agenda.⁹⁶ Secondly, this new agenda item, having been allocated directly for debate in the plenary, the Assembly was also asked to consider a proposal put forward by 72 delegations inviting the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people to participate in the Assembly's deliberations concerning the item.⁹⁷ The proposal was adopted by 105 votes in favour to 4 against with 20 abstentions as Resolution 3210 (XXIX), on 14 October 1974.

These developments were significant for three reasons. Firstly, the 'Question of Palestine', after having been excluded from the formal agenda of the General Assembly since the seventh session, was reintroduced. Secondly, the high salience of the issue to a large majority in Assembly was evident in the allocation of the item to the plenary and in the active participation of a great number of delegations in the debate. Thirdly, it culminated in the adoption of resolutions recognising the right of the Palestinian people to national independence and granting the PLO observer status with the Assembly.

Resolution 3236 (XXIX), of 22 November 1974, affirmed "the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people" including their 'right to national independence'. This resolution adopted by a vote of 89 in favour to 8 against, with 37 abstentions took the political rights of the Palestinians one significant step further compared to the previous session. Although in the previous session Resolution 3089 D (XVIII), of 7 December 1973, referring to the political rights of the Palestinians had received approximately the same level of support in a vote of 87 in favour to 6 against, with 33 abstentions, the new one was different on four substantive points. It recognised;

- i) the right to national independence and sovereignty rather than the more general reference to 'the right to self-determination'.
- ii) the inalienable rights of the Palestinian people are indispensable for the solution of the Question of Palestine and that the Palestinian people was a principal party in the establishment of a just and

lasting peace, previously the 'Palestinian people' was not referred to as 'the principal body'.

iii) the right of the Palestinian people to regain its rights by all means in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

iv) and it appealed to all states and international organisations to extend their support to the Palestinian people in its struggle to restore their rights in accordance with the Charter.

The first two points expanded and redefined the political rights of the Palestinians while the last two were completely new elements. Resolutions on the 'Importance of the Universal Realization of the Right to self-Determination' and 'the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' had regularly raised these last two points in respect to people under colonial and alien domination. However, it was the first time that these points had been raised directly within the context of the 'Question of Palestine'.

In the second new development in 1974, the Assembly adopted, by a vote of 95 in favour to 17 against with, 19 abstentions, a resolution which accorded the PLO the status of a permanent observer. The PLO, as it was noted earlier on, had already been invited to attend a number of UN Conferences and had also been participating in the work of a number of Third World regional organisations. In the context of the UN, this resolution enabled the PLO to participate "in the sessions and the work of the General Assembly, ... of all international conferences convened under the auspices of the Assembly and of other organs" in the capacity of a permanent observer.⁹⁸

This development had two consequences. Firstly, it meant that the PLO gained access to practically all parts of the UN, enabling it to raise various aspects of the Palestinian

problem in a variety of forums.⁹⁹ Secondly, it has also meant that the PLO has had to develop and articulate policy on many issues. The first factor ensured that the Palestinian issue reached numerous UN agendas and opened possibilities for the PLO delegations to develop networks of communications and engage in a wide range of lobbying. The second consequence meant that the PLO, or at least their delegations at the UN, became absorbed in a socialisation process that contributed towards the development amongst certain Palestinian circles of preferences for the achievement of a solution to the Palestinian problem by diplomatic rather than violent means.¹⁰⁰

Two further developments occurred during the remaining parts of the period under study. Firstly, by Resolution 3375 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, the PLO was invited to participate in all UN efforts to solve the Middle East problem, on an equal footing with other parties. This became an endorsement of the centrality of the PLO in efforts directed towards the resolution of the Middle East conflict. The Palestinian problem was not any more a by-product of Arab-Israeli wars but the main and central element in the conflict. Secondly, the Assembly in Resolution 3376 (XXX) of 10 November 1975, having declared the Palestinian problem a threat to international peace, decided to establish the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People. The Committee which was composed of 22 members, subsequently enlarged to 24, was given the duty of considering and recommending to the General Assembly a programme for the implementation of the rights of the Palestinian people.

The Committee, which was composed mostly of Non-Aligned countries, played a crucial role in the further expansion of the political rights of the Palestinian people from 'the right to national independence' to the clearer and firmer expression of 'the right to establish a State'. Over the

years during the discussions of the reports prepared by the Committee, an increasing number of delegations began to refer to an 'independent Palestinian State'. These points were eventually taken up by the 7th Emergency Special Session resolution in July 1980. Although, this resolution was far from receiving unanimous support it nevertheless recognised and defined the basis of a future Palestinian state that would be established in parts of Palestine occupied by Israel in June 1967.

A further development was the spread of the Palestinian problem to other parts of the UN. It did not remain an issue limited to the General Assembly in plenary and to the Security Council. As Sharif notes the Palestinian issue came "to permeate all major UN General Assembly Committees, subsidiary committees and commissions as well as agencies".¹⁰¹ The diagram below shows the parts of the UN which have dealt with the Palestinian issue. Sharif's version of the diagram excludes certain parts of the UN that ought to be included to produce a more complete picture of the relationship between various parts of the UN and the Palestinian problem.

Firstly, Sharif appears to exclude the Sixth Committee of the General Assembly, the Legal Committee, from his diagram. However, considering that this committee took up the problem of terrorism which led certain delegations to bring up the Palestinian problem during the deliberations to define terrorism it seems that the figure needs to be enlarged to include the Legal Committee as well. Secondly, as a result of the implementations of Resolutions 3237 (XXIX) and 3247 (XXIX) the PLO gained access to practically all Specialised Agencies with the exception of GATT, the IMF and the World Bank. The fact that the nature of this access gave the PLO the possibility of raising the Palestinian problem formally as well as informally warrants the inclusion of the other Specialised Agencies, which have been left out. Finally, Resolution 3237 (XIX) also entitled

the PLO to participate in the work of UN Conferences called under auspices of the General Assembly. The above additions should be made to complete the picture that shows the extent to which the Palestinian issue has penetrated the UN system.




Diagram 8.1: The UN system as it relates to the Palestinian problem¹⁰²

As Table 8.8 shows beside the fact that the Palestinian problem became a major issue on the UN agenda and the content of Assembly resolutions grew in strength throughout the 1970s, the political support expressed in votes for the Palestinian cause increased too. The major changes occurred amongst the divided 'West Europeans and others Group' and the Latin Americans. In the case of the Western group substantive numbers of relatively pro-Israeli countries moved to a 'intermediate' position while a group of mostly South Europeans continued to maintain

their pro-Palestinian position. It should be noted that the group of countries with a intermediate position were mostly European Community countries. In their Venice Declaration of June 1980 they had formally recognised "the right of the Palestinians to self-determination" but then abstained on most General Assembly resolutions because they believed these resolutions did not adequately state the right of Israel to exist.

TABLE 8.8: Distribution of support across two sessions*

	West Europe		Latin America		Africa		Asia	
	1974	1980	1974	1980	1974	1980	1974	1980
	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Highly pro-Pals.	19	22	44	87	96	98	88	91
Medium pro-Pals.	24	17	19	4	-	2	12	9
Intermediate	24	52	19	9	4	-	-	-
Medium pro-Isr.	29	4	-	-	-	-	-	-
Highly pro-Isr.	5	4	19	-	-	-	-	-
No. of Countries	21	23	16	23	23	36	17	23

*Percentages are based upon countries meeting the minimum attendance levels.

The change in Latin American views was of a particularly dramatic nature as 87% of Latin American countries had become pro-Palestinian by 1980 compared to 44% in 1974. Furthermore, many Latin American countries which had been pro-Israeli in the previous period and had maintained strong diplomatic ties with Israel moved to a intermediate position.¹⁰³ No doubt in this the influence of the Non-Aligned Movement, particularly in getting some Latin American members of the Movement to recognise the cognitive linkage between colonial struggles and the Palestinian struggle was central. To this, one also needs to add the pressure generated by high support for the Palestinian cause amongst the rest of the Third World. This has resulted, on the part of some Latin Americans, in a concern about being associated with positions regarded as untenable within the anti-colonial stance of the Non-aligned Movement.

8.6 Conclusion

The Palestinians from the very early days of the UN enjoyed either direct or indirect access to the General Assembly. However, in a Western and Latin American dominated UN this accessibility was not enough to prevent the Palestinian problem from losing its political nature. Third World membership to the UN began to increase at a time when the Palestinian problem in the minds of most delegations was firmly entrenched as a by-product of the Arab-Israeli conflict that required a technical-humanitarian solution. Hence, the increase in Third World membership did not immediately change the attitudes held towards the Palestinian problem. Instead it precipitated a process that began to change the structure as well as the concerns of the UN.

Most issues of concern to the North, such as Cold War related matters, became overtaken by matters concerning decolonisation and economic development. The change in the membership precipitated structural changes that led the Third World to have a greater say in decision making as well as in attitude formation. This brought about a conducive environment for a mobilisation process to alter the image held of the Palestinian problem to gain ground.

It was also during the 1960s that a new Palestinian national movement began to emerge. The Palestinian delegations derived from this movement coupled with radical Arab delegations began to project a different image of the Palestinian problem. They began to stress the political nature of the problem and in the context of the growing resistance movement in Palestine described the problem as a national liberation against occupation and a struggle for self-determination. As these delegations argued the similarities between the situation in Palestine and in other places experiencing colonial dominations their

arguments gradually found a receptive audience prepared to use their anti-colonial values in judging the nature of the Palestinian problem.

The establishment of a cognitive linkage between the Palestinian problem and other colonial problems became a source of support for the Palestinian cause. Naturally, this too did not happen overnight. The first signs in the form of Assembly decisions appeared in the late 1960s when with small majorities the Palestinian Arabs became recognised as a people entitled to self-determination as guaranteed by the Decolonisation Declaration. First it was mostly countries closely associated with the Arabs and in the fore front of the anti-colonial struggle that lend their support. Through this first basis of support the Palestinians gained access to a larger audience that became expressed to efforts directed towards achieving some degree of cognitive congruence in their perception of problems of Southern Africa and the Palestinian problem.

In this chapter the mobilisation process that changed the image of the Palestinian problem held by the Assembly was examined with very little attention to the possible impact of interactions between mobilisation at different levels. It is the purpose of the final chapter to examine this interaction and see whether the mobilisation process has been one of a linear nature or whether all levels have interacted and fed on each other.

ENDNOTES

- 1 For an analysis of Western, in particular, US influence at the UN in its first decade, see Riggs, R. E. **Politics in the United Nations, A study of the United States influence in the General Assembly**, (The University of Illinois Press, Urbana, Illinois, 1958).
- 2 The definition and membership of each grouping is given in Appendix III.
- 3 For a detailed study of the concerns of the newly independent countries and the impact they had on the politics of the UN, see Kay, D. **The New Nations In the United Nations 1960-1967**, (Colombia University Press, New York, 1970) and Haas, E. "Dynamic Environment and Static System: Revolutionary Regimes in the United Nations", in Gregg, R. and Barkun, M. (eds.) **The United Nations and its Functions; selected readings**, (D.Van Nostrand Company Inc., Princeton, 1968).
- 4 For a distribution of Presidents and Security Council seats up to 1959-1960 see respectively, Bailey, B. **The General Assembly of the United Nations; A study of Procedure and Practice**, (Stevens and Sons Limited, London, 1960) Table IX on p.54 and Hovet, T. **Bloc Politics in the United Nations**, (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960) p.6.
- 5 Xydis, S. "The General Assembly" in Barros, J. (ed.) **The United Nations; Past, Present and Future**, (The Free Press, New York, 1972) p.81.
- 6 For a discussion of the function and role of elected officers of the Assembly see Werners, S. **The Presiding Officers in the United Nations** (F.Bohn, Haarlem, 1967).
- 7 UN Doc. A/PV 2281, 21 November 1974, p.76.
- 8 **Arab Report and Record**, (1974: 499).
- 9 For a discussion of the origins and the politics flowing from the 'gentleman's agreement' see Goodwin, G. **Britain and the United Nations**, (Oxford University Press, London, 1957) pp.240-241 and Bailey (1960: 164-165).
- 10 Bailey, (1960: 167).
- 11 The general pattern that emerged from the first election of non-permanent members to the Security Council was;

Latin America	2
Middle East	1
East Europe	1
West Europe	1
Commonwealth	1

Goodwin, (1957: 40) and Hovet, (1960: 5).

The inadequacy of this criteria in meeting Third World demands for better representation becomes quite evident from the way by 1965 it excluded 36 of the 117 UN members from being eligible for elections. There were 11 Asian, 4 North African, 18 Francophone African and 3 other Africa countries which did not fit into any of the above geographical groupings.

- 12 Since the early 1960s there has been a growing tendency for the Soviet Union and East Europeans to vote together with the Third world. This obviously further strengthens the position of the Third World in the Security Council. For a study that notes the beginnings of a trend towards growing Third World and East European convergence in Security Council politics and voting see Todd, E. "An Analysis of Security Council Voting Behaviour" **Western Political Quarterly** Vol.22, (March).
- 13 UN Doc. S/PV 1859, 4 December 1975, p.3. On the issue of PLO participation in the Security Council debates it is interesting to note the President's, who was the representative of the USSR, role in the adoption of a majority statement that it "is the understanding of the majority of the Security Council that when it reconvenes on 12 January 1976 in accordance with paragraph (a) of resolution 381 (1975) the representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organisation will be invited to participate in the debate", (UN Doc. S/PV 1856, 30 November 1975, p.16) The significance of this statement in terms of prejudging a future meeting in a favourable way to the Third World position is made quite evident by West European representatives statements critical of the decision. The UK representative's remark summarises the Western European position that "in accordance with the established procedures and rules of the Council the question of participation in any meetings of the Council is a matter which has to be decided at the time of those meetings themselves", (UN Doc. S/PV 1856, 30 November 1975, p.41). For a report on the politics around this statement see, "Mandate of Golan Heights Force Renewed; PLO invitation to Mid-East Favored" **UN Monthly Chronicle**, No.11 (December 1975).
- 14 Although to a certain extent outdated the most prominent and thorough study on UN political groupings is still Hovet's work (1960) see particularly pp.29-101. A more recent but less comprehensive coverage of UN groupings is in Kaufmann, **United Nations Decision Making** (Sijthoff & Noordhoof, The Netherlands, 1980) pp.87-90.
- 15 Kaufmann, (1980: 90-92).
- 16 For a discussion of the participation of petitioners in

the work of the General Assembly on decolonisation see, Zuijdwijk, T. **Pettioning the United Nations** (St.Martin's Press, New York, 1982) Chapter V.

- 17 UN Doc. A/6835, 20 September 1967.
- 18 UN. Doc. A/8086 and Add. 1, 2 October 1970.
- 19 Resolution 2621 (XXV), 12 October 1970.
- 20 Resolution 2874, 20 December 1971.
- 21 Zuijdwijk, (1982: 213).
- 22 UN Doc. A/C.4/744, 22 September 1972.
- 23 Resolution 3280 (XIX), 10 December 1974.
- 24 See amendements to the recommendations of the Credentials Committee declining recognition of South African credentials; A/L 8142, 13 November 1970, by a vote of 60 to 42, 12 abstentions; A/8628, 20 December 1971, 60 in favour to 36 against, with 22 abstentions; A/8921 and Corr.1, 8 December 1972, 65 in favour to 40 against, with 21 abstentions; A/9179, 5 October 1973, 72 in favour to 37 against, with 13 abstentions. For a detailed discussion of the rejection of the South African credentials see Ciobanu, D. "Credentials of Delegations and Representation of Member States at the United Nations" **International and Comparative Quarterly**, Vol.25 (April 1976).
- 25 The Assembly approved the credentials of representatives of Portugal on a clear understanding that they represented only continental Portugal, UN Doc. A/9179/Add.1 and Corr.1), 17 December 1973, 93 in favour to 14 against, with 21 abstentions.
- 26 12 Latin Americans and 6 Africans joined the West Europeans in abstaining from this crucial resolution which had received 61 in favour to 34 against, with France not participating, (**General Assembly Official Records**, Annexes, 16th session, Vol.3, pp.3-4). For a discussion of the Algerian problem at the UN particularly in relation to African countries see Nweke, G. A. **Harmonization of African Foriegn Policies, 1955-1975** (African Studies Center, Boston University, Boston, 1980) pp.39-44.
- 27 This usually took the form of a willingness and readiness on the part of Arab delegations and Islamic ones, such as Afganistan, to raise and support the political rights of the Palestinian Arabs. To this one can also add the fact that there were highly positioned Palestinian Arabs within various Arab delegations inclined to raise the political rights of their own people, irrespective of their citizenship. A.Shukairy

was one such interesting Palestinian personality, who before becoming the Chairman of the PLO had worked for the Saudi and then the Syrian UN delegations. More recently another Palestinian, B.Hammad as head of the UAE delegation actually drafted Resolution 3237 that granted the PLO observership status with the UN. A.Sayegh is another Palestinian who as the Kuwaiti representative played a central role in the adoption of Resolution 3379 (XXX) equating zionism with racism.

- 28 During a Security Council debate called by Israel on 12 October 1966, Mali, Nigeria and Uganda referred to the need for the Security Council to deal with the substance of the Palestinian problem for lasting peace in the Middle East. However, it was not immediately clear as to what they meant with reference to 'the substance' of the Palestinian problem. Nevertheless, the position expressed was quite different than the one advanced by the West Europeans and Latin Americans, (Security Council Official Records, 21st year, meetings 1309-1319, 20 October-4 November 1966).
- 29 SCOR, 22nd year, meeting 1382, 22 November 1967.
- 30 GAOR, 23rd session, Special Political Committee, meeting 612, 11 November 1968.
- 31 Report of Commissioners-General of UNRWA (for the period 1 July 1968-30 June 1969), A/7601.
- 32 The Commissioner-General in his 1970 report not only noted the growth in political consciousness and influence of the PLO on questions pertaining to the administration of refugee camps but also observed the growing demands to have the PLO included in future UNRWA consultations on its activities, Report of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA (for the period 1 July 1969-30 June 1970), A/8013.
- 33 'The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories' was established pursuant to Resolution 2443 (XIII) of 19 December 1968. For a description of the Special Committee's composition, terms of reference, its operations, the content of its investigations and a short summary of the first ten annual reports see Zuidwijk (1982: Chapter X).
- 34 UN Doc., A/8089 October 1970. See GAOR, 25th session, SPC meetings 727, 744-751, December 1970 for a summary of the first report and the debate surrounding it.
- 35 See above Chapter 1, pp.8-9.
- 36 I.Tannous was, the General Secretary of the Representatives of the Arab Refugees in Lebanon. He addressed the Special Political Committee (then known

as the Ad Hoc Committee) and mainly elaborated on the refugee problem, (GAOR, 7th session, Ad Hoc Committee, 45th meeting, 19 January 1952). This practice continued unchallenged until the 15th session of the Assembly. At this session 10 Arab countries called on the Chairman of the Special Political Committee to extend an invitation to the 'Palestine Arab Delegation' to address the Committee, (A/SPC/48, 8 November 1960). The call for such a delegation was seen by certain members as a major departure from established practice. The ensuing procedural debate over the status of the PAD was concluded when Arab countries noted that there was no claim that this 'Palestine Arab Delegation' represented the Palestinian Arab people. Subsequently the Chairman of the Special Political Committee granted the Delegation to speak to the Committee on the understanding that there would be no departure from past procedure and the persons making up the Delegation would "confine themselves to facts and not to depart from questions dealt with in the Directors (UNRWA) report", (GAOR, 15th Session, 200th meeting, Special Political Committee, 17 November 1960).

Another development occurred during the 18th session of the Assembly when 13 Arab countries requested that "the Palestine Arab Delegation, representing the Arab people of Palestine, the principal party to the Palestine Question" be invited to speak to the Special Political Committee, (A/SPC/89, 29 October 1963). The invitation was granted however on the understanding that it did not mean an extension of any kind of recognition to the mentioned delegation. A. Shukairy, who until then had been serving as the head of the Saudi Arabian delegation, addressed the Committee. In his speech he declared that "The problem of Palestine was essentially a colonial issue. The native people had been uprooted, dispossessed and expelled from their country by aliens behaving like the colonizers who had settled in Asia and Africa" and claimed that the problem could only be solved "on the basis of the right of the indigenous people of Palestine to self-determination", (399th meeting, Special Political Committee, 5 November 1963). The 'Palestine Arab Delegation' continued to be invited to address the Committee until 1974. However, after the appearance of the PLO in 1965 only very few countries continued to sponsor requests to invite it.

- 37 The full debate and the decision can be found in *ibid.* 434th to 437th meetings.
- 38 These measures were reported in the **Report of the Secretary General to the General Assembly On the implementation of Resolution 3118 (XXVIII) UN Doc. A/9638, 22 May 1974.**
- 39 The PLO was invited as an observer to the 27th WHA (Geneva, May 1974) [WHO Resolution WHA 27.37, 27th WHA, A/27/VR/13(1974)] the 17th UPU Congress (Lausanne May-

July 1974) [Resolution Nos. C3 and C4, UPU, Congress de Lausanne, Decisions autres que celle Modifiant les Actes (Resolutions, Voeux, etc.) (1974) 9] The PLO was also invited to participate at a number of UN Conferences: International Committee of the Red Cross, The Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflicts (Geneva, February-March, 1974), the Third World Population Conference (Bucharest, August 1974), the annual International Civil Aviation Organisation meeting (Montreal, September-October 1974), the ICRC's Conference of Government Experts on Weapons that May Cause Unnecessary Suffering or Have Indiscriminate Effects (Lucerne, October-November 1974) and the World Food Conference (Rome, November 1974). The PLO was also invited as an observer to ITU Plenipotentiary Conferences (Malaga and Torremolinos, September-October 1973) even before the adoption of Resolution 3118 (XXVIII). In the preparation of this footnote Silverburg, R. "The Palestine Liberation Organisation In the United Nations: Implications for International Law and Relations", *Israeli Law Review*, Vol.12, No.3 1977, pp.382-3, has been extensively used.

- 40 Travers, P. "The Legal Effect of United Nations Action In Support of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and the National Liberation Movements of Africa", *Harvard International Law Journal*, Vol.17 (Summer 1976), No.3 p.570.
- 41 UN Doc. S/PV 1856, 30 November 1975.
- 42 UN Doc. S/11893, December 1975. For a detailed study of the Security Council's decision see, Gross, L. "Voting in the Security Council and the PLO" *American Journal of International Law*, Vol.70 (1976), No.3.
- 43 UN Doc. S/PV 1859, 4 December 1975.
- 44 Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the Security Council refers to the invitation of "Any Member of the United Nations which is not a member of the Security Council may be invited, as a result of the decision of the Security Council, to participate, without vote, in the discussion of any question brought before the Security Council, when the Security Council considers that the interests of that Member are specially affected, or when a Member brings a matter to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35(1) of the Charter".
- 45 Nicol, D. (ed.) *Paths to Peace; The UN Security Council and its Presidency* (Pergamon Press, New York, 1981) p.324.

- 46 * Ibid.
- 47 UN Doc. A/8163, November 1970.
- 48 In the context of a discussion of the politics surrounding the participation of national liberation movements in the 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law Baxter notes that "peoples fighting against ... alien occupation" were Palestinians. Baxter, R. "Humanitarian Law or Humanitarian Politics: The 1974 Diplomatic Conference on Humanitarian Law", *Harvard International Law Journal*, Vol.16 (1975), p.12.
- 49 The Sixth Committee during the 27th session was allocated an additional item concerning the prevention of international terrorism. However, a Saudi amendment to the title of this additional item ensured an examination of the "underlying causes" of terrorism, (A/L.673, September 1972). This opened the way for various Arab and non-Arab delegations to link aspects of international terrorism to the situation prevailing in Palestine, (For speeches including such points, see GAOR, 27th session, Sixth Committee meetings 1311-1314, September 1972 and meetings 1355-1370, 1372, November 1972 and 1386-1390 in December 1972). Also speeches critical of attempts to describe the struggle of Palestinian and African peoples to achieve independence as terrorism were delivered, (see for example the speeches of Oman, Zambia and Mauritania during the 1370th meeting of the Sixth Committee, November 1972 and the Chinese speech during the 1368th meeting).
- 50 The Assembly adopted Resolution 3034(XXVII) on 18 December 1972, by a vote of 79 in favour to 35 against, with 17 abstentions. This resolution reaffirmed "the right of self-determination of all peoples under colonial and racist regimes and other forms of alien domination" and "upheld the legitimacy of the struggle of national liberation movements." The resolution also called for the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the problem of international terrorism.
- 51 Resolution 1514(XV), 14 December 1969.
- 52 The lack of opposition to Resolution 1514 is a useful measure of the progress the UN has made in recognising the legitimacy of 'the right of self-determination', considering that less than a decade earlier Resolution 637A (VII), of 16 December 1952, concerning the rights of peoples and nations to self-determination had been adopted by a vote of 40 in favour to 14 against with 6 abstentions. Self-determination "in the decade of the 60s means much more than it did in 1945. The new manner of conceiving the colonial problem, and even the changes that have taken place in the way the United Nations interprets and applies the Charter's institutions, are above all a consequence of changing

reality. But the Declaration not only reflects the change that has been wrought; it also symbolizes and concretizes a new politico-juridical conception: the definite repudiation and end of colonialism". (Castaneda, J. **Legal Effects of United Nations Resolutions**, Colombia University Press, New York, 1969) p.175.

The significance of the adoption of Resolution 1514 without opposition is taken even further by the Mallisons when they noted that "Since there were no opposing votes, this resolution must be interpreted as reflecting the stated legal views of the then full membership of the United Nations". (Mallison, T. and Mallison, S. "The National Rights of the People of Palestine, **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.IX (Summer 1980), No.4, p.124) The legal strength of this resolution is also noted by R.Higgins, (Higgins, R. **The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations**, (Oxford University Press, London, 1963, p.7) For a short discussion of differing views on the legal status of Resolution 1514 see Bos, M. "The Recognised Manifestations of International Law; A New Theory of 'Sources'", **German Yearbook on International Law**, Vol.20, pp.66-67.

- 53 This was still the case in the years immediately before the 25th session. For example, the decisions of the International Conference on Human Rights, Tehran (22 April-13 May 1968), which were endorsed in Resolution 2442 (XXVIII), of 19 December 1968 (A/7433), extended support for 'the legitimacy of the struggle of the peoples and liberation movements in Southern Africa for the achievement of their national rights'. The resolution did not include the Palestinian struggle. Instead, the Palestinians had to be content with some references to the Israeli violations of human rights in the occupied territories and the recognition of the inalienable rights of the Palestinian refugees, (For a summary of the resolutions adopted by the conference see **The Yearbook of the United Nations**, 1968 pp.538-48). In a similar way in 1969 General Assembly Resolution 2588 B(XXIV), of 15 December 1969 and Resolution 2548 (XXIV), of 11 December 1969, reaffirmed "the right of all peoples to self-determination and the legitimacy of their struggle to exercise their right" without mentioning the Palestinians.
- 54 Lall, A. **The United Nations and the Middle East Crisis, 1967** (Columbia University Press, New York, 1968) p.213.
- 55 Ibid., p.276.
- 56 For the speeches of the Palestinian Arab Delegation and of the PLO see GAOR, 22nd session, SPC meeting 587, 13 December 1967 and SPC meeting 589, 14 December 1967.
- 57 The year 1968 saw an increase in Palestinian resistance

- activities, which included the battle of Karameh in March 1968. This battle, which precipitated a Security Council meeting (18-25 March), was seen by the Palestinians as a major victory. The increase in Palestinian resistance both at the local and international level seems to have had an impact on UN delegations' perceptions. This, for example, is quite evident in the observation of the Tunisian delegation that "a new factor had emerged in the Middle East as the Palestinian people took increasing responsibility for the struggle to recover their rights in their own country", (GAOR, 23rd session, SPC 625th meeting, 2 December, 1968).
- 58 For PLO and PAD speeches see GAOR, 23rd session, SPC, 623th meeting, 27 November 1968 and 628th meeting, 5 December 1968.
 - 59 Algeria, Iraq and Syria were countries whose delegations during a Security Council meeting made speeches to the effect that the struggle of the Palestinian people was of an anti-colonial nature. Iraq went as far as drawing similarities between Israel and South Africa by arguing that the Israeli regime was of an racist-settler nature, (SCOR, 23rd year, 1411th meeting, 2 April 1968). Algeria on the other hand saw the Palestinian struggle to be part and parcel of national liberation struggles elsewhere, (ibid. 1410th meeting, 30 March). Jordan too noted that the situation in Angola, Southern Rhodesia and South Africa was no different from the struggle of the Arabs of Palestine, (ibid., 1412th meeting, 4 April).
 - 60 Resolution 2649 (XXV), 30 November 1970.
 - 61 **The Yearbook of the United Nations** 1970 p.532. The vote was taken in response to an Israeli amendment to delete the word 'Palestine'. (A/C.3/L.1804, 4 November 1968).
 - 62 Mallison and Mallison, (1980: 125).
 - 63 The Afghani amendment to insert "and the peoples under alien domination" was adopted by a vote of 65 in favour to 2 against, with 39 abstentions, (A/L.622, 14 December 1970).
 - 64 Resolution 2787 (XXVI), 6 December 1971, was adopted by a vote of 76 in favour to 10 against, with 33 abstentions. A series of amendments to ECOSOC Resolution 1592(L) inserted the Palestinian issue. However, this did not pass unchallenged. Barbados and Uganda tried to remove direct references to Palestine, (A/C.3/L.1888, A/C.3/1889). However, these attempts were defeated by 47 in favour to 26 against, with 41 abstentions when the Committee voted on a Moroccan oral amendment reintroducing the references to Palestine, (GAOR, 26th session, Annexes, agenda item 55, pp.3-5).

- 65 GAOR, 26th session, SPC 801st meetings, 15 December 1971.
- 66 Ibid. and GAOR, 28th session, Second Committee, 1580th meeting, 7 December 1973.
- 67 Resolution 3151 G, Burundi amendment A/9232/Add.1, paragraph 28 adopted by 63 in favour to 31 against with 27 abstentions, (GAOR, 28th session, annexes, agenda item 42, p.10).
- 68 See *The Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1974 p.133 and GAOR, 29th session, Plenary 2320th meeting, 16 December 1974.
- 69 However, it should be noted that, during the 30th session, an attempt to get Zionism declared as "a form of racism and racial discrimination" did not go unchallenged. Firstly, Sierra Leone and Zambia proposed to defer the consideration of the matter to the next session. This is usually a practice employed with potentially embarrassing and contentious issues. Secondly, Ivory Coast and Liberia voted against the resolution with twelve Africans abstaining. Although Resolution 3379 (XXX) of 10 November 1975 was adopted, the controversial nature of its content was evident in the distribution of votes: 72 in favour to 35 against with, 32 abstentions, (GAOR, 30th session, Third Committee 2132-2134th meetings and Plenary 2400th meeting).
The politics behind this resolution was a complicated one. The OAU and the Non-Aligned had already taken decisions treating the Israeli and South African regimes as being racist. However, these decisions had stopped short of actually equating Zionism with racism and hence with apartheid. The resolution needs to be seen in the context of earlier Third World attempts to commit themselves to Israel's expulsion from the UN. To some delegates it seemed that, in view of the overwhelming support received for the political rights of the Palestinian people and the condemnation against Israel's reluctance to ensure these rights, this would be a natural consideration. This expectation was heightened by the fact that South Africa had been suspended from participating in the work of the General Assembly for its colonialist and racist policies and the Assembly had for sometime been noting the strong links and similarities between Israel and South Africa. However, in the face of strong US and West European reaction to potential initiatives to expell or suspend Israel these intentions were not put into practice. It is in relation to this background that a resolution questioning the legitimacy of Israel might best be better understood. Nevertheless it needs to be noted that although the Palestinian struggle did get integrated to anti-colonialism it seems this was done in relation to national liberation struggles against

colonialism and it did not necessarily apply to the anti-racist aspect of anti-colonialism, at least in the minds of many Third World delegates. Hence the equating of Zionism to apartheid was rather less easy. This may be best captured by the remark of the Dahomey representative, who had not only voted in favour of Resolution 3379 but had also sponsored it. He noted that while in essence Zionism was not related to apartheid it was in its manifestations easily comparable to racism and racial discrimination, (*The Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1975 p.592).

- 70 See above Chapter 1, p.13, and Tomeh, G. "When the UN Dropped the Palestinian Question", *Journal of Palestine Studies*, Vol.IV (1974 Autumn), No.1.
- 71 A/AC.61/L.23/Rev.3, 8 December 1952. GAOR, seventh session, SPC 36th meeting.
- 72 A/SPC/L.116, 17 November 1965 failed by a vote of 34 in favour to 38 against, with 23 abstention, (GAOR, 20th session, SPC 459th meeting).
- 73 A/SPC/L.100 and Add.1, 21 November 1963. This draft resolution supported by 15 Third World countries was later withdrawn.
- 74 Lall, (1968: 128-168).
- 75 Ibid., p.156.
- 76 Ibid., pp.134-5.
- 77 For references to the Palestinian Arabs right to self-determination, (see GAOR, eighteenth session, SPC 398-416th meetings). Most Arab countries referred to the 'right of the Palestinians' without specifying the right to 'self-determination'. The refugees right to return was frequently mentioned. Iraq were one of the few Arab countries referring to the Palestinians right to 'self-determination and national independence', (meetings 403 of 11 November and 405 of 12 November).
- 78 This was best captured by the Foreign Minister of Tunisia, "Today, in spite of affirmations of support and sympathy, the horizon is clouded by the majority of nations represented here particularly by the four great Powers, none of which has ever called into question the actual existence of Israel as a State, whereas in our eyes it is the very existence of Israel which constitutes permanent aggression", (Lall, 1980: 181).
- 79 For the divisions amongst Arabs and the reluctance of the summit to accept PLO proposals put forward by Shukairy calling for "a refusal to negotiate even indirectly with Israel, recognize even the pre-June 5 status-quo, or reach any settlement that may affect the

Palestinian cause", see Quandt, W., Jabber, F. and Lesch, A. **The Politics of Palestinian Nationalism**, (University of California Press, Berkeley, 1973) p.185, as well as Rodinson, M. **Israel and The Arabs**, (Penguin Books, New York, 1982) p.116.

- 80 **SCOR**, 22nd year, 1373th meeting, 9 November 1967.
- 81 List of Security Council meetings precipitated by Palestinian resistance movement's operations prior to the October 1973 war;
i) 25 July to 3 August 1966, ii) 14 October to 4 November 1966, iii) 16 to 25 November 1966, iv) 21 to 24 March 1968, v) 30 March to 4 April 1968, vi) 5 to 16 August 1968, vii) 29 to 31 December 1968, viii) 27 March to 1 April 1969, ix) 13 August to 26 August 1969, x) 12 May to 19 May 1970, xi) 26 to 28 February 1972, xiii) 23 to 26 June 1972, xiv) 10 September 1972, xv) 12 to 21 April 1973, xvi) 6 to 14 June and 20 to 26 July 1973.
- 82 Speeches arguing that resistance was a natural reaction to occupation were made by the representatives of USSR and Hungary in August 1968, (**SCOR**, 23rd Year, 1434-1440th meetings, August 1968) again by the USSR and Spain in March 1969 (**SCOR**, 24th Year, 1482-1485th meetings, March 1969) by France, Yugoslavia and USSR in February 1972, (**SCOR**, 27 Year, 1643-1644th, 1648-1650th meetings).
- 83 Examples of such arguments can be seen in the speeches of Guinea, (**SCOR**, 27th Year, 1644th meeting, February 1972) India (*Ibid.*, 28th Year, 1718th meeting, June 1973).
- 84 See speeches of France and the USSR on the need to expand Resolution 242, (**SCOR**, 28th Year, 1723th-1724th meetings, June 1973 and 1735th meeting July 1973).
- 85 Draft Resolution S/10974, 26 July 1973.
- 86 **SCOR**, 28th Year, 1733-35th meetings 20-26 July.
- 87 China did not participate in the vote because it did not find the wording of the resolution strong enough, (**SCOR**, 28th Year, 1735th meeting, 26 July 1973).
- 88 **The Yearbook of the United Nations**, 1969 p.235-7.
- 89 *Ibid.*, p.237.
- 90 UN Doc. A/L.652 and Add.1 10 December 1971, A/L.652/Rev.1, 13 December 1971.
- 91 The below is a list of failed attempts at the Security Council to adopt resolutions recognising the political

rights of the Palestinians.

1) S/10974, 26 July 1973, sponsored by Non-Aligned countries, referred to the 'rights and legitimate aspirations of the Palestinians', vetoed by the US.

2) S/11898, 8 December 1975, sponsored by Non-Aligned countries, referred to the Palestinians 'right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine', vetoed by the US with Cost Rica abstaining.

3) S/11940, 26 January 1976, sponsored by Non-Aligned countries and Romania, referred to the Palestinians 'right to establish a State in Palestine', vetoed by the US, with Italy, Sweden and the UK abstaining.

4) S/12119, 29 June 1976, sponsored by Non-Aligned countries, referred to the Palestinians 'right to national independence and sovereignty in Palestine', vetoed by the US, with France, Italy, Sweden and the UK abstaining.

5) S/13514, 24 August 1979, sponsored by Senegal, content same as above, not submitted to a vote.

6) S/13911, 28 April 1980, sponsored by Tunisia, referred to the Palestinians 'right to establish an independent State', vetoed by the US, with France, Norway, Portugal and the UK abstaining.

92 SCOR, 30th year, 11-26 January, meetings 1870-1879. A UK amendment to draft resolution S/11940 drawing attention to Resolution 242 and 338 was rejected by a vote of 4 in favour to 2 against, with 9 abstentions.

93 SCOR, 30th year, 31 March-9 April, 29 and 30 April, meetings 2204-2208. 2219, 2220.

94 Tunisian draft resolution S/13911, 28 April 1980.

95 UN Doc. A/ES-7/L.1/Rev.1, 29 July 1980.

96 The initiative for the inclusion of the 'Question of Palestine' had come from Arafat when during the Arab summit in October 1974 the Arab Ministers had agreed to take up the issue of placing the item on the Assembly's agenda, (see Silverburg, 1977: 372). Also see Report on Rabat Arab Summit Secret Sessions in Yodfat, A. and Ornan-Ohanna, Y. PLO Strategy and Tactics (Croom Helm, London, 1981) pp.176-179.

97 This initiative in this case too had come from Arafat and had the initial objection of Egypt "on two accounts; first, the lack of precedent on this matter; second, it (would) get the Arab delegations into a procedural wrangle with those opposed to it from Western and some Latin American countries".

(Correspondence with a Palestinian representative of a Gulf state delegation at the UN.)

- 98 Resolution 3237 (XXIX), 22 November 1974.
- 99 See Appendix VIII for a list of Specialised Agencies which have maintained contacts with the PLO and has allowed the PLO to participate in their work as an observer. The exceptions were the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the GATT.
- 100 Similar points are also made by Freudenschuss, H. "Legal and Political Aspects of the Recognition of National Liberation Movements" **Millenium: Journal of International Studies** Vol.11, No.2 and Fisher, R. "Following in Another's Footsteps: The Acquisition of International Legal Standing by th Palestine Liberation Organisation", **Syracuse Journal of International Law Commerce** Vol.3 (Spring 1975), p.238.
- 101 Sharif, R. "The United Nations and Palestinian Rights, 1974-1979", **Journal of Palestine Studies**, Vol.9 (Autumn 1979), No.1, p.23.
- 102 Sharif, (1979: 39).
- 103 Latin Americans strong ties were evidenced in their tendency to maintain their embassies in Jerusalem. Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, Panama, Uruguay, Venezuela kept their embassies in Jerusalem until when the Security Council adopted Resolution 476, 20 August 1980, asking members to move their embassies from Jerusalem. All the above countries together with the only other country, Netherlands, complied with this decisions, (**S/14248**, 11 November 1980).

CHAPTER NINE

CONCLUSION

9.1 Introduction

So far, in the second part of the thesis the mobilisation process, aimed at changing governmental attitudes towards the Palestinian problem and the aggregation of support associated with this process, have been examined. This was done by applying the mobilisation process model, developed in chapter three, to the Palestinian, the regional and the UN levels of analysis. Yet during this analysis neither the interaction between individual levels of mobilisation nor the feedback processes within each level were studied in detail. It is the main purpose of this concluding chapter to examine these two aspects of the mobilisation process. Furthermore, the chapter will also reconsider certain parts of the mobilisation model in the light of insights obtained from its application to the Palestinian case. This will be done in an effort to achieve a better conceptualisation of how issues are raised on the political agenda. Finally, to complete the general picture of how an item reaches the global political agenda the need to expand the analysis beyond governmental actors will be noted.

9.2 Interactive nature of the growth of support

One striking conclusion that emerges from the application of the mobilisation process model to the Palestinian case is that the aggregation of support across the different levels of analysis was far from being uniform and perfectly hierarchical. During the earlier stages of this research it was expected that the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause would grow in a multi step-wise manner, from one level of analysis to another. As depicted in diagram 9.1 it was speculated that the Palestinian community would be the first group to become mobilised

followed by the Arabs then those groups such as the Islamic world, the Non-Aligned and then the Third World at large. This it was thought would continue until adequate global support was mobilised to reflect itself at the UN level.




Diagram 9.1 Growth of support across different levels represented as multi step-function

However, the analysis emerging from the preceding chapters has to a large extent undermined this line of thought. Instead a more complex and fluid picture of the mobilisation process has emerged. One that is rather difficult to represent by a multi step-function aggregation of support. Instead the different levels appear to interact with each other in a dynamic manner. That is expressions of support at both a lower level as well as at a higher level appear to influence each other. It is possible to group these interactions into three. Those that occur;

- i) from a lower level to a higher one,
- ii) between regional levels,
- iii) from a higher level to a lower one.

9.2.1 From a lower level to a higher one

The best example of a flow of support from a lower level to a higher one is represented by the aggregation of votes to change policy in an international organisation. This

process is quite evident in the workings of the UN General Assembly. In organisations where no votes are taken this process usually takes the form of consensus building in favour of a change in attitudes as reflected in the decision-making processes of the OAU and the Non-Aligned movement.

The second type of interaction occurs when an actor belonging to a lower level of analysis such as the PLO is capable of demonstrating to an actor belonging to higher level of analysis such as an Arab government or a regional political grouping that it is the recipient of a high level of Palestinian support, leading to such an actor expressing support in favour of the PLO and/or the Palestinian cause. An example of such a process is the recognition of the PLO by the Non-Aligned as 'the sole representative of the Palestinian people' at their Algiers summit in September 1973. This expression of support for the PLO accompanied with the granting of Observer status seems to have been significantly influenced by the growing strength of the PLO amongst the Palestinians, which was conspicuously expressed during demonstrations precipitated by the deaths of three prominent PLO officials in April 1973 in Beirut. A more vivid example of this type of interaction is the Egyptian call in May 1976 to grant the PLO full membership of the Arab League in the wake of the West Bank mayoral elections in April 1976, whose results had been generally interpreted as an expression of support for the PLO.¹

9.2.2 Interaction between regional levels

However, it is interesting to note that this Arab League meeting appears, at the same time, to have been influenced by an earlier expression of support coming from another regional group. The influence that the promotion of the PLO, to the status of a full participant at the Non-Aligned Foreign Ministers meeting in Lima in August 1975, had on the above Arab League decision constitutes an example of

the second type of interaction that occurs between two groupings at the regional level.

It is possible to prepare a long list of examples to illustrate such a process. Here we shall limit the examples to a few significant and more apparent ones. In chapter six it was already mentioned that the Non-Aligned Movement played an important role in encouraging wide Latin American support for the Palestinian cause and the PLO. This type of interaction is also evident between Northern regional groupings and countries. For example, it seems Soviet support and commitment to the Palestinian cause played a central role in influencing the US administration to recognise in June 1973 that a settlement in the Middle East "should take into due account the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people".² Similarly, according to Golan the Soviet Union appears to have actually claimed credit for a further favourable shift in the position of the US in 1977 towards the Palestinians.³

The EC's preparedness, as expressed in the Venice Declaration of June 1980, to see the PLO associated with any negotiations towards the solution of the Palestinian problem appears to have been influenced by the decisions of the Arab League. This shift in EC's position towards a more pro-Palestinian one was also affected by the growing prestige of the PLO as well as by pro-Palestinian developments at the UN. This last type of interaction between expressions of support at the UN and the mobilisation of West European support brings us to the final type of interaction.

9.2.3 From a higher to a lower level

The recognition and support that the PLO and the Palestinian cause has received at the UN has influenced mobilisation processes at levels below the UN. Primarily, it increased the standing of the PLO amongst the

Palestinian community. Frangi notes that "Yasser Arafat's speech to the United Nations... led to a series of sympathy demonstrations for the PLO and protests against Israeli occupation" and that growing international recognition accorded to the PLO had a direct impact on the results of the 1976 mayoral elections in the West Bank.⁴

However, probably the most significant aspect of the role of the UN in the mobilisation of support is that the UN in the long run legitimises certain issue-positions at the expense of others. Claude is one prominent scholar who has pointed out this particular role of the UN in world politics.⁵ Kirkpatrick, President Reagan's ex-envoy to the UN, too notes this aspect of the UN. "The cumulative impact of decisions of the U.N. bodies influence opinions all over the world about what is legitimate, what is acceptable."⁶ Jacobsen is another scholar who, in the case of colonialism, points out how the decisions of the UN together with other organisations have delegitimised Western colonialism.⁷

Fisher applies this argument to the role that international recognition of the national liberation movements has had when he notes that such recognition

"allows a people officially to become part of the international decision-making process and gives a sense of illegitimacy to agreements reached without them. It enhances the prestige of their representative entity,... Finally, recognition puts pressure upon states which previously had withheld from dealing with that entity, to reconsider their positions."⁸

To support his argument Fisher offers the case of the Indian government which in January 1975 less than two months after the adoption of Resolutions 3236 (XIX) and 3237 (XIX) responded to a PLO request, reportedly made 'some time back', and recognised the PLO.⁹ It is also interesting to note that the adoption of Resolution 3210 (XIX), 14 October 1974, inviting Arafat to address the Assembly preceded the Arab summit decision to recognise the PLO as 'the sole and legitimate representative of the

Palestinian people' by less than two weeks.

Another less spectacular but nevertheless important example of the influence that developments at the UN can have on the aggregation of support concerns the US. American perceptions of the nature of the Palestinian problem and its salience to the settlement of the Middle East conflict may well have been influenced by the UN. Both Senator Percy, once a member of the US delegation at the UN, in 1974 and the US envoy to the UN, Yost, in 1975 recognised the need to take into account "the legitimate concerns and aspirations of the Palestinians." This change of attitude away from one that was uncritically supportive of Israel is attributed by Lillienthal, to the impact that the UN has had on their thinking.¹⁰ Similarly, to a large extent it was again the necessity of fulfilling the expected role of the President of the Security Council that induced Young another US representative to the UN to have talks with the PLO observer at the UN.¹¹

But probably the most important impact the UN had on the US in general, was the way in which the invitation to Arafat to address the General Assembly attracted high media attention. This opened up a debate on the Palestinian question and put the problem squarely on the public agenda in a way that otherwise might have not happened. May be it is not surprising that it was in the aftermath of this period that the first major US study of the Palestinian problem, which came to play an important role in the formation of US governmental attitudes, was prepared by a prestigious institute with close ties to successive US administrations.¹²

This type of interaction is not limited to the ones between the UN and lower levels. It can also occur between regional and governmental levels. One example of this is the way in which the Arab League influenced the position of Jordan on the question of PLO's status in relation to the

Palestinians residing in the West Bank. It is possible to point to a similar process between the EC and some EC members such as Denmark, Netherlands and Belgium. These countries that had traditionally held pro-Israeli positions changed their perceptions of the Palestinian Question to some extent as a result of EC influence. The same process, on the Palestinian Question, is evident in the relationship between the OAU and some conservative African governments such as Gabon, Liberia and Ivory Coast.

So far we have tried to demonstrate how support for the Palestinian cause and the PLO at one particular level has had an impact on the mobilisation process at some other level. The above examples although not exhaustive should be enough to point towards the interactive nature of the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause. However, before we proceed to look at the dynamic nature of the mobilisation arising from 'positive feedback' processes at each level, there remains one other aspect of the interactive process that needs to be examined.

9.3 Convergence of issue positions

Another weakness of depicting the aggregation of support as a multi step-function is that it naturally fails to account for the moderating effect that the above interactive process has on the demands put forward by initiators. To assume that support is simply lent or withheld from initiators' demands that remain unchanged throughout the mobilisation process is rather simplistic. In chapter three it was mentioned that those groups trying to put a new item on a political agenda or modify the definition of an existing item will frequently find themselves moderating their demands in an attempt to broaden their basis of support. This process is quite evident in the case of the Palestinian problem at all levels of analysis.

That is the PLO as the main initiator has had to modify its

stance on a number of crucial stakes. Two such stakes have arisen from the territorial aspects of an eventual settlement of the Palestinian problem and the methods to be followed in order to achieve this settlement. The position held by the PLO in the 1960s had been one that stressed the unity of Palestine and the primacy of armed struggle to achieve it. However, this position began to change in the early 1970s as the PLO interacted with actors from all the three levels in its efforts to gain support. These were mostly actors that favoured a solution to the Palestinian problem that did not jeopardise the existence of Israel within some recognised boundaries.

It is important to point out that most of these actors in the 1960s had once seen the Palestinian question as a by-product of the Arab-Israeli conflict and treated it as a refugee problem that basically needed humanitarian and technical solutions. Yet by the 1970s many of these actors had reconsidered their perceptions of the Palestinian problem and had demonstrated a tendency to support the political rights of the Palestinian people. This seems to point towards a situation whereby as a result of the mobilisation process the PLO and the prospective supporters of the Palestinian cause have converged towards a relatively common new issue position. Below we shall offer examples from each level to illustrate this particular dimension of the interactive aspect of the mobilisation process.

9.3.1 Convergence at the communal level

The initial advocacy and use of armed struggle by various Palestinian guerrilla groups had played an important role in putting the Palestinian problem on the political agenda and in awakening a Palestinian national consciousness. However, it appears that the gradual acceptance by the PLO of the idea of a Palestinian state alongside Israel played a crucial role in expanding its basis of support within the

Palestinian community. The acceptance of this idea by the PLO constitutes an interesting example of the interaction between the PLO and other actors from the Palestinian community supportive of the idea. The process appears to have led to a compromise on the part of the PLO in return for broader Palestinian support.

It is rather difficult to determine where the idea of an 'independent national authority' or a 'mini-state' first originated. But by the early 1970s the debate concerning the possibility of replacing the idea of a 'secular democratic state' through armed struggle with the idea of 'mini-state' as the eventual goal of the PLO had already gathered some momentum. It seems at the Palestinian community level the idea first began to gain some ground in the West Bank. This, for example, is evident in the support lent to the idea of a 'mini-state' by the mayor of Hebron in July 1973 followed by an official endoresment of it by the Palestinian National Front soon after the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war.¹³

The earlier categorical rejections of this idea in PLO circles began to change in the face of these developments. The PDFLP became the first guerrilla group within the PLO to adopt the idea in December 1973¹⁴ followed by Fatah and Saiqa¹⁵ and eventually by the Palestinian National Council in June 1974. As Coban notes, there was no doubt that the PNF

"had made some contribution to the Twelfth PNC's decision, in June/July 1974, to pursue a political option based on the call for establishing a 'Palestinian national authority' on any parts of Palestine evacuated by Israel."¹⁶

It was not just inputs emanating from the West Bank that brought about a moderation in the policies of the PLO. Similar clear demands were being made from both Arab countries and the Soviet Union. It is possible to argue that the PLO was able to receive greater support from the

Arab League and the Soviets as a result of the compromise arising from its readiness to recognise the possibility of achieving the establishment of a 'mini-state' through diplomatic means. Again the mobilisation process brought the participants closer to each other than they had previously been.

9.3.2 Convergence at the regional levels

In the aftermath of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war, Arab governments in September 1967 had agreed to a policy of 'no negotiation and no recognition' of Israel. Nevertheless, they had remained reluctant to include Shukairy's more dramatic calls that would have amounted to a commitment to liquidate Israel.¹⁷ This reluctance and hence the gap between the PLO and some Arab governments had become more evident when Egypt and Jordan accepted Resolution 242 in November 1967 joined by Syria in March 1972. The preparedness of Arab governments to enter peace negotiations became real in July 1970 when first Egypt then Jordan accepted the Rogers Plan announced in June 1970 and also later cooperated with Jarring's and the OAU mediation missions to the Middle East. Throughout this period fundamental differences remained between the PLO and these Arab governments.

Yet, this situation began to change after the October 1973 war. Resolution 338, of 22 October 1973, had been accepted by Egypt and Israel and preparations towards the convening of a peace conference in Geneva had also gained the support of the Arab summit in Algiers in November 1973. From then on the PLO came under increasing pressure to participate in peace negotiations as well as to accept the idea of a 'mini-state'. The Egyptians had already circulated these ideas in June 1973 but had then met the opposition of the PLO.¹⁸ Although the PLO continued to reject similar efforts well into 1974 the combined pressure emanating from the West Bank and the major Arab governments coupled with

the effect of growing international recognition of the PLO as the 'sole representative of the Palestinians', began to make inroads into PLO thinking on these matters. A number of scholars have attributed the growing Arab governmental support for the PLO and the eventual withdrawal of Jordanian objections to the status of the PLO as expressed in the decisions of the Arab summit in Rabat in October 1974 to the readiness of the PLO to moderate its policies.¹⁹

The Soviet Union too appears to have put effective demands on the PLO for moderation and then extended greater support as a consequence of the change in the PLO's overall approach. Soviet pressure on the PLO to show a willingness to participate in peace talks and to aim for a 'mini-state' alongside Israel took a conspicuous form during a visit of a PLO delegation to Moscow in November 1973.²⁰ According to Golan, the Soviet Union seems to have used its recognition of the PLO and the opening of a PLO office in Moscow as a lever.²¹ This is somewhat supported by the fact that there was a marked increase in Soviet support for the PLO when Arafat was received in Moscow by governmental officials immediately after the Twelfth PNC. Previously, PLO delegations had been invited to Moscow in an 'unofficial capacity' by the Soviet Afro-Asian Committee.²² It was also during this visit that the Soviets announced an agreement for the opening of a PLO office in Moscow.²³

It is possible to offer a much longer list of examples that point towards a growing convergence between positions held by the PLO and actors from various regions culminating in a growth of support for the Palestinian cause. In this respect 1977 was a particularly interesting year. It was marked by the 13th PNC decision to redefine the rather ambiguous term of 'independent national authority' to an 'independent state'.²⁴ The Soviet Union seems to have played a certain role in this by its repeated efforts to bring the PLO to make this change.²⁵ This change was

formalised in March 1977 during the 13th PNC session when the idea of the establishment of an independent Palestinian state by means of a political settlement was endorsed.²⁶ One concrete expression of Soviet support resulting from this development was an invitation to Arafat to visit Moscow in April when he also got to meet Brezhnev for the first time.²⁷

Many West European governments too were influenced by the PLO's growing preparedness to compromise and moderate its policies and demands. They moved closer to the PLO and lent greater support for the Palestinian cause during this period. Prior to the Twelfth PNC meeting the French Foreign Minister actually held talks with PNC leaders and promised support for a homeland in return for a PLO commitment to a political solution.²⁸ After the PNC meeting and Kaddoumi's declaration expressing a readiness to participate in the Geneva peace talks increasing contacts between the PLO and Western European governments took place. These contacts increased the prestige of the PLO but also encouraged it to adopt conciliatory measures.

For example, in May 1977 Arafat met the Austrian Chancellor Kreisky while Kaddoumi amongst others met the French Foreign Minister expressing the possibility of accepting Resolution 242 if some amendments were introduced to it.²⁹ This moderation also made it possible for the PLO to participate in the Euro-Arab dialogue as a part of the Arab delegation. Even the US position appears to have been influenced by these developments. Various congressmen and senators visited Arafat in the Middle East while Carter throughout 1977 made statements relatively favourable to the Palestinian cause compared to earlier ones. Finally, in October 1977 in a US-USSR statement the US government was prepared to take another step and recognise the legitimate 'rights' rather than 'aspirations' of the Palestinians and the need to include representatives of the Palestinian people in a renewed Geneva Conference.

9.3.3 Convergence at the UN level

Similar forces were also evident at the UN level. It would be difficult to imagine that Arafat could have addressed the General Assembly if the PLO had continued to maintain its earlier goal of liquidating Israel through armed struggle. Furthermore, the PLO's participation in the work of the UN appears to have had a particularly conspicuous impact on its policies. This participation has meant that Palestinian representatives have become exposed to an institution and a socialisation process that are inherently biased in favour of negotiations and conciliation.

The impact of this is evident in the way in which the PLO at the Security Council has found itself participating in efforts for the adoption of draft resolutions recognising the Palestinian people's right to self-determination together with the provisions of Resolution 242. The General Assembly too has had its own impact on the PLO. It has extended growing support for the Palestinian cause but at the same time it has obliged the PLO to articulate its objectives and means to achieve it in a way compatible with the Assembly's values. This became particularly evident after the establishment of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People in 1975. The Committee which was charged with the duty to consider and recommend to the General Assembly a programme for the implementation of the rights of the Palestinian people played a crucial role in getting the PLO to agree and contribute towards the drawing up and the eventual adoption of a precisely formulated plan. This plan provided for the evacuation of the Israeli occupied areas followed by UN supervision until the establishment of a Palestinian government. Hence as O.Carre notes "the more the Palestinian cause is accepted in the United Nations, the more precise, and consequently moderate, does the Palestinian' demands become".³⁰

Diagram 9.2 is an attempt, however elementary, to illustrate this convergence in issue positions held by the PLO and selected regional groupings. The diagram represents a field of changing issue positions projected from two axes. The vertical axis (AB) represents different definitions of the Palestinian problem accompanied with associated solutions. At one end of the axis (A) the problem is defined as a refugee problem, a by-product of the Arab-Israeli war and humanitarian solutions are advocated within an overall solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict. The other end of the axis (B) defines the problem as political one and sees the solution of the problem in the creation of a 'secular-democratic' Palestinian state. The horizontal axis, on the other hand, represents the types of methods advocated to achieve the envisaged solutions. It represents a continuum ranging from the advocacy of diplomatic means (C) to armed struggle (D).




Diagram 9.2 Convergence of issue positions on the Palestinian Question

Various intermediary positions on both axes can be plotted.

For example the idea of a 'mini-state' could be placed towards the centre on the AB axis. Similarly, the advocacy of multi-lateral diplomacy rather than direct negotiations could also be placed somewhere similar on the CD axis. The position of each actor on the field can then be plotted by projecting their place on each axis to a point on the field where they meet. The exercise can be repeated at specific intervals to see changes that are actually occurring. Diagram 9.2 depicts the change that has occurred in the position of selected actors in respect to positions represented on both axes. It visually displays the convergence that has taken place from positions all over the field towards positions in the middle of the bottom left quadrant.

So far we have seen how the PLO in its efforts to mobilise support for its demands has had to respond to pressures from all levels to adopt more realistic goals and policies. One major consequence of this has been that the Palestinian cause that was once defined by the PLO as the armed struggle to achieve a 'secular democratic state' in the whole of Palestine became redefined as the establishment of a 'mini Palestinian state' on parts of Palestine evacuated by Israel. It is to this Palestinian cause that the overwhelming majority of world governments have lent their support.

9.4 Dynamic nature of the growth of support, the role of feedback processes

The interactive aspect of the mobilisation process, which we examined earlier on, demonstrated the way different levels influenced each other. Consideration of the dynamic aspect of the mobilisation process is intended to capture the feedback through which an already existing level of support facilitates further growth of support at the same level. Growth can be in the form of an expansion of the domain of the support and/or an intensification of the

commitment to that support. Here the assumption is that an actor trying to expand its basis of support at a particular level will benefit from support that has already been mobilised. Naturally, the greater the level of existing support the greater the urgency for others to join ranks will be. Hence, it seems the impact of feedback from a previous round of support into a new one will progressively increase until it reaches a point where one may begin to talk about a 'snowballing' or a 'bandwagon effect'. Examples from each level might help to clarify the role of feedback in the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause.

It was amongst the Palestinians in the refugee camps that the PLO began to receive its first support which gradually expanded to other sections of the Palestinian community at large. This was evidenced in the increasing number of enrolments in the various guerrilla groups, in particular Al-Fatah. Violence played a central role in raising the consciousness of this first group of Palestinians that had been displaced by earlier wars.

While the Palestinians of the refugee camps were beginning to show signs of support in favour of the PLO, the Palestinians of the West Bank in the immediate aftermath of the civil war in Jordan had not yet completely committed themselves to the PLO. They had been reluctant to follow PLO calls to boycott the 1972 local elections in the West Bank which basically saw the reinstatement of the traditional pro-Jordanian leadership. However, the growing strength of the PLO amongst the Palestinians in the Lebanon, which was quite evident in the demonstrations following the killing of popular PLO leaders in Beirut, triggered similar responses in the West Bank and elsewhere. As Amos notes "This nationalist outpouring was repeated in May in a march opposing the Israeli military parade in Jerusalem, and in June in a general strike on the anniversary of the June war."³¹

These events could be interpreted as not only the expression of support for the PLO but also its intensification considering that previous acts of defiance against Israeli rule either did not involve slogans supportive of the PLO or were limited to acts of resistance mounted by guerrilla groups. But probably the most conclusive example of an intensified support for the PLO, at least partially attributable to a feedback from earlier levels of Palestinian support, was provided by the results of the 1976 West Bank local elections. It was on this occasion that the West Bank chose to elect mayors closely associated with the PLO and endorsed the desire to see the PLO, even though indirectly, involved in the administrative aspects of their day to day lives.

The last group of Palestinians to be mobilised were the ones who live within Israel. It is in respect to those Palestinians that the growing support for the PLO elsewhere in the Palestinian community appears to have been an essential prerequisite to their mobilisation. The Palestinians in Israel remained under the influence of a traditional leadership until the early 1970s. It is particularly from 1973 onwards that they became increasingly pro-PLO. This is evident in their growing tendency during Israeli elections since the early 1970s to vote in favour of political parties that recognised the PLO or were supportive of the Palestinian cause. It is in this context that one can argue that growing support from previous rounds has fed back into a following round helping to expand its domain/range.

At the Arab regional level, consideration of the effect of positive feedback from Arab governmental support for the PLO at the Arab summit in Algiers in 1973 to the one at Rabat in 1974 provides a more complete picture of the change in the nature and quality of this support from one summit to the other. The impact of feedback on this change

is particularly conspicuous in the case of the change in Jordan's position towards the PLO. The role of the already existing support for the PLO amongst the Arab governments in influencing Jordan's position on PLO's status is to some extent implicitly acknowledged in a statement made by the King Hussein that

"we shall also respect the collective Arab will if it is the wish of the Arab countries and their leaders to create a new situation in which the Palestine Liberation Organization is made fully responsible for discussing, striving and working for the recovery of the occupied Arab territories, including the West Bank and Jerusalem, and the recovery of Palestinian rights ... We shall... regard it [such a decision] as absolving us of our responsibilities".³²

Subsequently at Rabat Jordan withdrew its objection to the PLO being the 'sole representative of the Palestinian people'.

It is interesting to note that at the Rabat summit support for the PLO not only expanded with the inclusion of Jordan but also grew in intensity. During the previous Arab summit the decision to recognise the PLO as 'a sole representative of the Palestinian people' had been a secret one. Whereas at Rabat this recognition was included in a public declaration and was also strengthened by the addition of the word 'legitimate' to the provisions determining the status of the PLO.

It is probably only at the UN level that one can begin to ponder some possibilities of developing a formal model, composed of a set of equations representing each session, that could capture the feedback from one session to the following one. However, in this case too it would be very difficult to separate the effect that support from other levels may have on the UN, (which sometimes becomes as evident as the actual citing of decisions of other regional organisations). Nevertheless at the UN level it is easier to find a wide range of examples illustrating the dynamic nature of the mobilisation of support from one round to another influencing both the range and the intensity of

fresh support. Some of the evidence for this is actually evident in the wording of resolutions as well as the speeches of delegations.

For example, when it granted the PLO the status of a permanent observer Resolution 3237 (XIX) cited the previous UN decisions inviting the PLO to participate in the work of certain UN Conferences held earlier in that year. Similarly, the procedural decision of the Security Council in November 1975 to invite the PLO to participate in its work, with privileges similar to ones accorded to member states being invited under rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure of the Council, was influenced by the support expressed for the PLO in the previous decisions of the General Assembly. This was quite evident in some of the speeches made during the procedural debate.

The evidence for the impact of a feedback process becomes particularly conspicuous when a delegation actually acknowledges in a speech the role of the position of other delegations. For example, the UK delegation had voted against allowing the PLO to participate in the work of the Security Council in December 1975. However, they abstained when the matter next came up at the Security Council meeting in January 1976. On this occasion the UK representative noted that their earlier position was not shared by the majority hence "they did not think it right to press... objections to the point of voting against the proposal."³³

Furthermore, it seems it would not be too unrealistic to suggest that the PLO and its allies will, in their attempts to persuade potential supporters, point out at the already existing level of support during the lobbying that precedes most debates and votes at the UN. Unfortunately, UN documentation does not provide any information about this process. But according to a Palestinian diplomat it appears that those Non-Aligned countries that had been reluctant to

support Resolution 3237 on legal grounds found themselves revising their position in the face of the sponsors arguments pointing out the already existing support for it.³⁴

At the General Assembly, even more interesting is the steady growth in the number of countries voting in favour of resolutions supportive of Palestinian political rights. This growth in support together with the usage of stronger language in the wording of resolutions seems to be indicative of a positive feedback mechanism that lends greater legitimacy to the Palestinian cause and to PLO's representative status over the years.

The interactive and dynamic aspects of the aggregation of support between various levels were introduced to enhance the analysis emerging from the application of the mobilisation process model to each level offered in the previous chapters. The convergence of issue positions held by various actors including the PLO was developed to demonstrate an aspect of the mobilisation process that has culminated in the growth of support for the Palestinian cause going hand in hand with a redefinition of the objectives of the PLO along lines more acceptable to most governments. It will be the purpose of the following section to reconsider certain aspects of the core of the mobilisation process model.

9.5 Reconsidering the mobilisation process model

When preparing the mobilisation process model we started with Mansbach and Vasquez definition of politics as the raising of and the authoritative resolution of issues. Of particular interest to our research was their and Cobb and Elder's contributions to the understanding of how actors bring issues of high salience to them to the forefront of a political agenda. We noted that Mansbach and Vasquez identified two sets of factors as crucial determinants of

an agenda setting process. They were 'the nature and variety of access routes' available to actors who want to put an issue on the agenda and 'the salience of an issue to key actors' in the 'system of interest'.

In our model these two sets of factors constituted the basis for two of the three central variables called 'accessibility' and 'cognitive linkage'. In the light of the contribution made by the mobilisation theory to the study of the aggregation of support for social protest movements these two variables were supplemented by a variable called 'conducive environment'. The purpose of this section is to strengthen the core of the mobilisation process model by reexamining the nature of this variable and also its relationship to the other two variables.

In some ways it is possible to argue that without even having to go into the literature on mobilisation theory in Mansbach and Vasquez one can find a partial basis for the concept of a 'conducive environment'. This is evident in their argument which makes allowance for the fact that some issues "never reach the global agenda because those who are satisfied resist their inclusion".³⁵ They argue that "the capacity of elites to keep items off an agenda is primarily a function of the nature of formal and informal access points, a structural variable".³⁶ In such a situation it becomes rather difficult to talk of a 'conducive environment' for raising new issues by actors who lack access to the agenda. This structural variable, which Mansbach and Vasquez do not treat separately, constitutes a major aspect of the concept of a 'conducive environment'.

Hence, it seems certain structural conditions need to be present before mobilisation at any level can start. Those structural conditions can be determined by the presence or absence of certain type of actors, who have a say over the composition of a political agenda, as well as the existence or absence of communication networks between these actors

and the initiator. For example, when our system of interest is centred around the UN, a change in the structure of the UN precipitated by the growth of Third World membership will make the promotion of certain outputs more likely than before. Similarly at the Palestinian level the emergence of a Palestinian resistance movement was a necessary structural change to start the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause. It opened up, for example, the possibility of using violence as an access route to raise the salience of the Palestinian problem and also to attract the attention of the Palestinian community to their approach.

There is another dimension to the concept of a 'conducive environment' beside structural matters that needs to be taken into account. This concerns the nature of processes that are dominant in the 'system of interest'. It is these processes that will determine what kind of issues stand a better chance of being recognised and admitted to a political agenda. These cognitive processes will often be dominated by a 'belief system' which will condition how a problem is perceived and how it is treated by the participants.

For example again at the UN, since the adoption of Resolution 1514, attitudes towards colonialism and related issues have dramatically changed. The development of a new 'belief system' with its separate values, norms and expectations based on principles enunciated in this resolution generated a different set of criteria for determining the salience of an issue to the UN and the acceptability of various issue positions compared to the ones dominating the UN prior to 1960. This process culminated in decolonisation becoming separated from processes that used to treat it within Cold War thinking. It also enabled issues such as apartheid to be treated as problems of international concern and hence not subject to the 'domestic jurisdiction' principle at the UN. At the

Palestinian level events of high salience to the Palestinian community such as the Algerian and Vietnamese wars of liberation provided the basis for ideas advocating a Palestinian national struggle to develop and gain ground. This occurred against the prevailing wisdom which stressed Arab unity as the only means to liberating Palestine.

In the light of the above discussion a 'conductive environment' for the actor trying to put items on the global political agenda can then be seen as the product of changes in the structure and processes characterising our 'system of interest' hence making the promotion of certain outcomes more likely at the systemic as well as the sub-systemic level.³⁷ The possibility of a mobilisation process starting becomes dependent on the existence of such a 'conductive environment'. The absence of a 'conductive environment' constitutes an obstacle for the mobilisation process to commence. Yet the existence of a 'conductive environment' does not necessarily culminate in an immediate expression of support within the 'system of interest'. The mobilisation of support will only commence when the central actor, the initiator, begins to utilise access routes that become potentially available to it, as a result of earlier structural changes, and to exploit existing thought processes to articulate and legitimise its issue position.

It is in this light that 'accessibility' and 'cognitive linkages' have to be seen. 'Accessibility' becomes the variable that accounts for the exploitation of favourable structural features of a 'conductive environment' by an initiator to promote its cause. 'Cognitive linkage' on the other hand accounts for the perceptual similarities drawn between existing issues supported by a recognised belief system and the problem of concern to an initiator. The major purpose behind these linkages is to alter other actors' perceptions of the problem in such a way as to result in the extension of their support to the new issue.

9.6 Some limitations of this study

The purpose of this research was to study how the PLO raised the Palestinian issue to the global agenda and mobilised support for the Palestinian cause across the communal, regional and global levels of analysis. At the communal level we examined how the PLO gained the support of the Palestinian community in favour of the Palestinian cause as defined by the decisions of the PNC. At the regional and global levels the mobilisation process model was employed with a view to understanding how the PLO came to modify world governmental perceptions of the nature of the Palestinian problem and their attitudes towards the Palestinian cause.

One major limitation of this study is that throughout this analysis all actors, governments and the PLO alike, were treated as though they were unified. This should not be seen as the weakening of an earlier determination, as expressed in chapter two, to base this analysis on a paradigm that did not recognise the Realist assumption that states are monolithic units attempting to maximise their 'national interest'. Instead it should be seen as the only practical solution to dealing with the decisions of more than one hundred governments. Hence, it was practical rather than theoretical considerations that culminated in the black-boxing of governmental decision-making processes. This naturally gives the impression that governmental decisions were straight forward coherent responses to PLO demands and also that these decisions were actually representative of the whole country as a whole. This is basically the consequence of having chosen a low level of resolution for the analysis.

This level of resolution, however, is a rather crude and incomplete representation of the real world. The views of governments have also been influenced by the activities of certain non-governmental actors, such as trade unions,

student groups, political parties and various pressure groups, for whom the Palestinian issue became highly salient. Some of these actors who became supportive of the Palestinian cause went as far as developing direct relations with the PLO. Such actors became active participants in efforts for the development of attitudes supportive of the Palestinian cause at various levels. Naturally, to develop a complete picture of the influence that non-governmental actors have had on governmental attitude formation one also has to assess the impact of such actors supportive of the Palestinian cause against those who have worked to prevent any changes to the status-quo.

Beside the influence that various domestic groups can have on the decision of a government there is also the need to take into consideration the role that different parts of a government can have on an eventual outcome. It is not unusual that differences arise between positions taken by the government and, for example, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of a country. Such a situation, it seems would call for the treatment of an Ministry of Foreign Affairs as a separate and important actor that also brings considerable influence to bear upon the eventual outcome as well as the impact that other ministries such as trade, energy, religious affairs may have on issues of salience to them.

To achieve a more complete understanding of how the world at large came to change its perception of the Palestinian problem and how the PLO mobilised support for its cause, it would be necessary to include in the analysis the role of the above actors. It would be interesting to apply the mobilisation process model to the world of non-governmental actors and then examine the interaction between the two worlds in respect to attitude formation on the Palestinian problem.

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- 17 See above chapter 5, p.140-41.
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- 22 Yodfat et al., (1981: 90).
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- 33 UN Doc. S/PV.1870, 12 January 1976.
- 34 Correspondence and interview with a Palestinian representative of a Gulf state delegation at the UN.
- 35 Mansbach, R. and Vasquez, J. **In Search Theory** (Colombia University Press, New York, 1981) p.97.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 What is to be considered the system depends on what one is interested to explain. If the focus is an trying to

examine how an actor raises an issue on an agenda then the actor might be regarded as the system and the wider political process would be occurring in that actors environment. Whereas when one is focusing on contention over the issue then the environment of the actor becomes the system for analysis.

APPENDIX-I

OPERATIONALISING THE CONCEPT OF 'POLITICAL SUPPORT' FOR THE PALESTINIAN CAUSE

The purpose of this section is to introduce a framework for operationalising the concept of 'political support for the Palestinian cause'. Countries' voting behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly on resolutions pertaining to the Middle East and Palestine will be used as indicators to construct an index of political support. The purpose of this index will be to measure the level of support for the Palestinian cause through the period under study and answer such questions;

- i) Who forms the pool of support for the Palestinian cause and what levels?
- ii) How, or in what way, did this pool of support change during the period under study?

A1.1 Why UN General Assembly Voting Behaviour

It was decided that voting at the UN General Assembly would be a satisfactory representation of member governments' attitudes on the issue under study. Votes on resolutions adopted by the General Assembly can be assumed to reflect the final position taken by a governmental delegation at the end of a political process on an issue.¹ Bearing in mind its limitations voting analysis then can enable the analyst to observe and measure the changing perceptions and attitudes of member governments on a variety of issues. It is with this in mind that Russett notes, "Roll call votes in the General Assembly provide a unique set of data wherein many national governments commit themselves simultaneously and publicly on a wide variety of major issues... Voting behaviour ... remains one of our best sources of replicable information on the policies of its... members".²

However, from the start it might be useful to note some of the limitations inherent in voting analysis. Firstly, most of the methods employed in voting behaviour are not explanatory techniques. They do not necessarily explain causes and consequences of member countries voting behaviour. They can only be descriptive rather than explanatory. Methods are not explanatory on their own, they need to be led by theory. Voting analysis simply summarises a delegation's stand on roll-calls and does not try to account for all the various factors that can influence a particular vote. Secondly, voting analysis cannot account for the differences in the intensity of a country's commitment to a vote and treats every delegation's vote equally. Thirdly, UN voting can also be seen as being highly symbolic and not necessarily carrying high costs.³ Therefore some might argue that it does not necessarily reflect the 'true' attitude of the state voting. However, particularly on controversial and salient issues, the fact that UN voting is publicly recorded and highly visible can have political ramifications, both within and outside the UN, inducing the delegation to cast a 'meaningful' vote.

A1.2 Short Review of Methods for Studying UN Voting Behaviour

There is an abundance of literature that has studied voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly. This literature has used a variety of methods of varying degrees of complexity. These methods, whose origins lie in the study of judicial and legislative behaviour, particularly in the US, can be said to have gone through two stages of development.

In the first period attention was centred around measuring the degree of cohesion existing within pre-determined regional or caucusing groups at the General Assembly. Hovet⁴, for example, with the purpose of discovering the cohesion of various caucusing groups studied both plenary and main committee roll-calls for the first sixteen

sessions of the Assembly. Similarly, Ball⁵, too, has used a 'bloc-voting' framework of analysis limited to only four sessions on a number of specific issues. Although Ball by studying specific issues produced a more graphic and detailed analysis of group behaviour on these issues, it lacked Hovet's advantage of an all-encompassing issue classification which produced generalisations that allowed for trend analysis.

The second generation of works on the analysis of UN voting behaviour followed Lijphart's original contribution on the subject in the early 1960s.⁶ In place of Hovet's and Rigg's⁷ indices of cohesion in which he found statistical inadequacies⁸, Lijphart introduced a methodology derived from earlier works of Beyle and Rice⁹. This method of cluster bloc analysis was not only statistically sounder, but also capable of empirically identifying blocs from voting records. Another substantive advantage of this methodology was that it also allowed for the study of relationships between groups and between subgroups within a larger group.

Further improvements to the Lijphart's Rice-Boyle method were made in the 1970s. Willetts, with the help of improved computer facilities, developed a method that made use of algorithms which put Lijphart's idea of empirically discovering blocs into actual practice for large scale data.¹⁰ Previously, Lijphart's method relied on the manual manipulation of dyadic links generated in a small set of data. This used to limit considerably the amount of data that could actually be processed.

Early cohesion indices and cluster bloc analysis are not the only methods used for studying voting behaviour at the UN General Assembly. Scaling and factor analysis are two other, very different, methods that have been used in past research.

Guttman Scaling, has been widely used in the study of legislative and judicial behaviour, and is highly recommended by Farris as a method capable of distinguishing the causes of similarity in voting behaviour.¹¹ Reiselbach was the first to demonstrate the applicability of this method to the study of voting behaviour on colonial matters at the 11th session of the General Assembly. Having used 'bloc-analysis' to determine voting groups and indices of cohesion and likeness to measure the degree of internal unity within and between groups, Reiselbach¹² employed Guttman Scaling to measure countries' attitudes on colonial matters and placed them on a pro-con continuum. Tikhomirov¹³, on the otherhand, in his analysis of Pacific Nations' voting behaviour during the 33rd, 34th and 35th sessions of the General Assembly, employed scaling analysis on its own. Tikhomirov used this method to measure and compare the desirability of resolutions adopted during the sessions under study for Pacific Nations and the permanent members of the Security Council.

A final method is the one favoured by Alker and Russett in their study of the politics of the General Assembly.¹⁴ Factor Analysis, in their view, has more to offer than just identifying blocs, measuring cohesiveness and showing the direction of dissent within a group.¹⁵ They note that factor analysis, unlike the others, is able to summarise the main distinctive issues before the UN and also give some idea of the importance of the different issues and alignments involved. They note that, "the goal of factor analysis is to get at the basic issues and alignments underlying a wide variety of roll-call votes".¹⁶

Of the four basic methods used in voting analysis, the last three are widely employed in studies of behaviour in legislative bodies. The first one, based on the construction of simple cohesion indices, appears to have been superseded by the others and does not seem to have been used in any significant way since the early 1960s.

Before proceeding to introduce the preferred method for operationalising the phenomenon, 'political support for the Palestinian cause', it might be useful to look at some of the kinds of methodological problems particular to the study of voting behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly.

Al.3 Methodological Problems facing Analysts of Voting Behaviour

Al.3.1 Non-Participation and Absence

General Assembly official records show only three types of votes - Yes, No and Abstentions. The difference between the total of the votes and the total membership gives the number of delegations that were absent from the voting or did not cast a vote. It is important to make a distinction between the two.

Participation in the work of a General Assembly can be very demanding. Delegates often do not just follow the proceedings of the Assembly's main bodies and cast votes. Instead, they take part in speech making, drafting of resolutions and lobbying before they actually get to the point of reaching a final decision on a proposal. Small countries, particularly, find it difficult to mobilise resources to keep up with such a momentum of work. Harbert, in a study of mini-state participation in the work of the Assembly, shows that the average mini-state delegation size had 8.2 people compared to 18.8 for other states during 1971-72¹⁷ and notes the inability of some states to spare relatively large numbers of qualified personnel to staff their delegations. Willetts points at a strong relationship between the size of a delegation and the level of participation in the work of the General Assembly.¹⁸

A distinction must be drawn between members who are unable to attend a roll call because they do not have the

personnel, and other delegations who deliberately absent themselves or do not cast their vote inspite of actually being present in the Assembly hall. Lijphart calls such absences 'demonstrative non-attendance' and treats them in accordance with the previously known attitudes of the delegation in question.¹⁹ Willetts, too, notes that some states have occasionally announced that they were 'not participating' in a particular roll call, and "this implies strong opposition to a proposal and a denial that the U.N. had any right to be discussing and voting on the issue concerned, usually because the issue was alleged to be concerned with a state's internal affairs'.²⁰ (e.g. Guatemala on Belize, South Africa on Apartheid....) In this analysis where a state does not participate in the voting on a resolution and there is an unambiguous reference to its stand against the proposal in the records of the proceedings on the item, then such a country will be treated as if it had voted 'no'.

Different views have been expressed on the question of the treatment of 'absence'. One position is expressed by Reiselbach who asserts that a researcher working with Guttman scaling can speculate on the vote of an absent delegation.²¹ Another view is that if "available information did not suggest that either a 'Yes, 'No' or 'Abstain" was an appropriate voting estimate, the state was given a truly middle position".²² Russett, on the other hand, prefers "to equate an absence with abstention. In many instances an absence does, in fact, mean abstention."²³

For the purpose of this study it seems that it would be improper to try to assume how a state would have voted had it been present. It would also be distorting the information to attempt to classify absences together with abstentions. Instead, absence will simply be treated as lack of data.

A1.3.2 Abstentions

An abstention in General Assembly voting should be treated separately from absence or non-participation. The casting of an 'abstain' vote carries a political meaning as much as the others do. However, abstentions have created a somewhat unique problem for the various methods used in voting analysis.

The earlier indices of cohesion based on Rice's method treated abstentions as if they were negative votes. This approach, although criticised for forcing the data into a dichotomy and exaggerating disunity within a group,²⁴ is not in complete disagreement with Alker and Russett's position that "there are no completely neutral countries. Those abstaining against the pressure of a sizeable majority come out closer to the scores of those who said 'no' than they do to those in the affirmative".²⁵ The more widely applied solution to the problem of abstention is the one originally introduced by Lijphart. Lijphart suggests that "it seems reasonable to credit a partial agreement with half the weight of a complete agreement".²⁶ Such an assumption is not, of course, devoid of its problems, but it seems reasonable, as Lijphart says, to treat abstentions as a kind of intermediate position between a 'Yes' and a 'No'.²⁷ That appears to be the most practical or feasible solution to this problem, even though there may be different motives and forces behind an abstention than just a conscious decision to steer a mid-course.

Alas, the above list is not an exhaustive one. To this, one might add two others that seem to have escaped the attention of the mainline literature. Both problems have to do with the question of whether a vote is a reliable reflection of one state's attitude towards the issue. Reiselbach, talking about the limitations of the various methods studying voting behaviour, pointed out that these methods could "provide answers to questions about the

intensity of opinion of any single country and ... for log rolling."²⁸ The latter situation arises when a disinterested country votes along for future support on other matters. This is not very unlike the concept of bargain linkages discussed in the main text. Another problem is caused by the inability of these methods to account for what is known as the 'bandwagon effect'. This occurs when members of a legislative body find themselves in a situation where they prefer to go along with the majority rather than remain in a conspicuous minority.²⁹ Although this problem has been studied in respect to the US House of Representatives, there is no reason why it may not occur in the General Assembly too.

Both phenomena could be at work, for example, in relation to the Palestinian Question. Some non-aligned countries may not wish to appear to be voting separately from the group of which they are a member, for fear of alienating other members (log-rolling), as well as being seen as undermining group solidarity on a matter central to the group (the bandwagon effect). However, one can always argue that if a delegation felt sufficiently strong about the matter it could at least abstain if not vote against a proposal, as was the case, for example, with the resolution equating zionism with racism, hence reducing some of the influence of a bandwagon effect.

Unfortunately, the techniques that are available for the study of voting behaviour are unable to account for such phenomena. These techniques can only measure voting outcomes and cannot on its own account for the factors that have caused a certain outcome. Here we assume that a vote will reflect a government's attitude on the matter, but it is important to continue to bear in mind that a vote may have been determined by a string of factors such as those mentioned above, that is log-rolling and the bandwagon effect, and internalised ideological considerations or a mixture of them all. It is a theoretical framework that

will establish the link between voting outcomes and its causes.

Al.4 Constructing an Index of Political Support from UN Voting Behaviour

Al.4.1 The Scope of the Analysis and Methodology employed

During the normal sessions of the General Assembly member delegations find themselves voting on a great number of draft resolutions covering a wide range of issues. One such issue has been the Palestinian problem. The problem in one form or the other has been a part of the General Assembly's agenda since the early years of the U.N.. During the period under study, from 1967 to 1980, various aspects of the Palestinian problem have come to the attention of the General Assembly. However, in this study three aspects of the Palestian problem, the right of the refugees, the individual human rights of the Palestinians in the occupied territories and the collective political rights of the Palestinians, will form the basis for the definition of the scope of the 'Palestinian cause'. As it can be seen from Table Al.1 a total of 66 roll-calls during 8 sessions were studied in an effort to measure support for the Palestinian cause.³⁰

Issues	24th	25th	26th	27th	28th	29th	33th	35th	Total
Refugee problems	-	1	3	4	2	2	2	2	16
Human rights	1	2	1	3	3	4	2	6	22
Political rights	2	4	3	2	4	3	5	5	28
Total	3	7	7	9	9	9	9	13	66

Table Al.1: Distribution of roll-calls by sessions and by sub-issue

The origins of the methodology employed in this study, known as cluster-bloc analysis, can be traced to the late 1950s and early 1960s when scholars such as Reiselbach³¹, Hovet³² and Lijphart³³ became interested in studying voting behaviour at the United Nations in a systematic and comprehensive manner. It was by employing a modified version of Lijphart's Index of Agreement, which measures the degree of agreement between pairs of states at the UN General Assembly, that an Index of support for the Palestinian cause was constructed. Lijphart's Index, in its original form, was defined as;³⁴

$$I_A = \frac{(f + (1/2)g)}{t} * 100$$

Where f = is the number of roll calls with identical votes;
g = is the number of roll calls in which states showed 'partial agreement' (yes-abstain or no-abstain combinations)
t = is the total number of roll calls in which each pair jointly participated.

This Index treats all roll-calls as being of equal value. However, to use the index in this form would not account for the differences in the political importance of the content of roll-calls being studied. Earlier on it was pointed out that the Palestinian problem included an amalgamation of roll-calls ranging from ones seeking solutions to the problems of the Palestinian refugees, to ones calling for the establishment of a Palestinian homeland and the recognition of the PLO. It should not be difficult to note that the resolutions referring to the above matters carry political messages of rather different significance. A 'yes' vote cast on a resolution calling for an increase in voluntary contributions to the budget of UNRWA would have less significance than a 'yes' vote cast for a resolution inviting the PLO to participate in the work of the UN.

To be able to account for the differences in the political importance of the content of roll calls being studied this above Index was modified to incorporate a weighting scheme. Hence, the Index of Agreement was redefined as:³⁵

$$WI_A = \frac{\sum_i^t w_i (f_i + (1/2)g_i)}{\sum_i^t w_i} * 100$$

Where w_i = is the weight of the roll call under study, the i th roll call

f_i = is the value of a dummy variable for the i th roll call, a value of 1 indicates full agreement while 0 means a disagreement or partial agreement.

g_i = is the value of a second dummy variable for the i th roll call, a value of 1 indicates partial agreement and 0 indicates full agreement or disagreement.

A1.4.2 Weighting roll-calls

The literature on UN voting behaviour takes a very cautious approach on the problem of weighting and in general follows the position taken by Turner. Reiselbach³⁶, Lijphart³⁷, Willetts³⁸ and Chai³⁹ all agree with Turner's argument⁴⁰ that it is impossible to weight issues, resolutions or, for that matter, votes in a way that is both objective and meaningful - mainly because the assignment of weights is regarded as a subjective task varying not only from person to person but also from time to time. What might be important to one may be less important, if not trivial, to another. Similarly, what might be regarded as an important issue at one point in time may be judged as less important at a different period.

It may be difficult to weight objectively the importance of roll calls, but it may still be possible to make a meaningful effort and establish some acceptable degree of inter-subjectivity to the weighting process. In the case of this study it might be reasonable to introduce a weighting scheme to lend the Index of Support a greater degree of validity in relation to the concept it is trying to measure, (see endnote 41 for a comparison of unweighted and weighted results). The purpose of this weighting scheme is to capture the different levels of political importance that roll calls addressing the three aspects of the Palestinian problem carry. In order for the Index of Support to reflect these differences, it was decided that such resolutions would be weighted according to the level of controversy generated by the draft resolution being voted.⁴² In an effort to reduce the element of arbitrariness, in the construction of a scale to differentiate between the importance of various sets of roll calls, the method outlined below was followed.

Two empirical factors seemed to call for the separation of the period under study into two. Firstly, the agenda of the General Assembly between 1952 and 1974 did not have an item on the Palestinian Question. Various issues pertaining to the Palestinian problem were dealt during deliberations on three agenda items, entitled 'Assistance to refugees in the Near East', 'The Situation in the Middle East' and 'Situation regarding Israeli practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Population of the Occupied Territories'.⁴³

Secondly, the situation drastically changed when at the 29th session a separate agenda item solely looking at the political rights of the Palestinians was included in the agenda. Furthermore, this item was allocated straight to the plenary rather than to one of the Main-Committees thus reflecting the Assembly's feeling of the urgency and importance of this issue. Secondly, there was a significant change in the content and nature

of both debates and decisions between these two periods. While in the first period references to the inalienable rights of the Palestinians and their right to self-determination became frequent and elaborate it was at the 29th session and thereafter that the political rights of the Palestinians were unambiguously interpreted to mean the right to independence. This conspicuous difference in the political content of the resolutions was also coupled by an authorisation of the PLO to participate in debates as the sole representative of the Palestinians. Prior to the 29th session only individuals from various Palestinian organisations were allowed to put their case to the Special Political Committee of the General Assembly with little effect.

Having separated the period into two, the 66 roll calls included in the analysis were grouped into three, depending on whether they mainly addressed the problems of the refugees and their 'right to return', the individual human rights of the population in the occupied territories or the collective political rights of the Palestinians. Taking the first group of roll calls as a reference point of lowest importance, the other two group of roll calls were assigned separate weights for the first and second periods on the basis of the degree of controversy involved.

The degree of controversy involved on each roll call was calculated by the formula;

$$D_c = \frac{N + (1/2)A}{t}$$

where; N = is the number of 'No' votes

A = is the number of abstentions

T = is the total number of votes cast

Then by employing;

$$W_x = \frac{\sum^D c}{N}$$

the average value for each group of roll calls was calculated for each of the two periods. Subsequently by assigning a value of '1' to the first group of roll calls on matters pertaining to the refugees the weights as shown in Table A1.2 were obtained for the other two groups of roll calls. Thus the individual roll-calls were weighted according to the time and subject matter set in which they fell.

Issues	1967-1973			1974-1980		
	No. of r/cs	W_x	Weights	No. of r/cs	W_x	Weights
Refugee matters	10	0.14	1	13	0.04	1
Human rights	10	0.25	1.8	25	0.07	1.8
Political rights	10	0.33	2.4	27	0.19	4.8

Table A1.2: Distribution of weights by period and by issues

A1.5 Results

Having determined the type and the number of roll calls to be studied, the data for the two periods was processed with a computer package, VOTASS,⁴⁴ that calculates, among other statistics, the degree of agreement between pairs of members of legislative assemblies. Ideally, it would have been preferable to use the degree of agreement between the PLO and the other members of the UN. However, the PLO was not recognised by the General Assembly as the sole representative of the Palestinians until 1974 and even then the observer status accorded to the PLO did not entitle it to cast a vote, a right solely reserved for member states.

At first the possibility of using the Arab Group as a reference point for a pro-Palestinian position and calculating the Index of Inter-Group Agreement⁴⁵ of other groups with the Arabs was considered. However, for this to be meaningful a 100% cohesion within the Arab Group⁴⁶ would have been required. Furthermore only scores for pre-specified groupings could have been calculated. It would have not been possible to measure the Index of Agreement between the Arab Group and individual member states. In view of these problems, simply agreement scores between eligible⁴⁷ members and Israel were calculated. In this way, for example, if a score of $I_A = 90.0$ was obtained for the degree of agreement between Israel and the USA, this was interpreted as a 90% support for the Israeli position. The degree of support for the Palestinian cause was then calculated by subtracting the score obtained from 100 ;

$$I_{Sp} = 100 - I_{SI}$$

where; I_{Sp} = Index of support for the Palestinian cause

I_{SI} = Index of support for the Israeli position.

Al.5.1 Interpreting the Results

The modified Lijphart^{Index} gives scores ranging from 0.0 to 100.0 for the degree of agreement between Israel and each member of the Assembly. A score of 0.0 indicates complete disagreement with the Israeli position while, at the other end of the scale, score of 100.0 suggests full agreement with Israel. The scores lying between these two extremes represent the varying degrees of support that Israel receives from each country.

In view of the large number of scores generated for approximately 140 countries per session and the need to differentiate between one level of support and another, the scale given below was introduced;

GE 0.0 and LT 20.0 = Highly pro-Palestinian
GE 20.0 and LT 40.0 = Medium pro-Palestinian
GE 40.0 and LE 60.0 = Intermediate
GT 60.0 and LE 80.0 = Medium pro-Israeli
GT 80.0 and LE 100.0 = Highly pro-Israeli

These cut-off points were determined intuitively on the basis of their political significance. However, it is possible to determine statistically significant levels of high agreement.⁴⁸ This can be done by employing a test of significance against the null hypothesis of random voting. This test establishes the statistically high levels of agreement and disagreement between pairs of states. The scores lying between the two cut-off points are then treated as ones that could have been obtained by random voting. Although such a method is statistically very rigorous it was felt that for the purpose of this study it would be more appropriate to consider politically significant levels of agreement.

Two reasons played a role in this decision. Firstly, it seemed that employing intuitively determined categories of agreement levels would make a richer use of the information particularly for the scores lying between the statistically determined cut-off points. Secondly, strictly speaking one employs a test of significance to establish whether the sample one is using in an analysis to infer about the whole is actually representative of the whole or not. In this study all member states and all the roll-calls central to the research question were included in the analysis. Hence it was felt that in this case a test of significance did not appear to be necessary and the validity or appropriateness of the cut-off points for the different categories of support was left to the test of 'reasonableness', or in other words, to the judgement of the scholars in the field.

ENDNOTES

- 1 In this analysis of voting behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly the regular reference to a state and/or the personification of a state should not be taken as an indication of a state-centric (realist) approach to world political behaviour which assumes that states are monolithic and unitary. Here, when we refer to the US vote on a particular roll-call what we have in mind is the US delegation at the UN. Contrary to a realist position the view in this analysis is that the ultimate vote cast by a delegation is a product of factors ranging from instructions received from the capital to the influence of pressure group politics. At the level of analysis employed in this study it would be difficult on each occasion to look at lower levels of analysis to identify exactly the sources of influence on a delegation's decision. The ultimate vote cast, in this analysis will represent the amalgamation of the various forces of influence on a UN delegation.
- 2 Russett, B. **International Regions and the International System** (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1967), pp. 60-61.
- 3 The realists regard UN voting as relatively insignificant because there is no cost attached to it in real-value terms (such as territory lost, battle casualties etc...). Whereas the position of the transnationalists or the Global Politics Approach is that symbolic values can, in the minds of participants, be translated into real values. This process of attaching real costs to symbolic acts can take the form of, for example, loss of prestige and status of being associated with a losing or illegitimate vote or the cost arising from the erosion of one's position at home when accounting for a vote to an unsatisfied/critical domestic constituency etc... The position taken in this analysis is that such considerations on the part of UN delegations will ensure that the final vote is 'meaningful' and does represent that delegation's attitude on the issue.
- 4 Hovet, T. **Bloc Politics in the United Nations** (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1960).
- 5 Ball, M. "Bloc Voting in the General Assembly", **International Organisation**, Vol.5 (February 1951), No.1, pp.3-31.
- 6 Lijphart, A. "The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly", **American Political Science Review**, Vol.57 (1963), pp.41-74.
- 7 Riggs, R. "Politics in the United Nations: A Study of United States influence in the General Assembly", **Illinois Studies in the Social Sciences**, Vol.41 (1958),

pp.21-37

- 8 Lijphart, (1963:909).
- 9 Beyle, H. **Identification and Analysis of Attribute-Cluster Blocs** (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1931), and Rice, S. **Quantitative Methods in Politics** (New York, 1928).
- 10 Willetts, **The Non-Aligned Movement** (Frances Pinter, London 1978) p.100, and also see Appendix VI.
- 11 Farris, C. "A method of determining groupings in the Congress", **Journal of Politics**, Vol.20, (May 1958), pp.319-327. Other scholars, such as Belknap, G. "A Method for analyzing Legislative Behaviour", **Midwest Journal of Politics**, Vol.2, (1958), pp.377-402 and Schubert, A. "The Study of Judicial Decision-Making as an Aspect of Political Behaviour", **American Political Science Review**, Vol.52 (1958), pp.1007-1025 have used Guttman Scaling in their analyses.
- 12 Reiselbach, L. "Quantitative Techniques for Studying Voting Behaviour in the U.N. General Assembly", **International Organisation**, Vol.14 (Spring 1960), pp.291-306.
- 13 Tikhomirov, V. **Quantitative Analysis of Voting Behaviour in the General Assembly** (UNITAR, New York, 1981).
- 14 Alker, M. and Russett, B. **World Politics in the General Assembly** (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1965).
- 15 Ibid., pp.28-33.
- 16 Ibid., p.33.
- 17 Harbert, J. "The behaviour of ministates in the United Nations, 1971-1972, **International Organisation**, Vol.30 (Winter 1976), p.117.
- 18 Willetts, (1978:chp. 2).
- 19 Lijphart, (1963:910).
- 20 Willetts, (1978:92).
- 21 Reiselbach, (1960:302).
- 22 Alker and Russett, (1965:31).
- 23 Russett, B. "Discovering Voting Groups in the U.N.", **American Political Science Review**, Vol.60, (June 1966), pp.327-39.
- 24 Harbert, (1976:118).

- 25 Alker and Russett, (1965:31).
- 26 Lijphart, (1963:910).
- 27 Lijphart warns us that treating an abstention as a partial agreement is a rather tenuous assumption, "...because a wide variety of reasons may dictate abstention in addition to the desire to take an intermediate stand on a particular issue. This may also be true, however, of both affirmative and negative votes. For example, in numerous instances both the United States and the Soviet Union cast negative votes but for entirely different reasons. In these cases, the two countries cannot realistically be considered to have been in full agreement in spite of their common opposition to particular proposals", (1963:910, footnote 41).
- 28 Reiselbach, (1960:292).
- 29 Penning, W. "Bandwagon Effects on Congressional Voting", *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, (1977), pp.518-19.
- 30 Roll calls concerning the 'question of sovereignty over natural resources in occupied Arab territories', 'relations between Israel and South Africa' and 'arms sales to Israel' were not included in the analysis. Also not included were 'near unanimous' roll-calls that is roll-calls that received no opposition at all or had less than five abstentions. The data on roll-calls were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research.
- 31 Reiselbach, (1960).
- 32 Hovet, (1960).
- 33 Lijphart, (1963).
- 34 Lijphart, (1960: 910).
- 35 For example, consider a situation where two countries are voting on 20 roll-calls grouped into three. The first groups has 10 roll-calls with a weight of one assigned to each. The other two groups have five roll-calls each. The first five roll-calls are assigned a factor of 2 and the remaining five are assigned a weight factor of 3. The voting records for these two countries show 8 full agreements (yes-yes or no-no or abstain-abstain combinations) and 2 disagreements (yes-no or no-yes combinations) on the first 10 roll-calls and 1 agreement and 4 disagreements for the two other sets of roll-calls. The unweighted index of agreement for such a distribution of links would give a score of 50% agreement between the two countries while the weighted version would give a result of 37 %. The

agreement score has been affected by the weighting scheme which has assigned greater importance to the two groups of roll-calls with higher numbers of disagreements between countries.

The scores were obtained by;

$$I_A = \frac{(10 + 0)}{20} * 100 = 50$$

$$WI_A = \frac{(8 + 1*2 + 1*3)}{35} * 100 = \frac{13}{35} \overset{*100}{=} 37$$

- 36 Reiselbach, (1960: 292).
- 37 Lijphart, (1963: 911).
- 38 Willetts, (1978: 93).
- 39 Chai, T. "Chinese policy towards the Third World and the Super Powers in the U.N. General Assembly, 1971-1977: a voting analysis", *International Organisation*, Vol.33 (Summer 1979), p.393.
- 40 Turner, J. *Party and Constituency; Presures on Congress* (The John Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1951), pp.20-21.
- 41 Weighting is a treacherous exercise. However in this particular case it can be said that not weighting the roll-calls in affect is weighting them too. The Table below compares the unweighted and weighted results for the distribution of support at the 29th session. The difference between unweighted and weighted results is particularly evident in the case of the Western group. Not applying any weighting makes Western group much less pro-Israeli.

	Western Bloc		Latin America		Africa		Asia		Eastern Europe		Assembly Total	
	%		%		%		%		%		%	
	I _A	WI _A	I _A	WI _A	I _A	WI _A	I _A	WI _A	I _A	WI _A	I _A	WI _A
Highly pro-Israel	5	5	25	19	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	5
Medium Israel	5	29	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	6
Intermediate	33	24	13	19	4	4	-	-	-	-	11	10
Medium	38	24	25	19	-	-	12	12	-	-	16	11
Palestinian												
Highly pro-Palestinian	19	19	38	44	96	96	88	88	100	100	66	66
Mean value in %	40	48	39	41	13	7	14	11	11	8	22	24
No. Countries	21		16		23		17		11		88	

Table comparing unweighted and weighted versions of the distribution of support by groups at the 29th session (The first column for each group gives the unweighted values)

The average level of support for both Latin American and Western Europe is higher while the average values for Africa, Asia and East Europe indicate a more pro Palestinian position although the distribution across different levels of support remain the same.

- 42 With 'degree of controversy(importance)', here, we mean the amount of controversy or disagreement that the contents (or for that matter controversy over the Assembly procedures that govern a roll-call) of a draft resolution carry in the eyes of the delegate. We assume that the more a draft resolution refers specifically to the political rights of the Palestinians the more controversial it will be. The advantage of this index is that it is dynamic and empirical. That is it captures the perception of what delegates regard to be controversial and important at one point in time. However, establishing the importance of a roll-call naturally can not be captured completely by simply looking at the distribution of votes on a roll-call. [The degree of controversy obtained as defined in p.386 remains rather crude as it cannot, for example, account for the differences in the intensity of a delegation's commitment to one position or the other.] This commitment will vary by the salience that a particular issue has to a delegation. Ideally, one could construct an index that could possibly measure this intensity by examining the length of speeches made prior and/or after a vote, as well as by looking for certain key words. However, for the purposes of this analysis it was felt that the procedure followed in measuring the degree of controversy is adequate. The procedure employed, at least, reduces the element of arbitrariness in assigning weights to roll-calls by introducing a rationale behind the scheme that is be easily reproducible.

Russett too notes the problem of whether every vote is of equal importance and has sought to use amounts of discussion on the floor as a weighting device, (Russett, (1967: 59-93). A similar approach was also considered but found rather impractical in the face of limited resources.

- 43 Other than these items, the right of the Palestinians to self-determination was raised during deliberations on the agenda item entitled 'The Implementation of the Declaration on Self-Determination'.
- 44 VOTASS is a computer package written by Dr.P.Willetts for legislative roll-call analysis. The unit of analysis can be member of a legislative assembly such as the Senate or a country at the UN General Assembly.
- 45 The Index of Inter-Group Agreement measures the number of agreements between the members of two groups as a percentage of the total possible links between the two

percentage of the total possible links between the two groups. This Index can be defined as;

$$IG = \frac{(\text{Number of significant links between the groups})}{\text{Total possible number of links between groups } (M_1 * M_2)} * 100$$

For a detailed description of this Index see Willetts, (1978: 269).

- 46 For the Arab Group, as a whole, to be able to represent the Palestinian cause they would have had to agree amongst themselves on all roll-calls. This was not the case particularly during the sessions which adopted resolutions critical of the Camp David Accords.
- 47 Eligible members for the analysis are those who met the required minimum attendance level that normally was set at 90%.
- 48 For a detailed examination of the role of the test of significance in accounting for the effect of random voting in cluster-bloc analysis see Willetts, P. "Cluster-Bloc Analysis and Statistical Inference", *American Political Science Review*, Vol.66, June 1972, pp.569-82 or Willetts, (1978: Appendix 6).

APPENDIX II

ANTICOLONIALISM AND THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE;

A quantitative analysis of the linkage between anti-colonialism and the Palestinian issue

A2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this appendix is to examine whether the idea of a linkage between anti-colonialism and the Palestinian issue is supported by evidence from voting behaviour at the United Nations General Assembly. In the chapter presenting the analytical framework and in chapter 6 it was argued that the Palestinian cause benefited, in terms of increased political support, by being associated with anti-colonialism. The theoretical argument was that a 'cognitive linkage' was formed between the two issues by establishing similarities between them in respect to certain abstract values and symbols such as 'self-determination'. It was argued that actors by appealing to such widely supported and recognised symbols or abstract values try to recruit more support for their position and try to raise the salience of the issue to other actors.

In the preceding appendix we tried to measure growth of political support for the Palestinian cause. Here we intend to examine whether this growth can, partially, be attributed to the fact that from the early 1970s onwards the Palestinian cause became more and more integrated into anti-colonialism. An increasing number of countries appears to have drawn similarities between the Palestinian problem and the various colonial problems that anti-colonialism intends to eradicate.

One way of testing whether such a relationship does exist between the two issues is to examine whether the voting behaviour of delegations representing various governments at the United Nations General Assembly suggests the

existence of a linkage between the two issues. We hope that in this way we can statistically support the existence of a 'cognitive linkage' process that can account for the increase in the legitimacy of the Palestinian issue in the eyes of those who have supported anti-colonialism, hence supporting the argument that this has culminated in the extension of an already existing pool of support to cover the Palestinian cause.

A2.2 Anti colonialism at the UN

The eventual abolition of the colonial system was an inbuilt objective of the UN. Not only did the Charter in Article 1(2) refer to the equal rights and self-determination of peoples but it also set up an International Trusteeship System under Chapter XII and under Chapter XI expected the cooperation of administering powers in overseeing decolonisation. However, the UN through the General Assembly was only able to assert itself from the early 1960s. 1960 was the year when 17 independent countries joined the organisation. These countries organised at the time as the Afro-Asian caucus group, followed the initiative taken by the Soviets and got the General Assembly to adopt Resolution 1514(XV), the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. This declaration, rather less radical in content than the Soviet initiative, proclaimed the necessity of bringing colonialism to a speedy and unconditional end.

Throughout the 1960s the Afro-Asian Group and the East Europeans continued actively to participate in promoting anti-colonialism at the UN. Anti-colonial efforts contributed to the process that led a great number of countries to achieve their independence during the 1960s. However, during the 1970s there continued to be four major areas of concern for anti-colonialism (of which one was resolved by 1975). These were the problems of the white

minority regime in Rhodesia, the Portugese colonies in Africa, the independence of Namibia and the system of apartheid in South Africa. Although, these four issues are not the only areas of concern to anti-colonialism, they do attract a large propotion of anti-colonialist efforts. These efforts are the product of a dynamic political process, led by first the Afro-Asians and then by the Non-Aligned, inside and outside the UN. This dynamic process has generated an ideology that guides the position and foreign policy outputs of countries on issues that are perceived to be covered by this ideology. It is data from these four areas which will form the basis of our analysis.

A2.3 The data and the hypothesis

Two sets of variables were used in this analysis. The first set of data on the Palestinian Question comes from the analysis in Appendix I and is composed of agreement scores between each country and Israel. The second set of variables was obtained by processing 63 roll-calls across 5 sessions on colonial matters, falling under the four problem areas mentioned earlier on. The USSR was chosen as the reference point for calculating agreement scores on colonial matters. The degree of agreement between the USSR delegation and another delegation gives that delegation's position on the colonial issue. A country with a score of 90.0 was treated as 90% of the time in agreement with USSR and hence 90% anti-colonial.

The USSR was chosen as the most suitable reference country because, firstly, it pursued a constant and very anti-colonial policy through out the sessions and, secondly, it attended all the roll-calls included in the study. Other countries were considered but they failed to meet the above two criteria. The US, for example, although it met the second criterion, did not follow a constant colonialist or anti-colonialist policy. On the other hand, South Africa was always very colonialist in its voting behaviour but

after the beginning of the 29th session the South African delegation was denied the right to participate in the work of the General Assembly.

What we will want to do here is to see whether the General Assembly as a whole exhibits a voting behaviour that may suggest that in the eyes of the whole assembly the Palestinian Question and colonial matters, mostly pertaining to Southern Africa, are linked. Furthermore, if such a linkage does exist we will want to see whether anti-colonialist voting goes along with voting in support of the Palestinian cause.

To state it formally our null-hypothesis would point at no particularly significant relationship existing between the two issues. Statistically speaking, if delegates voting at the General Assembly on colonial matters and on the Palestinian Question do not see any relationship between the two issues, this would be reflected in a very low correlation coefficient.¹ Then, assuming that the Y variable represents our dependent variable voting on the Palestinian Question and the X variable represents the independent variable, voting on colonial matters, we would expect under the null hypothesis a near-zero correlation coefficient that summarises a scatter without a distinct pattern. Such a scatter would tell us that a country voting one way on an issue is voting differently or in an unrelated manner on the other issue.

On the other hand, if a relationship between the two issues does exist, we would expect, on the basis of our theory, to find a high correlation. More importantly we also would expect the correlation coefficient for the various sessions representing the period under study to increase across time. In other words the correlation coefficient would get closer and closer to 1, the point where the Assembly votes as if the questions fall on a single issue dimension.

Having established the strength of the relationship between voting on the two issues, we will also examine what percentage of the Assembly has voted both highly anti-colonial and pro-Palestinian across the sessions under study.

A2.4 Voting behaviour on colonial matters

The analysis of the relationship between voting on the Palestinian question and colonial matters implicitly assumes that the independent variable, that is voting on colonial matters remains stable over the period under study. The validity of this assumption is supported by Table I which gives the correlation between voting on colonial matters during the five General Assembly sessions included in the study.

	24th	28th	29th	33rd	35th
24th	1.00				
28th	.91	1.00			
29th	.77	.89	1.00		
33rd	.85	.90	.94	1.00	
35th	.83	.86	.92	.98	1.00

TABLE A2.1: Correlation coefficients for voting on colonial matters between General Assembly sessions

These high correlation coefficients suggest that there has been little variation in the pattern of the Assembly's members voting on colonial issues from one session to the other.² An examination of the scattergrams show that in all cases the best fit lines run very close to the diagonal (the line $Y=X$) with slopes approaching to 1.00. Whatever change there has been is captured by the intercepts, with mostly positive values, showing a slight change from one session to another by a general tendency to be relatively more anti-colonial. The relatively lower coefficient of .77 for the correlation between the 24th and 29th sessions is

caused by two outliers, Portugal and Israel. Portugal had voted highly pro-colonial during the 24th session and medium anti-colonial at the 29th session after the change of regime. Israel, on the other hand, first voted highly anti-colonial switching to pro-colonial voting at the 29th session. A similar relatively lower correlation coefficient for the 28th and 29th session was not obtained because Israel was excluded from the analysis for low attendance.

Table A2.2 to Table A2.4 show the distribution of support for anti-colonialism for the 24th, 29th and 35th sessions. The cut-off points used in classifying the scores into the five categories of support are similar to the one presented in Appendix I.

GE 0.0 and LT 20.0 = pro-colonial
GE 20.0 and LT 40.0 = medium pro-colonial
GE 40.0 and LE 60.0 = intermediate
GT 60.0 and LE 80.0 = medium anti-colonial
GT 80.0 and LE 100.0 = anti-colonial

As the three Tables below indicate the average level of support by the whole Assembly has changed very little over the years. The average agreement score was 88.7%, in other words strongly anti-colonial, at the 24th session rising to 89.8 and 91.0 for the 29th and 35th sessions. Most of the scores, particularly for the five non-Western United Nations regional groups and the Non-Aligned fell in the anti-colonial category. The anti-colonial category encompassed 77% of the members of the Assembly at the 24th session and 80% and 84% respectively for the other two sessions. This gradual increase can mostly be attributed to the fact that over the years the number of countries belonging to non-Western groups increased in proportion to the Western bloc.

From this and the earlier bivariate analysis we can conclude that on the colonial matters the behaviour of the

	Israel %	Western Bloc %	Latin American %	Africa ^a %	Asia ^a %	Non- ^b Aligned %	Assembly ^c Total %
Highly col.	-	10	-	-	-	-	2
Medium col.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Intermediate	-	40	-	4	-	-	9
Medium a.c.	-	40	15	4	6	-	12
Anti col.	100	10	85	92	94	100	77
Average Score	92.9	56.0	90.1	95.8	98.4	100.0	88.7
No. of countries	1	20	13	24	18	47	101

Table A2.2: Distribution of support by groups at the 24th session³

	Israel %	Western Bloc %	Latin American %	Africa ^a %	Asia ^a %	Non- ^b Aligned %	Assembly ^c Total %
Highly col.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Medium col.	100	17	-	-	-	-	4
Intermediate	-	44	-	3	-	-	10
Medium a.c.	-	26	6	-	5	-	6
Anti-col.	-	13	94	97	95	100	80
Average Score	33.3	59.0	94.3	97.7	98.0	99.0	89.8
No. of countries	1	23	18	29	21	66	120

Table A2.3: Distribution of support by groups at 29th session³

	Western Bloc %	Latin America %	Africa ^a %	Asia ^a %	Non- ^b Aligned %	Assembly ^c Total %
Highly col.	13	-	-	-	-	2
Medium col.	17	-	-	-	-	3
Intermediate	13	-	(Malawi)	-	(Malawi)	3
Medium a.c.	50	-	-	4	-	8
Anti-col.	9	100	97	96	99	84
Average Score	53	98.4	98.0	98.0	99.0	91.0
No. of countries	23	25	39	25	87	144

Table A2.4: Distribution of support by groups at 35th session³

a Excluding members of the Arab League,

b Including Arabs and countries from the preceding 3 columns

c Excluding from the tables those with low attendance at these roll calls

Assembly has been quite stable over the years. That is those parts of the Assembly that were anti-colonial and formed the overwhelming majority continued to exhibit anti-colonial behaviour while the Western bloc remained relatively disunited with its behaviour spread across mostly the first four categories of support. Establishing this continuity in the Assembly's behaviour is crucial to the analysis of the relationship between colonial matters and the Palestinian Question, as our theoretical framework takes voting on colonial matters and particularly the anti-colonial element within it as the frame of reference to see whether the hypothesis is substantiated.

A2.5 The relationship between the two issues

The bivariate statistic we intend to use to measure the relationship between our dependent and independent variables is Pearson's correlation coefficient. Unlike Spearman's rho and Kendall's tau the Pearson product-moment correlation assumes the two variables in the analysis meet at least the criteria for interval level measurement. Even though in social research it is very difficult to find true interval measures in our case the scales on which the two variables are based meet the properties of interval-level measurement.

The bivariate analysis employed here assumes that there is a linear relationship represented by a best-fitting straight line. It seems for most variables of interest social scientists in general assume pairs of variables to be related in a straight line. This is done because linear regression gives a simple summary of the relationship, although not necessarily the best. However, sometimes the scattergram for two variables may suggest a distribution that might best be summarised by fitting a curve. To find whether a curve or a straight line 'best' represents a relationship can be tested by transforming one of the axes and repeating the analysis to compare the results.

A logarithmic transformation was attempted on our variables to see whether a curve would better fit the data than a straight line. The comparision of the correlation coefficients suggested for all its weaknesses linear regression in this analysis offered a better 'fit' for the data. It should be stressed that this straight 'best line' still does not necessarily mean that this line is the absolutely 'best' representation of the data.

One further point to make before proceeding to the analysis, concerns the size of the samples across the period under study. Ideally, one would have liked to compare results across sessions that are based on the same sample size. However, in this analysis sample size varied in relation to the growing membership at the United Nations. We chose this approach firstly, because, we are interested in the behaviour of the Assembly as a whole and the UN groupings within it rather than every single member. Secondly, to limit the size of all the sessions to the first session would have excluded a large amount of information generated by the new membership.

A2.6 Results

Table A2.5 gives us the results for the first part of our analysis that tries to establish whether there is a relationship between voting on the two issues.

Session no.	correlation	Number of countries
24th	0.53	92
28th	0.83	101
29th	0.86	98
33th	0.80	121
35th	0.82	134

Table A2.5: Relationship between voting on colonial matters and on the Pálestinian Question

Other than for the first session Pearson's correlation coefficient is reporting a strong relationship between

voting on colonial matters and voting on the Palestinian question. It seems, compared to the 24th, in the following sessions the Assembly voted in away that suggests that delegations saw a relationship between the two issues. The breakthrough, from a medium to a strong relationship, seems to have come at the 28th session in 1973. This session was preceded by a number of events that must have influenced the attitudes, particularly of the Non-Aligned countries. The efforts of the Africans to mediate in the Arab-Israeli conflict by then had reached a dead-lock and most importantly the Non-Aligned Algiers summit in 1973 was marked by its pro-Palestinian stand and by the way in which the Palestinian struggle was explicitly likened to the anti-colonial struggle in Southern Africa.

These developments seem to have moved some Non-Aligned countries away from a situation where they had high scores on colonial matters and relatively lower scores on the Palestinian issue. A high correlation also suggests that some countries, particularly from the Western Group voted on the two issues in a similar way although at a level characterised by lower scores. This could well be the outcome of some countries in the Western Group reacting negatively to the increasing tendency of the Assembly to see a relationship between the Palestinian question and anti-colonial struggles in Southern Africa.

The slight drop in the correlation coefficients for the 33rd and 35th sessions might be accounted for by the influence of outliers such as Guatemala, Dominican Republic, France and an increase in the number of countries with high scores on both issues resulting in there being less variability to be explained.

A comparison of the scattergrams (Figures A2.1 and A2.2) presented in the next two pages and the regression lines for the 24th and 35th sessions represented by the equations;

$$Y(PQ)_{24} = -18.6 + .94X(CM)_{24} \text{ and } Y(PQ)_{35} = 33.0 + .65X(CM)_{35}$$

suggest that two simultaneous changes occurred. The first, as mentioned earlier on, is caused by delegations (in the bottom right hand quadrant of Figure A2.1) with lower Palestinian scores compared to their anti-colonial scores moving to more pro-Palestinian positions although some at the very top of the scale still remaining marginally more anti-colonial than pro-Palestinian. The second change is caused by those countries whose scores were less than 50% on the colonialism scale becoming more pro-Palestinian. That is moving away from an exclusively high to medium pro-Israeli position to a more balanced position. In certain cases the move on the Palestinian issue was also accompanied by a more pro-colonial stance.⁴

So far we have seen that throughout the 1970s a strong relationship has existed between voting behaviour on colonial matters and the Palestinian Question. Now we want to see whether the growing strength of the relationship between the two issues can be attributed to those anti-colonial delegations that also became pro-Palestinian. This would support our thesis that the Palestinian cause has benefited from support accruing to anti-colonialism as more and more supporters of anti-colonialism voted in a way indicating an attitude on their part that saw a strong connection between the struggle in Southern Africa and the struggle of the Palestinians. What we will want to do here is to see the frequency distribution for delegations that fall into different combinations of categories of support.




Figure A2.1: Scattergram of voting on the Palestinian Question
(down) by colonial matters (across) at the 24th session




Figure A2.2: Scattergram of voting on the Palestinian Question (down) by colonial matters (across) at the 35th session






Figure A2.3: Frequency distribution of countries voting the same way
 (Percent figures based on the whole Assembly excluding countries with low attendance)

Figure A2.3 shows the total number of delegations that have voted in a similar way both on the Palestinian and colonial issues. In other words it includes those delegations that have agreement scores that fall in the same levels of support on both issues. On the other hand Table A2.6 shows what percentage of each group, included in the analysis, has voted anti-colonial and pro-Palestinian across three sessions under study. From figure A2.3 we can see that the number of countries that have exhibited both an anti-colonial and pro-Palestinian voting has increased in both absolute and relative terms.

While, at the 24th session less than half of the Assembly supported the Palestinian cause as much as anti-colonialism this figure rose to 81.3% of the Assembly by the 35th session. Outside the Arabs and the East Europeans the other delegations were mostly Non-Aligned. However, it must be noted at the 24th session they did not behave in this way. As Table A2.6 suggests only 50% of the Non-Aligned fell in this category. But once the linkage between the colonial problems and the Palestinian cause solidified in the early 1970s this percentage increased to 94.4% for the 29th session and to almost 100.0% at the 35th session.

From Table A2.6 below we can see that a similar situation existed for the African group too. At the 29th session while 91.3 % of the Africans were fully anti-colonial only 34.8 % of them supported the Palestinian cause, lagging behind the average for the Assembly. The situation changed drastically when the Palestinian cause started to receive as much support as anti-colonialism at the 29th and 35th session.

The behaviour of the countries belonging to the Asian Group was slightly different from the African Group and the Non-Aligned as a whole. The change in their attitudes towards the relationship between the two issues was not as dramatic. Most non-Arab Asian countries with the added

influence of a common religion, familiarity with the issue from the Bandung Conference in 1955 and closer geographical proximity with the Arabs had already been voting nearer to a pro-Palestinian position. In the case of the Asian Group the change has come in the form of the gap between their anti-colonial voting and their voting on the Palestinian cause becoming even smaller than it used to be at the 24th session.

	Western Bloc %	Latin America %	Africa ^a %	Asia ^a %	Non- ^b Aligned %	Assembly ^c Total %
24th Session	10.5	81.8	91.3	92.3	91.7	76.1
	15.8	0.0	34.8	69.2	50.0	48.9
29th Session	10.0	91.7	95.5	93.8	97.2	77.6
	10.0	58.3	95.5	87.5	94.4	74.5
35th Session	8.7	100.0	100.0	95.7	100.0	83.6
	21.7	95.2	97.1	91.3	98.4	83.6

Table A2.6: Proportion of anti-colonial (first rows) and pro-Palestinian (second rows) votes in each group across three sessions.³

a Excluding members of the Arab League

b Including Arabs and countries in the preceding three columns

c Excluding those with low attendance at these roll calls.

The Latin American attitude, however, was very different from that of the other Third World groups. Although the Latin Americans were very anti-colonial throughout the period this did not condition their voting on the Palestinian question. That is they remained reluctant to see a linkage between the Palestinian problem and colonial matters. This is well supported by Table A2.6. None of the Latin Americans included in the analysis at the 24th session and 41.7% of them at the 29th session voted in a way which suggests that they did not perceive a link

between the two issues. Instead their scores were systematically higher on the scale for colonial matters. It was not until the 35th session that the Latin Americans with the exception of the Dominican Republic combined their anti-colonial voting with pro-Palestinian voting.

The Western bloc exhibited a unique behaviour in respect to the rest of the Assembly. Only two countries, Turkey and Greece, from the Western bloc were supportive of anti-colonialism and the Palestinian cause at the same time. However, the Western bloc was the only group with a larger number of countries higher on the Palestinian scale than on the colonial scale.

A2.7 Conclusion

The preceding analysis based on voting behaviour in the General Assembly points to the growing convergence between the two issues. Figure A2.3 shows this convergence graphically. And as Figures A2.1 and A2.2 suggest While during the 24th session of the Assembly the patterns in the scattergrams emerging from voting on these two issues bore little resemblance, this situation was transformed drastically by the 35th session.

These results are also corroborated by the matrices in the following pages. The first two matrices compare the cluster blocs on the Palestinian Question and on colonial matters at the 24th session while the subsequent two do the same for the 35th session. Each matrix is symmetrical and +1 indicates high agreement while -1 is for high disagreement and 0 is used for medium scores with pairs of countries meeting the minimum attendance levels.⁵

A comparison of the two matrices on colonial matters (Figures A2.5 and A2.7) does indicate, allowing for the change in the size of the Assembly, that the Assembly on both occasions was divided into one very large anti-

colonial cluster and smaller clusters that were progressively less anti-colonial. The change across the two sessions, in terms of the number and shape of the clusters, was small particularly compared to voting on the Palestinian Question. In the case of the Palestinian question the Assembly at the 24th session was divided into completely separate blocs covering various positions ranging from pro-Israeli to pro-Palestinian. The situation by the 35th session changed dramatically when a large majority of the Assembly became pro-Palestinian with a very small pro-Israeli group and a number of overlapping clusters mostly composed of countries from the Western Group covering the area between the two extremes. From the point of the argument presented in this appendix what is interesting to note is the overlap/similarity between the two large clusters in the last two matrices compared with the lack of such overlap in the first two.

The empirical observations obtained by two separate methodologies suggest that our hypothesis fails to be falsified. The 'cognitive linkage' that came to be established between the two issues benefited the mobilisation of support for the Palestinian cause. This behaviour is also supported by the speeches made by members of various delegations and also by the decisions of political bodies representing Third World groupings. These have been examined in chapter 6.

Figure A2.4: Cluster-Blocs on the Palestinian Question at the 24th session p.415.

Figure A2.5: Cluster-Blocs on colonial matters at the 24th session p.416.

Figure A2.6: Cluter-Blocs on the Palestinian Question at the 35th session p.417.

Figure A2.7: Cluster-Blocs on colonial matters at the 35th session p.418.

Due to lack of space the countries below are missing from the bottom of Figures A2.4 to A2.6

Figure A2.5: Barbados, Guyana, Poland.

Figure A2.6: Trinidad and Tobago, Czechoslovakia.

Figure A2.7: Malaysia, Bulgaria, Philippines, Indonesia, Surinam, Romania, Ecuador, Fiji, U.S.S.R.




Figure A2. 4




Figure A2.7

ENDNOTES

- 1 The correlation coefficient refers to the degree to which the data approaches a straight line of best fit and may suggest whether some relationship exists within the data.
- 2 A certain degree of stability is crucial in respect to our theoretical framework which suggests that a political movement can benefit from the support accruing to an already established political movement. The fact that a movement is established suggests a kind of continuity and stability in behaviour towards it.
- 3 The results for the Non-Aligned Group are not included in the aggregate results in the last column. The East Europeans and the Arabs were 100% anti-colonial. Although they are not in the table the Assembly total includes them. This is the case for all 3 tables.

4 For example;

	Scores on Palestinian Question	Scores on colonial matters	
Canada	64.3	13.6	in 1969
to	30.0	43.3	in 1980
UK	41.7	31.8	in 1969
to	66.2	10.0	in 1980
US	50.0	13.6	in 1969
to	10.0	19.4	in 1980

This may well be due to the resolutions on colonial matters becoming more and more critical of the countries singled out.

- 5 For an explanation of the full methodology see Willetts, P. **The Non-Aligned Movement**, (Frances Pinter, London, 1978), Chapter 3 and Appendices V and VI.

APPENDIX III

LIST OF MEMBERSHIP OF REGIONAL AND POLITICAL GROUPS

This appendix provides a list of countries in the various regional and political groupings used in the construction of the index of support as discussed in Appendix I. The basis of regional group membership is the same as the membership of geographical groupings used for the purposes of elections within the United Nations, with two exceptions. Firstly, Arab countries are taken out of the African and Asian groups to form a separate Arab Group based on Arab League membership. Secondly, the Western European Group which within the UN is formally known as the "Western European and Others' Group was enlarged to include the US, too.¹

The list below also includes two major political groupings. The two groupings are listed separately because unlike the Latin Americans and African political groupings their membership does not coincide with any one regional group. The Non-Aligned and the Islamic Group both overlap with several of the regional groups. The membership of the Non-Aligned group, for the General Assembly sessions studied, was determined by whether a country had attended a Non-Aligned summit in the year of or preceding a General Assembly session.² In the case of the Islamic group, which did not come into existence until March 1971, the 1980 membership of the Islamic Conference Organisation was used as a basis for all the General Assembly sessions included in the study. The Arab countries have been included in both the Non-Aligned and Islamic groups. Afghanistan and Egypt were included in the Islamic Group throughout in spite of their suspension from membership in 1980 and 1979 respectively. Egypt was readmitted to the ICO in January 1984.

The Arab Group includes all members of the Arab League, including in the statistics in this study Egypt after its suspension in March 1979. Even though Mauritania and Somalia were not admitted to the Arab League until 1973 and 1974 respectively they were included in the Arab Group for the sessions preceding these dates because of their close ties with the Arab world.

REGIONAL³
GROUPS

POLITICAL GROUPINGS

AFRICA	NAM64	NAM70	NAM73	NAM76	NAM79	ICO
Angola	-	-	-	M	M	-
Botswana	-	M	M	M	M	-
Burundi	-	M	M	M	M	-
Cameroon	M	M	M	M	M	M
Cape Verde	-	-	-	-	M	-
C.A.R	M	M	M	M	M	-
Chad	M	M	M	M	-	M
Comoros	-	-	-	M	M	M
Congo	M	M	M	M	M	-
Dahomey	M	-	M	M	M	-
Eq. Guinea	-	M	M	M	M	-
Ethiopia	M	M	M	M	M	-
Gabon	-	-	M	M	M	M
Gambia	-	-	M	M	M	M
Ghana	M	M	M	M	M	-
Guinea	M	M	M	M	M	M
G.Bissau	-	-	-	M	M	M
I. Coast	-	-	M	M	M	-
Kenya	M	M	M	M	M	-
Lesotho	-	M	M	M	M	-
Liberia	M	M	M	M	M	-
Madagascar	-	-	M	M	M	-
Malawi	M	-	-	-	M	-
Mali	M	M	M	M	M	M
Mauritius	-	-	M	M	M	-
Mozambique	-	-	-	M	M	-
Niger	-	-	M	M	M	M
Nigeria	M	M	M	M	M	-
Rwanda	-	M	M	M	M	-
Sao T.&.P	-	-	-	M	M	-
Senegal	M	M	M	M	M	M
Seychelles	-	-	-	M	M	-
S. Leone	M	M	M	M	M	M
Swaziland	-	M	M	M	M	-
Tanzania	M	M	M	M	M	-
Togo	M	M	M	M	M	-
Uganda	M	M	M	M	M	M

U. Volta	-	-	M	M	M	M
Zaire	-	M	M	M	M	-
Zambia	M	M	M	M	M	-
Zimbabwe	-	-	-	-	-	-

(N=41)

ASIA

Afghanistan	M	M	M	M	M	M
Bangladesh	-	-	M	M	M	M
Bhutan	-	-	M	M	M	-
Burma	M	-	M	M	M	-
Cambodia	M	-	M	M	-	-
China	-	-	-	-	-	-
Cyprus	M	M	M	M	M	-
Fiji	-	-	-	-	-	-
India	M	M	M	M	M	-
Indonesia	M	M	M	M	M	M
Iran	-	-	-	-	M	M
Japan	-	-	-	-	-	-
Laos	M	M	M	M	M	-
Malaysia	-	M	M	M	M	M
Maldives	-	-	-	M	M	-
Mongolia	-	-	-	-	-	-
Nepal	M	M	M	M	M	-
Pakistan	-	-	-	-	M	M
Papua N.G.	-	-	-	-	-	-
Phillipines	-	-	-	G	O	-
Samoa	-	-	-	-	-	-
Singapore	-	M	M	M	M	-
Solomons	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sri Lanka	M	M	M	M	M	-
Thailand	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vietnam	-	-	-	M	M	-

(N=26)

LATIN AMERICA

Argentina	O	O	M	M	M	-
Bahamas	-	-	-	-	-	-
Barbados	-	O	O	O	O	-
Bolivia	O	O	O	O	O	-
Brazil	O	O	O	O	O	-
Chile	O	O	M	-	-	-
Colombia	-	-	-	-	O	-
C. Rica	-	-	-	-	O	-
Cuba	M	M	M	M	M	-
Dominica	-	-	-	-	O	-
Dominican R	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ecuador	-	O	O	O	O	-
El Salv.	-	-	-	O	O	-
Grenada	-	-	-	O	M	-
Guatemala	-	-	-	-	-	-
Guyana	-	M	M	M	M	-
Haiti	-	-	-	-	-	-

Honduras	-	-	-	-	-	-
Jamaica	O	M	M	M	M	-
Mexico	O	-	O	O	O	-
Nicaragua	-	-	-	-	M	-
Panama	-	-	O	M	M	-
Paraguay	-	-	-	-	-	-
Peru	-	O	M	M	M	-
Saint Lucia	-	-	-	-	O	-
Surinam	-	-	-	-	M	-
Tri.&To.	O	M	M	M	M	-
Uruguay	O	O	O	O	O	-
Venezuela	O	O	O	O	O	-

(N=29)

WESTERN GROUP

Australia	-	-	-	-	-	-
Austria	-	G	G	G	G	-
Belgium	-	-	-	-	-	-
Canada	-	-	-	-	-	-
Denmark	-	-	-	-	-	-
Finland	O	G	G	G	G	-
France	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	-	-	-	-	-	-
Greece	-	-	-	-	-	-
Iceland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Ireland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-
Luxembourg	-	-	-	-	-	-
Malta	-	-	M	M	M	-
New Zealand	-	-	-	-	-	-
Netherlands	-	-	-	-	-	-
Norway	-	-	-	-	-	-
Portugal	-	-	-	G	G	-
Spain	-	-	-	-	G	-
Sweden	-	-	G	G	G	-
Turkey	-	-	-	-	-	M
U.K.	-	-	-	-	-	-
U.S.A.	-	-	-	-	-	-

(N=23)

EASTERN EUROPE

Albania	-	-	-	-	-	-
Bulgaria	-	-	-	-	-	-
Czechoslovakia	-	-	-	-	-	-
E. Germany	-	-	-	-	-	-
Hungary	-	-	-	-	-	-
Poland	-	-	-	-	-	-
Romania	-	-	-	G	G	-
U.S.S.R.	-	-	-	-	-	-
Yugoslavia	M	M	M	M	M	-

(N=9)

ARABS

Algeria	M	M	M	M	M	M
Bahrain	-	-	M	M	M	M
Djibouti	-	-	-	-	M	M
Egypt	M	M	M	M	M	M
Jordan	M	M	M	M	M	M
Kuwait	M	M	M	M	M	M
Lebanon	M	M	M	M	M	M
Libya	M	M	M	M	M	M
Iraq	M	M	M	M	M	M
Mauritania	M	M	M	M	M	M
Morocco	M	M	M	M	M	M
Oman	-	-	M	M	M	M
Qatar	-	-	M	M	M	M
P.D.R.Y.	M	M	M	M	M	M
Saudi A.	M	-	M	M	M	M
Somalia	M	M	M	M	M	M
Sudan	M	M	M	M	M	M
Syria	M	M	M	M	M	M
Tunisia	M	M	M	M	M	M
Y.A.Rep.	-	-	-	-	M	M
U.A.E.	-	-	M	M	M	M

(N=21)

Key

M Member O Observer G Guest - Not Member

ENDNOTES

- 1 For a discussion of the membership of the formal UN geographical groupings as it stood in 1960 see Bailey, S. **The General Assembly** (Stevens and Sons Limited, London, 1960) pp.29-41.
- 2 For the complete list see Willetts, P. **The Non-Aligned in Havana**, (Frances Pinter, London, 1981) pp.65-67.
- 3 The Table includes 149 countries, the 153 UN members in 1980 except for Byelorussia, Ukraine, Israel and South Africa.

APPENDIX VI

CODE BOOK FOR FILE ON AGREEMENT SCORES

Column*	Contents of the Variable
(1) 1-8	Name of the country
(1) 9-13	Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-calls U.N. 24th session, 1969. Percentage agreement with Israel to one decimal place (Lijphart Index), Minimum value 0, maximum value 100.0
(1) 14-16	No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by a member state at the U.N. 24th session, (Maximum 3).
(1) 17-18	Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 24th session The variable is the result of a test of significance, applied to data on columns 9-13, against the null hypothesis of random voting. 1 High agreement with Israel 0 Medium -1 High disagreement with Israel
(1) 19-23	Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-calls U.N. 25th session 1970 Coded as in columns 9-13
(1) 24-26	No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by a member state at the U.N. 25th session, (Maximum 7)
(1) 27-28	Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 25th session, Significance test for columns 19-23, coded as in column 17-18.
(1) 29-33	Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-calls, U.N. 26th session, 1971. Coded as in columns 9-13.
(1) 34-36	No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by a member state at the U.N. 26th session, (Maximum 7).
(1) 37-38	Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 26th session, Significance test for columns 29-33, coded as in columns 17-18.
(1) 39-43	Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-calls U.N. 27th session, 1972.

Coded as in column 9-13.

- (1) 44-46 No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by a member state at the U.N. 27th session, (Maximum 9)
- (1) 47-48 Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 27th session. Significance test for columns 39-43, coded as in columns 17-18.
- (1) 49-53 Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-calls U.N. 28th session, 1973. Coded as in columns 9-13.
- (1) 54-56 No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by a member state at the U.N. 28th session, (Maximum 9)
- (1) 57-58 Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 28th session. Significance test for columns 49-53, coded as in columns 17-18.
- (1) 59-63 Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-calls U.N. 29th session, 1974. Coded as in columns 9-13.
- (1) 64-66 No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by a member state at the U.N. 29th session, (Maximum 9).
- (1) 67-68 Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 29th session. Significance test for columns 59-63, coded as in columns 17-18.
- (1) 69-73 Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-calls U.N. 33th session, 1978. Coded as in column 9-13
- (1) 74-76 No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by a member state at the U.N. 33rd session, (Maximum 9)
- (1) 76-78 Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 33rd session. Significance test for columns 69-73, coded as in columns 17-18.
- (1) 79 Group membership
1 Israel
2 Western European and Others
3 Latin America
4 Africa (excluding Arabs)
5 Asia (excluding Arabs)
6 Eastern Europe
7 Arab

- (1) 80 Membership to the Islamic Conference Organisation
 0 Non-member
 1 Member
- (2) 1-5 Voting on the Question of Palestine, roll-calls U.N. 35th session, 1980.
 Coded as in columns (1) 9-13.
- (2) 6-8 No. of roll-calls on Palestine, attended by a member state at the U.N. 35th session, (Maximum 11).
- (2) 9-10 Significance of voting on Palestine, 35th U.N. session.
 Significance test for columns (2) 1-5, coded as in (1) 17-18
- (2) 11-15 Voting on the Question of Palestine, including roll-calls on Camp David agreements, U.N. 35th session, 1980.
 Coded as in columns (1) 9-13
- (2) 16-18 No. of roll-calls on Palestine attended by a member state at the U.N. 35th session, (Maximum 13).
- (2) 19-20 Significance of voting on Palestine, U.N. 35th session
 Significance test for columns (2) 11-15 coded as in (1) 17-18.
- (2) 21-25 Voting on selected roll-calls on colonialism, U.N. 21st session, 1966.
 Percentage agreement with USSR to one decimal place (Lijphart Index) Minimum value 0, Maximum value 100.0.
- (2) 26-28 No. of roll-calls on colonialism attended by a member state at the U.N. 21st session, (Maximum 7).
- (2) 29-30 Significance of voting on colonialism, U.N. 21st session.
 The variable is the result of a test of significance applied to data on columns (2) 21-25, against the null hypothesis of random voting.
 1 High agreement with the USSR
 0 Medium
 -1 High disagreement with USSR
- (2) 31-35 Voting on selected roll-calls on colonialism, U.N. 24th session, 1969.
 Coded as in columns (2) 21-25

- (2) 36-38 No. of roll-calls on colonialism attended by a member state at the U.N. 24th session, (Maximum 7).
- (2) 39-40 Significance of voting on colonialism, U.N. 24th session.
Significance test for columns (2) 31-35, coded as in column (2) 29-30
- (2) 41-45 Voting on selected roll-calls on colonialism, U.N. 28th session, 1972.
Coded as in column (2) 21-25
- (2) 46-48 No. of roll-calls on colonialism attended by a member state at the U.N. 28th session, (Maximum 17).
- (2) 49-50 Significance of voting on colonialism, U.N. 28th session.
Significance test for columns (2) 41-45, coded as in column (2) 29-30
- (2) 51-55 Voting on selected roll-calls on colonialism, U.N. 29th session, 1974.
Coded as in columns (2) 21-25.
- (2) 56-58 No. of roll-calls on colonialism attended by a member state at the U.N. 29th session, (Maximum 10).
- (2) 59-60 Significance of voting on colonialism, U.N. 29th session.
Significance test for columns (2) 51-55, coded as in columns (2) 29-30.
- (2) 61-65 Voting on selected roll-calls on colonialism, U.N. 33rd session, 1978.
- (2) 66-68 No. of roll-calls on colonialism attended by a member state at the U.N. 33rd session, (Maximum 14).
- (2) 69-70 Significance of voting on colonialism, U.N. 33rd session.
Significance test for columns (2) 61-65, coded as in columns (2) 29-30.
- (2) 71-75 Voting on selected roll-calls on colonialism, U.N. 35th session, 1980.
Coded as in columns (2) 21-25.
- (2) 76-78 No. of roll-calls on colonialism attended by a member state at the U.N. 35th session, (Maximum 15).
- (2) 78-80 Significance of voting on colonialism,

U.N. 35th session.

Significance test for columns (2) 71-75,
coded as in columns (2) 29-30.

- (3) 1 Attendance at the second Non-Aligned
 summit, 1964. Coded 1 attended and 0 did
 not.
- (3) 2 Attendance at the third Non-Aligned summit,
 1970. Coded 1 attended and 0 did not.
- (3) 3 Attendance at the fourth Non-Aligned
 summit, 1973. Coded 1 attended and 0 did
 not.
- (3) 4 Attendance at the fifth Non-Aligned
 summit, 1976. Coded 1 attended and 0 did
 not.
- (3) 5 Attendance at the sixth Non-Aligned summit,
 1979. Coded 1 attended and 0 did not.

* In brackets is the record (card) number.

ISRAEL..100.0 3 1100.0 7 1100.0 7 1100.0 7 1100.0 9 1100.0 9 1100.0 9 1100.0 9 110
100.0 11 1100.0 13 1 71.4 7 0 92.9 7 1 29.2 12 0 33.3 9 0 20.0 5-1 33.3 3 0
00000
U.S.A... 86.4 3 1 93.0 7 1 83.3 7 1 79.6 9 1 88.8 9 1 92.4 9 1 86.1 9 120
81.6 11 1 86.4 13 1 42.9 7 0 50.0 6 0 20.6 17 0 30.0 10 0 26.9 13 0 10.0 15-1
00000
CANADA.. 86.4 3 1 86.6 7 1 83.3 7 1 72.5 9 0 50.0 8 0 60.2 9 0 78.0 9 020
56.3 11 0 67.7 13 0 42.9 7 0 64.3 7 0 55.9 17 0 55.0 10 0 42.9 14 0 30.0 15 0
00000
CUBA.... 0.0 3-1 0.0 6-1 0.0 7-1 0.0 9-1 5.3 9-1 7.6 9-1 0.0 9-130
0.0 9-1 0.0 11-1100.0 6 1 50.0 5 0 27.1 17 1100.0 10 1100.0 14 1100.0 15 1
11111
HAITI... 0.0 0 0 80.6 5 1100.0 2 0 66.9 9 0 50.0 1 0 44.8 5 0 16.2 9-130
14.8 4-1 27.9 6 0 80.0 5 1100.0 3 1 20.6 16 1100.0 8 1100.0 13 1100.0 13 1
00000
DOM.REP. 86.4 3 1100.0 5 1 91.7 7 1100.0 9 1 67.6 9 0 91.4 2 0 24.3 9 030
48.8 9 0 56.0 11 0 83.3 6 1 83.3 6 1 55.6 9 0 88.9 9 1 85.7 7 1 96.7 15 1
00000
JAMAICA. 68.2 3 0 60.2 6 0 45.8 7 0 43.7 9 0 24.7 9 0 17.3 9-1 0.0 9-130
0.0 11-1 6.5 13-1 85.7 7 1100.0 6 1 91.2 17 1100.0 9 1100.0 14 1100.0 15 1
21111
TRI.TON. 0.0 0 0 50.0 2 0 29.2 5 0 29.6 9 0 5.3 9-1 3.0 8-1 0.0 9-130
0.0 11-1 6.5 13-1 80.0 5 1100.0 6 1 93.8 16 1100.0 10 1100.0 14 1100.0 15 1
21111
BARBADOS 50.0 1 0 75.4 7 0 87.5 7 1 83.1 9 1 66.5 9 0 44.7 6 0 0.0 9-130
0.0 11-1 7.5 12-1 0.0 0 0100.0 6 1 33.3 15 1100.0 6 1100.0 14 1100.0 15 1
02222
BAHAMAS 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 50.0 6 0 50.0 3 0 24.3 9 030
9.5 7-1 13.8 11-1 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 75.0 6 0100.0 8 1 89.3 14 1 96.7 15 1
00000
GRENADA 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 33.1 5 0 0.0 0 030
0.0 4-1 0.0 6-1 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0100.0 10 1100.0 1 0100.0 13 1
00021
ST.VI GR 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 030
0.0 3-1 14.8 4-1 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0100.0 15 1
00000
MEXICO.. 68.2 3 0 63.4 7 0 37.5 7 0 29.6 9 0 19.4 9-1 17.8 9-1 32.4 9 030
0.0 11-1 6.5 13-1 71.4 7 0 85.7 7 1 84.4 16 1 90.0 10 1100.0 14 1100.0 15 1
20222
GUATEMA. 86.4 3 1 93.7 7 1100.0 6 1 81.0 9 1 40.0 9 0 50.0 8 0 90.5 9 130
50.0 9 0 56.9 11 0 83.3 6 1 87.5 4 1 71.7 16 0 90.0 10 1 71.4 14 0 66.7 6 0
00000
HONDURAS 50.0 3 0 55.9 6 0 60.0 7 0 37.3 9 0 12.4 9-1 46.0 4 0 48.6 9 030
8.8 11-1 19.6 13-1 70.0 5 0 75.0 4 0 76.9 13 0 83.3 3 1 88.5 13 1 93.3 15 1
00000
EL SALV. 100.0 2 0 95.8 6 1 86.1 5 1 59.9 9 0 45.2 6 0 37.2 8 0 38.7 6 030
10.3 8-1 21.8 10 0 58.3 6 0 0.0 0 0 64.7 17 0 83.3 9 1 54.5 11 0 96.7 15 1
00022
NICARAG. 86.4 3 1100.0 7 1 91.7 7 1 96.5 9 1100.0 8 1 87.8 9 1 73.5 7 030
0.0 11-1 0.0 13-1 50.0 5 0 75.0 2 0 50.0 17 0 16.7 3-1 66.7 9 0100.0 15 1
00001
COSTA R. 86.4 3 1100.0 7 1100.0 7 1100.0 9 1 85.9 9 1 82.2 9 1 40.5 9 030
12.1 11-1 22.0 13 0 70.0 5 0 75.0 2 0 67.6 17 0 20.0 10 1 96.4 14 1100.0 15 1
00002
PANAMA.. 86.4 3 1100.0 6 1 73.5 6 0 50.0 2 0 0.0 2-1 32.6 6 0 32.4 9 030
0.0 11-1 13.0 13-1 70.0 5 0 87.5 4 1 94.4 9 1100.0 7 1100.0 14 1100.0 15 1
00211
COLOMBIA 100.0 2 0 69.7 7 0 78.2 6 0 56.3 9 0 27.6 8 0 45.8 9 0 32.4 9 030
19.0 9-1 27.6 11 0 50.0 5 0100.0 3 1 73.5 17 0 95.0 10 1100.0 14 1100.0 15 1
00002
VENEZUA. 50.0 3 0 46.5 7 0 41.7 7 0 27.6 6 0 50.0 9 0 27.5 9 0 8.1 9-130
0.0 11-1 13.0 13-1 64.3 7 0 92.9 7 1 79.4 17 0 90.0 10 1100.0 14 1100.0 15 1
22222
GUYANA.. 50.0 3 0 38.0 7 0 41.7 7 0 0.0 9-1 5.3 9-1 7.6 9-1 0.0 9-130
0.0 11-1 0.0 13-1 83.3 6 1100.0 7 1 97.1 17 1100.0 10 1100.0 14 1100.0 15 1
01111
SURINAME 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 32.4 9 030
0.0 11-1 13.0 13-1 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0100.0 14 1100.0 15 1
00001
ECUADOR. 100.0 3 1 75.0 2 0 34.2 7 1 0.0 1 0 7.6 6-1 55.1 8 0 24.3 9 030
0.0 11-1 13.0 13-1 80.0 5 1100.0 6 1 92.2 14 1 92.9 7 1100.0 14 1100.0 15 1
02222
PERU.... 68.2 3 0 50.0 7 0 41.7 7 0 0.0 6-1 5.3 9-1 4.7 6-1 8.1 9-130
0.0 11-1 13.0 13-1 60.0 5 0 91.7 6 1 85.3 17 1100.0 10 1100.0 14 1100.0 15 1
02111
BRAZIL.. 50.0 3 0 50.0 7 0 50.0 7 0 50.0 9 0 57.1 9 0 19.1 8-1 29.0 8 030
0.0 11-1 6.5 13-1 57.1 7 0 75.0 6 0 65.4 13 0 90.0 10 1100.0 12 1100.0 15 1
22222
BOLIVIA. 100.0 3 1 60.7 4 0 82.1 2 0 39.4 9 1 67.1 9 1100.0 9 1 9.8 9-130
8.8 11-1 19.6 13-1 64.3 7 0 83.3 6 1 60.7 14 0 70.0 5 0 92.9 14 1 96.7 15 1
22221

PARAGUAY 86.4 3 1 93.0 7 1 77.5 7 0 50.0 5 0 50.0 3 0 50.0 6 0 33.6 8 030
 14.8 4-1 22.9 5 0 64.3 7 0 100.0 4 1 59.4 16 0 50.0 3 0 50.0 1 0 100.0 1 0
 00000
 CHILE... 63.2 3 0 9.7 6-1 11.7 7-1 0.0 7-1 6.7 7-1 31.6 6 1 38.7 8 030
 22.4 10 0 36.9 12 0 78.6 7 0 92.9 7 1 83.3 15 1 85.0 10 1 96.4 14 1 86.4 11 1
 22100
 ARGENTIN. 50.0 3 0 46.5 7 0 45.8 7 0 43.7 9 0 5.3 9-1 7.6 8-1 9.7 8-130
 8.8 11-1 19.6 13-1 57.1 7 0 66.7 6 0 88.2 17 1 100.0 10 1 100.0 14 1 100.0 15 1
 22111
 URUGUAY. 100.0 3 1 96.5 7 1 91.7 7 1 59.0 9 0 44.1 9 0 50.0 9 0 40.5 9 030
 3.3 11-1 10.3 12-1 58.3 6 0 80.0 5 1 50.0 17 0 60.0 5 0 92.9 7 1 89.3 14 1
 22222
 UNI.KIN. 68.2 3 0 54.9 7 0 37.5 7 0 29.6 9 0 51.2 9 0 60.2 9 0 66.6 9 020
 43.8 11 0 58.4 13 0 50.0 7 0 41.7 6 0 23.5 17 0 35.0 10 0 25.0 14 0 10.0 15-1
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 IRELAND. 68.2 3 0 63.4 7 0 37.5 7 0 29.6 9 0 44.1 9 0 45.3 9 0 58.4 9 020
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 00000
 NETHERL. 68.2 3 0 86.6 7 1 67.5 7 0 46.5 9 0 44.1 9 0 60.2 9 0 66.6 9 020
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 BELGIUM. 63.2 3 0 68.2 6 0 67.5 7 0 46.5 9 0 44.1 9 0 60.2 9 0 58.4 9 020
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 LUXEMBR. 68.2 3 0 80.3 7 1 67.5 7 0 41.3 5 0 44.3 5 0 62.0 7 0 66.6 9 020
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 GREECE.. 18.2 3-1 25.4 7 0 0.0 7-1 8.5 9-1 12.4 9-1 28.0 9 0 0.0 9-120
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 DENMARK. 68.2 3 0 71.8 7 0 71.7 7 0 52.8 9 0 44.1 9 0 55.9 9 0 66.6 9 020
 43.8 11 0 58.4 13 0 57.1 7 0 64.3 7 0 61.8 17 0 50.0 10 0 64.3 14 0 70.0 15 0
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 ICELAND. 68.2 3 0 72.6 6 0 43.6 5 0 59.9 9 0 50.0 9 0 70.3 9 0 66.6 9 020
 43.8 11 0 58.4 13 0 57.1 7 0 60.0 5 0 67.6 17 0 62.5 8 0 71.4 14 0 70.0 15 0
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 GAMBIA..100.0 3 1 52.4 6 0 55.3 4 0 0.0 2-1 10.2 5-1 7.6 9-1 0.0 9-141
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 NIGER... 50.0 3 0 55.9 6 0 0.0 7-1 0.0 8-1 5.3 9-1 7.6 9-1 0.0 9-141
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 IVORY C. 68.2 3 0 58.5 7 0 50.0 7 0 50.0 9 0 6.6 7-1 4.5 7-1 40.5 9 040
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 UPPER V. 68.2 3 0 31.7 7 0 43.1 5 0 43.7 9 0 5.3 9-1 7.6 9-1 0.0 9-141
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 EQUAT G. 0.0 0 0 0.0 3-1 0.0 7-1 0.0 5-1 9.6 5-1 4.7 6-1 0.0 5-140
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 01111
 LIBERIA.100.0 3 1 78.2 7 0 63.3 7 0 59.2 9 0 5.3 9-1 7.6 9-1 8.1 9-140
 8.8 11-1 12.6 13-1 85.7 7 1100.0 7 1 96.9 16 1100.0 10 1 96.2 13 1 96.7 15 1
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 SIERRA L 50.0 3 0 31.7 7 0 43.4 4 0 0.0 7-1 5.3 9-1 7.6 9-1 0.0 9-141
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 GHANA... 31.8 3 0 40.1 7 0 50.0 7 0 50.0 9 0 5.3 9-1 7.6 9-1 0.0 9-140
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 TOGO.... 68.2 3 0 50.0 5 0 30.0 7 0 35.9 9 0 5.3 9-1 3.0 8-1 0.0 9-140
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 CHAD.... 68.2 3 0 33.8 7 0 41.7 7 0 0.0 9-1 5.3 9-1 4.5 7-1 0.0 9-141
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 CONGO... 0.0 3-1 0.0 6-1 0.0 4-1 0.0 9-1 5.3 9-1 7.6 9-1 0.0 9-140
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 SAO T.P. 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 9-140
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 8.8 11-1 13.0 13-1 85.7 7 1100.0 7 1 97.1 17 1100.0 7 1 91.7 12 1100.0 15 1
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 DJIBOUTI 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 9-171
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 ANGOLA.. 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 9-140
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 MOZAMBI. 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 0 0 0.0 9-140
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 MADAGAS. 81.8 3 1 63.4 7 0 79.2 7 0 0.0 7-1 5.3 9-1 7.6 9-1 0.0 9-140
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
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APPENDIX V

ORGANISATIONAL CHART OF THE PLO



APPENDIX VI

LIST OF PALESTINIAN NATIONAL COUNCIL MEETINGS

This appendix provides a list of PNC meetings including the location, the dates as well as decisions and debates characterising each meeting. The list was primarily prepared from the entries in **Arab Records and Report**.

	Lieu	Dates	Major decions/debates
1st	Jerusalem	1964 28 May	Establishment of the PLO. - 2 June Endorsement of Shukairy's Chairmanship and the first Charter.
2nd	Cairo	1965 31 May - 4 June	Tha main task on the agenda was the definition of ways of organising the Palestinians. Priority was given to unity.
3rd	Gaza	1966 20 - 24 May	Very similar to the preceding session.
4th	Cairo	1968 10 - 17 July	Major guerrilla groups gain access to the PNC. Procedural changes; Executive Committee to be elected by the PNC, previously it had been by appointment. Change of Leadership. Palestinian National Charter revised.
5th	Cairo	1969 1 - 4 Feb.	Al-Fatah dominates proceedings. Arafat elected to Chairmanship of the PLO. Future of Palestinian people to be decided by the Palestinians themselves. Armed struggle to be intensified.
6th	Cairo	1969 1 - 6 Sept.	Debate over 'a democratic state'. Some saw such a state as a threat to Arab unity and the Arab nature of Palestine. Commission set up to study the idea of a 'democratic state'.
7th	Cairo	1970 30 - 4 June	First time attendance by PFLP. Unified armed struggle. Central

			Committee formed. Res. 242 rejected. The idea of unity of 'Jordanian and Palestinian theatre' introduced by PFLP. Crisis in Jordan dominates debates.
Extraordinary		1970 27 - 28 Aug.	Roger Plan rejected. PNC session recognised as sole representative of the Palestinian people. Reassets the idea of a unified East and West Bank.
8th	Cairo	1971 28 Feb. - 5 March	Debate on future Palestinian state. The idea of a unified East and West Bank begins to loose favour. 'Democtratic state' endorsed while the idea of a 'mini state' or 'any truncated Palestinian entity' rejected.
9th	Cairo	1971 7 - 13 July	The idea of a unified East and West Bank regains favour in some circles. The question of a 'mini-state' debated at length at the initiative of PDFLP as well as the position of the Palestinian movement toward Jordan. No specific decisions taken on the future form of a Palestinian state other than condemning the idea of a 'mini-state'.
10th	Cairo	1972 11 - 12 April	Membership increased by 50 %. Problems of unity dominates discussions. Importance of assistance to the occupied territories to increase awareness of national identity raised. The idea of a unified East and West Bank finally shelved. A palestinian identity separate from Jordan begins to gain strength.
11th	Cairo	1973 6 -	Membership enlerged to 175. PNF 12 Jan. set up. Problems of unification discussed.
12th	Cairo	1974 1 - 9 June	Adopts 10 point programme endorsing the idea of a 'mini state'. AFL, PFLP and PFLP-GC enter reservations.

13th Cairo	1977 12 - 20 March	Question of Geneva Conference discussed. 15 point plan endorsing the creation of an independent national state. PFLP objects. Overall the role of political settlement in achieving a Palestinian state strengthened. Relations with 'democratic' circles in Israel and reconciliation with King Hussain debated.
14th Damascus	1979 15 - 23 Jan.	First PNC in Damascus. Camp David unanimously condemned. Relations with Jordan constituted a major source of debate.
15th Damascus	1981 15- 19 April	No changes from previous positions. Camp David denounced. European Community initiative welcomed. Brezhnev call for an all-party conference supported.
16th Algiers	1983 14 - 22 Feb.	Rejects the 'Reagan Plan'. Endorses the 'Fez Plan' as the minimum basis and expresses support for the Brezhnev plan. The need to complement the 'Fez plan' with military action was noted.

APPENDIX VII

THE STATUS AND LIST OF PLO REPRESENTATION ABROAD

The question of the PLO's status in the international system is extremely confused. Firstly, the status of the PLO vis-a-vis international law is a source of controversy and debate in itself. Secondly, the information on PLO representation abroad and their status is not easily available and what there is seems to be fraught with problems of interpretation.

There seem to be two approaches to the status of non-state actors in international law. The first is basically the traditional one which sees the state as the sole subject of international law.¹ In respect to the status of the PLO two conflicting positions appear to have emerged from this approach. The first follows a very strict and narrow interpretation of the criteria laid down by the Montevideo Convention² to determine whether a public body is a state or not. The second position is less clear one. It tries to strike a balance between the need to acknowledge the centrality of states in international law and the idea that states are not the only subjects of international law.³

Kassim takes the latter position.⁴ He develops the concept of the PLO as a 'non-territorial public body' and simultaneously tries to draw similarities between the PLO and a state. The implicit reliance on the traditional approach is evident in the way in which a central role is attributed to the state in the formation of a 'non territorial public body'⁶ and also in the way in which the attributes of the PLO are continuously compared and related to the traditional characteristics of states. Citing attributes of the PLO, such as varying degrees and types of governmental authority over the Palestinians, its membership of international organisations and diplomatic recognition, Kassim concludes that "[f]rom the juridical

point of view, the PLO is a territorial public body".⁷ This, he argues, "confers upon it the status of a participant in International Law. Its claim to represent the Palestinian people is one of its undisputed rights".

Kassim's analysis appears to have triggered a debate.⁹ One of his opponents, sighting in his case the fact that the PLO lacks "control over territory and effective government...(and that there) is also considerable controversy as to whether the PLO could establish a sufficient connection to a permanent population"¹⁰, concludes that "the PLO is not an international body and has no status according to contemporary international law".¹¹ This leads him to dispute and challenge Kassim's conclusion that the PLO has in international law an "undisputed right" to be recognised as the sole representative of the Palestinian people.¹² Another opponent reaches a similar conclusion and even challenges the idea that the PLO can receive diplomatic recognition because "despite claims to the contrary the PLO does not constitute a state".¹³

The second approach to non-state actors is one that takes a less rigid and narrow position on who may be participants in international law. The basis of this approach is best captured by a leading scholar, Lauterpacht, "in each particular case the question whether a person or a body is a subject of international law must be answered in a pragmatic manner by reference to actual experience and to the reason of the law as distinguished from a preconceived notion as to who can be subjects of international law".¹⁴ This approach hence appears to give greater importance to the principle of 'common consent' which can be described in international terms as the 'assent of the community of states'. Very central to this approach is the idea that the decisions of the UN can be regarded as a manifestation of this 'common consent'.

This position is best expressed by Higgins, "[t]he United Nations is a very appropriate body to look for indications of developments in international law, for international custom is to be deduced from the practice of states, which includes their international dealings as manifested by their diplomatic actions and public pronouncements. With the development of international organizations, the votes and views of states have come to have legal significance as evidence of customary law.... Collective acts of states, repeated by and acquiesced in by sufficient numbers with sufficient frequency, eventually attain the status of law. The existence of the United Nations-and especially its accelerated trend towards universality of membership since 1955-now provides a very clear, very concentrated, focal point for state practice."¹⁵

Travers follows this second approach when he argues that the numerous resolutions adopted by the UN General Assembly concerning national liberation movements and their struggles "enunciate the concept which underlies the principles that the national liberation movements of Africa are the 'legitimate representatives' of the oppressed people of their territories in the international community, even though they do not claim to be the governments of independent states".¹⁶ However, although he notes that resolutions about the PLO's status are very similar in content to those concerning the African liberation movements, he concludes that, because the "principles enunciated in United Nations measures in support of the PLO have ... not been consistently applied over a sufficient period of time to demonstrate their general applicability to the Middle East situation" and because the resolutions supporting, the PLO have not received majorities "as large as those in favour of support for the African liberation movements"¹⁷ the PLO can not claim a status similar to the African liberation movements.

On the other hand, Freudenschluss does not make such a

distinction between the PLO and African liberation movements and argues that collective recognition accorded to the liberation movements, including the PLO, through UN resolutions confers to them "a limited legal personality".¹⁸ He argues that this collective recognition is a an important basis for establishing the movement's acceptability. Fisher is another scholar who takes a rather similar position in respect to the decisions of an international organisation to recognise "a public body as the principal, if not exclusive, agent of the people in question. The effect is analogous to that of diplomatic recognition-an ascertainment of the fact that a people exists as a subject of international law and that the entity representing them is a public body which now has a legal standing."¹⁹

The second source of confusion over the PLO's status arises from the fact that, in complete contradistinction to the information concerning the position of various regional organisations and the UN in respect to the status of the PLO, the information on individual government's position on this matter is fraught with problems. It is possible to group these problems into two. Firstly there is the lack of complete and reliable information on individual governmental positions. Secondly, where the information is available, often it is not detailed enough to determine the exact nature and level of the status being accorded at the bi-lateral level.

The information in the literature on the status of the PLO in the eyes of individual governments is alarmingly inconsistent. First on the matter of the number of countries recognising the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people, the numbers in the 1970s vary from 103 to 115. The first number quoted in Kassim is attributed to a statement by Arafat made in March 1974 well before the UN vote to invite the PLO to the UN.²⁰ Silverburg notes that Arafat has claimed "a total of 105 countries have

recognised the PLO" and adds that "this claim is probably a reference to the 105 UN member states who voted to invite the PLO to participate in the General Assembly as an observer".²¹ Frangi, a PLO representative, claims 110 recognitions²² while Friedlander quotes a more recent Arafat claim in October 1979 of 115.²³

The situation gets even worse when it comes to the number and level of PLO offices abroad. Kassim writing in 1980 puts the number of diplomatic missions at 60.²⁴ Silverburg, writing in 1977, on his part lists 56 countries including Arab states and countries such as Zanzibar, North and South Vietnam, that have allowed PLO 'information offices'.²⁵ The largest claim for diplomatic offices comes from another PLO official, Terzi, who put the number between 80 to 90.²⁶ Becker, on the other hand, does not attempt to list all PLO offices but only Latin American ones.²⁷ Even this short list is problematic as it includes Jamaica which appears to be the only documented country that has formally rejected a PLO a request for an office.²⁸ As this short review indicates the information is far from being consistent and accurate. Furthermore, the above sources do not appear to make a conscious attempt to distinguish between PLO information offices and those offices that are treated as diplomatic missions.

The purpose of the remaining part of this appendix is twofold. Firstly, in the face of the above two problems relating to information on PLO offices abroad, the list give below has been compiled in such a way as to ameliorate the problem as much as possible. It has already been noted that attempts to obtain complete and accurate information through the circulation of questionnaires was a failure.²⁹ Instead a list obtained from the research department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office was combined with information gathered from entries in the **Arab Report and Record** on PLO offices abroad. This list is well short of a complete one. However, it is a systematic attempt to put

together all the available information.

The list firstly provides information on each country's position on the PLO's status at the bi-lateral level. This information has been broken into four: firstly those countries that extend the PLO some form of diplomatic status;³⁰ secondly; those countries that allow only information offices without formally recognising the PLO; thirdly; those countries who appear to have consented to an office, but about which there is inadequate information to determine whether it is a diplomatic mission such occurrences have been labeled as 'unclear'; finally there are those countries for which no information was available, (this however should not be automatically taken to mean a refusal to allow the PLO³¹).

The second purpose of the appendix is to bring some clarification to the representative status of the PLO at the multi-lateral level. In the face of the lack of agreement amongst those who study international law as to whether the PLO is a subject of international law and hence entitled to recognition, it will be assumed that votes on resolutions concerning the PLO will be indicative of whether a country recognises the PLO or not. It seems such a position would not be very different from the one held by Fisher and also by Green who notes that "[i]f ... a member state votes for the admission of another country, it would appear that such a vote is tantamount to an act of recognition".³² Hence, the list below also includes the votes cast by members of the UN on roll-calls that are generally regarded to be relevant to the discussion on the PLO's status. These roll-calls are the ones taken on Resolutions 3210 (XXIX), 3237 (XXIX), 3375 (XXX) and ES-7/2..

However, a word of caution needs to be stated. These resolutions should not be seen as pure indicators of member countries positions on the status of the PLO at the multi-

lateral level. Although the representative status of the PLO is often quite explicit in the content of these resolutions they do also address themselves to other issues and indirectly invoke matters that are not necessarily part of the text itself. Hence, in the case of some members their votes may have been cast with such matters in mind. For example, in the case of Resolution 3210 a number of European countries voted in favour not necessarily because they recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinians but because they were favourable to the idea that important leaders should be able to express the views of a people. In such cases it would be misleading to use their votes as a measure of their attitude towards the status of the PLO. It might be better to assess the position of individual members by taking into consideration the aggregate of their votes. But even then one needs to bear in mind the earlier point that these selected roll-calls do not solely address themselves to the status of the PLO.

Furthermore, the first three resolutions only relate to 1974 and 1975. Such a relatively static reference point will not accommodate change in the positions held by individual countries. During the second half of the 1970s a number of countries have conspicuously changed positions. This was usually brought about by changes in governments, as was the case with Nicaragua and Bolivia, as well as by the mobilisation process within and/or outside the UN. To be able to account for this change resolution ES-7/2 from the Emergency Special session in July 1980 was added.

THE STATUS OF THE PLO BY 1980

COUNTRY	STATUS OF OFFICE	VOTE ON RESOLUTIONS			
		3210	3237	3375	ES-7/2
AFRICA (N=41)					
Angola	Diplomatic	-	-	-	Y
Botswana	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Burundi	non diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cameroon	unclear	Y	Y	Y	Y
Cape Verde	-	-	-	-	Y
C.A.R	-	Y	Y	NP	NP
Chad	non diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Comoros	-	-	-	-	-
Congo	non diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dahomey	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Eq. Guinea	-	Y	Y	Y	NP
Ethiopia	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gabon	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Gambia	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Ghana	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Guinea	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
G.Bissau	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
I. Coast	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Kenya	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Lesotho	-	NP	Y	Y	Y
Liberia	-	Y	Y	Y	A
Madagascar	non diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malawi	-	NP	Y	A	NP
Mali	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mauritius	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Mozambique	Diplomatic	-	-	Y	Y
Niger	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nigeria	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Rwanda	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sao T.&.P	-	-	-	Y	Y
Senegal	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Seychelles	unclear	-	-	Y	Y
S. Leone	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Swaziland	-	NP(Y)	A	A	NP
Tanzania	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Togo	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uganda	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
U. Volta	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zaire	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zambia	unclear	Y	Y	Y	Y
Zimbabwe	Diplomatic	-	-	-	-
ASIA (N=28)					
Afganistan	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bangladesh	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Bhutan	-	Y	Y	Y	Y

Burma	unclear	A	Y	Y	A
Cambodia	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
China	Diplomatic	Y	Y	NP	Y
Cyprus	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Fiji	-	Y	Y	Y	A
India	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Indonesia	unclear	Y	Y	Y	Y
Iran	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Japan	non diplomatic	Y	A	A	A
Laos	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Malaysia	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Maldives	Diplomatic	NP	NP	Y	Y
Mongolia	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
North Korea	Diplomatic	-	-	-	-
Nepal	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Papua N.G.	-	-	-	-	-
Pakistan	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Phillipines	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Samoa	-	-	-	-	Y
Singapore	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Solomons	-	-	-	-	-
South Korea	-	-	-	-	-
Sri Lanka	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Thailand	-	Y	A	Y	Y
Vietnam	Diplomatic	-	-	-	Y

LATIN AMERICA (N=29)

Argentina	-	Y	NP	Y	Y
Bahamas	-	NP	A	A	A
Barbados	-	A	Y	A	Y
Bolivia	Diplomatic	N	N	A	Y
Brazil	Diplomatic	Y	Y	NP	Y
Chile	-	NP	N	Y	Y
Colombia	-	A	A	Y	Y
C. Rica	-	A	N	N	Y
Cuba	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Dominica	-	-	-	-	-
Dominican R	-	N	Y	A	N
Ecuador	non diplomatic	A	NP	Y	Y
El Salv.	-	Y	NP	A	Y
Grenada	-	NP	Y	Y	Y
Guatemala	-	A	NP	A	N
Guyana	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Haiti	-	A	A	A	A
Honduras	-	NP	A	N	A
Jamaica	-	Y	A	Y	Y
Mexico	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Nicaragua	Diplomatic	A	N	N	Y
Panama	-	Y	A	Y	Y
Paraguay	-	A	A	A	A
Peru	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Saint Lucia	-	-	-	-	Y
Suriname	-	-	-	-	Y
Tri.&To.	-	Y	Y	Y	Y
Uruguay	-	Y	Y	A	Y

Venezuela	unclear	Y	Y	Y	Y
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WESTERN BLOC (N=24)

Australia	-	A	A	A	N
Austria	Diplomatic	Y	A	A	A
Belgium	non diplomatic	A	N	A	A
Canada	non diplomatic	A	N	A	N
Denmark	non diplomatic	A	N	A	A
Finland	non diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	A
France	-	Y	A	A	A
Germany	non diplomatic	A	N	N	A
Greece	Diplomatic	Y	A	Y	Y
Iceland	-	A	N	A	A
Ireland	-	Y	N	A	A
Italy	non diplomatic	Y	N	A	A
Luxembourg	non diplomatic	A	N	A	A
Malta	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
New Zealand	-	Y	A	A	A
Netherlands	-	A	N	N	A
Norway	-	Y	N	A	N
Portugal	non diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	A
Spain	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Sweden	non diplomatic	Y	A	A	A
Switzerland	non diplomatic	-	-	-	-
Turkey	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
U.K.	non diplomatic	A	N	N	A
U.S.A.	non diplomatic	N	N	N	N

EASTERN EUROPE (N=9)

Albania	-	Y	Y	NP	Y
Bulgaria	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Czechoslov.	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
E. Germany	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Hungary	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Poland	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Romania	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
U.S.S.R.	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y
Yugoslavia	Diplomatic	Y	Y	Y	Y

Distribution of votes on the above roll-calls were;

	Yes	No	Abstention	Absent
Resolution 3210 (XXIX)	105	4	20	9
Resolution 3237 (XXIX)	95	17	19	7
Resolution 3375 (XXX)	101	8	25	7
Resolution ES-7/2	112	7	24	9

According to the table below the PLO appears to have 71 offices of which 47 have some form of a diplomatic status. It is interesting to note that 35 of the 47 countries who have granted the PLO a diplomatic status have also voted in favour of all the selected roll-calls. The others with the exception of Greece and Austria have not done so simply because they were either not members of the UN or not present. In the case of Nicaragua and Bolivia it was not until the last session included in the study that significant changes in their foreign policies occurred as a result of changes in the ruling elite.

	East Europe	West Europe	Latin America	Asia	Africa	Total
Diplomatic	8	5	6	14	14	47
Non-Dipl.	-	12	1	1	4	18
Unclear	-	-	1	2	3	6
Missing data	1	7	21	11	20	60
N of countries	9	24 ^a	29	28 ^b	41	131 ^c

Table A8.1: Distribution of PLO offices by regions

a Includes Switzerland

b Includes North and South Korea

c Excludes Arab countries. All Arab governments have allowed diplomatic offices for the PLO except Oman.

There are in total 61 countries who were present at all roll calls and voted in favour of them. This number increases to 77 when 100 % attendance is reduced to 75 %. The discrepancy between the number of diplomatic offices and the number of countries that voted in a manner suggesting a recognition of the PLO is too large to draw any conclusions about a relationship between 'individual' and 'collective' recognition.³³ However, this may merely be a consequence of the conspicuous lack of precise and

complete information on PLO representation abroad.

The question of whether the PLO has a recognised status vis-a-vis international law is a much more complicated one to answer. Literature in international law does not appear to give any specific guidance on what constitutes 'common consent'. Hence, the question of how many countries have to vote in support of a position and how many times this support would have to be repeated, for it to be recognised as common consent remains difficult to answer. It has already been noted that some scholars using the principle of common consent have reached conflicting conclusions. Although it may be difficult to define the status of the PLO in international law with some degree of confidence, it might be easier to establish the PLO's political standing.

Given that the PLO is the only non-state actor with so many diplomatic missions, combined with the significant majorities, it should be possible that the PLO enjoys a near to universal political recognition. This is further strengthened by the fact that, outside the UN, regional organisations such as the OAU, the Non-Aligned Movement, the Islamic Conference Organisation and the Arab League have recognised the PLO as the sole representative of the Palestinian people and the last three have admitted the PLO as a full member.

ENDNOTES

- 1 One of the major proponents of this approach is Schwarzenberger, G. **International Law** (Stevens and Son, 3rd ed., London, 1957) pp.140-155.
- 2 The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States in its first articles provides; "The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; (d) capacity to enter into relations with other states". Quoted in Friedlander, R. "The PLO and the Rule of Law: A Reply to Dr. Anis Kassim", **Denver Journal of International Law and Policy**, Vol.10 (1981), No.2, p.232 footnote 61.
- 3 For a description of participants in international law other than states see McDouglas, Lasswell and Reisman, "The World Constitutive Process of Authoritative Decision", **Journal of Legal Education** Vol.19 (1967), pp.263-267.
- 4 Kassim, A. "The Palestine Liberation Organization's Claim to Status: A Juridical Analysis Under International Law", **Denver Journal of International Law and Policy**, Vol.9 (1980), No 1, pp.1-33.
- 5 Ibid., pp.5-6.
- 6 p.7.
- 7 p.26.
- 8 p.33.
- 9 The articles comprising this debate can be found in "Dialogue: The Legal Status of the PLO", **Denver Journal of International Law**, Vol. 10 (1981), No. 2.
- 10 Levine, E. "A Landmark on the Road to Legal Chaos: Recognition of the PLO as a Menace to World Public Order" in *ibid.*, p.247
- 11 Ibid., p.256.
- 12 Ibid., p.256-7.
- 13 Friedlander, (1981: 232).
- 14 Quoted in Mallison, W. "The Legal Problems Concerning The Juridical Status and Political Activities of The Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency: A Study In International and United Nations Law", **William and Mary Law Review**, Vol. 9 (1968), No. 3, p.566.
- 15 Higgins, R. **The Development of International Law Through the Political Organs of the United Nations**

(Oxford Univ. Press, London, 1963) p.2.

- 16 Travers, P. "The Legal Effect of United Nations Action In Support of the Palestine Liberation Organization and the National Liberation Movements of Africa", **Harvard International Law Journal**, Vol.17 (1976), No 3, p.565.
- 17 Ibid., p.579.
- 18 Freudenschuss, H. "Legal and Political Aspects of the Recognition of National Liberation Movements", **Millenium: Journal of the International Studies**, Vol.11 (1980), No.2, p.121.
- 19 Fisher, R. "Following in Another's Footsteps: The Acquisition of International Legal Standing by the Palestine Liberation Organization", **Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce** Vol.3 (Spring 1975), No.1, p.235.
- 20 Kassim, (1980: 19).
- 21 Silverburg, S. "The Palestine Liberation Organization in the United Nations; Implications for International Law and Relations", **Israel Law Review**, Vol.12 (1977), No. 3, p. 369, footnote 31.
- 22 Frangi, A. **The PLO and Palestine** (Zed Books ltd., London 1983) p.144.
- 23 Friedlander, (1981: 232 footnote 62).
- 24 Kassim, (1980: 19).
- 25 Silverburg, (1977: 369 footnote 31).
- 26 Friedlander, (1980: 232).
- 27 Becker, J. **The PLO; The Rise and Fall of the Palestine Liberation Organization**, (Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1984) p.166.
- 28 **Arab Report and Record**, (1978: 619).
- 29 See Chapter 3 endnote 64.
- 30 One problem with the information on offices with diplomatic status is that the information is not detailed enough to determined the actual level of the mission. So it becomes rather difficult to tell whether one particular PLO diplomatic mission benefits from a status similar to an embassy or whether it is set at some other lower status.
- 31 The nature of diplomacy is such that in most cases there would not be a formal and public PLO request to open an office until the matter has been informally

taken up and a 'gentleman's agreement' been reached. However, there have been occasions when the issue has become public and precipitated public debate, culminating in a widely publicised formal decision.

- 32 Quoted in Silverburg, (1977: 389), Green, L. "Representation Versus Membership: The Chinese Precedent in the United Nations" **Canadian Year Book International Law** Vol.10 (1972), p.104.
- 33 Freudschuss, (1980: 124) suggests that 'individual' and 'collective' recognition will tend to overlap.

APPENDIX VIII

This appendix provides a list of specialised agencies and UN institutions that have extended to the PLO observership and/or maintain regular and formal contacts with PLO representations in New York, Geneva and Vienna. Two UN sources were used in preparation of this appendix. The first source are the yearly reports prepared by the Secretary General of the UN in accordance with Resolution 3300 (XXIX) of December 1974 adopted in relation to the agenda item entitled 'Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the Specialized Agencies and the International Institutions associated with the United Nations'. The second source are reports prepared in accordance ECOSOC Resolution 2100 (LXIII) of 3 August 1977 and Resolution 34/133 of 14 December 1979 specifically urging specialised agencies to consult and cooperate with the PLO.

SPECIALISED AGENCIES

INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANISATION (ILO)

FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANISATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS
(FAO)

UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL, SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL
ORGANISATION (UNESCO)

WORLD HEALTH ORGANISATION (WHO)

INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANISATION (ICAO)

UNIVERSAL POSTAL UNION (UPU)

INTERNATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATION UNION (ITU)

WORLD METEOROLOGICAL ORGANISATION (WMO)

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE ORGANISATION
(IMCO)

WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANISATION (WIPO)

INTERNATIONAL FUND FOR AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT (IFAD)

OTHER UN INSTITUTIONS and PROGRAMMES

UNITED NATION CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT
UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANISATION
UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME

UN document numbers for the reports used,
A/10080 and Add. 1-4, A/31/65, A/31/238, A/32/87 and Add.
1-3, A/32/286, A/33/109 and Add. 1-4, A/34/208 and Add. 1-
3, A/35/178 and Addl-4, E/1978/55, A/35/227 and A/36/305.

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